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Countries with rapidly growing economies, such as Thailand, must address the 
existing conflict between the promotion of environmental protection and the 
endorsement of economic development—a conflict that places significant strain on 
public policy. The question that remains concerns the methods via which such 
economies can adopt in order to maintain steady growth while mitigating the negative 
impacts on the environment. Although the housing development sector is a major 
driver of economic growth, it also has the potential to negatively impact the 
environment. In concurrence with rapid urbanisation, the demand for housing 
development is also on the rise, thus contributing to greater environmental stress. To 
address this issue, the Thai Government introduced the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) in 1981 to identify environmental problems associated with major 
development projects in order to achieve sustainable development goals. 
 
This thesis explores the extent to which the EIA impacts the development of new 
housing in Bangkok, Thailand. It seeks to identify how the state impacts private 
housing development by regulating and directing new house building. The study 
questions the extent to which state actions are influenced by private sector efforts to 
‘control’ state influence. Thus, the research investigates: (1) how far the 
implementation of environmental regulation in new housing development reflects the 
priorities of the private sector or those of national-local state authorities; and, (2) how 
far the framework for environmental regulation is a reflection of state sector 
imperatives or reflects a circumscribing of the role of the state by the private sector. 
As such, this research focuses on the interplay between the interests of the state and 
private sector actors, conceptualised in terms of how these competing interests 
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influence the introduction of new environmental demands in new housing 
development projects. Thus, the study focuses on state-capital relationships through a 
corporatist theoretical approach. The primary method of data collection in this 
research is in-depth qualitative interviews featuring large-scale and small private 
developers, housing development-related associations, EIA consultants, politicians, 
senior and street-level bureaucrats, NGOs, and academic scholars. 
 
The results of this study indicate that EIA has not been implemented effectively in 
Thailand primarily owing to the absence of political commitment, unclear legislation, 
an inflexible governance structure, inefficient allocations of authority, a lack of 
intercommunication between the civic and private realms, insufficient monitoring and 
implementation, and mechanism impotency. Thus, EIA has been concomitant with 
both micro and macro level impacts on new-housing developments. It further shows 
that economic growth has been the main priority for national development goals and 
hence, environmental considerations are rarely given precedence in the public and 
private sectors’ decision-making process.  
 
Therefore, it is argued that Thailand should consider reforming its EIA regulations 
and implementation strategy to counteract future imbalances between the growth of 
the economy and the decline of environmental conservation. In order to make EIA 
procedures more effective, this study suggests that it is imperative to (i) encourage 
political will; (ii) amend EIA regulations to enable efficient execution of the policy at 
every level; (iii) create codes of practice and precise guidelines for all stakeholders; 
(iv) strengthen institutional capacity; and, (v) enhance regulatory procedures, 
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This thesis focuses on the relationship between the state and the business sector in 
deciding on the character of new housing developments in Bangkok, Thailand. In 
particular, it places this investigation in the context of the theoretical literature on 
state-capital relationships, which posits various interpretations of the extent to which 
the state acts in an independent manner, thereby influencing the distribution of 
capital. The thesis explores how far public policy, especially as regards environmental 
regulation, impacts new housing development schemes in Thailand’s capital city.  
 
In this chapter, the central dimensions of the research and the importance of the 
research question are explained. The importance of this research is rooted in the 
tensions that exist between promoting environmental improvement while 
championing economic development. These tensions serve to impose   a notable 
public policy strain in rapidly growing economies. From a state perspective, one 
mechanism that has been widely adopted across the world to mitigate the impact of 
large projects on the environment is the introduction of Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs). In this thesis, the state-capital relationship is explored primarily 
through examination of the introduction (then adjustment) and implementation of EIA 
procedures in Bangkok. The context of these procedures is brought into highlight in 
the second section of this introduction, which is followed by a broader commentary 
on the dynamics and strains between environmental sensitivities and economic 
development in high-growth economies like Thailand. This introduction concludes 
with an outline of the structure of the thesis. 
	 16 
1.2 Housing Development and the Environment  
 
Housing construction has the potential to cause many environmental problems. It may 
contribute to excessive resource depletion, global warming, and issues pertaining to 
human health and well-being (UNEP, 2011). Globally, buildings are responsible for 
40 percent of annual energy consumption and up to 30 percent of all energy-related 
greenhouse gas emissions (UNEP, 2011). As populations grow, these impacts pose 
increased problems for humankind, with population concentrations in cities offering 
heightened environmental challenges (Cui & Shi, 2012). In this sense there is a need 
to understand how changes associated with urban growth might drive, constrain, 
shape, or influence the attainment of a more sustainable future. The question is, how 
can economies continue to grow effectively while mitigating negative impacts on the 
environment? How can ecological and economic considerations be merged so that 
they result in cumulative and lasting advantages for cities? According to the World 
Bank: 
 
Innovative cities have demonstrated that, supported by the appropriate 
strategic approach, they may greatly enhance resource efficiency by 
realizing the same value from a much smaller and renewable resource 
base, while decreasing harmful pollution and unnecessary waste. By 
achieving this, they have improved the quality of the lives of their citizens, 
enhanced their economic competitiveness and resilience, strengthened 
their fiscal capacity … and created an enduring culture of sustainability. 
(Suzuki, Dastur, & Moffatt, 2010, p. XVIII) 
 
 
Yet, what we know is that not all cities act in this way. Hence there is the question of 
what makes actors in particular cities behave as if they embody a culture of 
sustainability? Indeed, even if cities do not have this cultural standing, we can expect 
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some urban agents to push for this kind of outcome, while others are resistant. 
Currently as regards housing, there is little research that has been undertaken in the 
theoretical and empirical literature, which explores how stakeholders involved in 
housing development respond differentially to the dual challenges of maintaining 
economic buoyancy while encouraging environmental gains (or even mitigating 
environmental damage). Understanding the juxtaposition of these forces is 
particularly important for new housing construction, since it is here that the latest 
innovations can be most effectively introduced on a large-scale. Understandably, this 
means that in rapidly growing economies where new housing development is a major 
force in city transformations, the relationship between new housing, environmental 
quality and economic progress is especially critical. 
 
The main purpose of this research is to explore the relationship between these three 
activity spheres in terms of how major agents for change in the city prioritize 
economic and environmental considerations in new housing development. In 
particular, the thesis investigates how agencies of government and house building 
companies (and their representatives) interact and impose on one another either to 
tighten or to loosen environmental considerations in house building. As such, an 
initial focus of the thesis is on the imperatives within each sector to infuse decision-
making with environmental sensitivities. In the case of government agencies, the 
impetus towards enhancing environmental concerns might seem obvious given the 
worldwide debate on global warming, intergovernmental commissions and 
investigations of climate change, concerns over water shortages and pollution, and the 
encouragement of dominant powers and international agencies like the UN for 
national governments to behave in an environmentally responsible way (Abaza et al., 
	 18 
2004; Mol, 2003; Suzuki et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2011). Yet awareness of the gains 
that can accrue from environmental improvements, as with pressures from others to 
dampen environmental harm, is an uncertain determinant of governmental behaviour. 
Other imperatives, such as promoting economic growth, might be equally or more 
important, perhaps especially in low-income countries where there is a large 
population with limited household resources (Buttel, 2000). Hence, governments 
might pay lip service to the need for environmental improvement, while barely 
pushing enterprises to take any action, perhaps not because of their priorities but due 
to weak implementation practices (Siedentopf & Hauschild, 1988). Similarly, while it 
might be imagined that developers are resistant to restrictions arising from demands 
for greater environmental sensitivity, pressures on developer decisions are 
multifarious, as are market demands, which can lead to differential outcomes 
(Carmona et al., 2003). 
 
1.3 The Importance of Environmental Policy 
 
One way to solve problems of environmental accountability is to regulate activities 
and impose forfeits on those who overuse resources, to create a sense of awareness 
about the damage that wastefulness can cause. The ability to regulate in this way 
relies on the instruments available in environmental policy, which, if implemented 
effectively, can impact on both production and consumption to increase 
environmental gains (Sanchez, 1997, p.141). Lack of political will, however, has 
caused environmental degradation. History has already shown that without such 
regulation, the consequences of harming the environment ultimately affect human life 
in the long-term (Carson, 2002). The depletion of the rain forest, acid rain, global 
warming, noise pollution, climate change and so on, are problems of today that are 
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not being actively averted (Berman & Bui, 2001). Lack of concern of the political 
leaders for the environment reflects the fact that environment is not a priority (Canari, 
2008). However, given the political will, policy can ensure that, in the short-term, the 
costs for such negative externalities can be imposed (in some measure at least) on 
those primarily responsible (Crepaz, 2007). 
 
Of course, imposing such costs, given that they have not been levied on perpetrators 
of environmental damage in the past, is contentious. Concomitantly, the environment 
has become a political arena of increasing conflict in recent years (Patrick, 2007). 
Political parties work hard to develop an image of environmental conscientiousness, 
and it is difficult to determine when this is genuine and when it is only intended to 
garner favour. The only way to determine authenticity is to examine actions, rather 
than stated policies. For example, in the USA, there was a 140 percent increase 
between 1979 and 1993 in pollution control in manufacturing (Berman & Bui, 2001, 
p.498). This growth is reflective of a change in attitudes whereby environmental 
concerns in the USA have been steadily incorporated into many national and 
international agendas. As commentators have noted, there was previously a clear 
distinction between economic and non-economic issues in politics, however the 
boundaries are increasingly blurring, particularly in the UK’s social democratic 
parties (Kitschelt, 1994). Political policies seeking to tackle environmental issues are 
becoming fairly normal worldwide. It is in the interests of such parties to ensure that 
their efforts are genuine, because politicians who feign an inclination towards 
environmental concerns may suffer severe backlash if their electorates are not 
convinced by their rhetoric (Inglehart, 1997). The potential consequences could be 
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more severe for politicians than would be the case if the problem was simply ignored, 
although this is currently not an option in many countries (Bernhagen, 2007). 
 
Yet, at the global level, there is little economic incentive for enforcing 
environmentally safe practices, since it is almost always more expensive to be 
conscientious (Golub, 1998). Governments may worry that, the strict enforcement of 
environmental policies may undermine domestic businesses and create market 
advantages for foreign companies that are less inclined to act ethically (Golub, 1998, 
p.4). Competition from other countries and tight budgets mean that most countries are 
unwilling to be the first to adjust their policies, for fear of losing market share (Ulph, 
1997). Although the costs of optimal environmental practices are high, do long-term 
economic benefits justify these costs? Further, are the key players whose actions can 
have major environmental impacts convinced that this might be the case? Most 
analysts certainly suggest that the private sector still stresses the costs and 
disadvantages of having to adhere to environmental policy (Bernhagen, 2007). The 
political actions that are instigated by this potential standoff should provide nuanced 
insight on whether there is a skewed balance of power resulting from immediate 
government dependence on the economy or whether broader, long-term national 
priorities are ascribed greater importance. Along these lines, it is thus imperative to 
investigate the power relations between the state and capital that underpin the 
formation of environmental policy. 
 
1.4 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
 
There has been growing interest in the introduction of legislation that influences 
relationships between development and the environment in recent decades (Glasson et 
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al., 2005). Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) provide one example of such 
interventions, with this tool providing a mechanism for assessing the impact on the 
environment of development projects. First presented in United States in 1969 under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (Stampe, 2009), EIA requirements 
have been applied in many countries worldwide. Not unexpectedly, as EIA outcomes 
can point to unevenness in gains and losses between the private and public sectors 
from development projects, their introduction has not been without controversy. This 
observation is applicable even if we ignore the uncertainties concerning whether 
government agencies will act on problems identified via EIAs. Thus, while from a 
state perspective an EIA is an aid to decision-making over a proposed project, as well 
as an instrument for improving environmental quality, developers are prone to see 
EIA requirements as an obstruction to their activities (Glasson et al., 2005). This is 
not simply because the EIA process can be time-consuming and costly but also 
because state agencies might use EIA conclusions to turn down development 
proposals (Glasson et al., 2005). Thus, Glasson et al. (2005, p.8) opine that “EIA[s] 
could be of benefit to developers, since it can provide a framework for considering 
location and design issues and environmental issues in parallel. It can be an aid to the 
formulation of development actions, indicating areas where a project can be modified 
to minimize or eliminate altogether its adverse impacts on the environment.” Further, 
O’Riordan (1990, p.13) has argued that the EIA process can be positive for promoting 




One can see that EIA is moving away from being a defensive tool of the 
kind that dominated the 1970s to a potentially exciting environmental and 
social betterment technique that may well come to take over the 1990s... If 
one sees EIA not so much as a technique, rather as a process that is 
constantly changing in the face of shifting environmental politics and 
managerial capabilities, one can visualize it as a sensitive barometer of 




What lies underneath such claims is an understanding that an environmental ‘crisis’ is 
so entrenched that governments cannot ignore public concerns, nor can they fail to 
notice the already tangible effects of major environmental issues like climate change. 
It is no surprise then that since 1988, the Thai government has been using EIA as a 
means of environmental planning and managing projects/activities to counterbalance 
the impact of developments on the environment (ONEP, 2012). The Enhancement and 
Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA) was implemented in 
Thailand as early as 1975. Today, it forms a standard screening process in the 
planning of business ventures. It has been used to identify the impacts of projects, as 
well as to establish appropriate mitigation measures, so natural resources are 
efficiently used for economic development, within the housing sector in particular. 
The main objective of EIA in Thailand is to prevent environmental problems arising 
from major development projects, with the long-term aim being to achieve sustainable 
development objectives. EIA is designed to ensure that planning decisions for projects 
with possible significant effects on the environment are made by bodies with full 
information concerning likely impacts. 
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1.5 The Research Context  
 
In the last decade, increasing population mobility in Newly Industrialized Countries  
(NICs)1 has engendered major migration flows from rural to urban areas. These 
population flows have largely been due to economic and social disparities, with 
economic transformation a key driving force behind continuous urban growth (Evers, 
2000; McGee & Robinson, 1995).2 In terms of this growth trajectory, the various 
countries that comprise the NICs demonstrate similar tendencies toward a systemic 
transformation in their economies toward an internationally competitive market-
centred model (Otani et al., 1996). This shift towards a market-based economy has 
been driven by a desire to achieve improved economic performance, with 
governments working with the private sector to promote new economic activities and 
support industrial restructuring (Chopra, 1995). This quest for enhanced economic 
achievement has encouraged reform in state enterprises and the revitalization of the 
private sector, as seen through lifting centralized planning imperatives and reducing 
bureaucracy within government agencies (Buckley, 1994). 
 
One implication of these reforms has been growth in population concentrations into 
(especially larger) urban centres. In this context, shifting demand for housing is 
intimately related to national socio-economic and political change. In the case of 
Thailand, there has also been a direct consequence for housing provision, through a 
reduction in direct state involvement in housing supply (Dowall, 1992). Yet this shift 
                                                
 
1 The term Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) refers to countries with high-growth 
2 In the case of Thailand, for example, the urban population increased from 19.7 percent in 
1960 to 34 percent in 2010, from 5.4 million to 20.8 million inhabitants, with a recent 
estimate that 53 percent of the nation’s population will live in urban areas by 2040 
(Government Housing Bank, 2011). 
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has not seen the abrogation of state responsibilities for housing, for a number of 
reasons. First, states still have a major role to play in formulating and implementing 
policies that help determine the socio-economic and regulatory environment in which 
shelter is provided. Thus, while it did not provide housing units itself, in the 1990s, 
the agenda of Thailand’s 5th-6th National Economic and Social Development Plans 
(NESDP) was dominated by the UN Habitat’s concept of ‘enabling shelter strategies’, 
which called for a stronger emphasis on private sector development of new homes 
(Usavagovitwong, 2012). According to the Government Housing Bank (Government 
Housing Bank, 2007), the portion of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region’s (BMR’s) 
housing stock built by private developers increased from 34 percent in 1980, to over 
80 percent by 2000, illustrating the magnitude of change that occurred. Housing 
production in the public sector, through the National Housing Authority (NHA) and 
Bank of Investment (BOI), has however been very limited in recent decades.  
 
Arguably, the removal of state enterprises from the direct provision of housing does 
not lessen the importance of housing for national governments. Without proper 
government planning legislation, for example, a rapid growth of private development 
might cause significant problems for housing affordability, deficiencies in housing 
quality, traffic congestion and inadequacies in infrastructure in zones of residential 
expansion. As Bengtsson (2009, p.4) has argued “if housing is basically a private 
good, why is its provision seen as a matter of political concern at all? One answer is 
that the specificities of the housing market, if left alone, may result in strong 
fluctuations and in heavy imbalances in market power between suppliers and 
consumers.” 
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In the context of the Philippines, Strassmann (1994) has shown that the largely 
unregulated housing and land market in Manila is associated with a highly inefficient 
housing market that is characterised by a high degree of land speculation, idle land in 
private hands, and high housing and land prices. This is despite the Philippines having 
an efficient building industry and an active real estate market (Strassmann, 1994). The 
degree to which housing markets are deregulated or ineffectively supervised has a 
bearing on the efficiency and effectiveness of housing supply systems. This does not 
mean that there is a ‘natural’ tendency toward effective supervision, for private 
developers can see personal (or at least company) advantages for themselves in less 
formalised systems. Hence, to understand interactions between the state and private 
investment in new housing construction, we have to ask whether the laxity or 
tightness of state supervision is an outcome of vested interests seeking advantage 
from how the system is framed. 
 
In the case of Thailand, all house building is subject to approval from relevant 
national and local authorities. Approval processes, including land conversion into 
housing, preparation of layout plans, building and structure plans, planning of 
infrastructure and environmental impact assessments (EIA), involve many 
government agencies, both at national and local levels. In the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Region, these agencies include the Urban Development Planning Division under 
Ministry of the Interior, which oversees the Building Control Act and the Town 
Planning Act, and the local administration, which gives planning and building 
approval, as well as provides public utilities and infrastructure. Office of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP) provides EIA approval.  
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In housing development process in Thailand, EIA is an important means of ensuring 
that developers incorporated environmental protection as an integral part of the 
building process (Atkinson & Vorratnchaiphan, 1996). Using EIA became 
compulsory in both the private and public sector, although its degree of success in 
contributing to sustainability has been limited by the fact that its use is overseen by 
the governmental and administrative apparatus of Thailand (Mingsa et al., 1996).  
EIA is seen by project proponents as being something they need to adopt in order to 
be permitted to practice, rather than as a tool to be incorporated in decision-making of 
a project, meaning that it is not yet being used for the purpose for which it is intended, 
which has limited its effectiveness (Katharangsiporn, 2013). 
 
Despite the multiplicity of agency involvement, previous studies have shown that 
successive governments in Thailand have had no comprehensive or integrated 
housing and EIA policy; they have instead launched disjointed programmes to 
improve housing quantities and quality (Hiebert, 1997; Marohabutr, 2011; Sheng, 
2002; Usavagovitwong, 2012). The 1990s, for instance, saw a major shift in 
economy-led development under the 6th and 7th National Economic and Social 
Development Plans, whereby the pace of market-driven processes rose more 
dramatically than responses in political platforms or in bureaucratic systems. Uneven 
and unbalanced development resulted in many environmental and socio-spatial 
deprivations, which were associated with a lack of adequate city planning and 
environmental instruments (Agus et al., 2002; Marohabutr, 2011; Sheng, 2002). Then, 
in 1997, Thailand faced a severe economic crisis following monetary attacks by 
international hedge funds, which led to the collapse of new house building 
(Usavagovitwong, 2012). These perturbations prompted the Government of Thailand 
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to initiate new policies and programmes to address housing challenges (Marohabutr, 
2011; Sheng & Kirinpanu, 2000). 
 
Yet, the question can be raised over the likelihood that government initiatives provide 
a framework for coherent housing responses. As Sheng (2002) has suggested, many 
of Thailand’s ministers have close relations with commercial banks and the real estate 
sector, since both support political parties financially. Indeed, professional staff move 
freely between the Bank of Thailand (the regulator) and commercial banks (the 
regulated), which has not helped to maintain strict control over the banking sector 
(Sheng, 2002). Sheng posits that large-scale developers are important financiers of 
political parties in order to make sure government policies and legislation favour the 
real estate sector. However, these assertions are based on anecdotal as opposed to 
empirical evidence. Nevertheless if these propositions are indeed the case, then this 
creates an enabling environment especially EIA for the real estate sector to launch 
projects, and makes it harder for state agencies to introduce regulations that do not 
secure the approval of property developers (Sheng, 2002). Such an outcome could 
suppress new initiatives, such as the introduction of environmentally sensitive 
building codes (Keivani & Werna, 2001). This issue forms a key focus of this thesis.  
 
1.6 Research Questions and Objectives 
 
Amidst stricter regulations, the potential for friction between state agencies and 
builders has intensified. It may however be argued that tensions over EIA processes 
diverge from other forms of strains in state-capital relationships. Thus, theoretical 
perspectives on the state in capitalist societies (e.g. Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987) 
should provide nuanced insight on the interactions between the two. Drawing from 
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this literature, in this thesis, I attempt to answer the question of how the state impacts 
private housing development through regulating and directing new house building. I 
also question the extent to which the strength and content of state actions are 
influenced by private sector efforts to ‘control’ state influence. As part of these 
overarching questions, I further seek to explore: (1) how far the implementation of 
environmental regulation in new housing development reflects the priorities of the 
private sector or those of national-local state authorities; and, (2) how far the 
framework for environmental regulation is a reflection of state sector imperatives or 
reflects the circumvention of the state by the private sector. Thus broadly, this 
research focuses on the interplay between the interests of the state and private sector 
providers, viewed in terms of how these ‘competing’ interests impact on the 
introduction of enhancements to environmental demands in new housing 
development. It seeks to understand both theoretically and empirically, the impact of 
EIA on new housing development in Bangkok, Thailand.  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the decision-making processes that 
underpin public policy-making and implementation, as well as decision-making in 
relation to private new housing development. Overall, the aim is to discover why 
certain options are selected and others disregarded. The study will consider factors 
such as timing, costs, land-use constraints, amongst others, and the extent to which 
they make developers more or less likely to provide higher environmental quality in 
their projects. In exploring this, the study views new housing development as the 
outcome of interactions between a set of institutions and actors organised around 
processes for the promotion, production, marketing, and consumption of housing, 
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with these processes socially created and dependent on cultural, economic and 
political contexts.  
 
The pertinence of this study is rooted in the limited literature on new housing 
development, and the relationship between housing and the environment in 
economically dynamic countries. While in these countries, there is a substantial body 
of literature on issues such as low-income housing and housing affordability, housing 
choices and migration, and on changing government policies, especially the shift 
toward the privatization of state-owned dwellings (Boonyabancha, 2009; Hiebert, 
1997; Marohabutr, 2011; Sheng, 1989, 2002; Usavagovitwong, 2012), there is a 
notable gap with regards to research on new housing developments in Thailand.  
 
Existing studies tend to focus on provision for the low-paid, where often, the centre of 
attention is state policy (Agus et al., 2002; Aldrich & Sandhu, 1995; Boonyabancha, 
2009; Marohabutr, 2011; Sheng, 1989, 2002; Sheng & Kirinpanu, 2000; Wong, 
2001). With little research on new housing development, it is tempting to draw 
insights from European Union (EU) and North American investigations. It is however 
argued that these approaches are heavily biased toward institutional frameworks that 
do not conform with the institutional specificities of Newly Industrializing Countries 
(NICs). Longer histories of democracy in the EU and North America, dissimilar 
histories of state involvement in housing provision (for whatever reasons, housing has 
prompted significant state interventions for many decades in the EU and North 
America; Harloe, 1995) and different structures within the private sector (larger, more 
established companies in the EU and North America) account for very different 
institutional frameworks in NICs and EU-North American contexts. Thus, by 
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investigating the relevance of EU-North American insights in a NIC context, this 
study makes an important contribution to the literature. 
 
The empirical analysis that underpins this thesis focuses on the systems of actors, 
institutional structures, and processes in policy-making via the overarching questions: 
‘who takes the lead in determining environmental inputs into new housing 
development?’ and ‘how are environmental considerations in housing development 
influenced by public policy?’ In order to answer the above questions and to further 
gain a nuanced understanding of the underlying considerations that result in particular 
building outcomes, a qualitative research approach is adopted. The study relies on 
primary data collected via semi-structured in-depth interviews with stakeholders who 
have held key positions or played important roles in the EIA process, large-scale and 
small private developers, housing development-related associations, EIA consultants, 
politicians, senior and street-level bureaucrats, NGOs, and scholars, as further 
delineated in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
1.7 Outline of Thesis  
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: in chapter two, the literature on 
the relationship between capital and the state is critically analysed. This provides a 
framework for exploring the nature of the power relations that exist between the two 
‘sectors’ at a broad societal level in the latter chapters of this thesis. It also provides a 
lens via which the more focused aspects of state-capital interactions can be observed 
in the implementation of government policy. Of course, implementation issues are not 
simply a matter of interactions with non-state agents, for the literature makes clear 
that there are also within-state impediments to a smooth transition from policy 
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aspirations to policy implementation (see for example Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). 
This chapter examines two primary ways via which businesses might impact on the 
state namely, (1) by structuring the framework within which policy decisions are 
made, so as to specify not only what are regarded as legitimate fields of government 
intervention but also the nature of any intervention in terms of how far it champions 
interests that go beyond the business community; and (2) by affecting the 
implementation of government interventions, so as to impact how laws or regulations 
are manifested in real outcomes. The chapter, moreover, discusses the theoretical and 
conceptual underpinnings of the environmental impact assessment (EIA), as well as 
the policy making process. 
 
Chapter three, which presents the research methodology, explains the methodological 
framework for the empirical analysis in this thesis. The chapter also presents a 
detailed overview and justification of the paradigm that underpins its research 
methodology. The thesis is based on a qualitative research design and employs in-
depth interviews as the primary inquiry strategy to gain a nuanced and in-depth 
understanding of EIA practices and the resultant impacts on housing development in 
the Thai context. To achieve methodological triangulation, the study further relies on 
secondary data from documents concerning the operations, activities and concepts of 
the EIA process. The imperative of in-depth information on EIA processes and their 
outcomes also informs the decision to carry out interviews with a wide range of 
stakeholders which is further explained in the chapter. The interview guide including 
evaluation questions which were designed to support the data collection process is 
additionally delineated. The chapter also explains the qualitative data analysis process 
which forms the basis of the discussions in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.  
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Providing further context to the empirical investigation in the thesis, chapter four 
focuses on the circumstances in which new housing developments have occurred in 
Bangkok. This involves exploring key trends in Thailand's housing industry, 
alongside an exploration of the main actors and agencies in the field of private sector 
housing development. Alongside these private sector agents, the chapter investigates 
organisations that represent these companies in broader discussions with government 
agencies, such as all-sector business representation groups. It further draws out the 
existence of third sector institutions and groups that seek to represent civil society in 
housing plans or controversies. Chapter three also provides an articulation of 
government agencies operating in the housing field, and outlines their responsibilities, 
resources and legal frameworks for action. 
 
Chapter five commences the empirical analysis in this thesis. It focuses on the nature 
of current EIA stipulations in Thailand, and questions how these came into being and 
how they have been adjusted over time. In effect, this chapter seeks to uncover the 
driving forces behind the decision of the Government of the time to introduce EIA 
procedures (or more accurately with the tightening of the regulations in the last 
decade). From the perspective of the state, the key question concerns the extent to 
which the views of competing interests in the housing development process are 
incorporated into final policy outcomes. Has the state acted as a neutral arbiter or has 
it favoured particular outcomes, and if the latter, why? The approach used to obtain 
evidence for each of these dimensions, as with the materials required for the next two 
chapters, is outlined in chapter three. 
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In chapter five the precise requirements of EIA processes in Thailand are elucidated. 
Chapter six investigates the nexus between and across state agencies, private 
developers, and civil society interest and how they are involved in implementing EIA. 
The chapter explores how patterns of housing development have changed, and 
whether such alterations offer indicators of the successful implementation of EIA 
provisions. Hence, this chapter identifies and explores dimensions of environmental 
improvement that might result from EIA impositions. These include the geographical 
location of new developments, the design and content in new projects, from micro to 
macro scales. The chapter also identifies and explores the conflict of interest caused 
by integration of EIA into housing development. Additional considerations that are 
touched on include identifying socio-economic attributes of new housing 
developments, since there is a need to explore whether environmental mechanisms are 
being put forward as a means of securing social exclusivity, as has been reported 
elsewhere (see for example Frieden, 1979).   
 
Chapter six provides a backdrop for considering responses by individual developer 
companies to the requirements of EIA procedures. In chapter seven, these responses 
form the core of the analysis in this chapter. Questions are raised about perceptions of 
the prospect of such regulations being implemented by non-state actors. Critically, the 
question here is whether representatives of individual companies in the private house 
building sector lobbied against the introduction of the regulation, or indeed whether 
they have continued to lobby to have it changed in any way. The issue is not simply 
whether pressure was brought to bear on this question, but more importantly how 
effective it has been. Specifically, the aim is to uncover whether EIA procedures have 
altered how larger companies act (for example by changing materials, production 
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practices, or services for new dwellings) and how they have conditioned actions by 
smaller, growing companies (by not taking opportunities to build larger developments 
in order to exempt themselves from EIA oversight perhaps). Chapter six is concerned 
with the rationale and actions of builders, not simply over what they do, but also over 
how they seek to put pressure on government officials to lessen the impact of EIA 
regulations. As such, the focus for this analysis is not only building companies but 
also the street-level bureaucrats who seek to implement the directives of government. 
 
Chapter eight examines the elements that impact EIA practice, thereby illuminating 
the present position and shortcomings of EIA in Thailand which contribute negatively 
to its success as a nationwide project, and undermines the ability of the government to 
solve issues regarding the destruction of environmental resources in the country. The 
chapter provides an evaluation on the ways in which Thailand’s contextual factors 
influence its implementation of EIA and how the Thai EIA programmes are held 
back. The chapter also evaluates the factors that contribute negatively to EIA’s 
success as a nationwide project and diminish the ability of the government to solve 
issues regarding the destruction of environmental resources in the country. 
 
The conclusion to the thesis presents the results of the empirical analysis and their 
implications for discourses on state-capital relationships in Thailand. In addition, this 
chapter explains how the research findings of thesis offer insight into other Asian 
housing systems. The implications for expectations about the impact of new housing 
developments on the environment are further delineated. The chapter also underlines 
the ways in which the system can be improved to achieve the country’s sustainable 
development goals. 
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In this chapter, the theoretical and empirical literature that is pertinent to the focus of 
this thesis is critically examined. The chapter focuses on the literature that emphasises 
the overall characteristics of business-government relationships and the implications 
for housing development and NICs relations. The objective of the chapter is to 
provide a framework for later chapters for exploring the nexus between the two 
sectors at a broad societal level, and more particularly as seen through the 
implementation of public policy. It is imperative to note that implementation issues do 
not simply stem from interactions with non-state agents; the literature also 
underscores the within-state impediments to a smooth transition from policy 
aspirations to policy actions (see for example Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).  
 
The chapter first presents pertinent theories on the distribution of political power in 
society, after which it examines two primary ways that businesses might impact on 
the state. These are: (1) by structuring the framework within which policy decisions 
are made, so as to specify not only what are regarded as legitimate fields of 
government intervention but also the nature of any such intervention in terms of how 
far that framework champions the specific interests of the business community (or 
not); and, (2) by affecting the implementation of housing interventions, so as to 




2.2 The Concept of the State 
 
The relationship between the state and business has been defined by several theories. 
The perspectives in the theoretical literature are polemical with respect to how the two 
bodies interact and influence one another (Schneider, 2004). Six primary analytical 
ideologies are observable in the literature; these are the Marxist, Instrumental, 
Pluralism, Elite, Developmental State, and Corporatism theories. These fundamental 
theoretical perspectives must be explicated in order to isolate their dissimilarities and 
demonstrate how they can be applied to interpret the complex relationships between 
the state and business. It is crucial to note that the analysis of each unique theoretical 
ideology lacks cohesion but a simultaneous in-depth examination of these theories 
provide the framework for investigating how business and the state are interconnected 
and how this connection affects policy-change. The study of each political theoretical 
model allows for the isolation of common themes and aids the investigative process. 
It further facilitates the construction of an original hypothesis. The following section 
explores each of these theoretical hypotheses and how they relate to the state-business 
relationships. 
 
According to Weber (cited by Bendix (1977)), the modern state is an administrative 
and bureaucratic entity that exercises legal control over individuals within its borders. 
Hill & Ham (1997) expanded the definition of a state, describing it as a cluster of 
institutions with substantial authority over a particular area. The accepted list of state 
institutions includes legislatures, including parliaments and other law-makers, 
executive offices, bureaucratic agencies and judicial structures like law courts. These 
bodies span different tiers of governance, including the national, provincial and local 
(Hill & Ham, 1997).  
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The theory of state neutrality tends to portray official authorities as either bystander or 
referee, whose input is solely intended to guarantee the fairness of the contest 
(Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987). This differs from the weathervane model, because the 
neutral entity does more than facilitating the formation of policy by pressure groups—
it safeguards political balance and validates the exercise of power which, in effect, 
adjusts politics in favour of parties. In terms of state-business relationships, this 
framework implies that the state has a degree of independence and is not wholly 
dependent or responsive to business entities or other social groups. Rather, it has the 
goal of levelling and fairly facilitating different sets of interests. This presents some 
institutional challenges thus to perform this role effectively, it is imperative for the 
state to encourage the development of apex organisations, without restraining freedom 
of expression (Schneider & Maxfield, 1997; Schmitter, 1974; Bianchi, 1986).  
 
Hill & Ham (1997) suggested two modes of assessment which have emerged within 
these characterisations of the modern state. In one case, the state is considered as an 
autonomous actor that is not obliged to undertake certain activities by public opinion. 
In such cases, state representatives typically make the majority of decisions without 
much consultation with lobby groups or the public at large. In other situations, the 
state is assessed primarily according to its impacts on the public or specific social 
segments.  
 
One approach views the state as an independent entity, which can develop and 
implement public policy with little reference to the will of social pressures and lobby 
groups. The second approach requires an institutionalist assessment, which suggests 
that government policy depends on the structure of the political area, including the 
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quality of the relationship between the state and the business sector (Hill & Ham, 
1997). Additionally, the dynamics that exist between the state and the business sector 
are variable and, as a result, have considerable impact on the process and 
implementation of national policy (Hill & Ham, 1997). 
 
The concept of the state having autonomy is scarcely plausible in the context of 
contemporary politics because, as Almond (1988) highlights, the studies conducted in 
this vein have failed to adequately address the position of non-state actors, including 
politicians and their parties, lobby groups and the press. All of these forces are present 
in the majority of modern democracies. Additionally, within any state, there are 
generally differences of attitude and disputes between the bureaucracy and politicians, 
as well as between different elements within the bureaucracy itself. Such divisions are 
indicators that the state relies on a complex network of relationships and, moreover, 
that a country’s political system is constantly in flux. The theory also treats the state-
business relationship as being unidirectional. In other words, it assumes that the state 
has total authority. This perspective thus ignores the dialectical relationship that in 
real life characterises the link between the state and the business sector. Furthermore, 
the theory portrays the state as an inert institution, which is not susceptible to actual 
political dynamics (Nordlinger et al., 1988).  
 
This research is based on the approach by Evans (1992, 2003), which conceptualises 
the state as a dynamic entity which is rooted in its social context and is constantly 
being built and rebuilt by its engagement with the rest of society. Some extant 
research treats the state-business relationship effectively, but by and large the existing 
scholarship has conceptualised the state as a homogenous entity. In response, this 
study expands these traditional perspectives in its assessment of the policymaking and 
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implementation process in Thailand, by assessing the interrelations between different 
forces under the state umbrella. Overall, this approach aims to provide a thorough 
understanding of the interplay between the state and business sectors in Thai new-
housing development. 
 
2.2.1  Marxist Theory 
 
According to the Marxist approach, the term ‘class’ relates mainly to social hierarchy; 
the analysis of social class, class structures and reconfigurations of these structures 
are integral to conceptualising capitalism and modes of production or other social 
systems. Marx believed that the business sector belonged to the capitalist class due to 
its influence and authority. Marx’s emphasis on this authority relates to the way in 
which each class faces challenges. These challenges primarily relate to the economy, 
as well as the way in which the economic situation of a given class is influenced by 
politics (Kemeny, 1992).  
 
Marx viewed the capitalist bourgeoisie and business sector as the primary driver of 
the capitalist society (Kemeny, 1992). Thus, it can be suggested that the interests of 
the business sector should be a constant and major concern of the government. 
Miliband (1969) proposes that the state is comprised of actors whose beliefs and 
desires are in line with capital interests; that this scenario is driven by capitalists; and 
that state-business-relationships are subject to bias. On the other hand, Poulantzas 
(1969), among others, argues that state-business relationships are not subject to bias 
and that, therefore, the business sector is perfectly able to obtain favourable treatment 
from the state without the need for direct intervention.  
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Marxist perspectives on state-business relationships focus on the effects of politico-
economic partnerships on state policy. Classical Marxist theory asserts that the state is 
so embedded in capitalist culture that their governmental activities are heavily 
influenced by business interests. When a state body must reach a political decision 
that may affect corporate business, Marxist theory states that any government 
operating in a capitalist state must make policy decisions based on the needs of the 
corporate industry (Causer, 1978; Heilbroner, 1985; Poulantzas, 1973; Useem, 1979; 
Zeitlin, 1974).  
 
However, Marxist theorists also allow for the implementation of policy that may be 
opposed by particular business groups. Occasionally, a state government must work in 
favour of the class as a whole despite opposition from certain corporate sectors 
(O'Connor, 1973; Offe, 1975). They also acknowledge that democratic policy will 
often lead to social disunity and thus the state must put measures in place to prevent 
the exploitation of corporate power for personal gain.  Thus the state must act on 
behalf of the capitalist class as a whole, and not specific capitalists.  A variant of 
Marxist theory, instrumental theory, focuses on the nature of the state. Sweezy (1942) 
interprets the Marxist definition as suggesting that the state acts as an instrument 
utilised by the dominant ruling class to stabilise and reinforce the social structure. The 
capitalist state system acts in favour of the business elite in a capitalist society as it is 
directly subservient to that class. The interaction between the ruling class and the state 
is facilitated by networking and social fraternisation, and the ruling class leverages the 
state to wield power over society as a whole (Hay, 2006). This interpretation 
expounds the pre-eminence of agency over structure, in other words, the dominance 
of ruling forces over the governing of the state. 
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2.2.2  Pluralism 
 
Pluralism has been developed to fill some of the gaps that have not been filled by 
Marxist theory, and to contest some of its main statements. Pluralists argue against the 
notion that there are non-biased elements of the proletarian and capitalist classes, as 
suggested by Marxists. Bentley (1908) argues that groups are established through 
individual, subjective activity. In turn, this results in the convergence of the interests 
and desires of various groups, due to the effect of each group trying to sway the other. 
Therefore, he argues that politics are shaped by a constant ‘tug-of-war’ between 
various relevant interest groups (Bentley, 1908). 
 
Another similar argument against Marxism is presented by Truman (1951) who 
believes that discord and attempts to influence are eased when groups form similar 
interests and goals. Furthermore, Truman’s theory accepts the multifaceted nature of 
society, as shown through the variety of groups in existence, and suggests that these 
interest groups are likely to become established when their individual interests are 
linked to politics. Emerging groups, consequently, attempt to intervene in decision-
making processes to meet their collective goals (Truman, 1951).  
 
Pluralists such as Dahl (1956) and Truman (1971) believe that it is an individual’s 
behaviour (which can be identified using interest groups) that identifies a society. 
Pluralists are of the view that various groups and parties with divergent interests are 
connected to the expression of state-business relationships. These divergent interests 
coupled with the pluralist interpretation of society, indicates that the balance between 
parties and groups oscillates with each side gaining greater favour at certain times 
(Murray & McMillan, 1983).  Thus, Schmitter (1974) conceptualises pluralism as 
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defined by equality in access, competition, and state responsiveness or lack of control. 
All interest groups have the same level of influence, and the state has equal relations 
with all groups.  
  
Lobbying is a means of using influence to pressure political decision makers. Bentley 
further points out that pressure can take many forms, both visible and invisible. For 
example, politicians can be confronted by visible pressure (in the form of actions) or 
invisible pressures (in the form of threat of actions) (Bentley, 1908).  
 
Accordingly, an interest group is more powerful if it is able to apply pressure. Such 
ability is a by-product of the group’s nature and size, as well as its various resources, 
such as finances, information, and social status. A group’s ability to apply pressure is 
also affected by its ability to access government officials, and by its level of internal 
organisation (as well as the organisation of the government it is pressuring). When 
examining interest group politics, the pluralist tradition places emphasis on the idea of 
lobbying as pressure politics (Bentley, 1908).  
 
Though pluralists do not argue that all groups are equal, they do argue that democratic 
societies are characterised by a wide distribution of power and resources that can be 
used to articulate unfairness to government. The singular domination of one interest 
group is held at bay by a variety of factors including overlapping membership, a large 
number of groups, a large number of methods for directing the government, and a 






2.2.3  Elite Theory 
 
Pluralists accept the fact that if elite corporations are able to group together or work in 
harmony, there is a potential that they could become major political influencers. 
However, pluralists also maintain that if elites become segregated through friction and 
disagreements, this creates a foundation for capitalist regions to adopt polyarchal 
pluralism (Dahl, 1989). In terms of business, Mizruchi & Konig (1986) have 
suggested that certain issues, such as the quantity of purchases between companies, 
and a company’s position in the market, have an impact on the political tactics behind 
corporate harmony. For example, it has been argued that companies are able to gain a 
vast amount of political authority once the company is operating cohesively (Vogel, 
1989), and that a company’s ability to become harmonious and operate is a key driver 
of the company’s political success (Dahl, 1958). Bernhagen (2007) claims that certain 
elements of any given market result in continuous rivalry between companies, and 
that this leads to pluralists finding comfort in the notion that harmony in the corporate 
world is uncommon. Additionally, pluralists believe that the authority that comes with 
corporate harmony continuously evolves. This means that when corporate harmony is 
low, the non-corporate aims can be realised more easily. 
  
In contrast, elitists believe in the importance of a number of unity-promoting factors; 
though they do also accept the predisposition for segregation in the business world 
(Bernhagen, 2007). For example, it is possible to unite group goals, and encourage 
social and political engagement, through clubs, associations, boards and directorates 
that work together. Bearden & Mintz  (1987) have proposed that tools such as these 
can assist the corporate world in avoiding segregation, conflict and rivalry between 
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classes. Domhoff  (1998) further adds that this has led to capitalist society rising 
above their own personal goals to support the aims of the class as a whole.  
  
Moore (1979) suggests that elites are not, for the most part, segregated, and that elite 
corporations have the ability to coexist harmoniously. Elite corporations can work 
together to achieve collective interests due to the nature and mechanics of the elite 
network (Moore, 1979). It is important to however underscore, according to Moore 
(1979), that elite networks exist based on the desire to tackle certain problems as 
opposed to the idea that members have some sort of innate right to join. Moore’s 
(1979) study finds no influence of class and thus it refutes the findings of Domhoff, 
Hunter & Mills (Moore, 1979). For example, during the mid-20th century, scholars 
argued that collectives were able to influence government sectors as per their own 
agendas. Therefore, this also meant that elite groups could enforce change (Moore, 
1979). Many scholars, including Redford  (1969), Sayre & Kaufman (1965), have 
suggested that elite groups within the economy are able to move forward by 
generating ‘iron triangles’ (also known as policy subsystems and islands of functional 
power), which are derived by cultivating interactions and partnerships with 
government sectors. 
 
2.2.4  Corporatism and Neo-Corporatism 
 
Corporatism refers to the practice of policy-making and how it is a direct result of 
networking between influential social interest groups and state officials (Cawson, 
1986). Corporations or social organisations are permitted to contribute in policy-
making sessions and the state can often offer private companies an almost public 
status. There are several concepts that are crucial in corporatist theory and these 
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include integrity, validity and the institutionalisation of company organisations. These 
concepts can be applied to an interest group’s relationship with the state and can often 
assist in analysing the structure of the partnership and its impact on both parties 
(Wiarda, 1997). Schmitter (1974) has defined corporatism as the selection of a limited 
number of interest groups that are considered representatives of their various social 
groups. These interest representatives are placed in control of their group’s demands 
and the state offers them ‘representational monopolies’ under the condition that they 
follow procedure in choosing participants, voicing concerns, and expressing the 
demands or needs of their specific social groups (Schmitter, 1974, p.93-94). 
 
In light of this definition, it seems obvious that throughout the policy-making process, 
the state assumes a preeminent role (Cawson, 1982). Conversely, in a corporatist 
structure, policy changes are established by the state in collaboration with relevant 
interest groups that have been permitted to participate in policy negotiations by state 
officials. As a direct antithesis to classical pluralist philosophies, corporate interest 
groups are known to the state and governed by state laws. In a sense, corporatism has 
led to interest groups assuming a powerful role in society and essentially forming part 
of the state (Cawson, 1986).  
 
To regulate corporatist group’s participation in policy-making negotiations, the 
government has established procedures whereby a limited number of interest groups 
are selected based on categories of distinct social interest (Grant & Sargent, 1987). 
These distinctions may refer to religious beliefs, ethnicity, class or business 
affiliations amongst others. Each of these unique social interests are allocated an 
interest group which is responsible for acting as an intermediary between society and 
the state officials (Cawson, 1983). 
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Many corporate theorists interpret this practice as self-serving from the state’s 
perspective as they assume full control of society while convincing companies to 
operate in their favour without going so far as to initiate the complete nationalisation 
of industry (Cox & O'Sullivan, 1988; Lehmbruch & Schmitter, 1982; Miller, 1976; 
Pahl & Winkler, 1975; Rea & McLeod, 1976; Schmitter & Lehmbruch, 1979). 
Cawson (1982) claims that the behaviour of the state towards the private sector 
undermines the traditional divisions between the public and private spheres. The true 
nature of corporatism as a concept can be encapsulated by three elements which 
include intervention, intermediation (the relationships that are developed through 
negotiations between the state and the various interest groups) and incorporation (a 
consequence of interactions between interest groups and the state whereby organised 
interests become more intertwined with the state) (Grant & Sargent, 1987).  
 
Corporatist theorists agree with Marxist theorists in alluding to the phenomenon 
arising from society’s transition into a capitalist state whereby company executives 
seek stable conditions with few business rivals, state officials seek to prevent dramatic 
escalations in price and employment numbers, and labourers seek regular secure 
employment. Consequently, society’s transition towards capitalism will lead to all 
levels of society reluctantly allowing a high level of economic state intrusion 
(Cawson, 1986). 
 
Different types of Corporatism 
 
Wiarda & Skelley (1997, 2007) divide corporatism into three basic types according  
to the level of state involvement: (1) a strictly autocratic state; (2) limited interest 
representation by organisations that are acknowledged and controlled by the 
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government; and (3) corporatist groups that become assimilated into the state and 
work alongside them. 
 
In the first category, there is a high level of state involvement that can sometimes be 
viewed as dictatorial. This type of corporatism is known as ‘historical’ or ‘traditional’ 
and is usually practiced in regions with communally-focused societies. In such areas, 
corporate groups are often formed naturally based on heritage, ethnicity, family and 
other similar dimensions (Howard, 1997; Howard & Skelley, 2007).  
 
The second category is similar to traditional corporatism but with a few important 
distinctions. In these cases, the state is autocratic and is usually formed on the basis of 
a military framework. As the state is so authoritative and the society appears to be 
largely self-organised, state officials are often capable of categorising interest groups 
into distinct societal divisions. The connection between these interest groups and the 
state is generally referred to as ‘top-down’, a hierarchical division of society, which 
usually indicates that the state is responsible for policy changes; they may take the 
interests of social groups into account but once they have arrived at a final decision, 
the interest groups must agree with the state as no further negotiation is permitted. 
Furthermore, the state uses interest groups to coordinate communication between state 
and society as they relay information on policy changes and assist the state in putting 
them into practice (Wiarda, 1997; Wiarda & Skelley, 2007).  
 
The final category, often known as neo-corporatism, involves participatory decision-
making procedures involving both state officials and interest groups. The government 
often consults with such groups before a final decision on policy change is made and 
in theory, this negotiation process indicates that the interests of society, as presented 
	 48 
by the interest groups, are factored into the state’s final decision. Neo-corporatism is 
therefore defined by the transparency of its decision-making process, a process 
whereby interest groups participate fully in negotiations and adopt a fundamental role 
where mutual cooperation is the primary form of interaction. This system is in 
obvious contrast to more competitive pluralist methods whereby the diverse network 
of interest groups all strives to be considered by those responsible for policy changes. 
Neo-corporatism cannot be defined as ‘top-down’; indeed, in most neo-corporatist 
cases, the state and interest groups establish a partnership and work together to 
negotiate policy change (Wiarda, 1997; Wiarda & Skelley, 2007).  
 
The neo-corporatist system is usually adopted in Europe (Wiarda, 1997; Wiarda & 
Skelley, 2007); however, in developing countries, state corporatism was most 
common until the 1980s. The rise of democracy in these regions has however 
instigated a slow transition towards more neo-corporate systems (Howard J. Wiarda, 
1997). For instance, during the 1960s and the 1970s, Chile, Argentina and Brazil 
epitomised state corporatist practice (Schmitter, 1971, 1972, 1975). Traditional 
corporatism is more common in Asia, particularly before the 1990’s. Asian societies 
tend to be quite communal in nature which explains how such traditional forms of 
corporatism operated effectively (Boyd & Ngo, 2005).  
 
In many Asian nations such as South Korea and Taiwan during the 1960s and 1970s, 
governmental control evolved into something similar to state corporatism. The state 
was autocratic throughout these nations and strove to regulate social development and 
the representation of interest groups (Boyd & Ngo, 2005). Corporate and labour 
interests were largely under state control and a very select number of interest groups 
were acknowledged by the state. Society and the government had a strict hierarchical 
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relationship and governmental control was dictatorial. Social groups were often 
pressured into supporting their policy-making decisions (Schneider, 2004). Despite 
this, however, the state did communicate with corporatist groups in relation to issues 
of economic policy. In South Korea, for example, the state formed a committee which 
was composed of state officials along with nominated representatives of labour, 
corporate and financial industries. This committee was devised in order to meet and 
explore issues of economic significance and allowed for the diffusion of information 
between the government and corporatist groups. Business and labour representatives 
discussed their needs with the state which then used this situation to their advantage 
by securing the support of representatives present at discussions, and instructing them 
to endorse their policy measures according to their respective interest groups (Boyd & 
Ngo, 2005; Hermes & Schilder, 1997). 
 
2.2.5  Developmental State Theory 
 
NICs, which are concentrated in East Asia and Latin America, tend to demonstrate a 
variety of economic and political structures that differ from the norms of the 
developed liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America (Boyd & Ngo, 
2005). In Latin America, the dependent capitalist state is the defining trend, whereas 
East Asia is marked by the developmental state (Woo-Cumings, 1999).  
 
The theory of developmental state applied to East Asian states has been extensively 
elucidated by Meredith Woo-Cummings (1999). Ideologically, these NICs often 
occupy the middle ground between a free market and a centrally-planned economy. 
This is described as a “plan-rational” capitalist system, which unites the guiding role 
of the state with widespread private ownership (Woo-Cummings, 1992, p.2). The 
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theories of the developmental state are characterised as not being fully capitalist or 
socialist, but rather negotiating between the two. A developmental state, as portrayed 
by Loriaux (1999), posits a firm ethical goal of using the authority of the state to 
direct investment in order to promote a more unified economic atmosphere (Loriaux 
cited in Woo-Cumings, 1999). A developmental state does significantly intervene in 
the economic and social norms of the country because, as Chang (1999) emphasises, 
economic advances require the construction of a state that can normalise the political 
processes that encourage sustainable growth. 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, many South American countries, like Chile and Brazil and 
Asian countries, like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, were able to 
reach and maintain extended periods of economic growth of over 5 percent each year 
(Schneider, 2004; Boyd & Ngo, 2005). It is often questioned whether this period of 
sustained growth was a direct result of state corporatism during that timeframe. 
Krueger (Krueger, 1991, 1993)  addresses the issues regarding strong state 
interference and posits that liberal trade policies resulted in the markedly increased 
growth rates in many Asian countries. Conversely, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) 
believe that this period of economic growth would not have occurred without the 
state’s intervention. Furthermore, Wiarda (1997) opines that it was easy for the state 
to remain in control for the duration of this period as economies were thriving under 
their policies at the time. The increased wealth and rapid developments in technology 
during this period enabled private individuals and groups to impinge on the policy-
making process, with the government’s approach moving from authoritative to more 
co-operative. This demonstrates that economic development can have a tangible effect 
on the political mode, shifting it from an authoritative state corporatism system to a 
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less controlling system based on paradigms such as neo-corporatism or pluralism. 
Similar changes in the role and structure of governments also occurred in several 
Latin American and Asian nations in the late 1980s and 1990s, leading to a shift from 
state control towards democracy, allowing interest groups to gain more power under 
reduced government controls (Corrales & Cisneros, 1999; Kingstone, 1998; Perez-
Aleman, 2003; Schneider, 2004).  
 
Developmental state thinking represents a break from neo-liberal economics, because 
of its acceptance of state involvement. Additionally, Johnson (1999) highlights the 
microeconomic benefits of the model, in terms of the collaboration between business 
entities and the state, whereby the private sector becomes invested in the process of 
development. The significant role of private enterprise demonstrates that the 
developmental state is intrinsically capitalist (Johnson, 1999).  
 
2.3 The Concept of Power 
 
The power relations that govern relationships between key actors such as the public 
sector, private sector and civil society, is imperative for gaining nuanced insight into 
specific development ideologies (Kam, 1999). Planning mechanisms in turn, are 
further determined by the development ideologies that govern a state, the level of 
state involvement, and the availability of resources. Civil society and private sector 
interests further impinge on the efficacy of planning mechanisms.  
 
Power as a concept generally refers to the ability of one social group to exert control 
over another. With this mind, power reveals itself in the interaction between several 
social groups and is not necessarily an attribute of one particular person or 
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organisation. The relationship between several diverse social groups is usually 
disproportionate with one group exerting control over the others (Schutz, 1999). 
  
Power in political terms is explored by Dahl (1957) who posits that the relationship is 
‘one-dimensional’ as the dominant group has the ability to convince the subservient 
group to act in way that they would not otherwise choose to without coercion (Dahl, 
1957, p.202-203) . This concept of predetermined action is fundamental to this notion 
of power in that it is incorrect to assume that a dominant group will coerce a 
subservient group to behave in particular way by virtue of its dominant position.  
Analyses of political power are usually based on two paradigms. They either tend to 
view political power as a matter of ‘intentional’ domination, or as a problem of 
‘unintentional’ domination (Stewart, 2000).  
 
2.3.1  Intentional Domination  
 
Intentional domination focuses on types of corporate political action, which Getz 
(1997) describes as a company’s procurement of action (or inaction) from public 
leaders, as a way of emerging into the political landscape. Within this topic, business 
is conceptualised as an interest group, and researchers investigating this field have 
explored policy networks, petitioning and special interest politics. Wright (1996) 
focuses on the assets available and required for business and its interest groups to 
influence policy, including campaigns and political party funding. Page, Shapiro, & 
Dempsey (1987) have studied the way in which these resources assist the business 
sector to influence public perspectives of certain issues. Kang (2002) on the other 
hand, has examined the unethical underbelly of the situation. Mills (1956) and 
Domhoff (1998) have explored the relationship between business leaders and political 
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officials. Another element is the occurrence of serious political disasters and how 
business has become involved in these issues. Block (1977) suggests that when faced 
with oppositional policies, the business sector has in the past gone to the extent of 
becoming involved in violent protests and the overturning of the government, such as 
the case of armed takeovers. The latter scenario occurred in Thailand when the Royal 
Thai Army staged a coup against the elected caretaker government of Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006. 
 
Keim & Zeithaml (1986) acquiesce to this propositions since certain companies avoid 
political action based on the estimation that the losses involved in participating will be 
higher than the gains acquired. Olson (1965) further argues that this is not only the 
case for solo enterprises, but also for groups. Furthermore, Morton & Cameron (1992) 
point out that policy-makers can only react in the case of corporate political action. 
For example, in considering elections, policy-makers should be aware that bowing to 
the demands of large corporations could be unlikely to please supporters, which could 
lose public votes. 
 
2.3.2  Unintentional Domination 
 
The unintentional model of political intervention arises from an unusual collaboration 
between neoclassical economic theory and the Marxist approach to capitalism and the 
state. This model focuses on the institutional restrictions placed on policy-makers, and 
how this influences their ability to formulate policy. Lindblom (1977) referred to this 
model as being the business sector’s ‘structurally privileged position. Block (1977) 
termed it the business confidence element and Przeworski & Wallerstein (1988) 
referred to it as the state’s ‘structural dependence’ on the economy. The unintentional 
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interference model suggests that joblessness, lower tax income, slow development 
and a lack of benefits in investing funds has arisen due to capitalist greed. Therefore, 
policy-making officials attempt to sidestep policies that alter the business sector’s 
profitability, based on concerns about the repercussions mentioned previously, as well 
as concerns over the ways in which such policies could impact them financially and 
electorally.  It can be said that policy-makers, thus, focus on promoting business 
confidence at all times (Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1988).  
 
Przeworski & Wallerstein (1988) argue that because of this, the business sector is able 
to secure preferential treatment during the policy-making and implementation process 
without the need for direct involvement in political action. If this concept has some 
validity, it is not difficult to understand why this makes democracy a challenge, since 
democracy dictates that political parties should be segregated enough to offer voters a 
number of alternatives. Furthermore, Budge & Bara (2001) add that democracy 
entails the chosen political party keeping its word and carrying out its projected aims 
and objectives.  
 
Although there seems to be a number of truths to the institutional authority approach, 
this theory is not without its shortfalls. For example, if the approach was entirely true, 
policies would remain the same over prolonged periods; serving the interests of the 
business sector. On the other hand, Mitchell (1997) and Smith (2000) argue that there 
are many examples of the business sector not being able to control political policy. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to consider the omnipresence of politics in the business 
sector when following structural authority theories. The question is why capitalists 
would invest in political activity if they were already being served by the political 
arena. Additionally, due to a range of core methodological issues, it is difficult to 
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draw conclusions from previous studies on the ways in which public policy is driven 
by the business sector. Although it is possible to state that business does possess 
structural dominance, it is more challenging to prove this than to prove more overt 
actions such as petitioning or campaign funding (Mitchell, 1997). 
  
2.3.3  Power Characteristics of the Thai State 
 
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, under which the King serves as the Head of 
State and wields considerable moral authority. Under the new constitution, the King 
has been further ascribed new powers which are almost exclusively ceremonial in 
nature and exercised only with the consent of the current political leadership (ADB, 
1999). Thailand is a unitary state and thus, the absolute and overall power of 
governance is vested in the central government. It is the central government that 
decides how much power and authority may be relegated to organisations within and 
outside Bangkok (ADB, 1999).  
 
Thai society is relatively simple with the interests of government and the private 
sector dominating those of the civil society. Up until 2001, a prevailing system of 
clientelism or ‘money politics’ co-opted the policymaking process, leading to the 
marginalisation of inequality within policy discourses. Thailand’s political climate 
has been defined by the existence of various political parties, necessitating the 
formation of coalition governments during elections. These coalition governments 
have historically been weak and short-lived and further, these governments have not 
exhibited a clear policy focus, and have often leveraged local handouts to consolidate 
their position. This form of politics has largely excluded the majority and kept 
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representative institutions weak, enabling the military and monarchy to dominate 
(Hewison, 2014). 
 
Scholars such as Boyle (1998) have argued that status, hierarchy, and power are 
inextricably linked to a strong desire for paternalistic authority and a compulsion for 
dependency and loyalty to a group.  Boyle’s (1998) assertions are particularly evident 
in Thai society which is strongly hierarchal in nature so much so, that this structure 
permeates into its social, political and bureaucratic institutions. Thais are acutely 
aware of their relative place within this hierarchy and of their status vis-a`-vis others. 
Concomitantly, deference is commonly expected by and granted to people of higher 
status. In return for the assurance of deference from subordinates, leaders perform the 
roles expected of the powerful (Boyle, 1998). In government, lower-ranking officials 
have difficulty standing up to higher-ranking officials, even outside of the ministry 
within which they belong, and special requests from higher authorities are difficult to 
decline even if they possess underlying ulterior motives (Vichit-Vadakan, 1989).  
 
2.4 Characteristics of The Thai State 
 
The genesis of the Thai state is rooted in the 13th Century, commencing with the 
reign of King Chulalongkorn between1868 and 1910. King Chulalongkorn is widely 
recognised as the purveyor of the modern Thai state due to his implementation of 
several reforms such as the formalisation of the Civil Service Act in 1928.  The 
subsequent monarchy of King Rama VII, was dismantled following the staging of a 
coup in 1932. Notably during this period, Thailand’s first constitution was established 
after which its first elections occurred the subsequent year. Despite the 
implementation of democratic reforms, Thailand experienced political instability 
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following another coup in 1933.  Between 1933 and 1991, Thailand experienced 
political instability and during this period, control over the state swung between the 
army (1933-1944) and civilian rule (1944-48). Between 1948 and 1991, Thailand 
experienced oscillating periods of civilian and military rule (ADB, 1999).  
 
Under both civilian and military rule, state-owned enterprise experienced several 
privileges due to the existence of patronage networks. These privileges were further 
expanded as the state became increasingly involved in the economy in the 1930s and 
onwards. This enabled political elites to divert state resources for their private use 
(ADB, 1999). The role of the elite was further strengthened in the 1970s, due to the 
increasing importance ascribed to business interests in the House of Representatives. 
These changes were occurring alongside the emergence and growth of civil society 
and therefore, dissention in the form of student protests became increasingly common 
(ADB, 1999). In the mid 1900s, Thailand experienced economic malaise although this 
improved by the mid 1980s as a result of effective economic policies implemented by 
the semi-democratic government. This economic growth was concomitant with 
increased levels of foreign direct investment into the country, especially under the 
government of the Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhavan who promoted the business 
sector extensively. It is worthy to note that the majority of ministers within this 
government had business interests in the real-estate sector and auxiliary sectors in 
connection to it (discussed in chapter 7). The transition to civilian rule meant that this 
government was able to exert significant influence on policy (Sheng, 2002) in ways 
that were directly beneficial to them.  
 
Allegations of tax evasion and corruption have historically plagued Thailand’s 
civilian governments, the most notable being against the government of Thaksin 
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Shinawatra, elected in 2001 which instigated protests in Bangkok between 2005 and 
2006, eventually culminating in a coup. Between late 2006 and 2007, Thailand was 
once again under military rule. The period between 2006 and 2011 was characterised 
by extensive political unrest. The military again seized power in 2014 after months of 
protest against the former Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra (Global Property 
Guide, 2010). The Thai political system has often relied on the military to restore 
order and protect the monarchy, however akin to civil politicians, they have also 
leveraged their privileged position to advance their personal interests.  
 
The regulatory framework of the Thai state was not popular among neoliberals, due to 
the belief that the Thai state’s involvement in the economy slowed growth, which 
would have been expedited by market-oriented policies (Christensen et al., 1993). 
Thailand does not align with the theory of the developmental state that generally 
applies to Asian capitalist states. Rather, Thailand’s growth is seen to have been 
powered by a network of non-state institutions, including commercial banks and 
business groups (Doner & Ramsay, 1997). As a result, the Thai state was considered 
to be somewhat disjointed and lacking in strength, particularly when contrasted with 
the traditional Asian developmental theory. However, both parties concur that 
economic progress in Thailand can, to an extent, be attributed to the technocratic 
control over fiscal and economic bodies, which shielded them from patronage (Doner 
& Hawes, 1995).  
 
Evans  (1995) suggests that Thailand is neither a forceful nor a developmental state, 
but falls midway along the spectrum that ranges from the predatory to the 
developmental structure. As such, Thailand is not as strong as East Asian nations such 
as South Korea and Taiwan, but it is not as weak a state as the Philippines. Thailand 
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did not have the strength of a developmental state like Taiwan, but it did have 
sufficient strength to drive the economy forward from 1951 to 1995, when the country 
was ruled by military dictators and policy was determined by technocrats (Apichat, 
2002; Satitniramai, 2007). However, from the 1980s onwards the coincidence of rapid 
economic growth and democratisation caused the state to waver and diminished the 
influence of the technocrats. This fostered the economic crisis of 1997, indicating that 
multiple changes can cause state weakness, particularly by undermining effective 
bureaucrats (Apichat, 2002; Satitniramai, 2007).  
 
For instance, the state did increase its strength in politics and administration, while 
Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT)3 held power from 2001 to 2006, but the 
party’s promotion of a developmental state has not been a complete success. State 
structures are still ineffective and state institutions are divided, allowing industrial 
policy to be hijacked by TRT associates and cronies. Admittedly, the 2006 coup 
suddenly halted the move towards a developmental economy, which undermined the 
TRT’s efforts (Satitniramai, 2007).  
 
2.4.1  State and Business Relationships in Thailand 
 
Collaboration between governance agencies in the real estate sector is crucial for 
achieving effective urban governance. Collaboration between the state, local 
                                                
 
3 Under Thaksin, a liberal framework was created that empowered capitalists within the state, 
but this should not be viewed overly positively (Satitniramai, 2007). Bellin (2000) highlights 
that capitalists in “late-developing” political environments generally prioritise their own 




government, the private sector and civil society is especially imperative. State-
business relationships is shaped by a number of factors, including the regulations and 
agreements between the two actors, their structural nature, and the extent to which 
they share common aims and philosophies (Chingaipe & Leftwich, 2007). 
Laothamatas (1994) points out that prior to the 1960s, Thailand’s private sector was 
neither strong nor sizeable, and was in need of serious organisation. In this scenario, it 
is possible for the state to dictate political aims. However, Moon (1994) suggests that 
once a country’s private sector begins to improve itself, as it did in Thailand 
following the events of the 1980s, it is possible to achieve greater equilibrium 
between business and the state, due to a desire for increased autonomy or authority.  
 
Previous research implies that there has been a significant evolution of the impact of 
business on the state. Following the overturning of Thailand’s royal power in 1932, 
Thailand became bound to a political environment that elected leaders based on 
government interests (Riggs, 1966). After the overthrowing of the Thai monarchy, the 
nation’s armed forces led the country through a time regarded as the ‘bureaucratic 
polity’ era (Riggs, 1966). Although the environment was oppressive, and thought the 
business sector somewhat feared clashing with the government, business maintained 
an unlikely level of independence from the state during this period (Riggs, 1966).  
 
Further research suggests that, because of this, Thailand’s previous business sector 
entered a clash with the Thai government. This is largely due to Thailand’s great 
proportion of Chinese businessmen, leading Thailand’s previous business sector to 
appear foreign to the unwelcoming and patriotic state policy of the time (Skinner, 
1958). Furthermore, Skinner (1958) adds that Thailand’s Chinese businessmen (Sino-
Thai) began to engage in interactions with leading Thai actors, since these 
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relationships were crucial for receiving the required documentation to conduct 
business in Thailand. Additionally, business relationships provided Chinese 
businessmen with certain preferential treatment and relative protection from 
interference from the law (Skinner, 1958).  
 
In order to build these business links and obtain long-term assistance from Thai 
government actors, Skinner (1958) proposes that the Chinese people within the 
business sector were able to identify the names of influential Thai agents on the board 
of directors for various firms. Additionally, existing firms merged with other firms to 
create new companies, which involved a mutually-beneficial arrangement of Thai 
preferential treatment and benefits, in exchange for Chinese funding and business 
acumen. Furthermore, a number of Chinese businessmen became managers of Thai 
corporations, providing that they had Thai citizenship (Skinner, 1958).  
 
It can be said that during the 40-year-period following the Siamese Revolution (see 
Table 1), Thailand’s state-business relationships engendered a situation in which 
dominant and subordinate actors (i.e. patrons and clients) swapped assistance with the 
provision of security (Suriyamongkol & Guyot, 1985). During this time, it has been 
suggested that the business sector worked in accordance with the wishes of powerful 
government agents, thus the ability of groups from the business sector to change 
government policy was miniscule. If the business community had any influence on 
government policy, it was clientelistic in nature, spontaneous and unofficial 
(Suriyamongkol & Guyot, 1985). 
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Table 1 Historical Development of Thai politics in the Context of Politics and 
Business Relations 
Year Politics Economy 
Before 
1932 
Absolute monarchy – Thai feudal 
system  
Self-sufficient economy + Primitive capitalism 
based on agricultural society  
Absolute monarchy – Thai feudal 
system  
Primitive capitalism based on agricultural society  
1932 End of absolute monarchy – 
Introduction of a constitutional 
monarchy following the change to 
democracy with parliamentary 
government. 
Primitive capitalism based on agricultural society  
1943 Bureaucratic polity - first post-WWII 
military coup. The military retains 
power continuously until 1973. 
Full-fledged capitalism + import-substitution 
industrialisation  
1973 Semi-democracy  Export-oriented industrialisation + economic 
globalisation in trade  
1988 Firm parliamentary politics  Fully participated in economic globalisation in 
trade and finance  
1997 Economic crisis in Thailand and East 
Asian + Political reform through 
1997 Constitution  
Fully participated in economic globalisation in 
trade and finance  
2001 Authoritarian populism  Fully participated in economic globalisation in 
trade and finance  
2006 Political crisis (2006 Coup)  
 
Fully participated in economic globalisation in 
trade and finance  
2014  Political crisis (2014 Coup) 
 
Fully participated in economic globalisation in 
trade and finance 
Source: Tangsupvattana (2011); BBC (2017) 
 
  
Laothamatas (1988) argued that Thailand’s pre-1988 government system, which was 
semi-democratic in nature, has caused the business sector to become a more 
significant manipulator of political policy (see Jumbala, 1974). One of the reasons for 
this is that businesses are becoming directly involved in Thailand’s parliamentary 
system and election processes. Further, they are joining the Joint Public-Private 
Consultative Committees (JPPCCs), voting for political parties, and undertaking 
collective lobbying actions (Laothamatas, 1988).  
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The JPPCC was formed in 1981, on the basis of recognising Thailand’s private 
business sector and its power to spark change. Members included the Association of 
Thai Industries, the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Thai Banker’s Association, and 
other influential housing building associations including; the Thai Condominium 
Association, Thai Real Estate Association, and Housing Business Association etc. 
One of the JPPCC’s most influential activities was its use as a medium for expressing 
the interests of the business sector; offering an escape from Thailand’s corrupted 
institutions and relationships (Laothamatas, 1994; Muscat, 1994). The demise of the 
JPPCC began in 1988, when Thailand’s new Chatichai government placed a higher 
emphasis on building relationships with key business figures, as per the concept of 
clientelism (Doner & Ramsay, 1997). Concurrently, it is claimed that unethical 
political exchanges and activities became rife in Thailand (Haggard & Kaufman, 
1995). Nonetheless, the business associations of Thailand have managed to maintain 
their position as key representatives of the private business sector (Doner & Ramsay, 
1997).  
 
The current status of Thai business is non-bureaucratic, since business can influence 
the cabinet, the parliament, political parties, funding and employment policies, among 
others. This new semi-democratic regime is unlike Thailand’s former status of 
bureaucracy, partly because it incorporates free elections, competitive parties and a 
house of parliament that has been elected. Further, it involves better dissemination of 
political authority. As a result, public policy-making can now be influenced by groups 




Thailand differs from Korea and Taiwan in that the Thai government possesses 
comparatively better government organisations, as well as the ability to offer more 
protection from business and other interest groups that attempt to influence decision-
making or public opinion (MacIntyre, 1990). That notwithstanding, Thailand has 
largely depended upon its controlling and somewhat oppressive government to 
encourage business growth. In doing so, it has managed to achieve rapid 
industrialisation despite its sectors’ lack of autonomous strength (Lucas, 1997; 
Robison et al., 2005).  
 
2.4.2  Role of Thai Civil Society and Its Relationship to the state and 
Business 
 
Civil society is a crucial component of ensuring effective governance. In Thailand, 
social movements and the media have played a regulatory role in Thailand’s political 
history by assuming a strong activist stance. Thai civil society has been very 
intentional about revealing instances of corruption within the political structure 
(Pongsapich & Kataleeradabhan, 1994). As a result of their activist stance, civil 
society organisations have often been conceptualised as unfriendly in terms of their 
engagement with the state. Overtime, economic growth in Thailand led to the 
withdrawal of development-focused civil society organisations and those that 
remained had tenuous links with government and therefore played a minimal role in 
national development (ADB, 2011). Thailand has experienced a growth in social 
movements which have become increasingly viewed as a tool for legitimately 
expressing grievances against the state. Social movements in Thailand have mostly 
been predicated on subjects such as poverty, inequality, and other development-
related issues (Simpson, 2015). Along these lines, studies conducted by scholars such 
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as Albritton & Burekul (2002) have revealed that civil society participation is 
perpetuating inclinations towards the key political and social institutions of the state. 
Thus, while contestations between the state and civil society exist in Thailand, civil 
society does play an important role in encouraging public participation.  
 
2.5 The Corporatist Approach in the Thai Context 
 
Thai state patronage has had a significant impact on the development of business 
entities in Thailand’s quasi-democratic period. The Bank of Thailand’s decision to 
establish the JPPCCs demonstrates the desire for a more formal relationship between 
the executives in both fields. The topic for discussion that emerges is whether 
Thailand is developing its own model of state corporatism, under which businesses 
would act independently of bureaucrats and would have the capacity to hold 
government to account. Analysts of Thailand’s political system identify many 
corporatist strands (Laothamatas, 1988). Chenvidyakarn (1979) highlights the fact 
that according to the Trade Association Act and the Chamber of Commerce Act 
(1966), the state has control over licensing and registration of business entities across 
the country and can scrutinise the irregularities or histories of corporate individuals 
(Chenvidyakarn, 1979). Registrars selected by the government can additionally 
change the regulations of a company before allowing it to officially register. The 
Board of Trade (BOT), which is comprised of representatives of the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce (TCC), foreign-national chambers of commerce, trade associations, state 
companies and cooperatives, is legally empowered to represent the economic sector to 
the government. The same law requires the existence of a single chamber of 
commerce, whose president will be the de facto head of the Board of Trade. There are 
regional chambers of commerce, but each province can only have a single chamber 
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and it must be registered with the Thai Chamber (Chenvidyakarn, 1979). In hardline 
corporatist states however, every business-owner and company is obliged to register 
with a trade association, which is not the case in Thailand, nor are associations 
required to align themselves with umbrella organisations. Any number of trade 
organisations can establish themselves, within specific industries and in the country at 
large (Laothamatas, 1988).  
 
However, Thailand’s governance has changed repeatedly in the decades since these 
two acts were passed and the nature of public-private sector engagement is no longer 
consistent with the law. Laothamatas (1988) points out that in opposition to the decree 
of the Chamber of Commerce Act, the Board of Trade is no longer the economic apex 
organisation and most trade organisations have opted-out of membership. 
Laothamatas (1988) also explains that the Thai Banks and the Association of Thai 
Industry have become as powerful, if not more so, than the BOT and the TCC. 
Bankers and industrialists generally consider these organisations as their governing 
bodies, rather than the BOT or the TCC (Laothamatas, 1988). 
 
Laothamatas (1988) further demonstrates that because the government recognises the 
JPPCC as the core avenue for dialogue between the state and the private sector, that it 
has granted unique importance to the associations comprising the JPPCC, despite that 
fact that the Thai Bankers and the Association of Thai Industries are ordinary trade 
associations. The essential observation is that the state has tolerated the rise of 




The Thai government is entitled by law to interfere with the registration of 
companies, the appointment of executives and the bylaws of corporations, but it 
generally chooses not to exercise this authority. Many trade associations do not even 
submit the details of their activities, the identities of their leaders, their financial 
reports or even their locations to the Department of Internal Trade which, in theory, 
has oversight of their practices (Laothamatas, 1988). 
 
When considering the economic, social and political reform of the 1970s, corporatism 
seems to provide a good foundation for understanding the evolving nature of the state 
and the business sector for this study. Corporatism emphasises how much 
independence business institutions have in their interaction with the state; the results 
of the relationship in terms of policy decision-making; and the balance of power 
within the state-business relationship. Therefore, corporatism is a particularly 
appropriate approach to consider in this study, in terms of addressing Thailand and 
Bangkok’s impact on policy formulation and application.  
 
2.6 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): Theoretical 
Underpinnings  
 
In order to promote sustainable development, decision-making can be enhanced 
through the use of EIAs at the planning stage. Various scholars, including Wood 
(1995), Lohani & Halm (1987), and Munn (1979), report that during the 1970s and 
1980s, developing and developed countries alike embraced the concept of EIA. Over 
the last couple of decades, many have begun to consider EIA as a key component in 
the assimilation of environmental issues and planning-based decision-making. Wood 
(1995), Sadler (1995), and Ortolan et al. (1987) explain that despite this, EIA 
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implementation differs widely in terms of efficiency, usefulness and outcome due to 
the diversity of national planning and development project criteria, demand and 
setting.  
 
The UN (1991) argues that attempting to identify a single globally-relevant EIA 
model is a challenging task due to the number of different planning systems in 
existence. Consequently, countries around the globe are adopting different guidelines 
and definitions of EIA implementation. Furthermore, the first EIA process – launched 
in the US – was not intended to serve as a global model of assessment. For this 
reason, as Leu et al. (1996) and the UN (1991) explain, there have been many 
challenges involved in the integration of EIA practice into new planning systems. The 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (1992) and Hudson et 
al. (1979) add that the challenges that have arisen tend to be linked to different 
countries’ approaches to planning system operations and the introduction of EIA. As a 
result, many researchers have begun to focus on identifying the ways in which EIA 
implementation can be achieved in various settings.  
 
2.6.1  EIA: Terms and Definitions   
 
The most effective approach to understanding EIA development and it characteristics 
is to comprehend the terms and definitions that exist regarding it. As explained by 
Wood (1995) and the UN (1988), the terminologies related to EIA are both 
convoluted and varied due to the differences between different countries’ approaches 
to EIA strategy and wording. In many cases, different countries share common terms 
without sharing common meanings for these terms. Therefore, there is a clear 
rationale for an exploration of the key definitions that presently exist for EIA.  
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Firstly, Wood (1995) and Sadler (1995) report that ‘Environmental Assessment’ (EA) 
and ‘Environmental Impact Assessment’ (EIA) are frequently expressed in reference 
to the same thing. This can be dependent on the country. For example, Weston 
(1997), Wood (1995), and the Department of Environment (DOE) (1991)  explain that 
the EIA acronym is adopted in America due to the country’s National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) and EC Directive. However, in order to ensure that EIAs are 
presented as assessments of positive as well as negative factors, the EA acronym has 
been used in Canada and the UK. This being said, the Department of the Environment 
Transport and Regions (DETR) (1999) reports that the UK has adopted the EIA term 
so that it is not mistakenly thought to be related to the Environmental Agency (EA). 
This adoption of the EIA acronym has been in place since the implementation of the 
UK’s Town and Country Planning Act 1999.   
 
The lack of a global EIA definition is further emphasised by Barrow (1997) and 
Glasson et al. (2005), who note that nations continue to differ on their terminologies. 
One of the reasons for this is that EIA implementation must fit with specific 
countries’ planning systems and environmental situations regardless of EIA being 
globally acknowledged as a strategy and theory. Thus, as pointed out by Weston 
(1997), Barrow (1997), Wood (1995), Sadler (1993), and the UN (1991), it is the 
unique objectives and circumstances of each country that determines the definitions of 
EIA and the environment. Furthermore, in the case of the US, which is comprised of 
50 different states, NEPA is not able to determine every state’s procedural potential 
when it comes to EIA implementation due to the diversity of circumstances and 
structures within each state.  
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The UN (1988) reports that EIA now incorporates economic and social factors 
alongside environmental issues. Moreover, the unique circumstances of each EIA-
adopting country are now incorporated into EIA definitions. Of the various definitions 
that exist, some focus on specific projects’ cost-benefits, economic factors and 
environmental setting (Ahmed et al., 1985) while others highlight the importance of 
achieving sustainable goals by considering the protection and maintenance of natural 
resources during development (Wood, 1995; Glasson et al., 2005; Smith, 1993). In all 
of these definitions, it is not the ex-post assessment that is stressed, but the ex-ante. 
Socio-economic, health and human resource factors are emphasised in two other key 
definitions (UNEP, 1988). Others also have defined EIA in terms of advanced 
planning and decision-making procedures, which marks an extension of project-based 
definitions (Bartelmus,1994; World Bank,  1991).  
 
There is also significant diversity among EIA procedures, which are influenced 
heavily by the specific circumstances associated with different countries. In order to 
understand the key components of EIA processes, the following section outlines the 
theories underpinning the EIA process. According to Horberry (1985), EIA serves 
two main functions. Firstly, it can be used to ensure that development programmes are 
environmental-friendly and sustainable by assimilating the information that key 
decision-makers need to know. Secondly, EIA can be used to ensure that project 
outcomes (i.e. in terms of natural resources and the environment) are considered when 
developmental decisions are made. In addition, EIA can be used in construction 
projects in order to minimise environmental damage. Thus, when decision-makers are 
able to determine and forecast key environmental outcomes, EIA meets its main 
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objective. Moreover, when steps are taken to minimise or avoid such outcomes, EIA 
is able to meet its key aims. 
 
EIA entails not only theories, but strategies (Fortlage, 1990). It involves politics, 
decision-making and communication along with the ability to forecast the outcomes 
of policy or projects through environmental and other data. Wood et al. (1991) 
explain that EIA has the capacity to ensure that negative environmental outcomes are 
avoided or minimised through the rejection or adjustment of projects, respectively. 
The UN (1992) adds that informed decision-making should include consideration of 
economic, social and environmental factors. This ensures that projects that are 
predicted to result in overly-negative environmental outcomes may fail to receive 
approval.  
 
It should be mentioned that EIA is defined and perceived in a number of ways. While 
some scholars conceptualise EIA as a concept that guarantees the achievement of 
environmental decision-making objectives through appropriate development, others 
perceive EIA as simply an administrative barrier that needs to be crossed in order for 
a project to be carried out. However, this study adopts one definition of EIA in 
particular: EIA is defined by the Thai Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
(MONRE, 2012) as an assessment of the positive and negative impacts that 
development and other activity can have on the environment. Additionally, EIA 
serves the function of ensuring that such environmental impacts are avoided and 
minimised through the use of specific mitigation measures. EIA is a strategy that 
should be used before decisions are made in order to certify that decision-makers take 
the environmental impacts of development projects into full account.  
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2.6.2  EIA: Aims and Ideologies  
 
Any decision that will probably result in a substantial impact on the environment 
should involve an EIA. It suggested that effective EIA processes entail an evaluation 
of projects, schemes, plans and policies, which means that EIA has a strong potential 
capacity (Munn, 1979). Wood (1995) and Therivel et al. (1992) point out that so far, it 
is only project-level development that has involved the implementation of EIA. With 
regards to the effectiveness of EIA implementation, it is said that EIA entails three 
key components:  
 
Identification: This is based on determining the nature of development project 
factors that could impact the environment in a serious way as well as the nature of the 
current environment. 
Prediction: Here, predicted outcomes are measured with regards to a benchmark 
standard. Typically, relevant project decisions are evaluated in terms of their 
environmental effect in order to conduct this calculation.  
Evaluation: The identification and prediction stages converge to form the evaluation 
stage of the EIA procedure. The aim of this stage is to facilitate logical and informed 
decision-making based on data regarding other available options and the predicted 
effect that these will have on the environment. The effects that the proposed project 
could have is further considered. Furthermore, populations that may be impacted by 
the project are outlined during the evaluation stage.  
 
Wathern (1995) argues that the above three components must be incorporated if a 
logical and methodical EIA procedure is to be achieved. The majority of studies on 
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EIA conducted in developed nations have emphasised the precision of EIA strategies 
linked with these components through the introduction of changes and developments. 
It is imperative to note that EIA entails more than scientific components: its capacity 
in the decision-making process should be considered since EIA was constructed for 
the purpose of facilitating decision-making during the planning stage. Thus, as 
Kennedy (1988) points out, both scientific strategies and approaches to decision-
making at the planning stage should be taken into account when enacting EIA. There 
are a number of criteria for EIA implementation that are adopted by many countries. 
The following five criteria have been proposed by the UNEP (1988): 
 
Emphasis on key concerns: Of all possible impacts on the environment, EIA should 
focus only on the most important rather than on assessing numerous issues at once.  
Inclusivity of every relevant individual or organisation: In order to successfully 
implement EIA, three core groups should be involved. The first group are those who 
are assigned to EIA implementation and management, such as specialists and 
coordinators. The second group comprises policy makers, engineers, economists, 
scientists and other interested or invested parties who bring issues, thoughts and 
insights to the assessment. The third group entails politicians, regulators, authorities, 
investors, aid organisations, developers and other decision-makers who have the 
power to approve or change the development project. 
Coordination of project decision-making and EIS data: In order to make informed 
decisions regarding a development project, EIS information should be shared at the 
design and planning stages.  
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Achieve effective environmental management by providing strategies to control 
environmental outcomes: The EIA should be built in such a way that the probable 
outcomes of every option are outlined without ambiguity in order to offer effective 
guidance on project implementation and planning.  
Support decision-making by offering information in an appropriate format: The 
prediction and minimisation of environmental issues is the main aim of the EIA 
process. Those in charge of making key decisions should therefore, be able to 
comprehend the analyses of the EIA. Regardless of how significant the EIS 
information is, the majority of decision-makers will overlook information that is not 
offered in a style that they can relate to.  
 
When these criteria are met, those involved in the process are more likely to work in 
harmony. Furthermore, this provides a benchmark standard for decision-makers to 
follow. The UN (1991) emphasises that these criteria should provide the foundation 
from which EISs and EIA procedures are carried out. The key stages that should 
occur within the most effective EIA procedures are outlined in the following section.  
 
2.6.3  EIA: Key Stages  
 
Glasson et al. (2005) emphasise that in order to permit re-evaluation and comments 
throughout the entire process, EIA should occur under guidelines that encourage a 
repetitive approach due to its logical and methodical nature. Various scholars and 
organisations, such as Petts (1999), Weston (1997), Barrow (1997), Sadler (1996), 
Wood (1995), Wathern (1995), Glasson et al. (2005), and the UN (1991), have 
explored the stages within the EIA process in great depth. The majority of studies 
offer guidance on how to manage each stage, along with a common approach to best 
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practice. The guidelines are outlined below based on Pimcharoen’s (2001, p.26-27) 
propositions: 
 
Screening – In order to identify whether or not a development project is relevant for 
an EIA, or whether changing the project’s setting or size could negate the need for an 
official EIA, it is important that project screening takes place.  
Scoping – The effectiveness of an EIA depends heavily on scoping, which aims to 
identify major environmental impacts that must be explored in order to focus the 
analysis of the EIA. Here, the entities that are likely to be impacted by the project are 
determined along with the predicted major effects of the action. Since scoping 
removes the focus on more insignificant factors, scoping can offer time and cost 
benefits.  
EIS Preparation – The purpose of this stage is to present an objective and 
unambiguous image of the project’s environmental outcomes, the suggested strategies 
to manage these outcomes, the extent of the impacts and the issues raised by members 
of the public with regards to the project. Initially, a draft EIS is published under the 
USA NEPA framework. This draft is open to public input. After taking public opinion 
into account, the draft is modified and the final report is generated. In some cases, 
numerous reports can be released if the EIA process involves multiple modifications 
and adjustments. However, the main point of this stage is to produce one report that 
summarises the content in a non-technical manner.  
Public Participation and Consultation – It is important that the EIA process is 
inclusive of public input, since this can assist in making sure that the project or action 
is not perceived to be harmful to the environment. Public participation should occur 
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throughout the EIA process from the start, though it is essential during the scoping 
phase. The purpose of consultation is to ensure that decisions are not made without 
public input, since public opinion enhances the success of EIA implementation.  
EIS Review – At this stage, the competence of the EIA report is evaluated. 
Specifically, the report is assessed based on its provision of sufficient decision-
making data, proposal evaluations and fulfilment of its Terms of Reference (TOR). 
Here, the statement methodologies, quality and content of the EIS are officially 
reviewed by consultants, members of the public and the relevant authority. It is 
crucial that the EIS’ objectivity and accuracy is assessed by an independent review 
board, since consultants are usually assigned with releasing statements for supporters 
or developers of the project. At the decision-making stage, the project’s 
implementation terms and conditions (T&Cs) are constructed if the project is 
authorised. Projects can also be vetoed at this stage. The decision-making system has 
a crucial impact on the approval of the project. Often, other issues such as economic 
policy and national security must be reviewed along with the EIA for a proposed 
action to be passed.  
Monitoring and Auditing  – The purpose of monitoring is to guarantee that further 
EIA proposals and mitigation strategies are enhanced; the current project’s mitigation 
strategies are successful; the environmental effects of the project are noted; the 
forecasted outcomes are the same as the actual outcomes; and that decision-makers 
adhere to approval criteria. The monitoring stage should take place once decisions 
have been made on the project, and it should be conducted across the project’s 
operation, execution and construction. The idea behind EIA is that monitoring should 
be constantly conducted to identify the potential need for changes following the 
original decision. The purpose of auditing is to comparatively review the forecasted 
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outcomes against the real outcomes in order to assess how precise the EIA process is. 
Auditing is also important in guaranteeing that the post-completion stage of the 
project is supported by measures to protect and maintain the environment in which the 
project took place. In addition, auditing (and monitoring) can be useful for future 
EIAs and baseline research since it allows the processes of existing EIAs to be tested.  
 
Wood (1995) and the UN (1991) illustrate that EIA implementation involves a 
successful combination of decision-making (as an ‘art’) and EIA strategies (as 
‘sciences’). Thus, EIA is a multifaceted and cyclical process. It is crucial that 
decision-makers are provided with comprehensive and meaningful information if EIA 
is to be successful.  
 
2.6.4  EIA: Effectiveness 
 
Although it has been practiced for over 50 years, there are still significant debates 
about the effectiveness of EIA (Morgan, 2012) . The majority of the critique concerns 
the gaps between theory and practice  (Partidario & Sheate, 2013). As a result, the 
debate concerning the efficacy of EIA is still ongoing (Sanchez, 2013; Fischer, 2016) 
after gaining significant traction during the 1970s. It is suggested in this thesis, that 
research that focuses on EIA effectiveness can provide insight into how its application 
may be improved in order to achieve its intended objectives (Almeida & Montano, 
2017). The views concerning EIA effectiveness in the literature are summarised 
below. The majority of these studies have conceptualised effectiveness in terms of 
EIA’s ability to achieve the criteria delineated in methodological guides (Ahmed & 
Wood, 2002; Badr, 2009; Marara et al., 2011). For scholars such as Wood (2003) an 
EIA is only effective if it is able to meet the effectiveness assessment criteria. 
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Scholars such as Sadler (1996) and Macintosh (2010) measure EIA effectiveness in 
terms of its procedural (Cashmore et al., 2004; Sadler, 1996; Kabir & Momtaz, 2013), 
normative, transactive and substantive aspects. Its procedural aspect concerns its 
ability to adhere to international standards of good practice whereas its normative 
aspect concerns the adaptability of EIA agents based on learning outcomes. The 
transactive aspect concerns the ability to effectively measure time-based and financial 
resources, while the substantive aspect (Arts et al., 2012; Cashmore et al., 2004) 
concerns the ability to decipher the influence of EIA on decision-making processes.  
 
This research primarily focuses on the procedural effectiveness of EIA in Thailand, 
and it is thus imperative for the criteria to be employed in the analysis to be 
established. Organisations such as the International Association for Impact 
Assessment (IAIA) (1996) have delineated both operational and basic principles and 
basic principles to serve as the criteria for the EIA implementation process. Sadler 
(1996), also notes four categories: the timing of an EIA process; the stage at which 
the terms of reference (TOR) are prepared; the robustness of the information and 
other products; and the receptivity of decision-makers.  
 
With regard to this criteria, it is common knowledge that EIA should be implemented 
at an early stage and that the TOR are crucial for guaranteeing an effective EIA 
process. It is also imperative that alternative proposals are considered as part of the 
EIA process, and that the EIS is of a high standard as it impinges on the decision-
making of policymakers and thus, impacts on the EIA. Sadler (1996) identifies five 
limitations of EIA practice which are outlined below. In chapter 8, these limitations 
will be considered in the case of Thailand. 
1. Attitudinal: project proponents and development agencies circumvent the EIA;  
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2. Structural: the EIA is poorly aligned with decision-making in the area of project 
implementation, policy implementation, and planning;  
3. Institutional: the scope of the EIA is narrowly conceptualised and hence limits the 
focus on important factors such as health which ultimately become side-lined; 
4. Procedural: a lack of guidance and effective implementation of the EIA process 
underpins user challenges concerning efficiency and timeliness amongst others; and  
5. Technical: the accuracy and quality of EISs is inconsistent.  
 
In this research, the overarching objective is to examine the impact of EIA on new 
housing development by analysing the decision-making process that underpins EIA 
policy-making and implementation. In chapter 5, EIA systems are critically analysed 
and this analysis draws on the institutional, procedural and administrative components 
of the EIA decision-making process in Thailand’s housing sector (discussed in 
chapters, 5, 6, 7, and 8). 
 
 
2.7 The Policy-Making Process 
 
This section examines the topic of policy-making processes, policy implementation, 
and policy impacts by drawing upon the range of previous research studies and the 
theories currently available. Following this, the research provides a framework for 
analysing the state-business relationships in EIA policy-making process. The research 
focuses on the different roles of actors and their influence on three policy stages: 
agenda setting, formulation, and implementation. Following this, the research presents 
the concept of policy networks, and then outlines the conceptual framework. 
This research addresses policy-making and application along with an overview of the 
setting within which they occur, as well as the relationship between various interest 
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groups, in order to gain a clear comprehension of the state-business relationships in 
Thailand and their influence on the nation’s EIA legislation. Furthermore, Hajer & 
Wagenaar (2003) point out that the alterations to Thailand’s policy formulation 
processes over the last 20 years has led to a rising level of reliance, increased 
dynamics and uncertainty in the system. This is largely due to an evolution of 
authority, in which Thailand’s politicians and government institutions have begun to 
relinquish dominance, while interest groups from various sectors and industries are 
gaining influence.  
 
2.7.1  Policy Formulation 
 
Howlett & Ramesh (1995) suggest that policy-making involves the investigation and 
judgment of the policy options. In the majority of cases, policy makers do not make a 
great effort to incorporate theoretical studies and new perspectives into their decision 
process (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995). Instead, many policy makers look to other 
regions and local agents, as well as the expertise of their own institutions, to find 
direction (Rose, 1991). It can also be said that the knowledge acquisition of those 
forming the policy can depend on the knowledge of those applying the policies. 
Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) highlight the lack of policy models that could be used to 
solve restrictive issues (i.e. issues that involve unusual challenges, or that have similar 
socioeconomic features). Furthermore, an institution might find itself pushed, whether 
overtly or subtly, to take on a certain policy (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Grindle & 
Thomas (1991) suggest that this burden might force the hand of countries that require 




In terms of knowledge acquisition, decision makers must then find a way to 
incorporate what they have learnt, if they do decide to incorporate this knowledge. 
Rose (1991) and Bennett (1991) point out that policy learning can include imitation 
along with various levels of interpretation; meaning that the changes to the policy 
may fluctuate from the given framework. Rose (1991) explains that this is a 
consequence of a policy’s approval being reliant on numerous factors (i.e. 
socioeconomic situation, political environment, policy history and so on). Cobb et al. 
(1976) add that social opinion, cost and the realistic possibility of implementation can 
influence the decision on whether or not a policy is approved or changed. 
Additionally, the opinions, support, reactions, administrative room, budgetary 
allowance, career aims, and so on, of government elites are often influences of policy-
making (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). 
 
Howlett & Ramesh (2003) suggest that these actors must possess at least some 
information and expertise regarding the improvement of the issue at hand, given that 
these actors must be able to present a persuasive case for alternative policies. 
Furthermore, the actors should have a genuine, long-term interest in the issue, since 
policy-making can take a long time, and a lot of effort, to finalise. At this stage, 
policy networks may be a significant factor. For example, it has been said that the 
integrity of the intervention of network actors in policy-making and implementation 
processes is reaffirmed by the relations between the appropriate participants and 
government officials (Stone, 2001). 
Although both non-state and state participants are involved in cooperative activities, it 
has been found that decision makers tend to depend on the guidance to ‘epistemic 
communities’, which refers to knowledgeable networks within the given field (Rose, 
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1991). Stone (2001) points out that the knowledge acquisition gained from these 
networks, is obtained in a professional manner, with the consent of the participants; 
though this is not always the case. Marsh & Rhodes (1992) add that policy can be 
shaped by organised interests, officials and elite figures, along with experts and 
scholars; though, in some cases, policy-making can favour governmentally- or 
academically-elected actors (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). 
 
2.7.2  Policy Implementation  
 
Schofield & Sausman (2004) propose that policy implementation refers to the ways in 
which public policy is approved and carried out, along with the reasons for doing so. 
Hill & Hupe (2002) explain that since policy content can be changed or excluded 
while it is going through the implementation process, thus affecting the outcome of 
the policy, action is a crucial step in the policy implementation process (Hudson & 
Lowe, 2004). Parsons (1995) explains that the ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ models are 
two approaches often referred to in policy-making and policy implementation studies, 
and that the purpose of evaluating policy at this point is to identify why there are 
separations between policy outcomes and policy aims.  
 
Thus, the aim of this policy implementation section is to theoretically examine how 
roles and behaviour discretion influences policy implementation. In establishing a 
range of techniques and truisms regarding the organisation and management designed 
to produce the best possible pairing between administration and political objective, 




The Top-Down Approach  
 
Proponents of the top-down approach include Bardach (1977), Van Meter & Van 
Horn (1975), Nakamura & Smallwood (1980), and Mazmanian & Sabatier (1983). 
This approach views implementation as the centralised policy objectives in a 
hierarchical manner. The first step in policy implementation from a top-down 
perspective is that central government decides upon a policy (Parsons, 1995). The 
top-down approach largely ignores the effect of implementers on policy 
implementation and presupposes a straight causal connection between policies and 
perceived results. This approach views a policy as input and implementation as 
output, making it a rather narrow reading of implementation. The top-down approach 
has been described as a phenomenon of the governing aristocracy due to its focus on 
the decisions made by central policy-makers (DeLeon, 2001).  
 
Pressman & Wildavsky began the research from the position that central policy-
makers are responsible for establishing the intent of policies. According to Pressman 
& Wildavsky (1973), implementation itself is seen as the relationship between 
establishing objectives and the actions designed to achieve these objectives. In order 
to achieve the successful delivery of a policy, the scholars believe that implementers 
need to be governed by guidelines that set clearly comprehensible duties and establish 
a tiered system of control and also require ensured access to adequate resources 
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).  
 
Additionally, Van Meter & Van Horn (1975) focused their research on how the goals 
of a policy coincide with the ultimate results of implementation. The connection 
between policy and execution is evaluated through the analysis of six factors. The 
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majority of these variables concern hierarchical management and the capabilities of 
organisations. Similar to the propositions of Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) and Van 
Meter & Van Horn (1975), Sabatier & Mazmanian (1983) begin the analytical model 
with decisions made by government officials. The authors presuppose a clean division 
between creating and implementing a policy. For Sabatier & Mazmanian (1983), 
successful policy implementation requires that six criteria be satisfied: 
• The goals of a policy is clear and constant; 
• The policy programme is founded on a reliable causal theory; 
• The organisation of implementation procedures is well-structured; 
• Those charged with implementing the policy are devoted to the achievement 
of the policy’s objectives; 
• Executive and legislative leaders and interest groups are supportive; 
• The socio-economic context does not suffer any negative changes. 
 
Sabatier & Mazmanian (1979) claim that through adopting suitable programme 
models and well-structured implementation procedures, policy-makers can guarantee 
successful policy implementation. However, they do recognise that, in reality, it is 
extremely difficult to achieve ideal hierarchical management over implementation and 
that policy implementation can fail in uncomplimentary conditions (Sabatier & 
Mazmanian, 1979). 
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The Bottom-Up Approach 
 
The prominent scholars of the bottom-up approach include Lipsky (1971, 1980), 
Ingram (1977), Elmore (1980), and Hjern & Hull (1982). Lipsky (1971) states that the 
communication between citizens and social workers must be taken into account by 
policy analysts. Hudson’s (1993) claim that it is not simply the behaviour of citizens 
that public service employees (or ‘street-level bureaucrats’ as Lipsky terms them) 
have power over. Furthermore, these street-level bureaucrats are believed to enjoy 
significant independence from the institutions that employ them due to the substantial 
powers of discretion they are able to employ (Hudson, 1993). 
 
Lipsky reveals that policy-making at the ground level generates procedures that allow 
public service workers to deal with the day-to-day difficulties that arise in their 
professions. This central tenet supports the creation of procedural plans concentrating 
on players at the ground level, and illustrates that the hierarchical management 
structures emphasised in top-down theories are not sufficient to ensure the effective 
implementation of policies (Lipsky, 1971). Also, the bottom-up focus of Elmore’s 
(1980) work called ‘backward mapping’, rejects the idea that central policy-makers 
are in control of implementation and affirms that the starting point of evaluation 
should be a particular policy difficulty and how local agents work to resolve the issue. 
 
A practical network methodology for the analysis of the procedure of implementation 
is proposed by the work of Hjern (1982) and Hjern & Porter  (1981, 1982). These 
scholars believe that in the study of policy implementation, it is vital to consider the 
fact that execution involves a number of different agents and organisations. The 
starting point for their methodology is to identify the groups of agents found in the 
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pertinent organisations working on policy delivery, and to explore how these groups 
handle any difficulties they face. This method has been hailed as a valuable 
mechanism for detailing the structures of implementation involved in policy delivery 
(Hjern & Porter, 1981; Sabatier, 1986). Sabatier (1986) has, nonetheless, criticised 
this approach for not providing causal theories in relation to the associations between 
the actions of individuals and financial and legal variables. 
 
Differences between Top-down and Bottom-up Theories 
 
Top-down and bottom-up implementation approaches are poles apart. The key 
differences between the two approaches are wide-ranging. Each approach adopts 
polemical research methodologies, different interpretations of the process of 
interpretation, contrasting procedural policy models, opposing frameworks of 
democracy and conflicting analytical objectives (Pülzl & Treib, 2007). 
 
Indeed, they bear the names of their opposing approaches to research. The starting 
point of the top-down approach is the policy decisions taken by the governing elite 
which are then passed down to those charged with implementing the policy. The 
starting point of bottom-up approaches is the identification of agents active at the 
bottom of the chain, that is, those who play a part in the actual execution of a policy. 
Bottom-up analysis then progresses from this point, moving sideways as well as 
upwards, to find networks of implementers and examine their approaches to handling 
the difficulties associated with policy implementation (Pülzl & Treib, 2007). 
 
These two approaches each rely on opposing concepts of the procedure of policy-
making. Nakamura (1987) underscores the fact that top-down theorists are 
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significantly affected by the classic model of the policy process which presupposes 
that it can be separated into a number of easily identifiable, distinct stages. Bardach 
(1977) explains that, as a result, top-down analytical models concentrate solely on 
what occurs following the passing of a bill into law and not on the entire procedure of 
establishing a policy. 
 
According to the bottom-up approach however, the creation of a policy and its 
implementation are inseparable and policy-making is a continual process which 
occurs throughout policy formulation and implementation. As a result, bottom-up 
theorists look at the entire procedure of creating, implementing and, possibly, re-
thinking policies as opposed to one single phase of the process (Pülzl & Treib, 2007). 
Furthermore, both approaches adopt contrasting perspectives of the nature of policy 
implementation. Mazmanian & Sabatier (1983) explain that top-down theories 
interpret implementation as the execution of a policy decision, making 
implementation simply an administrative procedure untouched by politics. It is the 
central policy-makers who are in control, decide upon policy goals and establish a 
hierarchical structure to oversee the achievement of these goals. The concept of 
hierarchical management is dismissed by bottom-up theorists who claim that it is not 
possible to manage implementation from head to toe or to create statues with 
indisputable policy objectives (Hjern & Hull, 1982; Lipsky, 1971). The bottom-up 
theory posits that significant discretionary power is vested in implementers and that 
the process of implementation, therefore, cannot be seen as a straightforward 
procedure of adhering to decisions that come from the top of the hierarchy. Instead, 
bottom-up scholars believe that implementation is highly political and policies are 
formed largely at local levels (Lipsky, 1971). 
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Bottom-up theories claim that the concerns of private agents, local officials and 
relevant interest groups and citizens should be considered, stating that ignoring these 
real concerns invalidates the decisions taken by central policy-makers. It is not, in the 
view of bottom-up theorists, a violation of democratic values to depart from centrally-
formulated policy goals. Thus, democratic governance is only genuine when it 
involves a participatory democratic framework in formulating policies which takes 
into account everyone impacted upon by a policy decision, from ground level 
administrators to private individuals and interest groups (Pülzl & Treib, 2007). 
 
It is clear that the arguments between top-down and bottom-up theorists are wide-
ranging and far-reaching and do not simply concern the question of who drives the 
implementation process. According to O’Toole (2000), if the impetus behind 
implementation serves as the only source of disagreement between these two 
approaches, then the debate would be ineffective. Parsons (1995) does acknowledge 
that supporters of both camps adopt a broad view of the complexities of the process of 
implementation by overplaying their contrasting standpoints. For instance, top-down 
theorists have focused too much on the power of central policy-makers to introduce 
unambiguous policy goals and methodically manage the implementation process  
(Sabatier, 1986). The critical reaction of the bottom-down theory thus exaggerates the 
discretionary powers of street-level bureaucrats and the independence of ground level 
agents from those positioned above them.  
 
2.8 Analytical Framework  
 
The similarity across the NIC literature is the postulation that public policy-making 
and implementation is a key element within the complicated relationship of socio-
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economic and political influences, in both an overall and national context (Ronald & 
Doling, 2013). Hence in this context, this thesis aims to offer further frameworks to 
help understand the role of the state in enacting EIA regulations, as well as to assess 
the ways in which influential business representatives become a part of state systems. 
Further, the thesis aims to gain a nuanced understanding of the ways in which the 
constantly-evolving state-business relationships are a key part of regulatory and new-
housing development from a domestic political economy perspective.  
 
This research establishes a conceptual framework in order to investigate how EIA 
implementation in Thailand was affected by socio-economic and political factors, as 
well as how EIA impacts on private sector by focusing on state-business relationships 
through a corporatist theoretical approach. The ways in which EIA has developed, 
and how this is linked to the country planning system, can be understood through an 
exploration of the EIA policy making-process. Corporatist approach was applied in 
this study to investigate how EIA policy is affected by the input of business groups 
and their associations when the EIA might have an effect upon their members. This 
input takes the form of negotiations, of which the results are affected by how close 
they are to the government as well as how the groups are organized. The interaction 
between the groups accepted by the government and the government itself dictate 
what form public policy takes (Grant & Sargent, 1987). 
 
The establishment of environmental policies and programs in Thailand has been 
driven by diverse factors which diverge significantly from those in the Western 
contexts where EIA was originally established (discussed in chapter 5 and 7). 
Specifically, in the Western context, environmental policies and programs emerged as 
a result of citizens; demands and hence they were “bottom up” initiatives. Concerns 
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about environmental degradation mainly emanated from the key concerns of the 
social agenda.  
 
Environmental policies established in Thailand have largely assumed a “top down” 
design and emerged not due to a “perceived necessity but as a fashionable response to 
Western developments” (Roque, 1986, p.154). Thailand has been influenced by 
international “peer pressure” to address environmental issues. The country has also 
drawn from the efforts of bi- and multilateral development agencies who have 
actively promoted environmental protection causes via their loan and aid programs 
(discussed in Chapter 5 and 7).  
 
Contemporary researchers in the housing field are consistently focusing on state and 
business relationships and the influence of these relationships on the development 
efficacy of the country (discussed in chapter 4). Although a myriad of researchers 
have approached this subject in various ways, all of the previous studies have 
concentrated on the interaction between public sector, private sector, and civil society 
well as the formulation and implementation of public policies to illustrate the 
differences between nations in terms of their industrialisation orientations (discussed 




This research applied Dye’s (2014) concept of policy-making process as policy 
analysis framework which made up of three stages including policy formulation, 
policy implementation, and policy evaluation, as shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 Policy Analytical Framework 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Dye, (2014, p.38)  
 
Stage 1 - Policy Formation 
 
Stage one looks at the housing and EIA policy formation process which consists of 
problem identification, agenda setting, and policy formulation. This part examines the 
fundamental elements which influence the effectiveness of EIA implementation 
including national housing and environmental policies, regulations and guidelines 
(chapter 4 and 5), national and local administrative framework (chapter 4), EIA 
procedure (chapter 5), and role of actors involved (chapter 4 and 5). Howlett and 
Ramesh (1995) explain that during the policy-making phase, policy makers take time 
to investigate, judge, and refute or adopt the policy, or policy change. In this instance, 
the participants must have a reasonable amount of understanding regarding, as well as 
long-term interest in, the issue at hand – and how to solve it – since their aim is to 
promote the benefits of alternative policies. Public policy is said to be driven more 
Structuring  
• Understanding the housing and EIA policy formation process (CH 2,4,5) 
• Determining its objectives(CH 5) 
• Analysing the EIA implementation (CH 5) 
Analysis 
• Identifying the effects of the EIA (CH 6) 
• Evaluating impacts of EIA on target and nontarget groups (CH 6,7) 
• Determining effectiveness, efficiency (CH 5,8) 
Decision 
• Identifying failures and/or successes of the policy (CH 8) 
• Proposing changes and "reforms" (Conclusions) 
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often by actors that have been chosen by officials (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995). 
Nonetheless, Stone (2001) argues that epistemic communities (i.e. scholarly 
networks), can also form an important part of policy change, though, as Marsh & 
Rhodes (1992) illustrate, this impact may be influenced by interest groups within the 
government system, as well as externally.  
 
Stage 2 - Policy Implementation 
 
Stage two explores the EIA policy implementation stage. The discussion covers the 
EIA Implementation in practice (chapter 5, 6, and 7), EIA compliance and its impacts 
(chapter 6, and 7), and international interactions (chapter 7). Outlying government 
departments are often responsible for taking policy from the formulation stage to the 
implementation stage. Hudson & Lowe (2004) suggest that, during the 
implementation phase, the policy may be changed (or refuted) by government elites. 
This can occur due to a number of issues, including discord within the workplace, a 
lack of sufficient time and funds, ineffective interaction between the relevant actors, 
or a lack of clear aims. Consequently, Marsh (1998b) suggests that when the members 
responsible for carrying out the policy have not been a part of the policy-making 
process, there may be issues involved in the implementation of the policy. Perkin & 
Court (2005) state that there should be an assessment of how each policy stakeholder 
shapes each phase of policy formulation. This is especially important in terms of 
international growth activities and the role of civil society organisation networks. 
Additionally, at the agenda-setting phase, policy makers are advised by networks to 
focus on certain key issues through the use of discussions regarding relevant 
theoretical perspectives and academic findings, lobbying, and building relationships 
between interest groups and policy makers. Civil society organisation networks offer 
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comparable services, in terms of offering their findings to the relevant policy makers 
in order to promote alternative policy content. This being said, the majority of civil 
society organisations offer assistance on problems that are low on the government’s 
priority list, and other provisions of aid, community support and advice; thus enabling 
governments to deal with more pressing or complicated issues (Perkin & Court, 
2005). The study of part 1 and 2 offer a standardised basis for evaluating the insights, 
effectiveness and functioning of EIA systems in Thailand and, at a subsequent point, 
provide a foundation for the part 3 which includes evaluation and suggestions. 
 
Stage 3 - Policy Evaluation 
 
Finally, Stage three examines EIA Policy evaluation in Thailand which includes 
discussion on the strengths and shortcomings of EIA implementation in Thailand 
(chapter 8), as well as policy alterations and suggestions (chapter 9). Although policy-
making processes are complicated and drawn-out, it is possible to segregate these 
complications into separate elements by using the stages framework (see Figure 1). It 
has been suggested that policy changes occur only when emerging groups of members 
with alternative aims and perspectives take over the position of policy community 
leaders (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991). While these policy communities tend to be 
heavily limited in terms of resources such as knowledge, different policy options and 
innovation of issues can occur when these benefits are shaken. Kingdon (1984) 
suggests that certain political events (i.e. committee changes, media focus, interest 
group activation, or changes to public perceptions) can lead to policy change 
(discussed in chapter 5 and 7).   
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In summary, it is essential that the relationship between representatives of various 
interest groups is considered as a key element of policy-making process. For example, 
from housing and environmental development perspective, we must consider the 
interaction between those causing damage to the environment, which is likely to be 
impacted by policy implementation, and the government, which is tasked with solving 
environmental issues through the generation and enactment of public policy. 
Essentially, it can be recognised that the consequences and results of policy 
implementation relates largely to this relationship.  
 
The interaction between the business sector, the government, and civil society is 
assessed how the key players involved in the relevant policy-making processes, as 
well as the way in which they relate to one another, and their respective authority. The 
relationships between business and the state can vary, and often relies on a number of 
factors. Such factors include the country’s (in this case, Thailand) policy-making 
norms, its economic and environmental policies, the level of comprehension between 
the two actors (i.e. the business sector and the government) as well as the political and 
economic significance of the sector (in this case, business).  
 
2.9  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the state-business relationship  theoretical and empirical literature that 
will serve as the analytical framework for the subsequent chapters in this thesis, was 
critically analysed. Central to the discussion in this chapter was the tenor of the 
available literature pertaining to the characteristics of business-government 
relationships and the implications for housing development and NICs relations. This 
aspect of the literature is particularly crucial for addressing the research questions of 
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this thesis. In the next chapter, the methodology of thesis, which depicts how these 
research questions will be answered, is delineated in detail.  
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This chapter explains the methodological framework for the empirical analysis in this 
thesis. The thesis aims to understand the impact of EIA on developers’ decision-
making in new housing development. In particular, the study intends to illustrate the 
problems and constraints developers face when environmental regulation potentially 
conflicts with imperatives favouring economic growth. The role of the EIA process is 
explored in order to understand its influence in new housing project development. The 
study involves an exploration of relationships between new housing development, 
environmental quality and economic progress in terms of how major agents for 
change in Bangkok prioritise economic and environmental considerations in new 
housing development.  
 
3.2 Why Qualitative Methods and In-depth Interviews 
 
The primary focus for data collection is on exploring decisions regarding the 
introduction of environmental regulation related to new housing (especially as regards 
environmental impact assessment), examining how such regulation is taken into 
account in private sector decisions on housing construction. There is further a focus 
on the interaction of builders and government agents in interpreting how 
environmental regulation is enacted. As such, this thesis is not simply concerned with 
outcomes (viz. building patterns) but also with what lies behind those outcomes in 
terms of how competing interests make their presence felt in compromises, lobbying 
and the enforcement of environmental considerations.  
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In terms of the primary unit of analysis, or “what or whom is being studied” (Babbie, 
2007, p.94), this investigation focuses more on the processes via which outcomes are 
reached, rather than on the patterning of outcomes themselves. This does not mean 
that outcomes are ignored, nor that patterns are not important, for insight on causation 
can be derived from analysis of distributions as well as from in-depth analysis of 
processes (for example comparing distributions before and after imposing the EIA 
policy to assess its impact). Thus, insight can be gained from quantitative, qualitative, 
comparative, or case studies approaches; each has something to offer in developing a 
stronger understanding of cause and effect. In terms of the research question 
investigated here, the processes involved in policy-making take on particular 
importance because one of the questions at hand is whether the framework within 
which decisions are made is ‘constructed’ so as to favour one set of decision agents 
(viz. private sector builders). In other words, are outcome patterns not simply a result 
of interactions between builders and government agents over specific construction 
decisions but also a result of setting the ‘rules’ within which builders and government 
agents act? If there is an interaction effect between these two, which casts important 
light on the influence private sector firms have on the efficacy of environmental 
regulations on house building, then this points to advantages in exploring both how 
regulations are formulated and how they are enacted. As Kalof et al. (2008) have 
indicated, where there can be interactive effects between causes, with the investigator 
needing to interpret processes as they unfold, a qualitative approach is most optimal 
with in-depth interviews serving as the primary method for data collection.  
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A qualitative as opposed to quantitative method is applied in this study because 
quantitative approaches are predicated on a search for explanations of social 
phenomena via the use of scientific methods and deductive logic (Vallaster & Koll, 
2002). Quantitative approaches facilitate comparisons and the statistical aggregation 
of data and hence permits a broad generalizable set of concise findings (Patton, 2002). 
While the quantitative approach has several merits it stresses the measurement and 
analysis of causal relationships between variables, and not processes (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005). Further, considering the framework of the research approach, a 
qualitative design can yield more descriptive data which is required for addressing the 
research questions of this thesis. Thus, a qualitative approach is more appropriate for 
this research. Denscombe (2007) suggests that deciding a strategy for the research 
with a focus on the scope of the research problem and investigation could enable the 
researcher to devise a good research strategy that is compatible with the research 
objective. The purpose of this research is to investigate the in-depth decision-making 
process with regards to public policy-making and its implementation, as well as 
decision-making in relation to private development in Bangkok, Thailand. In 
accordance with the research scope of this thesis, a case study design is adopted.  
 
Yin (2011a) has described case study methodology as a means of empirical enquiry 
particularly suitable for exploring the how and why of contemporary phenomena 
within a real-life context. This methodology, notes Yin (2011b), is particularly 
relevant when the researcher believes the context to be highly pertinent to the subject 
under study. In the context of this thesis, the pertinence of the study is rooted in the 
lack of research on NICs as delineated in chapter 1. 
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Stake (2005) states that cases examined can be single case studies or comparative 
(multiple cases) studies. Yin (2011b) defines single cases as relevant when the case is 
contemplated under demanding, exclusive, emblematic, or on-going criteria. A 
comparative approach is to be used when establishing duplicated or confirmed 
criteria. Many analysts have cited advantages of using comparative approach. Baxter 
and Jack (2008) and Stake (2005) argue the attributes can be distinguished when 
comparative cases are studied. Yin (2011b) explains that the investigator is able to 
interpret the evidence both within and across situations. Yin’s findings also concluded 
that comparative study could be used to either argue contradictory evidence for 
expected reasons, or to argue comparable conclusions in the research.  
 
Comparative approach possesses benefits and drawbacks, which the analyst must 
contemplate. Siggelkow (2007) argue that different circumstances can be adequately 
characterized by single case study. The characteristics of the theories are superior in 
single case study as they produce additional and sophisticated data (Dyer et al., 1991). 
Comparative approach is time consuming and allows the researcher less time to 
examine each case (Gerring, 2004). Yin (2011b) argues a single case study is 
sufficient when one lone individual needs to be studied, such as an individual from a 
distinct body, or a single country. Dyer et al. (1991) argue that the analyst receives a 
more profound perception of the account in this way.   
As reasons outlined above, a single case study approach is considered as the most 
appropriate research strategy for this thesis. Thailand is the main focus in this study. 
Moreover, a single case study permits an exploration of the structure of EIA in 
Thailand, including the motives behind its workings and how associates regard it. It 
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analyses the data collected and investigates possible enhancements that could benefit 
the performance of EIA in Thailand.  
 
3.3 Data and Data Collection Methods 
 
The data collection process for this study entailed three phases. Firstly, preparatory 
research was conducted to initially establish the current status of EIA regulations and 
housing development in Bangkok. This involved extensive research in libraries in 
Thailand and in databases located at the King’s College London Library in the UK. 
The second stage of the data collection process was to analyse Thailand’s EIA and the 
work of established environment and planning agencies. The final stage of the data 
collection process entailed nine months of fieldwork in Bangkok, Thailand, from May 
2014 to January 2015. During this period, data was mainly acquired through primary 
methods in the form of semi-structured in-depth interviews although data 
triangulation was used to verify interview data, through the analysis of secondary 
sources in the available literature. The interviews involved key respondents such as 
government agencies, private sector actors, as well as third sector agencies involved 
in the EIA registration and housing market. The content of the interviews drew 
extensively from an understanding of the Bangkok housing market derived from a 
statistical examination of major trends in house building which is explained in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Since the purpose of this study is to investigate the decision-making process with 
regards to public policy-making and its implementation, as well as decision-making in 
relation to private development, interview questions were designed to elicit nuanced 
insight on the research focus above. The sample population, as has been delineated 
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above, was selected based on probability sampling techniques discussed further in this 
chapter. It is however notable that Fischer et al. (2007, p.410) caution that: 
 
Policy-related research often draws on interviews, especially of legislators 
or agency executives. Yet interviewing need not be restricted to “elites” 4. 
From an interpretive research perspective, especially one informed by 
critical theory, non-elite actors are also seen as playing a role in shaping 
policies, especially in rejecting top-down acts such as in policy 
implementation; and the researcher would want to understand their 
perspectives as well.  
 
 
For instance, it has been discovered by Hoffman (1995) that policy regarding 
technology is influenced by factors beyond policy-makers, including technology 
companies and university research teams. To derive a comprehensive understanding 
of the policy formation process, it is necessary to capture the ‘mind-set’ of each of the 
actors involved in such processes in their own terms (rather than imposing an 
interpretive framework through the structure of questions in a questionnaire, for 
example). Thus, this thesis sought to incorporate the views of a myriad of actors in the 
policy formation process via semi-structured interviewing, as opposed to a myopic 
focus on elite groups solely. The sets of questions are about how government officials 
seek to achieve in drawing up (or implementing) EIA procedures. How the EIA 
regulation was planned and developed, as well as how EIA regulation impacts on new 
house building in Thailand’s capital city (see Appendix 2). 
 
While semi-structured interviews generate information between interviewer and 
interviewee (Kvale, 1996, p.124), derivation of themes from interview transcripts 
                                                
 
4 (see, e.g., Soss, 2006; Walsh, 2004) 
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requires circumstantial understanding and insights from theory. In other words, 
interviews are more than discussions on an issue (Wengraf, 2001); rather, interview-
based information is grounded in theory.  
 
The specific focus for investigating interactions between government agents and 
private sector builders concerns EIA procedures. In order to investigate the 
relationship between development companies and state agencies, two aspects of the 
EIA process were investigated.  
 
First, there are the specific building projects that are required to be subject to this 
procedure. In this regard, there is already an impressive literature on how legislation 
is often implemented in unexpected ways; where the intention behind the legislation 
is not matched by outcomes from it (e.g. Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Siedentopf & 
Hauschild, 1988). This is where interaction between agents takes a different form 
from that involved in introducing new laws or regulations. Once legislation is in 
place, a great deal of business interest can be expected to focus on what companies 
have to do to ensure a project succeeds. Here the kind of issues that arise include: how 
companies engage with public officials before submitting proposals in order to secure 
maximum favour for a proposal; how they engage with officials after a submission is 
made to mitigate requirements they do not like; what characterises the compromises 
they prefer to make in order to secure official support; and, of course, what they see 
as the bottom-line as regards deciding whether a project is tenable.  
 
These set of issues are about how companies respond within a regulatory framework. 
Yet there is also the issue of how they seek to determine what that framework is: how 
far they engage with politicians, officials or others to have legislation framed in a way 
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they find less burdensome; whether lobbying over this framework persisted over time; 
and, how effective any such lobbying has been.  These two sets of issues provide foci 
around which semi-structured interviews were framed. Relevant agents in the state or 
third sectors were asked similar questions to those in the building industry. For 
example, what did government officials seek to achieve in drawing up (or 
implementing) EIA procedures; have these objectives changed over time; and, if so, 
why is this? Again the focus is on both what happens for specific development 
projects, as well as what was intended and achieved in establishing the framework for 
EIA procedures. The Appendix 2 presents the interview question guides for each 
category of respondents.  
 
During the interviews, informants were provided the flexibility to set the scene and 
provide subjective accounts of their phenomenological experiences. Thus, 
information concerning the involvement of certain agents, how they acted, their 
respective motives, actions that had been tried and failed and so on, was provided by 
the respondents as opposed to the a priori assumptions of the researcher.  In this 
sense, the approach adopted follows Patton (1990), who argued that the objective of 
interviewing is to find out what cannot be directly observed and allow the researcher 
to understand the viewpoint of other people. This process begins with the assumption 
that other people’s viewpoints are significant and that they are capable of being 
articulated through a discussion of relationships and events in their own terms. 
 
For Keats (1999),  a key advantage of semi-structured interviewing is that it presents 
researchers with opportunities to obtain more in-depth and natural responses from 
respondents and further permits additional questioning. Thus, the semi-structured 
interview aims to derive information that is scarcely available or is unavailable from 
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secondary sources (Gaskell, 2000; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Wengraf, 2001). As a 
caveat, such information can be obtained via questionnaire surveys, provided these 
follow in-depth exploration with a small group of relevant respondents so as to ensure 
the relevance of questionnaire items. This is an approach used by many scholars for 
large-scale investigations because the questionnaire survey has significant advantages 
in determining general trends and differences across population groups. In the case of 
this thesis however, the population group under study is not large; in Bangkok there 
are approximately 60 large (Public Company Limited) housing developers with 
operations of a size that have the potential to be directly affected by or at least have to 
consider how Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) might impact on their 
building programmes  (SET, 2014). These companies might well operate in different 
fields, so the mix of housing developments they are engaged in is not uniform. In 
these circumstances, the operational framework within which building companies 
conduct their business can be expected to be subject to dissimilar pressures, with 
different behaviours across sub-markets. These factors point to the appropriateness of 
an in-depth interview as opposed to questionnaire approach in this study. It is argued 
that the use of in-depth interviews facilitates the acquisition of a detailed 
understanding of the driving and restraining forces that inform the actions of national 
and local public policy-makers, as well as private sector construction operations.  
 
Research Sampling Procedure and Sample Size  
 
It is important in comprehending the complex processes that occur between different 
parties when establishing new environmental rules, that crucial actors in such 
processes are first determined (Wengraf, 2001). This section explains the research 
sampling process including the selection of key informants.  
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When conducting a study, sampling is important. Flick (1998) states that the groups 
and cases incorporated into the research method are decided by the decision made 
relating to the sample and how the sample is structured. Neuman (1997) defines a 
sample as a group upon which generalisations can be based that the researcher has 
drawn from a portion of the total population. Mason (2002) claims that monetary and 
time restrictions are the main reason a small, selected sample is typically used.  
 
Non-probability sampling can be divided into four types (Berg, 2001). The first 
pertains to convenience samples or samples that are chosen due to the researcher’s 
accessibility and close relations. The second concerns purposive samples, which are 
selected on the basis of their knowledge and fields of expertise that can be used to 
represent the whole with regards to a particular field. Samples are also generated 
though the snowballing technique whereby the acquaintances of the initially 
interviewed persons are leveraged to expand the sample size.  Finally, quota sampling 
is based on the selection of the sample that conforms to specific demographic 
requirements (Berg, 2001).  
 
In this thesis a mixed form of non-probability sampling strategies is applied. A quota 
sampling process is employed to select sample informants who are integral to EIA 
processes including those specified by legislation; namely, governmental 
organisations, non-governmental organisations and development firms. Yet what 
precise role these and other agents play needs to be determined by empirical analysis. 
The key aim is to identify and gain insight from those who have been most influential 
in determining the outcomes of EIA frameworks and decisions. As this cannot be 
determined before undertaking the research (following Hunter’s (1953) classic study, 
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no assumption should be made that those in formal positions of authority are 
necessarily the most influential agents), criteria it is required to identify those who are 
likely to have knowledgeable insight on the ‘reality’ of EIA processes, most 
obviously by identifying those who have formal positions in such processes. From 
this initial list, a snowball sampling method was employed, as this provides access to 
new informants that those engaged in the policy process have identified as influential 
on policy outcomes (Given, 2008). As such, the initial group of interviewees was 
approached as an opportunity to gain access to interviewees’ contacts, and thus, 
access to further crucial respondents.  
 
The snowball sampling method was applied in this research because the population of 
interest was not directly accessible to the researcher. This method entailed the 
identification of an initial set of relevant respondents, who were subsequently 
requested to suggest other potential subjects with similar characteristics or who have 
relevance in some way to the object of study. This second set of subjects were 
subsequently interviewed, and were also requested to supply names of other potential 
interview subjects. This process was continuously implemented until the researcher 
was able to attain a sample large enough for the purposes of the study, or until 
respondents began to repeat names to the extent that further rounds of nominations 






3.4 The Primary Sources  
 
 
A review of the relevant literature concerning the EIA was conducted to identify the 
key stakeholder groups to be studied. In order to address the research question of this 
study, it was imperative to understand the interactions between relevant stakeholders 
and the level of influence of each group. Thus, it was important to engage with the 
actors who had participated in, and had been affected by the project. The study made 
use of stakeholders or target groups categorised into nine units of analyses: 
government agencies and local government officers, politicians, the project 
proponents; associations; lobbyists, the EIA consultants; the non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs); and, scholars and experts (see Appendix 1). This research 
sample was selected because of their technical knowledge of the EIA issues. Alo 
(1999), Glasson et al., (1997), Abaza et al., (2004), Garb et al., (2007), and ONEP 
(2014) recommend that research subjects are based on specialist knowledge to 
facilitate in-depth research studies.  The nine categories established represent varying 
roles in the policy-making and implementation process.  
 
3.4.1  Research Participants: Stakeholders of the EIA process 
 
Key informants were selected from the three categories based on their usefulness and 
convenience, and were contacted by the researcher after the sample had been selected. 
Some respondents were purposively selected based on their unique combinations of 
knowledge and expertise. Access to such respondents was gained through familial 
relations, social networks and data searching skills.  
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Persons that form a part of EIA’s population of actors or who represent organisations 
within it, were selected as key informants in order to provide an accurate 
representation of the greater organisation as a whole.  
 
Table 2 The EIA Process and Associated Actors 
Source: Lee (1989), Grab et al., (2007) 
 
 
To ensure the feasibility and success of this investigation, it was imperative for the 
researcher to initiate contact early in the fieldwork process to determine whether a 
viable strategy had been adopted. Ritchie & Lewis (2003) state that doing so has two 
primary goals. The first is to provide coverage of every individual relevant to the 
 Major Activities  Actors 
Screening of project proposal • Senior officers in a competent authority 
• Developer companies and certain of their 
support staff 
Scoping: 
• Definition of key issues 
• Establishment of parameters of study 
• Collection of base-line data 
• Competent authority 
• Developer 
• Environmental agency specialist 
• Representative of interest group 
Impact Assessment (EIS) 
• Identification and prediction of impacts 
• Evaluation of impact significance 
• Recommendation of mitigation and 
management strategies 
• Release of final EIS 
• Developer 
• Project leaders 
• Technical specialists employed by developer 
• EIA Consultant 
• Competent authority 
• Other environmental control agencies. 
Review of EIS — decision is made Expert Review Committee (ERC) 
Implementation — development begins Developer/ consultancy project leaders. 
Monitoring and Auditing • Technical specialists employed by developer 
• Competent authority and other environmental 
control agencies 
• Competent authority senior officers 
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subject and of vital importance to it. The second is to guarantee that opinions on all 
pertinent areas are obtained and enhance the diversity of the sample.  For this sample, 
participants were selected from three major stakeholders and agencies by the 
researcher. The process of creating and implementing the EIA policy involves 
members from all of these groups. An effective way to discover key informants is by 
determining the actors involved in EIA processes and their respective activities within 
these processes as shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 3 A Summary of Samples of Target Groups in this Study 
Source: Compiled by Author 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, the sample size and categories of respondents that participated 
in the study are as follows: 46 informants, including 9 central government agencies, 6 




Associations Thai Condominium Association (TCA) 1 
The Thai Real Estate Association (TREA) 1 
Project proponents Big developers 12 





National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB) 
2 
Ministry of Natural Resources & Environment (MNRE) 3 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) 4 
Local authorities Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) 6 





associations; 1 lobbyist, 4 EIA consultants; 1 NGO; and, 4 scholars and experts (see 
Appendix 1). 
 
The objective was to interview both senior and street-level bureaucrats as they are 
involved in designing and implementing policy. EIA consultants and business 
CEO/managers that are involved in projects decision-making were also targeted. Each 
category of respondents was interviewed by different set of questions (see the 
Appendix 2) and each interview lasted approximately 30-60 minutes. Rather than 
adopting a numerical target for interviews, the theoretical sampling approach of 
Glaser & Strauss (1967) was used. This is where information is sought to the point 
where further interviews, even taking account of different perspectives and entry 
points in processes, yield no added insight. This is what Glaser & Strauss (1967) refer 
to as saturation. Participants were sampled from both governmental and non-
governmental organisations as outlined below. 
 
3.4.2  The Project Proponents (Private Housing Developers) 
 
Since this research seeks to understand the impact of EIA on developers’ decisions for 
new housing developments on whether or not to provide higher environmental quality 
in projects, interviewing private developers was conceptualised as a priority. This 
research focuses on housing developers who have undertaken at least one housing 
project involving an EIA process (at whatever stage of the process) in Bangkok. 
Informants from this sector include companies’ Managing Directors / General 
Managers (larger firms) and Company Managers (smaller firms), as it is these agents 
who are most involved in project decision-making and dealing with the government 
officials (Dowall, 1992). The goal of such an interview is to understand the firm’s 
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observed behaviour in light of the firm’s business and competitive strategies, 
relationship to its markets, production, the behaviour of competitors and so on 
(Schoenberger, 1991).  
 
In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the broad structure of the Thai 
private house building industry, Golland & Blake (2004) postulate that it is imperative 
to adopt a system for classifying house-building companies which includes 
components of company size, in terms of: company type, annual output, profits, and 
turnover. It is argued that size provides a good measure of the various facets of a 
house-building company, as the aforementioned elements strongly influence modes of 
operation and internal organisation (Golland & Blake, 2004).  In this thesis, Ball’s 
(2002) approach to classifying house-building companies which is based on 
benchmarking characteristics against norms and availability of finance, based on the 
assumption that this approximately relates to annual levels of housing output is 
adopted. Thus the study adopts two classifications of private house-building 
companies: big developer and small developer. 
 
Small Developers  
 
All small developers interviewed in this study possess the Company Limited (Co. 
Ltd) status. These companies can be characterised as small capitalist, small family 
capital, or non-speculative house-building firms. This group of companies is 
dominated by local firms with long-standing ties in particular regions. They are 
characterised by firms whose main activities are not within the speculative house-
building industry and thus, during difficult trading climates, these house-builders may 
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retract and build no houses for that period, rendering them vulnerable to the 
consequences of bankruptcy. These firms have an annual output of up to 1,000 units.  
 
Big Developers  
 
All big developers that participated in this study possess the Public Limited Company 
(PLC) status. Usually this type of house-building company operates a two-five year 
land bank, whereby money can often be raised through periodical calls to the share 
market via rights issues. This category encapsulates the major house-building 
companies which are generally large capital or long term development capital house-
building firms. These firms build in excess of 1,000 units output each year and are 
typified by the ownership of several subsidiary companies operating on a regional 
basis. They archetypally dominate the house-building industry’s output.  
 
The selection of the initial interview list was based on the targeting of  two groups. 
First, and most obviously, there was a focus on developer companies that undertake 
projects requiring EIA reports. Secondly, attention was given to developer companies 
that build residential projects that do not need EIA approval. These companies’ 
information was collected from the Agency for Real Estate Affair (AREA). 
Regarding the number of projects and size of market share of the companies, this 
research first chose Twelve Public Limited Companies (PLCs), defined in this thesis 
as “Big Company” for interviews and detailed analysis. These 12 property developers 
by market capitalisation, occupied 60 percent of the market share of the total Bangkok 
property market (CBRE, 2014). The data collected from AREA shows that each of 
these companies has developed a number of residential projects which provide 
diversity of project types, sizes, and locations. The study also focuses on five small 
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development companies (Company Limited companies) defined as “Small Company” 
in this thesis. Public Limited Company developers and Company Limited developers 
both dominate the condominium markets in Bangkok. As mentioned above, the major 
criteria to be considered for choosing companies are: the number of companies’ 
projects, types, and location involved in EIA and project prices and types.  
 
In this study, the affected target has been identified as the individual companies and 
the housing related associations. The number of both big and small housing 
developers in Bangkok has been estimated in excess of 200 companies and thus, a 
significant investment of time and money is required to research this population. 
Thus, it was difficult to achieve a large sample size with respect to this population 
meaning that not all companies affected by the EIA have been captured in this study. 
The sample size of the affected housing companies used in this research is: 17 
interviewees, including 12 big-developers and 5 small-developers. It is argued that 
despite the small size of the sample, it provides enough accurate data to achieve the 
purpose of this research.  
 
3.4.3  The State  
 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent of influence of a range of 
governmental and non-governmental organisations on the outcomes of the decision-
making procedure. Environmental policy is not made under the independent control 
of the government; rather it seems to be influenced by different organisations, 
frameworks and concepts at a political and social level (Sharkansky, 1971). The 
planning system in Thailand is composed of three sections: firstly, national 
development planning; secondly, planning at an intermediate level; and thirdly, 
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planning at a local level concerning special zones (DTCP, 1994). One of the primary 
issues the government must deal with is environmental policy. However, the 
preparation and realisation of these policies are dealt with as discrete entities. The 
central government creates thorough blueprints outlining the general path of 
development in the future (Rattanatanya, 1997).  
 
The planning of the environmental policy of the country was created and enacted by 
the members of this group. Their influence in the creation and implementation of new 
policies is a well-known and accepted part of the political system and is one of 
Thailand’s oldest institutions, the bureaucracy.  
 
In order to understand the procedures and policymaking process of the EIA and its 
impact on new-housing development, it is important to learn the opinions of 
government officials. Current and past employees of the core national agencies that 
worked as street level bureaucrats or mid-high ranking government officials were 
used as key informants. The policy making process and implementation of Thailand’s 
EIA policy initially relied on senior bureaucrats within the central government to 
provide vertical support and gradually involved street level bureaucrats and local 
stake holders to provide horizontal support. This study has tracked this transition by 
interviewing enforcement officials.   
 
The interview with the senior and street-level bureaucrats provided data on how state 
agencies assume the role of determining impacts on private housing development 
through the setting of the environmental policy framework and by regulating and 
directing new house building. The broader perspective relates to articulating factors of 
the economy and politics, especially bureaucratic politics affecting this policy. While 
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senior bureaucrats provided a top-down’ perspective of fidelity to policy makers' 
goals, street-level Bureaucrats provided a ‘bottom-up’ perspective of policy 
adaptation during the implementation process (Yong & Miller, 2008) (details about 
the roles of senior and street-level bureaucrats are explained in chapter 2). A range of 
state agencies include: 
 
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) 
 
The National Economic and Social Development (NESD) Plan establishes the main 
aims of national development and is drawn up by the NESDB. The plan is re-
considered every five years and a shift in direction and agenda has been noticed in the 
past years. The NESD Plan contextualises and lays out the main objectives of 
Thailand’s economic and societal state. The NESD Plan is responsible for 
coordinating the function of all governmental departments. The departments must also 
create their own plans based on a five-year cycle that corresponds with the policies 
and ventures put forward by the NESD Plan. Thus, the interviews with its officials 
helped to understand whether the EIA objectives and its strategies comply with the 
five-year national development plans and goals from the macro (national) perspective.  
 
The Ministry of Natural Resources & Environment (MONRE)  
 
In order to gain insight into the historical and current aspects of EIA procedures, 
participants for the interview were selected based on their experience with the EIA. 
These interviews helped to identify the current situation of EIA in Thailand with 
particular focus on the EIA process, implementation, and approval (ONEP, 2012). 
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• Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy & Planning (ONEP)  
o Expert Review Committee (ERC) 
§ According to NEQA1992, section 48-49, EIA report has to be 
submitted to ONEP for preliminary review before final 
decision on the report was made by the Expert Review 
Committee. 
§ Environmental Impact Evaluation Bureau (EIEB) 
 
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
 
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for planning and building approval. A factor 
that has a major impact on EIA adoption is planning legislation and regulations. The 
primary focus of the EIA mainly concerns land-development planning and the 
realisation of ventures (Weston, 1997). The interviews helped to understand the 
relations between EIA and the planning frameworks on a national scale, particularly 
in terms of the institutional context for urban planning.  
• Office of Urban Development Planning (OUD), which oversees the Building 
Control Act and the Town and City Planning Act. 
• Department of Public Work (DPW), which is responsible for all infrastructure 
design and construction. 
• Department of Town and County Planning (DTCP), which directs the land use 
planning.  
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• Department of Lands, which oversees the Condominium Act and Land 
Management Act. 
 
Local Authorities  (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration) 
 
The local authorities of Bangkok are the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. 
According to the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Act 1985, this body is in 
charge of the running of Bangkok city and thus it has complete responsibility for 
residential wellbeing at a local level. The aim of the interview is to further investigate 
the rapport between the government, local authorities and private companies in 
relation to the integration of EIA, land development and the procedure of planning. 
While the central government designs the policies and plans, the local authorities are 
responsible for their realisation.  
• City Planning Department 
• Public Work Department 
 
3.4.4  EIA Consultants 
 
Besides governmental bodies, EIA Consultancies are another crucial party in the 
process. EIA Consultants refer to those who are registered with ONEP and have the 
capacity to make EIA reports. The EIA Consultants, according to the National 
Environmental Quality Act (NEQA), 1992, Section 46, are responsible for the 
preparation of the EIA report. In Thailand there are currently 74 license holders 
including private companies, university-based institutions and state organisations 
(ONEP, 2016). These licences last for 2 or 3 years depending on the age of the 
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company. The interviews chose four prominent firms that specialise in making EIA 
reports for residential projects.  
 
3.4.5  NGOs 
 
Since the 1980's, the numbers of NGOs in Thailand have been proliferating 
dramatically (Awakul & Ogunlana, 2002). A myriad of environmental NGOs in 
Thailand have supported community rights on environmental and natural resource 
issues, over state rights. Presently, there are approximately 80 NGOs registered as 
environmental NGOs in Thailand, although many more have not yet formally 
registered their organisations (King Prajadhipok's Institute, 2007). It is assumed that 
many of those that have not registered formally do not want to be legally accountable 
to the state. Further, formal registration is concomitant with increased paperwork 
since they are required to submit reports about their activities to the government 
(Awakul & Ogunlana, 2002). 
 
The Thailand Environment Institute (TEI), a registered NGO was focused upon in this 
study. Established in 1993, the TEI is a purely academic and large private institution 
that is highly influential in the formulation of environmental policy through its close 
relations with the government. Government reports often rely on TEI research as their 
authoritative source (AIT‐UNEP, 2010). A TEI staff member with extensive 
experience in the EIA process was interviewed as part of this study.   
 
3.4.6  Academics and Experts 
 
The academics and experts in this study stem from the national academic 
organisations who are interested and involved in EIA. Some of these persons have 
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been integral to the formation of EIA for example, by participating in the EIA policy-
making process, seminars, or consulting with the government about EIA 
implementation. In particular, one academic was selected to sit on the Expert Review 
Committee (ERC).  
 
3.5 Secondary Sources 
 
To understand the responses of different agents to the EIA regulation, interviews need 
to be undertaken from a position of knowledge about building patterns in Bangkok, so 
appropriate prompts can be used in interviews, and relevant contextualisation for the 
interview can be attained. There is a plentiful supply of statistical data to help in this 
regard. Much of this information is used in chapter four to provide a setting for the 
reader on the dynamics of Bangkok’s new housing construction, as well as on the 
character and diversity of the construction industry.  
 
The deeper meanings contained within documents are illustrated, substantiated, and 
better understood by the documentary information obtained from documents (Ritchie 
& Lewis, 2003). Public questions regarding public information is the heart of written 
information, whereas, experiences, history, and events are studied through 
documentary information. Assessing the effects of EIA on the development of new 
housing is the goal of this thesis. The history of these events was unfolded through the 
study of the relevant forms of private and public data.   
 
Varying kinds of documents and the information they contain can be acquired through 
many different methods. The internet, newspapers, journals, international and local 
literature, research documents, implementation reports and inventory or supervising 
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results of connected authorities, policy and regulation documents, company profiles, 
housing statistics, and demographic information are all existing secondary documents 
that can be used to generate relevant information (Mason, 2002).  
 
Electronic and printed sources provide documentary data. Thailand’s housing applied 
in the BMR, environmental registration, and planning are all areas covered by the 
statistical and descriptive data stored in these sources. An ample supply of 
documentary data for the core of this thesis was provided by reports from the relevant 
institutions, journals, magazines, research, and related books that contain statistical 
and descriptive information. 
 
The data from electronic sources are mainly gained from websites of relevant 
institutions. These institutions include governmental bodies e.g. Office of Natural 
Resource and Environmental Planning (ONREP) National Housing Authority (NHA), 
Government Housing Bank (GHB), National Statistical Office (NSO), National 
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), and Real Estate Information 
Centre (REIC); private institutions include the Agency for Real Estate Affairs 
(AREA), Real Estate Information Centre (REIC) and Thai Appraisal Foundation 
amongst others. Table 4 summarises sources of housing and other related data. 
 
3.5.1  Housing Data and Statistics 
 
The assessment of policy making decisions and the performance of the urban housing 
sector was carried out through sources that are detailed in this section. Information on 
housing that aids in the planning and decision making of policy makers and planners 
is contained within the “Housing Report” issued by the National Housing Authority 
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(NHA) and the Government Housing Bank (GHB) that was requested by the Housing 
Policy subcommittee (HPS) in 1990. As a part of the Housing Information System 
(HIS) this report collates and details the recent developments in: 
• The population increase and rates and other population data. 
• Laws and regulations that affect housing development.  
• Professional labour, the rate of construction and other labour data.  
• The classification of housing projects by type and the applicable numbers. 
• The quality and quantity of housing producers and housing stock data.  
• The effects of changing attitudes and income on housing demand. 
• The correlation between the number of houses completed and supply. 
• Quality of system finance, rates of finance and other matters of housing 
finance. 
• Land utilisation, such as maps showing land use and permission for land 
allocation. 
The notable variation in the quality of the information collection process, resources, 
and technical expertise in the eight different agencies that contribute to various 
aspects of this report, is the reason for these deficiencies.  
 
3.5.2  Housing Developers 
 
Data on housing construction is available based on the type of developers operating in 
the Bangkok Metropolitan Region’s housing market. This information is important for 
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deciding on an interview strategy, since there are some companies who have had 
housing projects that are smaller than the cut-off for falling under the environmental 
impact assessment requirement. Yet some of these companies are growing rapidly, 
and have the potential for undertaking larger projects. They thereby offer a particular 
perspective on how the regulation is impacting the sector, by enabling the exploration 
of how the regulation affects decisions on increasing the size of existing projects. 
Available data on developer characteristics includes information on: 
• Ownership Structure / Type of firm / Size of firm / Scale of operations  
• Market area of operation / Geographical sector  
• Level of experience / environmental concern/house built  
 
Table 4 Sources of Housing-Related Data 
Classification of Data Source of Data 
Population (Demographic) BMA, National Statistical Office (NSO) 
Housing Demand   CBRE, AREA, REIC, NHA, BOT, GHB, NSO, and Thai Military 
Bank (TMB) 
Housing Stock  CBRE, AREA, REIC, NHA, Bank of Thailand, GHBank, NSO, 
NHA, BMA 
Housing Completion CBRE, AREA, REIC, NHA, BOT, GHBank, TMB, and BMA 
Slums    BMA, NHA, NGOs 
Housing Finance Bank of Thailand, GHB, TMB 
Land     Department of Lands, BMA 
Laws and Regulations BMA and Department of Lands 




As shown in above, this information is available at CBRE, the Real Estate 
Information Centre (REIC), the Agency for Real Estate Affairs (AREA), the National 
Housing Authority (NHA), the Government Housing Bank (GHB), Bank of Thailand, 
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and the National Statistics Office (NSO). The available data is used to formulate the 
research plan. This is especially true regarding housing outlook information in 
Bangkok in relation to the pattern of development and resultant effects on the 
environment. The information is examined in order to serve as a basis of choosing the 
case studies. These are selected as a representation of residential development. 
 
3.5.3  EIA Data and Statistics 
 
The data and statistical information regarding ventures put forward to the EIA during 
the years 1985 to 2016 was gathered from ONEP. The information held by the EIA 
ventures include the name of the venture, the developer, the kind of development, its 
scale, location, consultant, date it was submitted and approved, and EIS’s report. This 
information is available on the ONEP’s website. The ONEP library and other 
organisations such as the National Economic and Social Department Board (NESDB), 
the Department of Town and Country Planning (DTCP) and the Department of City 
Planning for Bangkok, were used as a sources of information regarding EIA 
legislation and regulations, documentation concerning planning, studies on EIA 
procedures and some insightful case studies of EIA practice.  
 
Besides EIA data and documents from ONEP, the following legal documents and 
administrative data are also important sources of information about EIA and housing 
operations, activities, and outcomes. The analysis of these administrative data and 
legal documents help to establish the basic facts and underlying processes concerning 
housing and environmental regulation in Thailand and Bangkok. The consulted 
documents are as follows: 
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• Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) 
o Bangkok Comprehensive Plan B.E. 2549 (2006) 
• Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
o Building Act 
o Land Development Act B.E. 2543 (2000) 
o Condominium Act (No. 3) B.E. 2542 (1999) 
o Ministerial Regulation No. 8 & 9 (B.E.2543) Issued under the 
Condominium Act B.E. 2522 (1979) 
 
3.6 Data Analysis  
 
Data analysis can be conceptualised as the “systemic procedures in order to identify 
essential features and relationships” (Wolcott, 1995, p.24). Raw data from the field 
in qualitative research approaches is typically iterative and messy (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) meaning that qualitative data analysis must be done in a meticulous 
and creative manner (Spencer et al., 2003). In this research, unstructured raw data was 
collected through the use of tape recordings and interview notes. To understand the 
responsibilities and functions of key organisations from a historical perspective, 
electronic documents and publications were analysed prior to the fieldwork. This raw 
data was subsequently coded for analysis through the use of interview transcripts 
(Patton, 2002b). Throughout the research, the anonymity of the interviewees was 
maintained. Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel were used to systematically 
manage the interview data, generate memos, and form groups of codes based on 
themes found from the interview data. During the transcription process, transcripts 
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were carefully checked for accuracy before and during the conversion to a word-
processing file for analysis in order to safeguard the reliability of the research findings 
(Mays & Pope, 1995).  
 
The qualitative data analysis process in this study relies on the theoretical sampling or 
grounded theory approach proposed by Glaser & Strauss (1967, p.x), defined as 
follows: 
 
...the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst 
jointly collects, codes and analyses his data and decides what data to 
collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it 
emerges. There are two important concepts associated with theoretical 
sampling that should be considered. Saturation refers to the fact that no 
additional data can be found that contributes to the categories being 
considered. The researcher must focus on ‘situations’ until no further 
insights can be generated. Secondly, slices of data define different kinds of 
data that give the analyst different views or vantage points from which to 
understand a category and develop its properties. 
 
 
The goal of using this approach is to construct theories from data in a systematic way 
in order to understand the observed phenomena of the impacts of public policy on 
new-housing development regarding relationships between new housing 
development, environmental quality and economic progress. According to Berg 
(2001) the adoption of a theoretical foundation enables the researcher to gain a better 
understanding of the data since via this process, the opinions and language of the 
socially constructed world of the informants are revealed to the researcher.  
 
Data coding formed an integral part of the analysis process. It is argued that this is a 
suitable method because it enables the themes that emerge from the key informants’ 
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account to be established. It also better illuminates the subjective meanings of human 
activities and social behaviour which is the goal of this thesis. The coding and 
analysis process entailed the characterisation of data according to their similar 
attributes (Sinclair et al., 2009) for the purpose of addressing the research questions. 
The coding process was enabled through a scheme guide designed to address 
questions such as: what were barriers and constraints to implementing EIA? The 
scheme guide thus enabled a more focused approach to drawing out, and then 
subsequently coding the raw data that had been acquired. As part of the coding 
process, the characterised attributes were classified again into more conceptual 
categories of theoretical analysis. Data and categories were grouped in accordance 
with their relation to each other.  
 
In the presentation of research findings in this thesis, direct quotations from the 
transcribed interviews were used. These direct quotations were coded accurately and 
are presented in italics. However, some additions, which have been presented in 
brackets, have been added to clarify speech. Direct quotations are essential in some 
parts of the thesis because they constitute the empirical data of this study. Since data 
in this thesis is mainly qualitative, these quotations represent the subjective 




Bryman (2008) claims that the severely limited generalisability, limited repeatability, 
and high subjectivity are the primary criticisms of the methods and results of 
qualitative research. The quality of the research can be guaranteed by demonstrating 
the reliability and validity of the research in the face of these limitations. In the 
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context of this study there is the possibility of informants’ going off topic in response 
to the interview questions and moving into self-justification, In order to overcome 
these obstacles, the triangulation strategy was adopted. Bryman (2008) states that 
investigating social events through more than one form of information and using 
multiple tools is the definition of triangulation. Combining methods of collecting data, 
by studying documentaries and carrying out interviews for example; acquiring 
information from multiple sources, and gathering information over various periods of 
time are all elements of data triangulation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). It is 
suggested that checking the accuracy of the information obtained through the 
information gathering process increases the validity and reliability of the conclusions.  
 
Official statistics, reports, government publications, company newsletters, journals, 
parliamentary debates, newspapers, books, and the Internet all served as secondary 
data sources for the researcher. Methodological triangulation was thus used to obtain 
access to these records. It is imperative to note that interview data is rarely considered 
in isolation, and thus, the goal of collecting such data is often to confirm information 
that has already been collected from other sources. When documents, memoirs and 
secondary sources provide an initial overview of the events or issues under 
examination, interviews with key respondents can be used to corroborate the early 
research findings (Tansey, 2007). Thus, interviews contribute towards the research 
goal of triangulation, where collected data is cross-checked through multiple sources 
to increase the methodological robustness of the research findings. Hence by ensuring 
that data is not collected solely from one source or type of source, triangulation serves 
as a strategy for increasing the credibility of findings through the support of multiples 
sources, and can reveal the weakness of some sources that might otherwise have been 
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viewed as reliable (Davies, 2001). In this research, interviews also served the purpose 
of confirming the accuracy of information previously collected from other sources.  
 
Findings were verified and inconsistencies highlighted by comparing interview 
transcripts of stakeholders and government officials with archival documents. Hodder 
(2000) states that this strategy provides information that cannot be obtained orally or 






This chapter presents a justification of the paradigm that guided the research 
methodology of this thesis. Qualitative in-depth interviews were employed as the 
primary inquiry strategy for this thesis in order to conduct a case study of EIA 
practices and its impacts in the Thai context. To achieve broader and 
methodologically robust data and results, secondary data collection was used to 
triangulate the research findings. The first method entailed a review of documents 
concerning the operations, activities and concepts of the EIA process. A need for in-
depth information on EIA processes and their outcomes also led to the decision to 
carry out semi-structured interviews featuring a wide range of stakeholders. 
Stakeholders who held key positions or played important roles in the EIA process 
were identified for the interviews and an interview guide including evaluation 
questions was developed. Data analysis and discussion are conducted through a 
qualitative approach and are presented in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. In the next chapter, 
background information on housing development in Thailand is critically examined.  
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CHAPTER 4  HOUSING MARKET AND 






In this chapter, the housing market in Bangkok will be focused upon with an emphasis 
on the genesis of housing development in the city.  This discussion will include an 
investigation into the principal trends in the Thai housing sector and the main 
actors/agencies involved in housing development in private sector housing 
development. Additionally, the organisations that represent these firms when 
interacting with government agencies, including representation organisations for 
companies in all sectors, are explored. Further, third sector organisations that work on 
behalf of civil society in terms of housing developments and related issues, are also 
critically assessed examined. Finally, this chapter expounds on the nature of 
government agencies related to housing, particularly focusing on their responsibilities, 
the legal systems within which they work, and their resources.  
 
4.2 Thailand and Bangkok: Growth and Urbanisation  
 
Urban economies rely heavily on the housing industry. In developing countries, the 
proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that has been invested in housing has 
continued to rise. From 1960-71, the mean proportion of GDP dedicated to housing in 
low-income countries was 2.51 percent, whereas it was 4.56 percent in the period 
2001-11, a rise of 2.01 percent. In upper middle-income countries, the corresponding 
figures for the same periods showed a rise of 5.11 percent from 4.01 percent to 9.12 
percent. 
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 (Dasgupta et al., 2014). In Thailand,  housing investment and services together make 
up around 7 percent of GDP in 2017 (Klinchuanchun, 2017). The significance of 
housing is even higher when taken as an asset and it comprises from one-fifth to up to 
half of all wealth in most nations. It further has an impact on household consumption 
and acts as a key incentive for household saving. Indeed, housing’s impact is far-
reaching and it has an effect on financial depth, repayments, government budgets (via 
taxes and subsidies), labour mobility and inflation (Dasgupta et al., 2014). Clearly, the 
housing industry must be viewed as an essential component of the wider economy. 
The characteristics of the housing sector in Bangkok, Thailand, and its surrounding 
regions are discussed in this section. 
 
4.2.1  Thailand: Introduction 
 
Thailand is located in the middle of Southeast Asia (see Figure 2). The country is one 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The country was declared a 
Newly Industrialised Country (NIC) in 1988 (Friend et al., 2016). It is approximately 
513,120 square kilometres in size and is home to around 67.6 million inhabitants 
(NSO, 2018). With 132 inhabitants for every square kilometre, the country is the fifth 
most densely inhabited ASEAN nation (ADB, 2018). Thailand comprises 76 
provinces, an estimated 2000 municipalities and 878 districts. Bangkok serves as the 
capital city and it is governed by an autonomous local authority, the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration (BMA) (DOPA, 2018a). 
 
Thailand has grown as a production centre for manufacturing industries and became 
the second biggest economy in Southeast Asia. The economic development of the 
region is higher than a number of other regions worldwide and the GDP is 
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approximately US$525 billion (BOT, 2017). The nation has a liberal capitalist 
economic system which has led to robust internal competition and a growing middle 
class, with economic development being driven in large part by the private sector.  
 
Figure 2 Location of Thailand and Southeast Asia 
Source: Ontheworldmap.com (2016) 
 
 
Thailand’s economy was founded on agriculture and it was an underdeveloped nation 
up until 1960. Excluding the years between 1997 and 2000 when Thailand succumbed 
to the Asian financial crisis, from the 1960s onwards the country’s economy grew 
consistently (BOT, 2015). Economic growth peaked at 10 percent per year between 
1987 and 1996 (OEPP, 1998), and approximately 4.6 percent per year between 2000 
and 2010 (JICA, 2013). This was due to the Thai government’s export-oriented 
policies and low production costs compared to other countries (Thabchumpon, 2002). 
Thailand enjoyed a larger share of the global market as a result. During this period, 
Thailand became a NIC. According to the Bank of Thailand (BOT) (2017), poverty in 
Thailand had been progressively falling. The improvements seen in the country are 
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due to its transition from an agriculture-based economy to industry-based economy, 
with manufacturing mostly for the export markets (Reutergardh & Yen, 1997; OEPP, 
1998). At the beginning of the 1950s, Thailand’s manufacturing industry accounted 
for 14 percent of total GDP with agriculture accounting for 38 percent of GDP. This 
situation has now reversed and agriculture accounts for approximately 9 percent of 
GDP while manufacturing accounts for 40 percent of GDP (BOT, 2017).  
 
4.2.2  Bangkok and Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) 
 
Bangkok is a post-industrial city that is reliant on a service-based economy. Bangkok 
occupies 1,568 square kilometre in the Chao Phraya River basin in Central Thailand 
(BMA, 2016). The Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), which occupies an area of 
7,762 square kilometre, encapsulates Bangkok and five adjacent provinces which are: 
Samutprakarn, Patumthani, Samutsakorn, Nakornpatom and Nonthaburi (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 Maps of Thailand, Bangkok, and Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) 
Source: Rainer Lesniewski (2016) and Sized.us (2018) 
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Thus, Bangkok can be conceptualised as an extreme primate city (Bureau of 
Registration Administration, 2016). In the past 15 years, Bangkok has experienced 
continual development. The increasingly high cost of available prime land has been 
concomitant with the proliferation of high density, high-rise buildings in response to 
high investment costs (CBRE, 2017). 
 
Bangkok has only one CBD which is located in the Sukhumvit, Silom, and Sathorn 
area (Figure 4). The CBD is mainly characterised by high-rise condominiums, 
service-apartments, hotels, and office buildings targeted at high-income and elite 
groups. It serves as the hub of economic activity which revolves around the country’s 
financial and service sectors. Bangkok’s CBD is still undergoing expansion along its 
rail transit system such as Metropolitan Rapid Transit (MRT) and Bangkok Mass 
Transit System (BTS) because of rapid urban growth. Gentrification has been 
accompanied by rising land costs in the CBD. Several sub-centres are located on the 
periphery of the inner city (CBRE, 2017) and the majority of these are located along 
main roads or railways.  
 
 
These areas are also characterised by condominiums located close to MRT and BTS 
stations. By contrast, most housing projects in the urban fringe and suburban areas are 
in the form of townhouses and single-family houses, also located close to main roads 
and expressways (CBRE, 2017). Hence, it may be argued that the major 
transportation routes serve to indicate Bangkok’s urban growth patterns. Residents of 
the BMR commute into Bangkok city on a daily basis and thus, housing 
developments have spatially expanded from Bangkok city to cover these five areas in 
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response to urban trends.  As a result, the Bangkok housing market encapsulates the 
greater area of the BMR (CBRE, 2017). 
 
Figure 4 Bangkok CBD and Outer CBD 
  
 
Source: Fresh Property (2017) 
 
 
4.2.3  BMR Demographics 
 
The expansion of Thailand’s economy has been accompanied by population growth. 
Table 5 depicts the connection between the household size, household number in the 
housing market and population. Information gathered in 2016 reveals that there was 
an average of 2.02 individuals in every household in the BMR, a significant reduction 
from the estimated 2.54 individuals per household recorded ten years earlier.  
 
According to the World Bank (2017), the population of Thailand is estimated at 69.04 
million. It is also estimated that the Thai population lives in over 23.8 million 
households (UN, 2017). In 2017, the population grew at a rate of 0.3 percent (World 
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Bank, 2017) which is slower than the growth rate between 2000 and 2010: 0.8 percent 
per year (JICA, 2013). 
 
Table 5 Population and Household in Thailand, 2006–2016 
  2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
Population 
 
BMR 9,948,392 10,161,694 10,326,093 10,455,800 10,624,700 10,765,226 
Bangkok 5,695,956 5,710,883 5,701,394 5,673,560 5,692,984 5,686,646 
Thailand 62,828,706 63,389,730 63,878,267 64,456,695 65,124,716 65,931,550 
Household 
Size 
BMR 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.22 2.1 2.0 
Bangkok 2.65 2.52 2.4 2.25 2.1 2.0 
Thailand 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 
Household  
Number 
BMR 3,916,690 4,181,767 4,450,902 4,706,232 5,006,091 5,318,037 
Bangkok 2,149,417 2,266,223 2,395,544 2,522,855 2,672,423 2,816,711 
Thailand 19,572,806 20,581,081 21,653,650 22,836,819 24,091,404 25,233,077 
Source: Data Processing Centre, The Bureau of Registration Administration, 
Department of Provincial Administration (DOPA) (2017) 
 
 
Concurrently, the number of households increased by 2.5 percent per year between 
2000 and 2010 which is nearly identical to the growth experienced between 1990 and 
2000. The average household size in 2010 was 3.2 persons (JICA, 2013). In Table 5, 
the 2016 data shows that the number of households in the BMR rose by 6 percent in 
that year. The registered population of the BMR stood at 10.76 million in 2016 (about 
16 percent of the population), representing a population growth of 1.32 percent from 
2014. The population of Bangkok is 5,686,646 which represents approximately 8.5 
percent of the Thai population (BMA, 2016). These demographics changes, therefore, 
have significantly impinged on housing demand, particularly in the BMR. As the 
average household size continues to decline alongside the rising cost of land in prime 
areas, there is an increasing demand for condominiums. In response to this demand, 
the size of housing units has become smaller. In the BMR, housing in proximity to 
arterial roads and especially MRT and BTS are in high demand.  
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4.2.4  The Urbanisation Process in Thailand 
 
There have been remarkable social and economic shifts in Thailand since the 1970s, 
with the nation experiencing ongoing development of its industrial base and a 
continuing urbanized. Rural-urban migration, urbanisation, and increases in the size 
of nuclear families are some of the corollaries of this growth (Friend et al., 2016). The 
data presented in Table 6 indicates that, in 2014, the percentage of the Thai 
population who lived in cities stood at 49 percent, a rise of 20 percent since 1990. It is 
estimated that, by 2050, the figure will have risen to 72 percent. This increase in the 
urban population is occurring at unprecedented levels across Southeast Asia, with the 
greatest mean shifts being seen in Laos and with Thailand in second place. According 
to World Bank (2015), Thailand’s major progress towards becoming an urbanised 
nation began after the year 2000. Between 2000 and 2010, Thailand’s urban area grew 
from about 2,400 square kilometres to 2,700, representing an average annual growth 
rate of 1.4 percent (World Bank, 2015).  
 












Country\Year 1990 2014 2050 1990 2014 2050 1990 2014 2050 2000-2015 
Cambodia 1,408 3,161 8,167 7,649 12,247 14,022 16 21 36 0.9 
Lao PDR 655 2,589 6,435 3,589 4,305 4,144 15 38 61 3.1 
Myanmar 10,350 18,023 32,206 31,773 35,696 26,439 25 34 55 1.6 
Thailand 16,649 33,056 44,335 39,934 34,167 17,046 29 49 72 2.7 
Vietnam 13,958 30,495 55,739 54,952 62,053 47,958 20 33 54 2.0 
Source: Friend et al., (2016, p.18)   
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The urbanisation process in Thailand was stimulated by in-migration to urban areas, 
and was concomitant with the transformation of housing conditions in the country as 
well as its demographics. Bangkok and its peripheral areas have been the focus of 
national development with the provinces being largely ignored (Krongkaew, 1996). 
Thus, the status of the BMR has grown and large numbers of people from across the 
country are pulled towards the capital. Urbanisation has, however, spread to the five 
adjacent provinces around Bangkok. The fact that close to 50 percent of Thailand’s 
GDP emanates from the BMR is a testament to the area’s importance. The result is 
that the BMR, and the BMA in particular, have a high population density and are thus 
subject to overcrowding. Notably, in 2014, an estimated 13 percent of the Thai 
population resides in Bangkok, which covers less than 1 percent of its land area. 
When compared to the remaining parts of the country, the population density of the 
BMR is high at 1,337 people per square kilometre, although there is an average of 128 
people per square kilometre in the country as a whole. In Bangkok, the population 
density is 3,630 persons per square kilometre (Friend et al., 2016). 
 
Over the last 40 years, development in Bangkok has spread out from the boundaries 
of the city to other areas in the BMR. This happened first in the northern provinces of 
Pathum Thani and Nonthaburi, but it has also continued to the south into the province 
of Samut Prakan. Figure 5 demonstrates clearly that, although the population of 
Bangkok city has remained largely the same over this period, the population of its 
Metropolitan Region has increased. Heeckt et al. (2017) have argued that robust 
planning for urban development must take into account population increases not only 




Figure 5 census populations of Bangkok and the BMR between 1960 and 2010  
 
Source: Lambregts et al., (2015)  
 
 
According to BMA (2013) and Supatn (2011), the proportions of land in Bangkok 
used for the following purposes in 2011 were: 29.6 percent for commercial, industrial 
and governmental use, 23.6 percent for agriculture use, and 23 percent for housing 
use. As shown in Figure 6, Bangkok has expanded in accordance with a ribbon 
development model (LSE Cities, 2016), with developments to provide for the 
increasing population of the city, along with industrial and commercial requirements, 
spreading along newly-built roads. The development in fringe areas has made the 
boundaries of each province within the BMR less distinct. 
 
As shown in Figure 6, the increase of the urban area has recently spread beyond the 
BMR into the eastern province of Chacheongsao and the northern province of 
Ayutthaya. As a result of their proximity to the nation’s two most important airports 
(Suvarnabhumi International Airport and Don Mueang International Airport) and to 
the Port of Bangkok, development in these provinces has mostly taken the form of 
industrial estates. As Heeckt et al. (2017) and Supatn (2011) have pointed out, such 
AsiAn Cities ClimAte ResilienCe  20
Figure 2: Registered and census populations for 
Bangkok and the BMR 1960-2010














Source: Lambregts et al., (2015) summarising BMA Statistic Profile and NSO Population and Housing Census
Despite the updating of these official statistics there is a well-established narrative that Thailand’s rate of urbanisation 
remains low, and from some perspectives this low rate of urbanisation is highly problematic. This also seems to fit with a 
persistent cultural perception of the country as remaining largely agricultural and rural.
Looking to the future, it is increasingly clear that we are now entering a new phase of urbanisation for Thailand that is 
dramatically different from earlier historical phases. Urbanisation is projected to reach a rate of 72% by 2050. This is a 
phase of rapid urbanisation, and a phase in which the intensity of dependence on infrastructure and technology, and 
linkages to urban networks across the region will grow. Evidence from each of the case studies attests to an expansion 
of the urban area and increases in population, further demonstrated by rapid changes in land prices and patterns of 
speculative investment, and the movement of migrant labour from neighbouring countries, as well as a return of previous 
migrants to their hometowns. But critically, these trends are linked to regional flows of trade and investment, and the ways 
in which networks of transport infrastructure create linkages across the region.
Table 5: Average land prices in major cities in Thailand









Source: data from the Department of Treasury (2012) and www.thaiappraisal.org (2014)
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47  Data visualisation and description










2000–20020 5 kmSource: LSE Cities 2016. 



















Source: LSE Cities 
2016. Based on 
Lincolninst data
13  This map is of planned 
growth in Yangon – the 
actual urban footprint is 
not yet available. This is 
a project currently being 
undertaken at YCDC, but 
this was the most reliable 
data available at the time 
of publication. 
developments outside the boundaries of the BMR experie ce less traffic gridlock and 
the cost of land is cheaper, factors which have appealed to investors. 
 
Figure 6 The Expansion of Bangkok 1850-2015 
Source: LSE Cities (2016, based on Lincoln Int data)  
 
 
The evident presented in this section clearly demonstrates that urbanisation in 
Thailand is entering a new phase. UNDP (2014) estimates that by 2050 Thai urban 
population will have attained 72 percent. Friend et al. (2016) have argued that this 
period of rapid urbanisation will lead to an increasing reliance on infrastructure and 
technological solutions, along with a rise in links between the various urban networks 





4.3 The Housing Context in Thailand  
 
The key economic centres in Asia have extremely diverse property markets due to 
varying regulations and control with regards to foreign developers. According to 
scholars such as Seek (1995) these differential property markets are further a result of 
divergent city layouts and the different ways in which developers operate in the 
respective countries. Property development is often associated with the movement of 
capital around the world and often plays a part in establishing economic hubs such as 
Bangkok. As stated by Wu (2000) such economic hubs appear to have similar 
characteristics and skylines however they are each marked by a complex and varied 
history. In this section, the various changes that have occurred in Thailand’s housing 
market, particularly Bangkok are delineated. The section further explores the trends of 
housing provision in Thailand in a chronological manner.  
 
4.3.1  History of Housing Development in Bangkok and Thailand 
 
According to UN-HABITAT (2008), housing development in Thailand can be divided 
into three major periods: prior to the financial crisis (1990-1996), during the Asian 
financial crisis (1997-2001) and the recovery from the financial crisis (2002 
onwards). In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of housing development in 
Bangkok, it is necessary to examine Thailand’s housing provision. It is imperative to 
highlight that there were very few private developers in Thailand before the 1960s 





The first 150 years of housing development in Bangkok (1780s-1930s) 
 
Bangkok was established in 1782. In the 150 years that followed, public or private 
housing provisions were few and far between. Development was virtually non-
existent from 1782 until the 1880s. Between the 1880s and 1932, a large number of 
roads were built and the Town and Country Planning Act was adopted and 
implemented. The typical housing provision of the 1920s was residential land sub-
divisions (UN-HABITAT, 2008).  
 
In 1932, the Town Planning Act came into being although the Town Planning Office 
was only created thirty-three years later. The Building Control Act was implemented 
in 1933 and then later amended in 1979. Few other housing provisions, either legal or 
governmental, existed at this time and the housing market itself was still yet to be 
established (UN-HABITAT, 2008).  
 
Housing development following the Second World War (1940s – 1960s) 
 
During this period the rebuilding and increased provision of public housing formed 
the core of the government’s key duties. Private sector investment continued to 
occupy only a small part of the housing development market at this time. To deal with 
housing provision in Bangkok, the government established housing development units 
and a Government Housing Bank (GHB), which formed part of the Ministry of 
Finance (Chiu, 1984). 
   
The Department of Public Welfare in the Ministry of Interior was the government’s 
first foray into providing the general population with housing. Building housing 
through rural resettlement schemes formed the principal focus of the division (NHA, 
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1978). The Public Housing Act was implemented in 1942. The further division of the 
Public Housing Office was created in 1951. This division was charged with 
constructing social housing in Bangkok targeted at the rental market (Chiu, 1984). 
GHB was set up in 1953 with the initial goal of creating housing units for sale on 
hire-purchase schemes. The primary task of the GHB did change over time and later, 
the institution became responsible for providing housing loans to the general public 
for owner-occupied properties (Nitaya & Ocharoen, 1980).  
 
Housing development in Bangkok during the industrialisation period  
(1950s – 1970s)   
 
The industrialisation of Thailand began at the close of the 1950s. Import substitution 
prompted a strengthening of trade and the population of Bangkok increased (Chiu, 
1984). Private land sub-division in the private housing sector continued. The Thai 
government made its first foray into city planning in 1958 when it employed 
Litchfield Whiting Browne and Associates, a US consulting team, to produce a city 
structure draft plan for Bangkok. The Litchfield Plan was implemented in 1992, a full 
six decades after the Town Planning Act was enacted. Law enforcement and the 
betterment of certain groups were hindered by this significant delay (Dowall, 1992).  
 
In an attempt to meet Bangkok’s housing needs, the government attempted to appeal 
to investors. Aroonakasikorn et al. (1996) have noted that the Revolutionary Party 
Decree No, 49 of 1959 invalidated Article 34-37 of the Land Code (1954) all of 
which related to the boundaries of land ownership in the country. By invalidating 
these articles, the government was able to attract more industrial and agricultural 
investment on the outskirts of Bangkok. A key initiative taken by the DPT (1960) in 
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the development of Bangkok was the improvement of slum areas. In their draft plan, 
the consulting firm’s recommendation was that these areas should be dismantled 
(Dowall, 1989). A further government initiative was the construction of social low-
rise apartments for low-income groups (NHA, 1978). The sole type of private housing 
available during this time was private land subdivisions through which individuals 
constructed their own houses (Rodpai, 1986).  
 
The rise of private housing developments (1970s – 1990s) 
 
The late 1960s heralded in Bangkok’s first era of formal and modern housing. The 
first turnkey properties, furnished housing units, became available in the single and 
detached houses forms (World Bank, 1993). The decrease in land sub-division 
schemes was followed by the creation of detached houses. A number of housing 
projects emerged as a result of the rise in the popularity of detached houses among 
middle-income groups (Seik, 1992).  
 
The government merged the Slum Improvement Office under BMA, the Public 
Housing Office, the Public Welfare Housing Division and the NHA (created in 1973 
as a public enterprise under the purview of the MOI). It now had two chief 
mechanisms for housing, the NHA (acting as a developer) and the Government 
Housing Bank (acting as loan provider for home-buyers in particular) (Chui, 1984).  
 
The first oil shock of 1973 led to a rise in the price of building materials and labour. 
As the cost of houses rose, townhouses and condominiums were introduced to the 
market for the first time (Roehner, 1999). The housing market had begun to recover in 
1976. In 1977 the GHB expanded its loan service to include housing developers and 
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this was concomitant with further housing growth resulted. The GHB became the 
principal housing bank of the country as its interest rates were lower than those of 
other financial institutions (NHA, 1978).  
 
The Building Control Act (1933) was amended in 1979 with the stipulation that all 
buildings require a construction permit from the local authorities who must 
subsequently issue a house registration number. Buildings could not access public 
utilities unless they had a registration number (Rodpai, 1986).  
 
First formal national housing policy was created in 1983. This policy set a structure 
for the roles that private developers and government agencies would play in providing 
housing (Haan & Kuilen, 1986). Haan & Kuilen (1986) note that the policy also listed 
the functions of the GHB and the NHA who were mandated as responsible for 
implementing the policy. Unfortunately, the second oil shock of 1980 and the 
devaluation of the Baht compromised the Thai economy and suppressed the housing 
market (Haan & Kuilen, 1986).  
 
Until the mid-1980s, the trend was to construct inexpensive housing units, 
townhouses in particular, with a one-story townhouse. An increasing number of 
people were thus able to afford housing due to the dual effect of a growing economy 
and inexpensive housing (Sheng, 2002).  
 
The beginning of the Gulf War in 1990 brought the real estate boom to an end. In 
1995 there was a huge amount of speculation on the housing market. According to 
AREA (2003), 50 percent of the unoccupied housing units in the BMR were 
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condominiums. This contributed significantly to the deterioration of the real estate 
market and its ultimate collapse (AREA, 2003).  
 
The Financial Crisis Period (1997- 2001) 
 
In 1997, the previous insistence on the protection of the baht was dropped by the 
Bank of Thailand in favour of a floating exchange rate. The changes to the global 
economy had a negative impact on Thailand’s housing sector, due to the increase in 
real estate prices and decrease in wealth (Sheng, 2002). Chaisang (1997) illustrates 
that the price of real estate suffered a sharp decrease with the flailing economy. 
Property developers then became the main focus. The rising interest rates and 
crawling economy retarded the market, and prospective home owners already tied 
into contracts began to withdraw down-payments. Following this, banks and other 
lenders were hit by the financial crisis. Eventually, a large number of lenders suffered 
bankruptcy, due to the inability of property developers to repay the large loans they 
had secured from them; especially in the case of big development companies, which 
had been investing in foreign real estate via domestic borrowings (Sheng & 
Kirinpanu, 2008). Agus & Doling (2002) note that the housing sector played a role in 
the economic crash although it was not the only driving force of the problem. The 
impact that the housing sector had on banks and private enterprises are recognisable. 
In order to recover from the financial crisis, Thailand welcomed the assistance of the 
IMF via its rescue package (Agus & Doling, 2002). Table 7 summarises a timeline of 





Table 7 A Chronological Timeline of Housing Development in Thailand 
Year Events 
After 1945 
(World War II) 
Public housing provided by the government  
1959 
Restrictions on the ownership of empty land, agricultural and industrial 
investment promoted 
Early 1960 Apartments, relocation of over 10,000 slum dwellers  
1960 Buy a parcel of land (household) and build a house  
1963 Public housing apartments for low‐income urban population  
Late 1960 Detached houses on private service plot of land  
1950 - 1967 Government plays a central role in housing development  
1968 - 1975 Turnkey housing units, ready‐to‐move‐in units  
1970 - 1984 Townhouses and condominiums 
1973 
• Formation of Government Housing Bank (GHB) and National Housing 
Authorities (NHA)  
• First oil shock crisis and resultant decline in economy 
1980 
• Second oil shock crisis 
• IMF#1  
After 1980 
• Baht Devalues#1  
• Increase in labour and material costs 
1983 First formally national housing policy framework delineated 
1986 - 1990 
 
• Foreign investment, particularly from Japan  
• Urban fringe: from agricultural land use to factory sites and townhouses 
projects  
• Inner city: low-income housing plots to condominium projects  
1991 - 1996 The Gulf War and drop in housing value  
1997 
• The Asian financial crisis: the decline of economy and real estate sector  
• Baht Devalues #2 
1997 - 2002 
• Debt restructuring and old projects rebuilt, recovery period  
• IMF#2 
2002 - 2007 Boom in condominiums projects along rail transit routes  
2007 Subprime mortgage meltdown accompanied by economic decline  
2007 - 2010 Political instability accompanied by low growth rate  
2011 Great Flood crisis in Thailand particularly in the BMR 
2012-2015 
• Political instability (Junta & Martial Law) 
• Housing demand returning to the market and steady growth 
Source: Manotham (2010); GHB (2017) 
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4.3.2  The Current Housing Market in Bangkok 
 
In Thailand overall and in the BMR in particular, real estate primarily consisted of 
housing and housing in the BMR represented 70 percent of the country’s total housing 
stock. The housing market in Thailand has recovered from the financial crisis. As 
shown in Figure 6 BMR housing between 2001 and 2010 has consistently increased. 
The data indicates growth in the number of housing units at a rate of approximately 
13 percent for the last 10 years.  
 
Figure 7 Newly Completed and Registered Housing Units in BMR 
Source: Bank of Thailand (2011) 
 
 
As a result of the 1997 Asian crisis, the Thai property market slowed down between 
1997 and 2003. Since 2003 however, property developers have been intentional about 
filling any housing deficit as a result of those 5-6 years of inactivity. As Figure 7 
denotes, between 2003 and 2005, the quantity and value of the housing units launched 
was equivalent to the numbers before 1997. This indicates that the number of housing 
units launched during the financial crisis period dropped suddenly. Yet growth was 
substantial before the financial crisis period and from 2000 to 2004, the value of new 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  
Self-Built Housing 32,118  28,059  27,418  22,716  15,497  18,064  19,639  17,693  18,598  19,859  25,244  28,949  25,341  24,017  19,618  22,498  
Apartment & Condo 65,207  57,801  66,086  29,666  11,978  12,187  3,320  5,769  7,354  8,490  10,534  18,607  17,432  34,049  53,725  59,919  
















development projects increased by 100 percent annually and consistently grew 
slightly afterward until 2010.  
 
Figure 8 Newly-launched Housing in the BMR (1994-2010) 
Source: CBRE (2012) 
 
 
More recently, housing developers have become cautious and are aware of the 
problems of creating a housing surplus (CBRE, 2012). Thus, in 2011 the number of 
housing units launched decreased (see Figure 7). As a caveat, the decrease in housing 
provision was not symptomatic of a problem with the housing market as had been the 
case in 1997, but simply an adjustment of the market.  
 
Location is a key consideration in new housing developments. New projects were 
previously generally constructed in areas where land was less expensive, i.e. the 
suburbs. This kept the price of housing competitive. More recent housing 
developments have been built closer to the cities and tend to border significant new 
road and BTS as well as MRT systems which offer high development potential. Thus, 13 Asia-Pacific Housing Journal
Housing finance
Chart 3 : Newly-launched housing in Bangkok and surrounding provinces 
Newly-launched       
housing in Bangkok and 
surrounding provinces 
  
Another important indicator of future 
housing supply is the number of newly 
launched homes in any single year. Again, 
in the year 2011, this indicator turned 
negative in the first 11 months of 2011.  
From January until November 2011, 
developers began building 77,381 new 
units in Bangkok and its surrounding 
provinces compared to 100,315 units 
during the same period on 2010, a 22.9 
per cent decrease.  
 
By the end of 2011, developers had 
launched 85,800 units, a 27.8 per cent 
decrease from the previous year. (Chart 3)  
House owner hip 




The actual transfer or registration of home 
ownership from developers to end-buyers 
is also a critical real estate industry indicator. 
Again this indicator had already turned 
negative during the first ten-months of 
2011. From January–Oct ber 2011, only 
126,417 units were transferred in Bangkok 
and surroundi g re s, a 14 per cent 
decrease from 2010.  
 
By the end of 2011, total transfers were 
150,189 units, 18 per cent less than during 
2010.    
 
Condominiums constituted 39.9 per cent 
of total units transferred, while townhouses 
/commercial buildings constituted 39.3 
per ce t and single-detached and duplexes 
20.8 per cent (Chart 4 and 5).  
 
Source : AREA
Complied by :  Research & Information Services Department 
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in an effort to ensure saleability, more attention is now paid to the location of 
developments (CBRE, 2016).  
 
Table 8 presents the proportion of home-owners in BMR in 2010 which as indicated, 
stood at 51 percent with the remaining fraction of occupants being renters. As 
Pornchokchai (1998) notes, Bangkok is home to a large number of temporary 
migrants in search of work. Some of these migrants may think about remaining in 
Bangkok long-term but not many studies of this phenomenon exist.  
 
Table 8 Occupancy Status in 2010 
Source: Data Processing Centre, The Bureau of Registration Administration, 
Department of Provincial Administration (2011) 
 
 
Figure 9 indicates that property prices have risen very modestly in Thailand in the 
past several years, in part, as a result of political imbalances in the country. It is quite 




No. of Households 
Percent of 
Total 
No. of Households 
Percent  of 
Total 
Owns dwelling and land 16,803,267 77.5 1,923,065 43.2 
Owns dwelling on rented 
land 
823,902 3.8 347,220 7.8 
Rents 2,601,796 12.0 1,633,715 36.7 
Occupied rented free 1,452,670 6.7 547,539 12.3 
Total 21,681,635 100 4,451,540 100 
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Figure 9 Housing Price Changes Between 2008 and 2017 (2009=100) 
Source: Global Property Guide (2017) 
 
 
4.3.3  The Condominium Market in Bangkok 
 
Thailand’s first law concerning condominiums, the Thailand Condominium Act 1979, 
was passed in 1979 and enacted in 1982 (see section 4.6.2). Ever since the Thai 
Condominium Act 1991 was enacted, blocks of condominiums have become the 
domestic counterparts of the modern residential skyscrapers. For the centres of the 
various Asian metropolises, they are a visual reminder of the thriving property 
market, answerable for much of this region’s growth (Askew, 2002).  
 
The popularity of the development of condominiums has attracted significant 
academic interest, largely because it relates to how the scarce resource of land can be 
exploited to the greatest advantage in this age of cities. Indeed, some (see Haila, 
1997) have deemed them to be a key part of how cities operate internationally, 
important for promotion and funding.  
 
The spatial structures of the inner cities of Thailand based around the past, used and a 
range of actors of particular areas. This part of the study explores the condominiums 
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which have been built in Bangkok. This new wave of development is considered in 
conjunction with the past features of the areas in which the high-rise and low-rise 
condominiums5 have been built under the planning and EIA enforcements (Askew, 
2002). Figure 10 illustrates that low-rise condominium projects have surpassed high-
rise condominiums. This research is investigated in detail in chapter 6. 
 
Figure 10 Condominium Types from 2005 - 2010 
Source: Real Estate Business Promotion Bureau, Department of Lands (2010) 
 
 
The condominium is often in the form of a high rise. High-rise condominium 
developments have become entirely typical in how a metropolis will grow upwards 
(Askew, 2002). Figure 11 shows that the condominium has the highest number of 
built units compared to self-built housing and housing projects before the financial 
crisis (before 1998) and after the market recovered from the crisis (since 2008). The 
factors relate to: first, continuous increases in the demand for central property causing 
original owners to sell their land to developers; second, buildings expanding upwards 
as developers seek to maximise the returns on their payments for expensive plots of 
                                                
 
5 Low-rise condominiums are categorised as having eight floors or less (GHB, 2011). 
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 * as of November 2010 






















Type of building 
Year 
Low rise High rise 
Source : Agency for Real Estate Affairs 
 * as of November 2010 
Condominium types from 2005 - 2010 
High rise vs low rise 
condominiums 
 
In Thailand, low-rise residential condominiums 
are those that are eight floors or less. Studies 
done by the Agency for Real Estate Affairs 
from 2005 to 2010 indicate that low-rise 
buildings (256 buildings) exceeded high-rise 
condominium construction (178 units). 
 
We believe that developers build low-rise 
units because total construction costs are 
lower and because transactions can be 
completed more quickly.   
 
Many developers also elect to build low rise 
condominiums because building set-backs 
can be limited to 10 meters.  
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land; third, government policy choosing to encourage investment by allowing 
investors to have an interest in new developments (Askew, 2002).  
 
Figure 11 Number of Projects and Number of Condominiums (1995-2010) 
 
Source: Real Estate Business Promotion Bureau, Department of Lands (2010) 
 
 
Factors particularly concerned with demand include; significant investment in office 
premises from firms, bringing a wave of demand from their comparatively well paid 
employees and demand for properties in proximity to the central offices, exacerbated 
by mobility problems due to traffic congestion. This meant that those who can afford 
to are eager to live as close as possible to their workplace to avoid a troublesome 
commute (Pornchockchai, 2006).  
 
After such extensive development, there was a clear spectrum in the market and each 
section aimed at a different consumer. Those which were particularly prominent were 
the luxury condominiums and those designed to house low-middle income 
individuals. At this time, there was not a large market for middle to low incomes 
neither a particularly middle or low income, indicative of how this class preferred to 
live further out, rather in the centre. 
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Historical view of 
market’s development 
 
■ Economic cycles affect 
 condominium developments 
 
 Thailand’s condominium market has been 
 much more buoyant during good economic 
 times. 
 
 Newly registered condominium units  
 decreased tremendously during the 1998  
 to 2002 Thai economic crisis. In the good  
 economic years prior to 1998 and the years 
 subsequent to 2002, the number of new  
 condominium units rose continuously.   
 
 During the economic crisis, the number of 
 condominium buildings per project also  
 decreased from 2 to 1.5 buildings per  
 project while condominium projects under 
 construction also dropped to about 150  
 per annum in 2000 and 2001 from a  
 historical averag  that exceeds 200  
 projects per annum.  
 The number of units per project also  
 dropped from 300 to 200 especially during 
 2004 and 2005.  
 
 In addition to addressing declining demand 
 many Thai developers limited projects to  
 79 units per project to comply with new  
 environmental impact requirements. 
Source : Real Estate Business Promotion Bureau, Department of Lands (as of September 2010) 
Number of projects and number of condominiu s 
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There was a high increase in the price of high-end condominiums and business 
premises of around 300-400 percent between 1985 and 1990 (Jackson, 1995). In 
2015, the luxury condominiums were worth an average of approximately £43,000 for 
an average floor space of 120 square metre. Low-income housing on the other hand 
cost between approximately £10,000 and £14,000 for a floor space of 20-40 square 
metre (Tangmatitham, 2011). The low-income condominiums were in the cheaper, 
less central area of the city with many competitors choosing to create this type of 
residence (Seik, 1992). Therefore, the landscape of the city is the one which has 
experienced such significant changes (explained in chapter 6). Table 9 shows price 
ranges of each condominium type.  
 
Table 9 Classification of Condominium Price 
Type Price 
Super Luxury Above £5,000/m² 
Luxury £3,400-5,000/m² 
High End £2,400-3,400/m² 
Up Scale £1,800-2,400/m² 
Mid-Range £1,400-1,800/m² 
Entry-Level Below £1,400/m² 
Source: CBRE (2015) 
 
 
In 2016, the prices of newly launched condominium projects continued to increase 
throughout Bangkok but at different rates according to the location. The average 
selling price of condominiums in the CBD was £4,585 per square metre, which is the 
equivalent of an increase of 5.3 percent. The average selling price of city fringe 
condominiums also increased by 4.8 percent to £2,697 per square metre and the 
average selling price of condominiums in the peripheral area of Bangkok similarly 
increased by 3.6 percent to £1,520 per square metre (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12 Bangkok Condominium Average Selling Price (Thai Baht), 2008-2016 
 
Source: Knight Frank Thailand  (2017) 
 
 
Frank (2017) notes that the Bangkok condominium supply at the end of 2016 
amounted to 435,805 units, 52,195 of which were launched in 2016. This is 
tantamount to an increase of 13.6 percent from 2015 (see Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13 Supply & New Supply of Bangkok Condominium, 2008-2016 
 




The majority of the new housing supply stemmed from big developers who were 
investing in the market for future revenue; the high supply of housing is not reflective 
of the recovery of condominium demand.  
 
It is estimated that 76 percent of new developments were still located in the peripheral 
Bangkok area, while 14 percent of new supply were in the city fringe area. Further, 
the data indicates that 10 percent of new supply in 2016, were located in the CBD as 
shown in Figure 14. 
 





Source: Knight Frank Thailand (2017) 
 
 
Approximately 315,393 condominium units were sold out of 435,805 units, 
representing a sale rate of 72.4 percent which is a slight decline from the previous 
year during which the sale rate was 75.3 percent. Only 26,595 units of condominiums 
were sold in 2016, marking a 59 percent decrease compared to 2015 during which 
approximately 64,170 units were sold (see Figure 15).  
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Figure 15 Supply, Demand and Sale Rate between 2008-2016 
 
Source: Knight Frank Thailand (2017) 
 
 
In summary, Thai people traditionally prefer to purchase their own homes as opposed 
to joining the rental market. Specifically, they have historically demonstrated a 
preference for detached housing. However, in recent years, it is clear that traditional 
preferences are changing particularly in Bangkok and its peripheral areas. In these 
areas, condominiums have gained traction and there is an increasing variety in the 
types of housing available according to price and location. Mass transit systems such 
as the BTS and MRT have simultaneously driven demand for condominiums units in 
proximity to stations. It is argued that if these current socio-economic trends continue, 
then the future housing market will not only expand at a rapid pace; it will also be 
more varied by location, size, quality and price to meet changing demands.  
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4.3.4  Housing Categories and Income Levels 
 
This section explains the relationships between the housing prices, types, and income 
levels. O’Sullivan (2007, p.292-293) proposes that housing can be categorised as low-
, medium-, or high-end, often reflecting the income level of its residents. 
Additionally, a higher-class dwelling can take the place of a lower-class dwelling if 
demand is high enough. This being said, the likelihood of substitution in Bangkok is 
low. This is because each type of residence is constructed and designed for a specific 
type of resident. Furthermore, housing classified under one company is priced too 
differently to housing priced in other companies. Given this, Choiejit & Teungfun 
(2005) explain that buyers considered to have middle-incomes are unable to afford 
high-end housing even if the price drops, and low-income earners are unable to afford 
medium-end housing even if the price drops by one rung. In an ideal market, supply 
and demand are balanced out over time. However, as Sahachaisaeree (2008) and 
Pornchokchai (2005) explain, this cannot be achieved if each class of housing is 
unable to replace another.  
 
High-end housing projects exists all over Bangkok. High-end housing is classified 
based on the attributes of the neighbourhood and not overall location (Manotham, 
2010). For instance, individuals with high-level income may wish to live close to 
work or in the CBD area. On the other hand, with greater purchasing power, they may 
prefer to live away from the city, in a quiet suburb. Therefore, as Atkinson-Palombo 
(2010) explains, high-income housing must be built with these specific factors in 
mind. These housing developments typically offer benefits such as convenient 
infrastructure, green space, strong security, an on-site gym, a swimming pool, and 
other facilities. In many cases, this type of development is placed near to major 
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shopping areas or educational institutions such as schools and universities 
(O’Sullivan, 2007). It is likely that high-end condominium prices will continue to 
increase given the lack of prime land available for developers to buy (JJL, 2015). 
Consequently, investors are also keen to secure long-term profit by purchasing high-
end condominium developments in these prime locations. 
 
The medium-end housing market is particularly competitive, especially since the 
overall housing market is hugely represented by the private sector in Bangkok. 
Consequently, as Pornchokchai (2002) explains, developers must now strike a balance 
between minimising costs in order to offer a reasonable price to homeowners whilst 
also ensuring that enough quality is provided for this class of buyer. Sharkawy & 
Chontipanich (1998) point out that the majority of medium-end housing 
developments are situated in the suburbs and around the edge of the city. Some have 
suggested that urban expansion has been experienced as a result of the rise in 
medium-end development projects over the years. Developers select locations based 
on access to transportation links, popular working areas, and nearby towns and 
villages. Hara et al. (2010) add that middle-income buyers tend to be more focused on 
price than any other factor, whilst high-income buyers are more concerned with the 
presence of luxury facilities.  
 
Lastly, low-income households are comprised of two subcategories of people. The 
first category represents office workers, factory workers, market stall owners and 
junior government officers. These people typically have a low but stable income. 
Low-end housing is accessible to this group due to the rise of high-density, high-rise 
buildings, public housing initiatives, and cheaper construction as a result of 
technological development.  
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A JLL report (2015) indicates that the housing market in Bangkok in general will 
experience significant growth in the coming years due to urban migration and the 
expansion of the middle-income group. Such a continued momentum from developers 
seemed to be in anticipation of what they perceived to be the time for middle and 
lower income families to purchase homes closer to the centre of Bangkok. Indeed, it 
was clear that many office workers were extremely keen to live closer to their 
workplaces. Condominiums in Bangkok are available at prices and sizes that make 
them attractive to middle-income groups (Colliers, 2013). The expansion of the urban 
area and the ever-increasing cost of land has affected the popularity of condominiums. 
 
The increase in middle-income groups on the market, moreover, has led to a higher 
demand and price for condominium properties. A trend inherent in this climate is that 
middle class buyers are then driven to seek cheaper properties in existing, older 
housing sites which are located further away from the CBD or in the peri-urban areas 
where housing is deemed affordable. The Bangkok Post (2015) reports that much of 
this demographic could not afford the central condominiums, instead, purchasing 
those that were built somewhat further out. Nowadays, a number of people are 
purchasing older homes away from the city’s BTS and MRT lines and further from 
the CBD as a result of the increase in land and unit prices (JJL, 2015). The research 
reveals that older sites offer condominiums 20-30 percent less expensive than new-
builds in the same neighbourhoods (JLL, 2015).  
 
In summary, housing development projects have been an issue, with Yap (1996) 
reporting that construction has taken a long time due to multiple changes in many 
factors and a lack of focus in government objectives for these projects. It can thus be 
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argued that the housing market and location of housing developments are impacted by 
public policy regarding land use patterns, urban structure, building control, and 
particularly EIA (discussed in chapter 6).  
 
4.3.5  Informal Housing in Thailand  
 
Informal housing is a critical issue in housing study in developing countries. Informal 
housing in this study refers to slums and squatter settlements. Even though these 
settlements are marginal actors in the real estate market in Thailand, they still play a 
role affecting the housing supply and demand market. Thus, it is worth exploring. The 
study in this thesis, however, only focuses on the formal housing units. While there is 
a lack of recent data on Thailand’s slums, it is widely assumed that the situation has 
not changed much since the 1990s. In 1990, the total slum population in Thailand was 
1,763,872, which represented 3 percent of the total population. These figures suggest 
that slum development is not prevalent in Thailand.  Of the total slum population, it is 
worthy to note that the majority was concentrated in Bangkok or 62 percent. An 
estimated 22 percent of slum dwellers are located in the BMR (excluding the BMA) 
while the remaining 16 percent are dispersed across other urban centres in the country 
(UN-HABITAT, 2008). The underpinning cause of the concentration of slums in 
Bangkok, stems from the pull factors that drive in-migration towards the city, which 
serves as the hub of socio-economic and political activities (UN-HABITAT, 2008).  
 
Between 1985 and 2000, the number of slums in BMR decreased from 1,020 to 866 
or by 15 percent (NHA, 2000). According to UN-HABITAT (2008), there was a 
massive decrease in the number of people living in slums. In 1958, it was estimated 
that 46 percent of the Bangkok population lived in slums. By 1994, the figure had 
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declined to 6 percent  (AREA, 1999). Over the past 25 years, there has been a marked 
decline in the slum population, mostly as a result of massive formal housing 
development in a market (Pornchokchai, 2006). The increased provision of formal 
housing in the BMR and the general increase in the supply of the housing stock 
instigated a reduction in rents and further provided an alternative means of housing. 
Slums no longer served as the primary option for rural migrants (AREA, 1999).  
 
4.4 Stakeholders in the Housing Sector in Thailand 
 
There are a myriad of public and private actors in both the supply and demand side of 
Thailand’s housing market. These actors stem from national and local government 
organisations, banks, private developers, and management companies. In Table 10 
and Table 11, the key stakeholders in the housing sector are delineated. Table 10, 
Table 11, Table 12, and Table 13 further describe the approximate operational 
frameworks of the various actors.  
 
4.4.1  Private Sector 
 
Bunnag (1985) distinguishes six periods of private housing development until 1984, 
when the NHA abandoned its direct construction of low-income housing. The first 
period (1957–1967) was accompanied by the emergence of land developers who 
divided and developed vacant plots of land after which properties were sold to low- 
and middle-income families. Initially, such plots were popular, however problems 
with the infrastructure and the title deeds meant that this interest soon waned. Up until 
the 1960s, private developers launched few housing developments but they were 




The second period (1967–1973) saw the rise of housing project developers. They 
leveraged the availability of housing mortgage loans from commercial banks and 
good economic conditions in the country further promoted the expansion of the 
sector. Three types of housing developers operated in the market: (a) land 
development companies who had expanded into the housing development trade, (b) 
professional housing developers, and (c) building contractors specialised in shop 
house construction who had transitioned into housing development (Durand- 
Lasserve, 1983). Initially, only a few private developers provided housing units, most 
of which were single detached homes aimed at high-income earners.  
 
During the third period (1973–1976), housing development declined. The National 
Executive Decree No.286 imposed high operational costs in an attempt by the 
government to gain control of land allocation for housing, and to protect the interests 
of purchasers. The rise in operational costs was due to the obligation on developers to 
provide adequate and appropriate facilities (Laothamatas, 1988). This period 
coincided with the first oil crisis in Thailand, and the cost of housing increased. 
 
During the fourth period (1976–1979), housing project development boomed again, 
with the GHB playing an important role in the promotion of private-sector housing 
development. Row houses and town houses gained traction in the market and they 
were quite popular with middle-income families.  
 
During the fifth period (1980–1982), in an attempt to expand housing stock and in the 
belief that the state should control economic policy, in 1980, the government 
promoted the role of private sector in housing development through the agenda of the 
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Joint Public-Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC). The provision of private sector 
housing was also buoyed by updated housing credit facilities (Chenvidyakarn, 1979). 
Substantial private sector housing developments were initially quite expensive due to 
high operational costs. Thus, the financial feasibility of these developments was low. 
As a result, private developers focused on smaller projects. These projects were 
located in urban areas on the outskirts of Bangkok where the population had grown 
and better transport and communication facilities had been created near to industrial 
work spaces (Sheng, 1989).  
 
The sixth period which coincided with the aftermath of the crisis, was accompanied 
by economic growth. Economic growth was concomitant with increased employment 
and income and Thailand’s urban middle class grew rapidly, thus creating a renewed 
demand for housing. The GHB initially alone, later in competition with the 
commercial banks, extended loans to private-sector developers and homebuyers to 
support this demand.  
 
After the sixth period, due to the fact that the higher-income housing sector was 
saturated, the private sector focused its attention on the lower-middle income groups 
that, for the first time, had the purchasing power to buy a house. According to 
Pornchokchai (2002), private developers focused on constructing townhouses targeted 
at low and middle income earners by decreasing the size of the housing units and the 
size of the plots they stood on. Yet, the rapid increase in costs meant that townhouse 
construction came to an end by the close of the 1980s. Yap (1997: cited in Yap & 
Kirinpanu 2000) states that developers now moved on to constructing condominiums 
located in Bangkok city and targeted at middle and high income earners. 
Pornchokchai (2002) notes that while this was occurring, the demand for affordable 
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condominiums was growing. These affordable condominiums were located on the 
outskirts of Bangkok as land was comparatively inexpensive in these areas.  
 
Table 10 Private Stakeholders in Housing Sector 
Field Stakeholder Business Target Market 
Housing Supply  
 
Commercial Banks  Finance for developer  Housing Developer  
Private Developer  Construction  High – Low Income Group  
Housing Broker  Brokerage  High – Low Income Group  
Housing Demand  Commercial Banks  Finance for homebuyer 
or investor 








High – Low Income Group  
Source: JICA (2013, p.24) 
 
 
In summary, the first foray into private sector housing developments since the 1970s 
came to a halt as housing prices went up following a military coup, political disorder 
and the outbreak of the Gulf War. The second foray emerged following the election of 
the civilian government in 1992. In 1992, developers where given the chance to 
obtain financing from foreign investors as a result of a policy of financial 
liberalisation. Government regulations concerning land appraisal and Floor Area 
Ratio (FAR) were also enforced which strengthened the real estate market. The 
following year, incentives offered by the Board of Investment prompted the private 
sector to construct affordable housing units. According to Yap and Kirinpanu (2000), 
many large and small private developers consistently provided the market with more 
housing stock.  
 
The private sector has led the growth of housing development. In 1974, private sector 
housing developments accounted for less than a quarter of total housing stock. The 
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proportion of private sector developments rose and was in fact the main form of 
housing in the BMR housing market until the real estate market collapsed due to the 
1997 financial crisis (Pornchokchai, 2002). Thailand’s recovery has led to another rise 
in private developments and Pornchokchai (2002) reports that since 2001, formal 
housing provided by the private sector now accounts for 95 percent of the total 
housing stock.  
 
4.4.2  Public Sector 
 
This section delineates the government agencies operating in the housing field with a 
focus on their responsibilities, resources and legal frameworks for action.  
 
Beginning of Public Housing Development  
 
Thailand’s housing situation was highlighted during the beginning of Thailand’s 
move towards urbanisation; particularly because there were a large number of slums 
in the nation’s large urban areas. After 1932, land ownership and leasing was 
transferred from the monarchy to the public sector. Despite this, housing standards, 
city planning and land use changes were not managed effectively by the public sector, 
and modernisation incentives and funding took the lead in these areas  (DOL, 2008) 
although slum development prevailed.  
 
Between 1953 and 1972, the establishment of the following offices between 1953 and 
1972: the Community Improvement Office, GHB, Housing Division and Housing 
Bureau was concomitant with the emergence of rigorous housing guidelines. The 
purpose of the GHB was to offer low-interest mortgages to organisations within the 
public sector. Additionally, housing demand had dramatically overtaken the ability of 
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the Housing Division and Housing Bureau to provide housing. Finally, the purpose of 
the Community Improvement Office was to rid certain regions of slums. Rather than 
working as one cooperative unit, these four agencies worked independently of each 
other (Usavagovitwong, 2012). In 1961, the NESDP was broadcasted, and the 3rd 
NESDP eventually had a negative influence on Thailand’s national development. In 
turn, this resulted in Thailand’s bureaucratic housing departments being reorganised 
(DOL, 2008). After some time, the management of housing in Thailand was 
transferred to the National Housing Authority (NHA). 
 
National Housing Program (NHA) 
 
The NHA was responsible for addressing the gap between housing availability and 
housing demand between 1975 and 1978. In order to achieve this, it offered citizens 
who could not afford other housing solutions the opportunity to obtain welfare 
housing in Bangkok. The policy was completely government funded, since its aim 
was to benefit low-income groups with a 5-year goal of providing approximately 
120,000 houses to low-income citizens (Chui, 1984). However, Chiu (1984) reports 
that the project exceeded its construction budget significantly after just 3 years 
leading the Thai government to reduce its goal by more than 50 percent. 
 
Its objective was to construct 50,000 dwellings and an overall completion of 25,600 
dwellings by the end of the 5-year scheme. Eventually, the lack of funding resulted in 
the termination of the NHA. The Accelerated Plan (1978-82) outlined the redirection 
of the NHA’s objectives following the financial struggle, introducing the need for 
foreign borrowing. Eventually, this resulted in the launch of a number of housing 
schemes, including slum development and inexpensive housing (NHA, 1978). 
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Affordable housing programs  
 
This housing scheme began as a ‘site-and-service’ project, and was established by the 
NHA along with a number of financial and global development organisations (Yap & 
Wandeler, 2010). As a caveat, it was difficult for the NHA to obtain land since most 
of the free land was situated in rural and marginal regions. Almost one third of site-
and-service activities represented housing policy, city planning, and land 
procurement. During these activities, it was predicted that a number of residents 
would need to be evicted from these areas, though a number of houses were empty 
and put on the market for sale (Pornchokchai, 1992). Because of this, the affordable 
housing scheme did not restrict the formation of further slums. Panichpakdee (2010) 
suggests that the reason for this was that a large number of residents faced too long a 
commute to work; that public transportation links in marginal regions were poor; and 
that the scheme failed to offer the type of stable housing that citizens were 
demanding. After 1982, the NHA became a charitable organisation and the site-and-
service projects were terminated (Usavagovitwong, 2012).  
 
The Sub-Committee on National Housing Development was commissioned by the 
NESDB in 1982, which aimed to encourage slum development through housing 
supply schemes. Housing supply incentives were addressed on an annual basis by the 
Sub-Committee, between 1987 and 1996. The 5th and 6th NESDP and HABITAT II 
formulated a basis for national housing policy, which aimed to offer housing for low- 
and middle-income citizens. Additionally, Government Housing Bank (GHB) 
operated in conjunction with the NHA to offer assistance to low-income citizens with 
construction funding from the Thai government. Panichpakdee (2010) reports that 
during 1970s and late 1980s, the NHA established an ‘internal cross-subsidy’, which 
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enabled the institution to obtain revenue from a number of schemes in order to 
supplement the loss of other funding. This eventually led the NHA to become 
engaged in the competitive housing market. These NHA schemes included mall 
development, new town projects, community housing, mixed income housing and 
rental properties (NHA, 2006). Over time, due to overwhelming demand for housing, 
the housing and construction sectors of Thailand have grown as the institution has 
become less of a public tool and more of a market-orientated system (NHA, 2006).  
 
New direction of national public housing scheme  
 
The Thai Rak Thai Party made an improvement to housing policy and housing 
schemes in 2003 although these were often regarded as populist in nature. The NHA 
and Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI) reconstructed certain 
government departments to operate under the Ministry of Social Development and 
Human Security. This led to a couple of housing schemes across Thailand. The first 
was the CODI-orchestrated ‘Ban Man Kong (BMK)’, which was a secure lease 
scheme aiming to impact 300,000 homes, and the second was the ‘Baan Eua Arthorn 
(BEA)’ scheme, facilitated by the NHA, which was given the mission statement of 
‘we care’, and was aimed at 600,000 residencies (Usavagovitwong, 2012, p.11).  
  
The BEA scheme’s objective was to offer housing to low-middle income residents, 
and receive some government funding. Panichpakdee (2010) explains that the BEA 
scheme acted as a ‘certified contractor’ for private construction enterprises in order to 
succeed in its 5-year plan. Therefore, while the NHA was once regarded as a 
contractor for the public sector, it now acted as a regulator. After 4.5 years, housing 
oversupply brought the NHA’s activity to a crawl. While the NHA had a target of 
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281,556 residencies (and had built 240,186 of these) and was outperforming its 
expected figures, approximately 1 in 5 residencies were yet to be sold by 2010. 
Therefore, the NHA struggled to stay afloat due to a differentiation in housing 
demand and housing supply (NHA, 2010).  
 
The Rural Development Fund and UCDO established CODI in 2000. CODI’s scheme, 
BMK, began 3 years later and was in full force by 2004. By this time, the BMK had a 
sole focus of providing stable tenancies to slums. The BMK scheme is resident-
focused and operates on both a community and administrative level. At the 
administrative level, the BMK communicates with a number of local and state 
government divisions to promote the chance of obtaining secure tenancies for low-
income residents. At the community level, the BMK aims to stimulate residents to 
take action on various housing development problems, such as community interaction 
and supervision, funding, negotiation, community politics, construction and planning 
(Boonyabancha, 2005). Table 11 shows the public stakeholders in Thailand’s housing 
sector. 
 
In summary, housing development and the housing market in Thailand is prominently 
dominated by the private sector as opposed to the government sector. However, the 
government still plays a salient role in the market via its policies which impinge on 
the sector at large.  In terms of housing supply, the private sector has provided 
roughly 95 percent of the total current stock since 1973. Of the nearly 23 million 
housing units available nationwide, only between 700,000 and 800,000 units have 
been completed by the NHA, CODI, and other public housing providers (JICA, 
2013).  
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Table 11 Public Stakeholders in Housing Sector 
Field Stakeholder Business Target Market 
Housing 
Supply 
National Housing Authority 
(NHA)  
Housing construction  Mid – Upper Low Income 
Group  
Community Organizations 
Development Institute (CODI)  
Lower Low Income Group  
Local Governments  Low Income Group  
Housing 
Demand 
Government Housing Bank 
(GHB)  
Finance for homebuyer 
or investor 
Mid – Low Income Group  
Government Saving Bank 
(GSB)  
High – Low Income Group  
National Housing Authority 
(NHA) 
Mid – Upper Low Income 
Group  
Community Organizations 
Development Institute (CODI) 
Lower Low Income Group 
Ministry of Finance  (MOF) Tax incentive  Mid – Low Income Group  




National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) 
Policy  National development  
Ministry of Interior (MOI) Regulation  Urban Plan, Building Code  
Local Governments Permission  Land development,  
Building construction  




Mid – Upper Low Income 
Group  
Community Organizations 
Development Institute (CODI) 
Lower Low Income Group 
Source: JICA (2013, p.24) 
 
 
4.5 Government Institutions and Organisations in Thailand  
 
In the previous sections, the characteristic of Bangkok with regards to its 
demographics, economy, urban form, and housing was delineated.  It is evident that 
changes to any of these characteristics are a function of the urban governance system 
thus it imperative to provide a nuanced understanding of the decision-making 
processes and wider political frameworks that govern the city. In this section, the aim 
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is to critically explore the urban governance of Thailand, particularly Bangkok, with 
the view to better understand the decisions that shape the urban sphere. It is however 
first important to identify the basic administrative divisions that exist in Thailand 
which relate to the housing sector. This section also identifies the structure of local 
governments in Thailand, in the context of their relationship with the central 
government. 
 
4.5.1  The Administrative Structure of the Thai Government 
  
There are three basic levels of public administration in Thailand: central, provincial, 
and local administration. The central administration consists of ministries and the 
provincial administration forms part of the deconcentration efforts of the government. 
It  consists of provinces, districts, minor districts, sub districts and villages. The local 
administration is based upon the concept of decentralisation, which is rooted in the 
aim of enabling local citizens to  participate in local affairs under relevant laws and 
regulations. There are 2 types of local administrative organisations: the general type 
(composed of the Provincial Administration Organisation, Municipalities, and the 
Subdistrict Administration Organisation); and the special administrative organisation 
which is established in some significant localities. This type of local government 
consists of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and the Pattaya City 
(see Figure 17) .  
 
The unique characteristics of both these authorities have been recognised. Bangkok is 
Thailand's dominant city. The city exercises significant influence over Thai politics, 
economy, education, media and culture. Pattaya City is distinctive because of its 
economic dependence on the tourist industry. Consequently, specific laws have 
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granted both cities a higher level of independence than other municipal authorities. 
The World Bank (2012) reported that these two cities are administered by a legislative 
council, which is elected using a system of proportional representation, and a Chief 
Executive or Governor chosen by the people through direct elections. Both the 
council and governor serve for four years. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
(BMA) will be discussed at greater length in the following section. 
 
Thailand comprises 76 provinces and each province except BMA is headed by a 
governor who is an official of the Department of Local Administration in the Ministry 
of Interior. The administration of the governor is considered an extension of the 
authority from Bangkok (DPT, 2013).  
 
Figure 16 Thai Bureaucratic System 
Source: DPT (2013) 
 
 
The National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP), which forms part of 
the purview of the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB), is conceptualised as the most authoritative document with regard to all 
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matters concerning national policy. Spatial development policies, including region-
specific programs, have traditionally been included in this document although in 
recent years the policy statements on spatial development have grown weaker. 
Concurrently, the Department of Public Works and Town & Country Planning (DPT) 
of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has become much more involved in spatial 
development and planning at the national, regional, sub-regional, provincial, town, 
and area levels (Sakkayarojkul, 2013). 
 




Source: Kaosa-ard & Pednekar (1996) 
Institutional Framework for New-Housing Development 
and Environmental Protection 
Office of the Prime Minister 
Officeof the National Economic 
and Social Development  
Ministry of Interior 
Dept of Town & Country 
Planning 
Dept of Land 
Dept of Public Work Dept 
National Housing Authority 
Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment 
Office of Natural Resources 






City Planning Dept 
Public Work Dept 
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Beside housing authorities, the planning mechanism for land use, along with EIA 
processes, is reliant upon a number of bureaucratic divisions. The primary public 
sector organisations related to housing policy and strategy include the (NESDB), 
Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Social Development and Human Security 
(MSDHS), Ministry and Finance (MOF), Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MONRE), and local governments (see Figure 17).  
 
For example, housing and planning are currently under the government’s MOI, BMA, 
and MONRE which are responsible for overseeing EIA processes. Housing, planning, 
and EIA procedures have never before been combined; either on a local or national 
scale. Therefore, the following section of this study outlines the individual 
responsibilities of the key officials in the EIA, planning, and housing process sector.  
 
4.5.2  The Thai Bureaucracy and Planning System  
 
During the EIA process, ONEP works conjointly with other ministries, particularly 
the Ministry of Interior which is the putative permitting agency; and housing 
developers, which are the project proponents. On the national and local scales, land-
use planning is shaped by governance at a number of levels (DOPA, 2018a). For 
instance, local governments are tasked with implementing development strategies and 
policies, whilst the national government is tasked with creating them. Therefore, some 
ambiguity and discord exists with regards to the abilities of each level of the 
government, which has an impact on the planning process in terms of incorporating 
EIA into the decision-making process. In Bangkok, for example, EIA rules may 
overlap with land-use planning and building control regulations which leads to 
duplicative regulation, as well as the emergence of conflict between MONRE and 
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BMA or other local governments. Such issues often emerge in cases where MONRE 
manages the EIA process while the BMA issues the development permits. Next 
section delineates the administration system in Thailand which is generally divided 




The central government consists of ministries, and departments. Each of the ministries 
are governed by a minister and each department under such ministries is led by a 
director general. A central government agency known as the Office of the Prime 
Minister is led by the prime minister and bears ministerial status (DPT, 2013).  
 
The ministers, his deputies, and secretaries, symbolise the political power which 
determines and controls the policies of that ministry. Beneath this political structure 
lies a vast permanent bureaucracy that implements the day-to-day duties of the 
ministry or otherwise, the policies of the minister. At the centre of this bureaucratic 
set-up of the ministry is the Permanent Secretary which is the highest ranked 
bureaucrat. Ministry headquarters are all located in Bangkok, where policies are 
formulated and directives and orders are designated to the provincial and local levels 
(DPT, 2013). 
 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)  
 
The National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) is devised by the 
Thai government to oversee the national economic and social development plans, as 
well as to formulation of housing and environmental policy strategy over a five-year 
period. Furthermore, the Office of the National Economic and Social Development 
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Board (NESDB) was founded in 1959 and took control over the generation of national 
development plans (NESDB, 2012). Each governmental body is responsible for 
devising their own comprehensive infrastructure development strategies but they are 
obliged to operate in compliance with the directives outlined in the NESDP. The 
primary framework directive is intended to oversee all secondary planning activity.  
NESDP is formulated by the NESDB, approved by the cabinet, and promulgated by 
government decree (NESDB, 2012). Rattanatanya (1997) explains that while 
Thailand’s planning and design policies are created by government figures, the central 
government is not responsible for applying these policies and plans within the various 
local regions. Furthermore, instead of focusing on the environment and the issue of 
natural resources, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th National Plan focuses primarily on 
stimulating economic goals. The 11th NESDP (2012-2016) promotes six key 
strategies, one of which encompasses social and environmental development, within 
which “housing” is conceptualised as a salient component. Feedback from the 
NESDB suggests that local, regional, and national housing policies must be aligned 
with urban development planning. Urban planning must also include considerations 
for transport, industry, and the environment (NESDB, 2012) (see the Appendix 3 for a 
chronology of 1st -12th NESDP). Rattanatanya (1997) and TDRI (1996) suggest that 
this has led to a number of increasing and clear local environmental issues which need 
to be addressed (discussed in chapter 5 and chapter 8). 
 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
 
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) is not directly involved in the formulation of housing 
policy or the provision of housing supplies. A myriad of departments are however 
responsible for issues related to housing. These include organisations with the 
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mandate to manage land and urban development planning, building codes, and 
electricity and water supply planning and provision. Importantly, departments under 
the MOI are responsible for registering lands, buildings, people, and households. Due 
to the wide range of the responsibilities of the various departments within the MOI 
(see Table 12), it is imperative that any future housing strategy development and/or 
implementation is a coordinated effort (DPT, 2013; JICA, 2013).  
 
Table 12 Departments/Agencies Related to Housing in the Ministry of Interior 
Departments/Agencies Matters related to Housing 
Department of Public Works and 
Town and Country Planning  
Policy and Standard on Urban Plan, Building Code  
Department of Lands  Assessment of Land Development, Registration of Land  
Department of Community 
Development  
Policy and Standard on Community Development  
Metropolitan Electricity Authority  Planning and Supplying Electricity  
Provincial Electricity Authority  Planning and Supplying Electricity  
Metropolitan Waterworks Authority  Planning and Supplying Drinking Water  
Provincial Waterworks Authority  Planning and Supplying Drinking Water  
Bangkok Metropolitan Authority  Land Use Planning, Zoning, Building Codes /  
Inspection for Bangkok  
Source: JICA (2013, p.27) 
 
 
The MOI is responsible for managing the Department of Public Works and Town & 
Country Planning (DPT), which is in turn, responsible for determining land use and 
planning. The DPT offers collaboration between local and relevant government 
divisions and ministerial departments, so that land use plans can be applied. Because 
local government officials are able to sign-off housing construction proposals, they 
play a key part in the application and regulation of land use planning. This is the same 
across all national regions. Furthermore, local government agents look to the 1979 
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Building Control Act and the 1992 Amended Building Control Act to determine the 
approval of land use management and planning (DPT, 2014).  
 
Ministry of Finance (MOF)  
 
The Ministry of Finance has the mandate to develop and manage national fiscal 
policy, collect and manage taxation, oversee the national treasury and state-owned 
enterprises amongst other functions. It also oversees eight Special Financial 
Institutions (SFI), which govern the implementation of fiscal policies. The institutions 
include organisations such as the Government Housing Bank (GHB) and Government 
Savings Bank (GSB). Prior to 2011, the MOF had no official role in formulating 
housing policy or providing housing. In July 2011, the MOF drafted and implemented 
a “First-Home” Policy until June 2013, which was designed to promote home-
ownership and stimulate demand within the housing market. The policy targets low-
income taxpayers, who are first time buyers, exclusively.  Notably, the MOF does not 
support similar incentives targeted at middle- and high-income groups.  
 
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MSDHS)  
 
The MSDHS does not have a formal role in housing policy or provision. It 
nevertheless, houses the NHA and CODI which are responsible for supplying housing 
to low-income households (see Table 13). The function of MSDHS is to allocate the 
budget for both agencies, although as a caveat, it does not influence policy 




Table 13 Departments/Agencies related to Housing in Ministry of Social 
Development and Human Security  
Departments/Agencies Matters related to Housing 
Department of Social Development 
and Welfare  
Budget related to housing  
National Housing Authority (NHA)  Implementation of housing construction  
Community Organizations 
Development Institute (CODI)  
Improvement of slum upgrading  
Source: JICA (2013, p.28) 
 
 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) 
 
The MONRE is a central government body responsible for planning and supervising 
EIA procedures, and operates under the National Environment Act (NEQA). The 
1992 NEQA is implemented by the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Policy & Planning (ONEP) which controls EIA procedures alongside a number of 
expert groups (NEQA, 1992). However, the EIA process is not influenced by MOI-
based local planning authorities, which are only informed of EIA proposal success. 
Therefore, EIA planning varies somewhat from the standard Thai design procedure 




The provincial government entails 76 provinces, each of which are led by a governor. 
Thailand’s provinces are divided into districts; in 2010, there were 878 districts 
throughout the country. In each province, there is one capital district and each district 
is led by a district chief (DPT, 2013). At the provincial level, DPT, is expected to 
coordinate economic development planning for their region. For example, they are 
responsible for the formulation of structure planning and land-use planning. However, 
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the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) is the only organisation responsible 
for devising its own land-use directives though the plan must be sanctioned by the 
DTP before it is implemented (DTP, 1994). Thus, the DTCP controls the formulation 
of land-use directives but has no involvement in the actual realisation of their 
carefully-devised plans. These plans are delivered to local government officials who 
are obliged to initiate the implementation process. This stage is the most problematic 
as the local government encounters issues with local infrastructure planning, planning 




Local state officials are expected to effectively implement the plans as devised by the 
DPT at a provincial level. This stage of planning involves the securing of investment 
and the formulation of land-use directives (Chuwong, 1997). These plans are 
sanctioned by the central state coordinating office, namely the NESDB, who make 
alterations or decisions relating to the implementation plan. In 1999, the Thai 
parliament passed the “Act for Promotion of Decentralisation” which stipulates that 
local governments must elected their own leadership, including an assembly and 
mayor (JICA, 2013, p.29). The Act further stipulates that local governments must be 
partially responsible for supplying housing to low-income families. Hence 
theoretically, local governments should be conceptualised as stakeholders in housing 
sector policy development, however as nearly all local governments with the 
exception of the BMA lack both the funding and the technical capacity to implement 
affordable housing, no new housing supply has been added by local governments yet 
(JICA, 2013).  
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Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA)  
 
The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) is a special local government 
organisation that comprises 50 districts and 169 sub districts (see Figure 18). Bangkok 
has become the centre of several activities which have a supply chain and linkages 
with BMR as per the Bangkok Metropolitan Regional Plan. As a caveat, the BMR is 
not a political entity but rather, a geographic designation with some governance 
power (Nantasenamat, 2013). 
 
Figure 18 Map of Bangkok 
Source: BMA (2016) 
 
 
The BMA was granted special governing rights by the Bangkok Administration 
Authority Act of 1985. This bestowed a greater level of control to the municipal 
organisation as it was permitted to operate outside of regulatory administrative 
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hierarchies. The BMA council, along with the Bangkok city governor, are elected 
officials and are obliged to collect city taxes and also receive fiscal support from the 
state (BMA, 2016). Local state officials are responsible for the formulation of all 
plans and must ensure that they comply with the directives outlined in the NESDP, 
National Plan, and the Comprehensive Land-use Plan (BMA, 2016).  
 
The existing institutional framework of BMA entails 3 offices, 16 departments and 50 
district offices (see Figure 20). The office acts as the Secretary to the Governor, the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Council and the Civil Service Commission of the BMA. 
 
Figure 19 Organization of the BMA 
 
Source: BMA (2016) 
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Figure 20 depicts the fact that at least 19 central government organisations are directly 
responsible for managing various aspects of the urban space in Bangkok (BMA, 
2016). On the other hand, the 16 departments have oversight of the duties assigned to 
them by law and district offices typically provide services at the district level (Heeckt 
et al., 2017).  
 
Figure 20 Bangkok Governance Structure 
 
Source: LSE Cities (2016) 
 
In many ways, the BMA acts independently although several of the city’s 
responsibilities are carried out in conjunction with other agencies and national 
departments (Figure 20). Due to Bangkok’s central position, every significant 
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development project in and around the BMA has to be approved by the national 
cabinet. These developments ostensibly have to align with the BMR regional plan 
(BMA, 2016; Heeckt et al., 2017).  
 
In summary, planning on a national and provincial level progressed without issue; 
however, policy implementation on a local level became problematic. The national 
framework plans tend to be comprehensive overviews of economic and social 
infrastructure development on a state level and there are often contradictions and 
duplications between various government departments (Chuwong, 1997). Ever since 
the launch of the fifth National Plan, environmental issues have become an important 
aspect of infrastructure development and when the eighth plan was launched in 1997, 
social and environmental issues became integral to the formulation of an economic 
development framework (NESDB, 2012). Apparently, the local government does not 
interfere in the housing market; rather, free market mechanisms are allowed to 
naturally function. On the other hand, the central government focuses on 
implementing housing policy in response to urban growth and housing development 
in Bangkok. 
 
4.6 Regulatory Frameworks Related to New-Housing Development 
  
Housing and condominium development is governed by four overarching laws. The 
first pertains to the Town Planning Act, which is exercised by the BMA for 
development in Greater Bangkok and nationwide by the Public Works Department. A 
section of the law concerns environmental considerations such as the directive that the 
construction process must not affect neighbouring locations. Secondly, the Building 
Control Act is also exercised by the BMA and the Public Works Department. This 
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law focuses primarily on environmental management. Thirdly, the Condominium Act 
is implemented by the Interior Ministry's Lands Department and, lastly, the 
Environmental Quality Protection and Promotion Act, stipulates the EIA approval 
process which is implemented by MONRE. 
 
4.6.1  The Town Planning Acts B.E. 2518 (A.D. 1975) 
 
In 2002, the cabinet mandated the DPT to accelerate the development of the urban 
plan to encapsulate all areas throughout the country. In response to the 
abovementioned resolution, DPT established a national – regional plan with the aim 
of setting up development policies, strategies, and measures as frameworks for spatial 
development and planning at all levels (see Figure 22).  
 








Thailand’s initial Town Planning Act was introduced in 1936, using Britain’s Town 
and Country Planning Act of 1932 as a template. As a result of the transformation of 
Thailand from a rural and agrarian society to an urban and industrial society, the 1936 
Act was amended in 1952 and again in 1975  (DTCP, 1994). The 1975 Act gave rise 
to the Board of Town Planning (BTP) and the Comprehensive Land-use Plan. The 
BTP was given nationwide authority over the Comprehensive Land-use Plan, 
including acts of enforcement, demolition and modification, as well as dealing with 
appeals raised based on the land-use plans (see Figure 22).    
 
Figure 22 The Outline of Existing City Planning Laws and Regulations 
Source: DPT (2016) 
 
The Act was amended in 1992. According to the 1992 document, the MOI has overall 
responsibility for city planning, via the twenty representatives on the Board of Town 
Planning. The board is the most authoritative body in the country in the area of urban 
planning (DTP, 1994). The executive wing of the board, the DPT, is responsible for 
national planning, overseeing planning activities and acting as a middle-man for the 
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Board and local government bodies. The Act designates two levels of city land-use 
for planning purposes: The Comprehensive Master Plan and the Specific Plan, both of 
which are implemented on the authority of the minister and the town planning acts. 
The Comprehensive Plan is a big-picture framework that provides broad guidelines 
for the design and development of specific areas. The DTP is expected to create the 
Comprehensive Plan and subsequently hand it over to local officials for 
implementation (Tummanon, 2013) (see Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23 Spatial Plan Hierarchy and Characteristic 
Source: DPT (2013) 
 
The Bangkok Comprehensive Plan has the same authority as a statute over five years, 
provided that it has been approved by the cabinet and has been disseminated by the 
minister as an official regulation (see Figure 24). There is an allowance to extend 
them for two years or less in order to facilitate the development of a new plan. This 
can expand to a five-year extension if the region’s situation has remained largely 
unchanged and if the public have no complaint (BMA, 2016).  
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Figure 24 The Bangkok Comprehensive Plan 2013 (B.E.2556): Land Use Zoning 
Plan 
Source: BMA (2016) 
 
A Specific Plan applies to zoning and construction in a specific location. Specific 
plans include a huge amount of detail regarding land, construction, roads, utilities and 
other local features. In fact, the plan is so thorough that it could be used as a map or 
zoning ordinance for the relevant region (DTP, 1994).  
 
The Town Planning Act of 1992 specifies that when a Comprehensive Plan has been 
put in place, an aligned Specific Plan can be created by appropriate local authorities. 
Alternatively, the local authorities are entitled to have their plan drawn up by the 
DTP. If no Comprehensive Plan is in effect, the minster can demand the DTP or the 
local agencies develop a Specific Plan. During the process of drawing up a plan, local 
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authorities must attain the endorsement of the Town Planning Board before the 
Specific Plan can take effect (DTP, 1994).  
 
However, although acting against the plans is technically illegal, it remains the case 
that they are inadequately enforced. Nothing compels companies or individuals to 
gain planning permission when they intend to develop land (CEC, 1995). As a result, 
determining whether the plans have been violated requires close examination of land 
use along with the Ministerial Regulations on land designation and density limits. 
However, as a result of their statutory function and the punishment for violations, the 
land use maps are inevitably not sufficiently detailed and the density limits are too 
vague (CEC, 1995).  
 
4.6.2  The Building Control Acts B.E. 2522 (A.D. 1979)  
 
The Building Control Acts allow the MOI to share the Ministerial Regulations for 
potentially environmentally-damaging construction and development. Furthermore, 
municipality bylaws can be applied by local government officials in accordance with 
the Ministerial Regulations. 
 
The Building Control Act B.E. 2522 (1979) and its accompanying ministerial 
regulations are the specific sources of law governing the application process for 
building construction permits and other licenses concerning safety and fire protection 
among various other aspects. Therefore, it is imperative that housing developers and 
contractors carefully consider the Building Control Act prior to a construction project. 
This Act has been modified from previous versions in 1992, 2000, 2007, and 2015 
(DPT, 2016). 
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Local and central governments who determine planning policy can employ the 
Building Control Acts as guides, particularly with regard to approval of construction 
undertakings. For instance, if no Comprehensive or Specific Plan is in place, the 
Building Control Act can be used as a source of direction. Additionally, this Act 
prompts the provision of ministerial regulations and municipal ordinances, both of 
which bolster the planning permission system (Figure 25). When it comes to urban 
planning, such regulations and ordinances can be implemented as a means of 
containing development in a given region by facilitating the proscription of 
construction, renovation or changes to buildings’ purposes  (DTCP, 1994).  
 
Figure 25 The Law of Building Control Act 
 
Source: BMA (2016) 
 
 
At first, the Act was not primarily concerned with land usage. Rather, it focused on 
the characteristics of individual buildings, including area, height, relation to adjoining 
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streets, building lines, open space and site cover. Additionally, rather than applying to 
zoning, a ministerial regulation than falls within the remit of the Act, it establishes the 
requirements relating to off-street parking in various buildings. The 1992 Act changed 
the requirements applied to particular buildings according to the zoning laid out in the 
Land-use Comprehensive Plans. For example, it restricted the number of allowable 
floors in Low Residential Zones and required buildings to be a certain distance from 
the main road in Commercial Zones (DTCP, 1994).  
 
The main purpose of the Act is to control the issuance of building-use permits, but 
this is generally determined by the building’s appropriateness for its designated 
function and not based on the zoning of land. The Act applies more to the usage of 
buildings relative to the designated purpose of the land, as opposed to the 
appropriation of particular sites (DTCP, 1994). This Act also codified the regulations 
related to structural resilience, fire resilience, health and safety, environmental 
suitability, adherence to town planning, architecture and congestion considerations. 
Ultimately, the stipulations of the Act overlaps with EIA regulations, which has an 
adverse effect on the implementation of EIA in Thailand  (CEC, 1995).  
 
4.6.3  The Condominium Act B.E. 2522 (A.D. 1979) 
 
In 1979, Thailand’s first law concerning condominiums, the Thailand Condominium 
Act 1979, was passed after which it was enacted in 1982. The Act regulates the 
management of collective housing such as condominiums and it has been modified 
from previous versions in 1991, 1999, and 2008. This Act is applicable to housing 
units for sale, but not in the rental market. The Act aimed to control the development 
of condominiums by recognising condominium management and property deeds. The 
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objective of the Condominium Act 1991 was to enable foreigners to own the property 
deeds of condominiums and thus encourage foreign investment in the condominium 
market. This act formed part of an effort to boost Thailand’s economy and between 
1986 and 1990, the real estate market in the BMR flourished.  
 
4.6.4  The Enhancement and Conservation of National 
Environmental Quality Act (NEQA) B.E. 2535 (A.D. 1992) and 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
 
As a result of increasing environmental problems, EIA has been implemented in 
Thailand to facilitate environmental planning and the management of economic 
development projects via a screening approach under the Enhancement and 
Conservation of the National Environment Quality Act (1975). This Act has been 
modified from previous versions in 1975, 1978, and, 1979. Currently, the 4th version 
is still in use. The new NEQA act was delineated and came into force in 1992 and its 
overarching purpose is to set and follow the environmental policy, plan, and standards 
to protect the environment by providing basic provisions for environmental protection 
in aspects of natural resources and pollution control. It further aims to be a 
comprehensive environmental law, incorporating varied aspects of environmental 
management in Thailand (AECEN, 2015). EIA specifies that any project or activity 
that may be concomitant with negative externalities on the environment must have an 
assessment of their environmental impacts before the project is implemented (ONEP, 
2016). EIA is explained in detail in chapter 5. 
 
In summary, the abundance of legislation related to land designation and planning has 
caused many practical difficulties because different pieces of legislation give control 
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to different bodies, leading to internal confusion and conflict. Efforts to streamline 
planning efforts have consistently failed, both regarding the horizontal interaction 
between different offices and the vertical interaction between the national elite and 
local administrators (discussed in chapter 8). As noted by a planning authority senior 
bureaucrat that was interviewed: 
 
Although urban land-use policies have been outlined as were shown on 
coloured maps or what they call Land Use Plans, they have never been 
implemented effectively.  
 
 
Thailand has lacked rules on planning permission. Buildings, therefore, are merely 
constructed in areas with high demanded. This means that the urban spatial 
characteristics of the BMR is somewhat haphazard, failing to have any clear scheme 
or coherence (Chuwong, 1997). Housing is constructed haphazardly and as a result, 
the provision of essential public utilities, such as water and road access has become 
problematic. 
 
In the less recently developed areas, a commonly used method to access water is to 
redirect streams and concomitantly, burst sewerage pipes have caused sinkholes in 
some instances. As housing developers rarely consider the most suitable areas for 
residential use, congestion on roads has been exacerbated. Furthermore, the lack of 
consideration given to new developments often means that there can be serious 
environmental damage, even worsening conditions in nearby buildings (PADCO, 
1990; Tummanon, 2013).  
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A condominium association representative provides more detail about the efficacy of 
the Act: 
The Building Control Act, Town Planning Act, and Condominium Act have 
an impact on the housing projects but it’s not necessarily effective because 
these laws and regulations are consistent and concrete. Private developers 
approve of anything as long as it is concrete and clear. The developers 
will always adapt to it although there may be some complaints in the 
beginning of the enforcement. Eventually everyone adapts and fulfils the 
requirements. The legislations thus affect the decision on launching a new 
housing project. For instance, if the developer has a piece of land in a 





Among the major points discussed in this chapter was an outline of the character of 
the Thai housing market, the key stakeholders in the housing sector, as well as the 
characteristics of private and public housing. The situation and circumstances 
whereby housing development has taken place in Bangkok was critically discussed 
and this entailed an exploration of the key issues within Thailand’s housing 
development sector. The chapter further focused on the role of the private sector in 
the country’s housing development, in addition to the role played by government 
institutions with a focus on their duties as well as resources and legal structures for 
taking action.  
 
The housing development in Thailand must be undertaken in accordance with the 
provisions of Building Control Act, Condominium Act, and Town Planning Act. The 
Building Control Act enables the government to regulate almost all types of 
development through the requirement to make applications and to sanction offenders, 
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whilst the Town Planning Act is concerned with the purposes for which land can be 
used in various areas. Furthermore, both pieces of legislation enable Ministers to issue 
regulations concerning standards of construction and to specify the amount and 
purposes of development allowed in specific areas. There may also be regulations in 
force in certain areas concerning the height and size of buildings which may impact 
on the output of building projects. Finally, environmental laws, particularly the need 
to undertake an EIA, may also place limits on development (discussed in chapter 6). 
In the following chapter, the practice of EIA in Thailand is critically discussed. 
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The chapter starts with an overview of the nature of EIA policy and implementation 
after which it outlines the nature of EIA in Thailand. It subsequently evaluates the 
factors that impact the policy formulation and implementation of EIA. The study 
especially focuses on EIA stipulations in Thailand, questioning how these emerged 
and how they have been adjusted over time. The chapter further questions the driving 
forces behind the government decision to introduce EIA procedures, or more 
accurately, to tighten regulations in the last decade. The overarching objective, is to 
uncover the ways in which the state has dealt with competing interests in the housing 
development process and the ways in which it has incorporated the views of such 
actors, into final outcomes. Has the state acted as a neutral arbiter or does it favour 
particular outcomes?  If the latter, why?  
 
5.2 EIA Practice Worldwide 
 
When the United States introduced NEPA in 1969, preliminary legal status had been 
given to EIA, which in the following years has spread across the world. NEPA’s EIA 
approach has been replicated by many other countries. In the USA it was stipulated 
that when environmental impacts were predicted from a state-backed or financed 
scheme, an EIA was necessary (IAIA, 1999). 
 
Since the early 1970s and having been inspired by the US approach, EIA policies 
have been introduced in various states such as Australia, France, Thailand, and 
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Canada. Particularly in economically advanced states by the mid-1980s, it had 
become common practice and a part of global standards to implement EIA (Fischer, 
2016; Garb et al., 2007; Glasson et al., 1999; Jay et al., 2007). When Agenda 21 was 
adopted at the 1992 UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, calling on states to factor in 
environmental considerations in their policy choices, EIA received renewed focus 
(Garb et al., 2007; Morgan, 2012). The Convention on Bio-Diversity (CBD) also 
incorporated EIA mechanisms. Investment schemes run by the UN and the World 
Bank often now include stipulations regarding EIA directives, reflecting the approach 
of other global aid bodies and the mechanisms of various international laws. Every 
continent and over 100 states have some presence of EIA mechanisms (Garb et al., 
2007), meaning its adoption has spread to economically developing states as well.  
 
Nevertheless, the implementation and success of EIA policies has been mixed across 
various states; legislation and processes are state-specific. Barrow (1997) has 
observed that certain states such as Denmark, the UK and Sweden have not 
introduced stand-alone EIA policies (Hickie & Wade, 1998; Lee & Dancey, 1993; 
European Commission, 1996). Rather, they have incorporated EIA into development 
scheme processes. In the USA, the EIA approach is to produce distinct policies and 
this approach has been adopted by Thailand. Economically advancing countries tend 
to have context-specific conditions that influence the implementation of EIA; scholars 
such as Glasson (2005) have also pointed out to the variable application of EIA to 
schemes as well as the divergent levels of citizen engagement and number of EIA’s 
undertaken across developed states.  In France for example, around 7000 EIAs are 
done annually, while in Austria it is only 20. Mindfulness regarding the variability in 
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background factors and EIA outcomes is crucial, as opposed to assuming a broad 
perspective of the applicability of a standard EIA approach across all states.  
 
A crucial aspect of EIA mechanisms is the evaluation of other possible courses of 
action other than the proposed scheme (Bulleid, 1997; Partidario, 2014). Commonly, 
other possible technical responses or potentially different schemes are unlikely to be 
posed in the majority of submitted EIA reports. Part of the answer may be in making 
EIA expert advisers central to EIA assessment processes and mechanisms, as the 
expert knowledge of development bodies and advisers has been argued to improve 
EIA assessments (Skeham, 1993). The normalisation of EIA mechanisms and 
procedures may also engender the incorporation of environmental legislation advice 
into schemes (Kakonge & Imeybore, 1993). 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, effective EIA mechanisms may also rest on the utilisation 
of professional and trained cross-disciplinary employees for effective cooperation and 
support (Morgan, 2012). It is argued that one person is unlikely to have the capacity 
to tackle various problems and context-specific concerns (Lee-Wrights, 1997). 
Estimative simulations, information evaluation, fieldwork experience, lab research 
and a whole manner of skills in relation to the assessment of data are likely to assist 
the EIA process, for both advisers and bodies (Alo, 1999). There has been significant 
debate concerning what such scoping and assessment should entail, despite the 
general consensus on its importance to EIA (Fischer, 2016; Parario, 2014; Sanchez, 




5.3 EIA Practice in Developing Countries 
 
Economically advancing and advanced states have mostly incorporated EIA 
mechanisms and systems to some degree, following the USA’s legislative action in 
1969. In the 1990s, it was observed that over 40 states had implemented EIA 
mechanisms (Robinson, 1992). However, there has been mixed success in 
incorporating EIA in industrialising states, in relation to context-specific abilities and 
processes.  
 
The implementation of EIA systems in economically advancing states has been 
championed by countries in Southeast Asia, with Horberry (1985), Kennedy (1988), 
and Moreira (1988) noting that particularly in Africa, as well as Latin America, EIA 
has not been put in to practice so significantly. In terms of theories, methods and 
processes of EIA, considerable development was made in the 1970s and in to the 
1980s.  
 
Industrialising states have had variable experiences with implementing EIA 
mechanisms, reflecting the pattern across industrialised states in relation to EIA. 
Lohani et al. (1997) and Donnelly et al. (1998) have pointed to the mixed success of 
implementing EIA mechanisms in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Various 
industrialising states’ variable experiences in implementing EIA and introducing 
relevant legislation, have been explained by George (2000). George (2000) 
conceptualises these variable experiences as a function of the degree of economic 
progress in the respective countries, cultural and societal factors, assets, as well as 
bureaucratic and political mechanisms. 
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The enhancement of EIA mechanisms may also occur as a result of implementing 
various other processes, as identified by academics focused on international 
application of EIA (Wood & Jones, 1997). A scheme’s environmental protection and 
sustainability aspects would thus be enhanced, and it would further contribute to an 
appraisal of the effects estimated in the EIA. It has also been recommended that EIA 
implementation bodies should also be given sufficient remit for policing and 
prosecution. This would include the ability to conduct assessments of EIA 
implementation, as well as complete ability to impose relevant rules and codes of 
practice by the appropriate agencies (Abracosa & Ortolano, 1987; Kakonge & 
Imeybore, 1993).  
 
Industrialised states’ experience of implementing EIA has been significantly 
divergent from that of industrialising states. That preliminary EIA implementation 
within industrialising countries was not based on calls within the state for improved 
environmental regulation, but rather from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
and aid organisations’ pressure or stipulation as part of agreements. Nevertheless, 
with regards to the implementation of EIA mechanisms in certain Southeast Asian 
states, greater realisation within states of the need for sustainable development may 
have encouraged EIA adoption (Lohani et al., 1997).  
 
As opposed to industrialised states, low-income countries have only began the process 
more recently and thus may not fully incorporate EIA mechanisms (Lee & George, 
2000). Donnelly et al. (1998) have noted how the majority of advancing nations’ 
policy and statutory foundations of EIA only came into creation during the 1990s, 
with only a few states such as the Philippines in 1977 and Colombia in 1974 
implementing EIA legislation prior to its introduction in industrialised states.  
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5.4 EIA Practice in Thailand  
 
“Environmental policy is designed with the goal of enabling both today’s 
and future’s society to enjoy a good quality of life through the ethical 
management and utilisation of natural resources.” (BOI, 2014) 
 
The point in the excerpt above is supported by the Thai government, which 
emphasises the importance of such resources in achieving economic development and 
growth, although it is imperative for the government to take action if this goal is to be 
realised. One of the main reasons that effective resource management depends upon 
government intervention is the risk of overconsumption of natural resources due to 
market failures (BOI, 2014). As the BOI (2014, p.4) explains, such failures stem from 
the external costs and benefits where others are impacted by someone else’s resource 
consumption.  
 
Over the last 40 years, Thailand's economy has undergone phenomenal growth. As a 
result, it has experienced a multitude of both successes and complications. To face 
these issues, policy reforms and development strategies have been crafted, 
particularly within sectors heavily involved in resource management and 
environmental issues. The growth of the economy, and with it, the enlargement of 
industry, has raised many environmental concerns. As such, the Thai government has 
responded to such concerns by enforcing several regulatory acts, one of which being 
the crucial EIA, an obligatory undertaking for large scale development projects to 
better inform the environmental aspects of planning and management for economic 
development projects such as new-housing projects. Since 1981, all such undertakings 
have been subject to an economic development screening approach.  
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The EIA is a process that has been applied for the purpose environmental supervision 
in Thailand. This study particularly focuses on new-housing development projects in 
Bangkok, Thailand. As environmental problems are ever rising, it is vital that 
processes such as the EIA are implemented in order to highlight any potential 
environmental impacts of these housing projects. Identifying any potential problems 
in advance can lead to appropriate planning to ensure that any environmental issues 
can be resolved. Using natural resources efficiently can be economically beneficial 
for Thailand. In the following section, an emphasis is placed on EIA policy 
formulation, alteration, and implementation. The ways in which EIA has developed, 
and how this is linked to planning, can be understood through an exploration of the 
changes made to Thai legislation. The strengths and shortcomings of EIA 
implementation in Thailand will also be discussed. 
 
5.4.1  Substantive Impact on the Environment of Thai Development 
 
From the export-focused policy implemented by the Thai government in the 1980’s to 
the present day, Thailand’s economy has seen rapid growth. In order for this industrial 
revolution to take place in such a rapid way, developments in industry, natural 
resources were intensely pursued. There has been high demand for the utilisation of 
natural resources (OEPP, 1998; Nicro & Apikul, 1999).  
 
However, during this time there has been a distinct lack planning, efficient use of 
resources and environmental protection (Intaraparvich & Clark, 1994; Bureekul, 
2000; TEI, 2005). Serious environmental problems, therefore, began to occur all over 
the country (Thabchumpon, 2002; Violette & Limanon, 2003). There was 
considerable reduction in natural resources, with a considerable increase in pollution 
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(Muanpawong, 1999; Bureekul, 2000; Shytov, 2003). As a result, Thailand 
encounters increasing environmental degradation across the country. This is an issue 
that is being manifested particularly through the substantial depletion of natural 
resources and a significant pollution problem affecting atmosphere, water resources, 
the country’s biodiversity, the loss of plant and animal species, waste issues, and 
climate change (UN ESCAP, 2006). 
 
Air pollution: Critical air pollution has been a consequence of Thailand’s 
industrialisation, especially in Bangkok, with industry and transport being major 
contributors (World Bank, 2011). In 2015, Air quality in many areas failed to meet 
environmental standards due to the high percentage of PM10 (Particulate Matter with 
airborne particles with a diameter of up to 10 µm), PM2.5 (particles with a diameter 
of up to 2.5 µm) and O3 (ozone) (PCD, 2015). The World Bank’s figures suggest that 
the number of fatalities in Thailand as a result of poor air quality was approximately 
49,000 in 2013, which compares with an equivalent figure of 31,000 in 1990 
(Buakamsri, 2016; World Bank, 2016). 
 
 
Water pollution: According to data released by the PCD (2015), a quarter of 
Thailand’s surface water was below the quality targets set, and 9 percent of the water 
off the country’s coasts was poor with 3 percent categorised as being very poor. The 
Inner Gulf of Thailand was the poorest measured quality of water, and this was due to 
effluent entering the natural drainage system. It has been the agricultural sector that 
has contributed most to this situation. In 2016, according to Rujivanarom (2017), 
agricultural sector was responsible for creating 39 million cubic metres of effluent per 
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day; the next-highest figure recorded in this year was the 17.8 million m3 attributed to 
the industrial sector, with 9.6 million m3 coming from residential sector.  
 
Waste and Hazardous Waste: PCD data from 2015 indicate that the amount of 
hazardous waste produced by the community that year amounted to some 591,127 
tonnes, which is 14,811 tonnes (2.6 percent) in excess of the previous year’s figure. In 
terms of industrial waste, 2.8 million tonnes of the 37.4 million tonnes produced in 
total that year, or 7.5 percent, were hazardous (PCD, 2015). According to Suksamran 
(2017), the total national figure for solid refuse production was 27 million tonnes, an 
increase of 0.7 percent on the 2015. Bangkok was responsible for 4.2 million tonnes 
of solid waste in 2016. In terms of measures to deal with solid waste, nationwide there 
were 2,490 waste consolidation locations, in 2014, although just 466 landfill sites 
were of the required standard, and 28 megatons of waste were not treated at all. 
Techawongtham (2016) highlighted the very serious pollution problem that existed 
with the country’s canals, which had become full of effluent as a result of having 
liquid waste released into them.  
 
5.4.2  Problem Identification and Agenda Setting 
 
The rapid economic growth led to massive environmental problems, mostly due to the 
mismanagement of the environment and natural resources (Thabchumpon, 2002; TEI, 
2005). Developmental strategies were sanctioned without any strategies being put in 
place to address social or environmental impacts (Shytov, 2003). This engendered 
many conflicts about the correct use and allocation of natural resources 
(Thabchumpon, 2002). It is clear that rapid economic growth is concomitant with 
environmental pollution and thus, Thailand’s economic prosperity and development 
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should go hand-in-hand with the efficient management of the environment. It is 
imperative for development to be sustainable and this entails accurate assessments of 
environmental strategies (Langkarpint, 2000). Economic growth is vital to improve 
quality of life, however, the impacts on the environment also need to be addressed. 
Thus the important question is, how can Thailand protect and conserve its 
environment? 
 
What are the root causes of environmental problems? The basic answer is increasing 
industrial development, together with an increasing urban population, which has to be 
housed appropriately. This expansion inevitably encroaches on the environment. 
Thailand’s NIC status has brought many economic benefits, but it has also brought 
environmental challenges. Management and regulation is obviously the way forward, 
if a sustainable natural environment is to be maintained whilst industrial development 
continues (Langkarpint, 2000). However, since the progress of the economy takes 
centre-stage in all political policies, the sustainable environment agenda frequently 
takes a ‘back-seat’. The government is aware that to foster more economic 
development, less regulation is required and as a result, the environmental agenda is 
weak (Langkarpint, 2000). 
 
The institutional development of environmental regulations in NICs has been rapidly 
expanding when compared with developed countries (Harashima & Morita 1998). 
This is the case because environmental policies in developed countries have been 
imitated in NICs. There have been international incentives and support for global 
agencies, such as the World Bank and the U.N. These agencies have driven the 
environmental agenda forward to counter the threat of environmental deterioration 
(Harashima, 2000). Since the late 1980’s, Thailand has relied on international 
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assistance, such as from the World Bank, for further development planning. 
Environmental policy development has also been encouraged by these international 
agencies in Thailand. The Thai government, as a result, has driven many 
environmental programmes that have been financially supported by international 
agencies (Harashima, 2000). The EIA is then used to monitor and assess the planning 
and outcomes of these programs. 
 
In Thailand, the government has complete power to control all natural resources, as 
well as the environment of the nation as a whole (Muanpawong, 1999; Jarusombat, 
2002). Thus, all policies and their implementation and enforcement are the 
responsibility of the government. Unfortunately, the government has not taken its 
responsibilities for environmental protection and sustainable natural resources 
seriously (Bureekul, 2000). The public has had to comply with whatever legislation 
has been set forth by the Thai government. 
 
The Thai government participated in the Stockholm conference in 1972. As a 
consequence of that conference, it created the National Environment Board, NEB, as 
well as the Office of the National Environment Board (ONEB). These bodies were 
created to centrally manage environmental issues (OEPP, 1998). This was the first 
time that the government created organisations to directly manage the environment, 
dealing with all issues associated with the protection and sustainability of natural 
resources (Reutergardh & Yen, 1997). As a consequence of this action, new 
environmental laws and regulations were set up by the government and the Thai legal 
system thus became influenced by international convention (Shytov, 2003). 
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5.4.3  EIA Policy Formulation 
 
These environmental initiatives in Thailand have been implemented for different 
reasons than the EIA in Western countries. EIAs in Western countries have been 
formed due to social pressure on respective governments (Boyle, 1998). 
Environmental degradation caused these problems to be highlighted in social 
discourses and as a result, environmental issues became one of the priorities for 
political and institutional agendas. Whereas the environmental policies developed and 
implemented in the Western countries were ‘bottom-up’, in Thailand, these policies 
have been implemented from a ‘top-down’ approach. That is to say, in Thailand, these 
initiatives have been developed and implemented by the government of Thailand. 
This may be so because it is seeking to replicate the strategies in the Western 
countries, as opposed to having serious environmental concerns (Roque, 1986). 
International peer-pressure can be brought to bear on developing countries as is 
evident in the case of Stockholm 1972 and the Rio International Environment 
Conference 1992. At these conferences, bilateral and multilateral development 
agencies promoted environmental initiatives by offering loans and aid programs 
(ADB, 1997). 
 
NEQA 1975 was Thailand’s first environmental quality act and environmental 
management changed dramatically following its implementation. The Prime Minister 
was directly involved in the formulation stage, sitting as Chair of the NEB committee. 
The EIA was first initiated and incorporated into NEQA 1975. EIA was officially 
implemented in 1981. At the time, the purpose of its introduction was to meet the 
national development aims of the Thai government. The primary role of the EIA in 
this location was to achieve sustainable development by avoiding the negative 
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externalities of development activities with respect to the environment (ONEP, 2012). 
The EIA is often used under the Ministerial Mandate for certain activities. It is used to 
facilitate the decision-making process in development projects and serves as one kind 
of an environmental management method.  
 
Prior to the establishment of the First National Economic and Social Development 
Plan (NESDP), the government between the 1950s and 1960s, focused on improving 
Thailand’s airports, roads, public networks and dams via funding from supranational 
agents. Ludwig (1997) and Kaosa-Ard & Pednekar (1996) report that these goals, 
along with EIA and other development schemes, has led to a historical dependence on 
international funding. Furthermore, Vannasaeng (1989) and Piamphongsant et al. 
(1981) explain that this was a necessary means to an end in terms given the scope of 
infrastructural development.  
 
Therefore, it can be argued that the influence of EIA has a longer history than the 
official implementation of the need to notify authorities about the ‘type and sizes of 
projects or activities’ that depended on EIA (1981) approval. For example, the World 
Bank had established a partial EIA in 1977, regarding the hydro-electric dam 
development of Srinalcarind. The World Bank (1974) reported that this dam scheme 
was raised by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). Every 
scheme involving a substantial development in Thailand that was carried out by 
government officials and it was mandatory for businesses to gain the approval of the 
EIA during its initial years following implementation. The MOSTE (1981) points out 
that the early criteria of the EIA directed that all Thai government schemes should 
apply to EIA akin to the EIA processes in the USA. Because of this, the establishment 
of EIA is exemplar of national policy-making with the support of global actors. 
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Additionally, in terms of development schemes, EIA has not been perceived as only a 
logical requirement, but also a political and governmental concept. Kaosa-Ard & 
Pednekar (1996) assert that the way in which EIA processes and environmental 
agencies have evolved to fit the state of Thailand is largely determined by government 
agents. 
 
It can be seen from the NESDP 4 – NESDP 7 that between the periods of 1961 to 
1996, Thailand’s natural resources were often used to support economic growth. 
However, this consequently led to a rise in social and environmental issues. These 
issues were addressed within the eighth NESDP 8, between 1997 and 2001, which 
encouraged the path of sustainable development. The NESDP 8 can be seen to entail 
three key components. The first component pertains to achieving sustainable 
development through effective management. The second component focuses on the 
creation of a broad approach to national development and the third component 
concerns the identification of requirements for meeting economic and social 
development aims (NESDB, 2006). Thailand and other parts of Asia, however, 
suffered greatly from the economic crisis in 1997 (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2000). This 
resulted in policies that emphasised economic repair (NESDB, 1997). During NESDP 
9 (2002-2006), the nation turned its attention towards both sustainable development 
and economic repair through an economy built on ‘self-sufficiency’. From NESDP 9 
to the current NESDP 11 (2012-2016), Thailand has focused on reforming its 
environmental structure (see Appendix 3).  
 
The NEQA 1975 governed the EIA processes within Thailand, and gave approval for 
the state-owned National Environmental Board (NEB) to govern the regulations for 
Thai EIA processes. The NEB released the Manual and General Guidelines for EIA 
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Preparation in 1979, which offers assistance and guidelines for generating an EIS. 
Further developments in legal environmental protection led to NEQA1992. This act 
was built on the experiences learned by the environmental agencies, such as NESDPs, 
over the previous years. More prominence was placed on protection and management, 
as opposed to simple pollution control from previous acts (TDRI, 1996). Thus, the 
EIA has been adopted as an indispensable tool for effective management of the 
environment. Under Section 46 of the NEQA (1992) (ONEP, 2012), the MONRE, 
with the approval of NEB, has the power to notify the type and size of projects or 
activities requiring an EIA. For large-scale projects that have the potential to cause 
significant impacts, EIA reports must be submitted to the ONEP. EIA reports have to 
be prepared by a consulting firm registered by ONEP. These reports are obligatory for 
a range of different industries including residential condominiums. MONRE 
notification, issued in 2012, listed 35 project types that are required by law to file a 
report (ONEP, 2014). According to ONEP (2014), the EIA policy was designed with 
very specific aims: 
• The assessment of environmental impacts, when compared with previous 
assessments.  
• The study of the effects of both short and long term human activity on the 
environment. 
• The promotion of sustainable development through preventive measures and 
effective planning, thus leading to cost reduction in rectifying any problems. 
• The enhancement of environmental considerations, especially focused on 
planning and decisions. 
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As a result of these initiatives, the legal system of Thailand has been modernised and 
improvements have been continuing over the past years. It was imperative for the 
legal system to be updated in this way so that Thailand could better deal with the 
global world. However, despite these advancements in the Thai legal system, there 
have been failures with regards to modern environmental law (Langkarpint, 2000). 
The problems posed to Western industrialised countries in resolving environmental 
issues are significantly diminished compared to the issues faced by Thai authorities 
(Boyle, 1998).  Despite having constrained political assets, the pressures for 
development and economic advancement are still as significant as in Western 
industrialised states. Furthermore, the political adoption and prospects for integration 
of environmental and sustainability demands is diminished, while demands for 
regulation from within society is generally less. Consequently, the political 
establishment does not give much weight to demands from an already frail 
environmental advocate community for change (Boyle, 1998; Langkarpint, 2000). 
Moreira (1988), Roque (1986), and Grindle (1980) have underscored particular 
factors that contribute to this situation. These include dictatorship, poverty, dominant 
economic and political concerns of a narrow section of society, poor access to data 
and knowledge, low literacy levels, as well as weak civil society structures.  
 
5.4.4  EIA Policy Alterations 
 
The type and size of projects that require EIA were set forth in Section 17 of the 
NEQA 1975 Act (ONEP, 2014) however the NEQA 1975 was amended in 1979. It 
became known as the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE), 
and it defined the criteria for activities that would require EIA. In 1981, the first 
announcement was made detailing the size and types of projects that would require 
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EIA (Yap, 1994; Reutergardh & Yen, 1997). This announcement covered public and 
private projects (Tongcumpou & Harvey, 1994). 
 
Boyle (1998) points out that there was little economic and political input in 
environmental protection during the initial implementation stages. Furthermore, at 
this time, economic institutions had more authority than environmental ones in many 
cases. For instance, the power of the ONEB was considered to be relatively weak. 
Yap (1994) explains that the proponents had full authority over whether or not to 
encourage public participation in the EIA process. 
 
Thailand experienced a huge number of environmental issues and struggles prior to 
the end of the 1980s. As a result, environmental problems – and the absence of 
sufficient natural resource management strategies – achieved greater recognition 
among the public. Reutergardh & Yen (1997) as well as Yap (1994) explain that, 
therefore, the NEQA 1975 was no longer believed to be a sufficient approach to 
dealing with the issues that had occurred. Only administrative applications were 
covered by NEQA 1975. NEQA 1978 did not empower NEB with any legal powers. 
The NEB did produce a guide for the practical application of EIA. However, this did 
was not backed by law to ensure enforcement. Therefore, the amended NEQA 1992 
was introduced. As part of improvement and conservation of the NEQA 1975, a broad 
variety of projects must be evaluated using EIA in Thailand. According to Stærdahl et 
al. (2004), project proponents and, where relevant, government agencies, were 
involved in talks with NEB (operating under the MOSTE, and previously under the 
Office of the Prime Minister) in order to identify projects that might have negative 
effects on the environment. Under the NEQA 1992, the EIS is detailed, in association 
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with this modification. In the years that have followed, a number of statements have 
been broadcasted in order to ensure that the act is executed.  
 
NEQA 1992 provides details concerning the sizes and types of activities or projects – 
whether private, state or government run – that are subject to an EIA. It further 
provides details on the relevant guidelines, regulations, rules, processes and quality 
criteria that must be followed when conducting environmental impact reports. The 
projects subject to an EIA, based on size and type, were determined by the MOSTE 
and supported by the NEB, as per Section 46 of the NEQA 1992 (ONEP, 2014).  
 
The NEQA 1992 also authorised the 20-year plan passed by the Cabinet in 1996: The 
National Policy and Prospective Plan for the Enhancement and Conservation of 
National Environmental Quality, 1997-2016 (‘the Plan’). As part of the Plan, the 
recovery of renewable resources is supported through the provision of various 
facilitating methods. The Plan also outlines broad objectives for different areas of 
concern, and responds to the issue of waste and pollution through various 
environmental management techniques.  
 
The EIA was taken over by ONEP, as a division of the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment (MONRE), in 2002. As Pantumsinchai et al.  (2003) and Tan (2002) 
explain, MONRE was introduced to manage the tasks of the former MOSTE. As of 
today, responsibility and authority for EIA assignment lies with the MONRE, 
supported by the NEB, as per Section 46 of the NEQA 1992. In 2012, the MONRE 
notification detailed a total of 35 public and private project types and sizes, including 
large-scale housing development and land adjustment (ONEP, 2014). Table 14 
illustrates key movements for EIA in Thailand. 
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• EIA was first introduced in Thailand and pass into law in 1975 
• The Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environmental Quality Act 
1975 (NEQA 1975) was implemented 
1981 • The Thai EIA system began 
• Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE) announced the first 
notification of types and sizes of projects which require EIA  
• 11 types of projects required EIA 
1984 • Ministerial regulation of EIA Consultant qualification 
1992 • The Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act 
1992 (NEQA 1992) was implemented 
• 22 types of projects required EIA 
• Expert Review Committees (ERC) were established 
• EIA for condominium projects was enforced 
2002 • Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) was founded 
2003 • The Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP) was formally 
reconstituted under the MONRE as the Office of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP) 
2006 • Changed specification for EIA requirement of condominium project 
2009 • 34 types of projects required EIA 
2012 • 35 types of projects required EIA 
Source: ONEP (2016) 
 
5.5 EIA Implementation in New-Housing Development in Thailand 
 
Outlying government departments are often responsible for taking policy from the 
formulation stage to the implementation stage. Hudson & Lowe (2004) suggest that 
during the implementation phase, the policy may be changed (or modified). This can 
occur due to a number of issues. This section examines whether the EIA has been 
implemented according to its objective. The EIA process does have strengths and 
weaknesses which are also highlighted in this section. 
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Glasson et al. (2005) explain that the EIA is a methodical procedure that seeks to 
assess, identify and forecast any serious effects that a project may have on the 
environment before the project is approved for implementation. Glasson et al. (2005) 
and Awakul & Ogunlana (2002), add that since the EIA assists in informed decision-
making and therefore reduces the effort and complication involved in the decision-
making process, it is considered a helpful evaluative tool. The EIA in Thailand 
ensures that all positive and negative effects of any project can be highlighted in 
advance, at the planning stage. The effects on the environment, as well as the 
communities affected are analysed. By doing this in the planning stage, it can be 
ensured that the most positive outcome possible can be actualised, whilst limiting the 
negative effects as much as possible (ONEP, 2014). 
 
EIA is a decision making tool and plays a vital role in the Planning and Building 
Control legislation. Section 46-48 of the NEQA 1992 is the process primarily adopted 
currently. Regarding this act, The NEQA 1992 dictates that EIA is a mandatory 
process. In Sections 46, 47 and 48 of the NEQA, the EIA processes are outlined: 
environmental evaluation must occur prior to project implementation when the project 
may result in relatively serious environmental outcomes. The ONEP (2014) explains 
that an EIA report must be created and submitted when projects are legislatively 
required to receive approval before they can be carried out. EIA processes and 
associated stakeholders are discussed in the next section. 
 
5.5.1  EIA Processes and Associated Actors 
 
The Thai EIA procedure has 2 pathways: one requiring cabinet-approval and the other 
not requiring such approval. An EIA is undertaken in conjunction with a feasibility 
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study. Whether for a government or public project, a report is filed with the ONEP. 
This is reviewed by the ERC and comments are then passed onto the NEB. The NEB 
has the mandate to request for additional comments from the ONEP. The complied 
report can then be presented before cabinet for approval, without any time-constraints. 
This is the main process for governmental projects. For private projects, the EIA does 
not require the approval of the cabinet as it is submitted directly to the ONEP. The 
ONEP makes comments on proposals only and the final decision is then taken by the 
Expert Review Committee (ERC) (ONEP, 2014). 
 
The NEQA 1992 is the guideline on which the procedures and timeline of the EIA 
approval system is based. This system is made up of a number of phases and involves 
the work of several individuals (see Figure 26). The phases outline the various stages 
and duties relevant to the EIA procedure. The five stages of the EIA process are 
further discussed in the next section.  
 
5.5.2  Major Actors Involved in EIA Process 
 
Different locations offer different levels of access and involvement to different groups 
of people. According to the ONEP (2015), those who may be involved in EIA include 
governmental legislative and regulatory agencies, consultants, interested parties, 
members of the public, local governments, national governments, EIA evaluators, 
project proponents, appraisers and decision-makers (Munn, 1979). Furthermore, the 
impact that these actors can have on the decision-making process can differ from case 
to case. The roles and responsibilities are explained in this section for new housing 
cases in Thailand.  
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Figure 26 Five Steps and Corresponding Tasks of the EIA Process and 
Associated Actors 
 
Source: Garb et al. (2007); ONEP (2015) 
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The Project Proponent (Housing Developers) 
 
The housing developer is usually the initiator of any housing project. As such, the 
EIA needs to be involved with the housing developer at an early stage, in order to 
ensure appropriate planning occurs. All aspects and alternatives can be considered by 
the EIA, in conjunction with the private developer (discussed in chapter 3 and 4). 
 
 
The Government Agencies 
 
Government agencies involved in the EIA process can be classified into 2 groups as 
follows:  
 
1) Government agencies involved in reviewing EIA reports: Office of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP) of the MONRE 
The government dictates the process of EIA implementation in Thailand. The NEB is 
permitted to request that environmental evaluations and reports are provided by 
project proponents where the NEB deems fit, under the NEQA 1992. The NEB’s 
Chairman is the Prime Minister, and one of the MONSTE’s two Vice Chairman 
positions are filled by the minister. According to the ONEP (2014), the EIA process is 
supported by an expert review committee (ERC), which is made up of various 
specialists from a number of sectors. 
 
In 2003, MOSTE’s ownership of the OEPP was handed to the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment (MONRE) in response to government policy regarding 
bureaucratic change. From this point onwards, the OEPP was known as the Office of 
Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP). In Thailand, EIA 
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administration is carried out by the Environmental Impact Evaluation Bureau (EIEB) 
which is part of ONEP (see Figure 18), undertaking the preliminary review of EIS and 
making initial recommendations to the ERC who makes the final decision. ONEP 
(2012) defines the key actors involved in the EIA process as shown in Figure 26. 
ONEP must receive and review EIA reports for any project that is likely to result in 
serious environmental outcomes and is large in size. ONEP-listed consultants must 
complete the EIA report, which it then assesses and discusses with the relevant 
cabinet or agency. 
 
2) The Permitting Agencies  
Until an EIA report and project receives authorisation from the ONEP, the permitting 
agency – which is given legal authority to provide the developer with a permit for 
notification-appropriate project implementation – must defer the provision of the 
permit. This is also the case if the evaluation is not completed by ERC by the deadline 
expressed within the Act, as per Sections 47 and 48 of the NEQA 1992. The ERC is 
responsible for communicating the licensing criteria to ONEP. The main permit 
agencies for any new housing project, operating in Thailand are BMA, local 
government agencies, provincial governors and the Ministry of Interior (see Figure 
18). The provincial governors provide the permission for the construction of any 
housing schemes within their jurisdiction. Central government agencies become more 
involved in any projects proposed in nationally sensitive areas. The decision-making 
process thus can be extensive. The NEQA 1992 stipulates that the EIA approval must 
be sought before final permission is granted for any construction project. All housing 
project developments in Thailand must go through the EIA process, whether for the 
City Plan, Building Control, and Condominium Acts. It is mandatory that the EIA 
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must be completed before developers submit their construction application. The 
permission for construction is then granted by the EIA’s final approval. Many statutes 
are taken into account during this process. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, there 
is a shortage of experienced and qualified members who truly understand the EIA 
process, especially within other housing authorities. As an environmental authority 
officer that was interviewed notes: 
 
This lack of experience means that the environmental aspect of the process 
has less consideration, with more emphasis placed on Building Control 
Acts or other planning laws. The EIA process is not effectively 
implemented by these agencies, which is the responsibility of the ONEP.  
 
 
The ONEP usually informs the relevant authorities of the decision, once EIA approval 
has been granted. As a result, many decisions are made based on the planning and 
other laws all together by-passing the EIA regulations. A planning authority officer 
that participated in this study asserts: 
 
The Building Controls Act and other related planning laws is sufficient to 
make a decision on housing projects on a local level. Environmental 
consideration is included in these acts. However, the environmental 
concern featured in these acts are much weaker than the EIA procedures. 
Ultimately, a permitting officers’ decision is highly based on other 
regulations, such as the Municipality Regulations.  
 
 
3) Expert Review Committee (ERC) 
The ERC reviews the EIS for the EIA approval process, in accordance with the needs 
of the NEB. Within the EIA process, the decision-making takes place by the ERC. 
The ERC can then approve or reject any proposal. It can also review and make 
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recommendations. ERC is made up of members of governmental agencies, along with 
other NEB members (i.e. the heads of relevant government agencies and the licensing 
agency, the OEPP secretariat as the committee chairperson and OEPP officer as a 
secretary, as well as up to seven ONEB-approved environmental specialists). The 
OEPP (1996) explains that ERC members are a collective team of multidisciplinary 
experts, including employees of environmental NGOs and those working in the 
education sector.  Members of the ERC are specialists working within numerous 
relevant industries and professions (Table 15).  
 
Table 15 Members of Expert Review Committee  
No. Members Position 
1 ONEP Secretary General  Chairman  
2 Permitting Agency or representative  Committee  
3 Experts or Specialists up to 9 persons appointed by NEB  Committee 
4 ONEP Official  Secretariat  
Source: ONEP (2016) 
 
ERC is, by law, deemed capable of approving, rejecting, revising or requesting further 
data on any given development activity or projects. The ERC is the mechanism by 
which the EIA procedures are realised. Members of the committee must not have 
conflicts-of-interest (ADB, 1997). There is also no compensation offered as part of 
the process. This ensures impartiality in the decision-making process. Objectivity 
must be maintained throughout this process. 
 
The quality of the EIA process can be influenced by the ERC, especially if members 
of the ERC are chosen based on their position in any planning authority, such as the 
Department of Public Work and Town and Country Planning. Unfortunately, some 
members do indeed have little knowledge of the EIA process. Normally, ERC reviews 
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the EIS via a research report which provides substantial technical details, as compared 
to the EIA report, according to an EIA consultant that was interviewed. Absence of 
members at critical meetings is one major cause for delays in the approval system, 
according to an interview with an EIA consultant:  
 
Several governmental authorities provide officers for the ERC 
membership. Unfortunately, because of this, limited time can force 
members to be absent and thus delay the process further, also leading to a 
back-log of decisions to be made. 
 
 
It seems clear that government is challenged by inadequate staff resources. It is 
essential that there are experienced officials, who are highly qualified, who can 
evaluate the EIA effectively, within the ERC. Only this way can the EIA remain 
effective in its mandate. Shortfalls in more specialist members is very detrimental to 
this whole process. The ERC, moreover, has no total authority over decision-making 
because it has been co-opted by political bodies, particularly in government projects. 
In the past, there have been instances where the ERC members have been removed if 
their views differ from that of the government, or if they disagreed with the project 
aims and objectives; in such cases, government representatives substituted them 
(ADB, 1997; Chompunth, 2011; Simpson, 2015; Wells-Dang et al., 2016) (discussed 
in chapter 7).  
 
4) EIA Consultants  
It is the responsibility of the EIA consultant to review the project proposal and to 
compile a report highlighting the various EIA areas of concern, including direct, 
indirect, short-term and long-term environmental impacts that may be realised as a 
consequence of implementing the proposed project. The EIA report typically 
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concludes with recommendations on the means by which any adverse effects that 
have been highlighted in the report may be mitigated in practice. Established 
consultancies can be granted licensure for one to three years. According to ONEP 
(2015), there are currently 77 EIA consultants in Thailand that can be categorised into 
three typologies according to the length of their respective licenses: 3 year- license 
(50 companies) 2 year-license (24 companies), and 1 year-license (3 companies). 
Where significant detrimental environmental impacts are highlighted, it is the 
responsibility of the EIA consultants to propose alternative pathways for delivery of 
the scheme. Typically, such proposals involve design amendments to reduce 
detrimental effects, but could also consist of advice to relocate the scheme in an 
entirely different location.  
 
In reality, the relative skills of registered EIA professionals is subject to wide 
variation due to the burgeoning number of schemes requiring environmental impact 
assessment as a result of a rapidly growing economy leading to increased housing 
demands. As a result, there is a wide spread deficit of EIA consultants (OEPP, 1996; 
Ludwig, 1997). The investigation determined that the skills and experience required 
of EIA consultants are often specialisms associated with particular categories of the 
scheme (see Table 16). According to Petts (1997), it is the capabilities of the EIA 
consultants that determine whether or not EIA is effective and meaningful. The 
relationship between consultant experience and EIS quality has also been 
demonstrated in other research by scholars such as Glasson et al. (1997) and Kobus & 
Lee (1993). Consultants essentially need to have prior experience of EIAs in order to 
accurately assess their quality and determine whether or not the quality and 
effectiveness of EIA has increased over a certain period of time.  In Thailand, EIA 
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consultants with the greatest number of EIAs approved for housing developments are 
depicted in Table 16. 
 






Housing Mining Power 
Plant 
Transportation 
Consultant of Technology 4 6 13 1 8 - 
Thai-Thai Engineering - - 27 - - - 
Earth & Sun - - 21 - - - 
CMS Engineering & 
Management  
- - 18 - - - 
Phuket Environmental 
Service 
- - 17 - - - 
En Tech 1 - 6 1 8 1 
Source: ThaiPublica (2014)  
 
 
A significant proportion of EISs prepared by these specialists frequently attained 
approval at the initial submission stage, following interviews between the EIA 
consultants and street-bureaucrats. Big Developer K comments that: 
The quality of EIA consultants is related not only to the standard of the 
EIS, but also to the care and time taken during all the EIA processes.  
 
 
An environmental authority officer that was interviewed further comments: 
…some registered EIA consultants do not possess adequate skills and 
experience of the requirements for an in-depth and successful EIA process.  
In addition, a great number of organisations do not provide EIA 
specialists to cover all specialities.  Consequently, EISs are frequently 
compiled by ‘cut and pasting’ from those approved previously with scant 
regard to scheme specifics, particularly in relation to especially location 
and local environmental impact.  
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Pantumsinchai & Panswad (2004) assert that EIA reports are commonly compiled by 
self-employed consultants contracted by scheme developers in order to minimise time 
and cost expenditure.   
 
A dearth of current data on baseline physical and biological ecosystems and socio–
economic aspects may also lead to oversights on the part of the EIA consultants. Sub-
standard methodologies are being implemented to determine and quantify the 
potential scale of detrimental environmental effects (Pantumsinchai & Panswad, 
2004). An environmental authority senior bureaucrat notes that: 
 
EIA consultants tend to prepare EIA reports in favour of the project 
proponent since they are paid by the project proponent to prepare the 
report with the aim of getting the approval from ERC. This kind of 
arrangement undermines the reliability and credibility of the EIA report.  
 
 
5.5.3  Five Stages of the EIA Process 
 
In this section, an overview of the ways in which current Thai EIA processes for new 
housing developments are practically implemented is presented. This section further 
includes a summary of the Thai housing development project pathway. This approach 
enables a thorough evaluation of the means by which the current EIA approval 
process conforms within the standard procedures for the development of new housing 
projects. Five major stages in the EIA processes are identified and discussed along 
with the factors that contribute to its advantages and disadvantages, with regards to 
the manner in which it is currently implemented.  
 
In 1975, the first compulsory requirements for EIA in Thailand were announced.  
These were subject to further development, leading to an inclusion of Section 46 of 
	 226 
the NEQA1992, the MONRE which, with the approval of NEB, specified the size and 
form of schemes subject to compulsory EIA requirements. The housing development 
project was added in 1992. For new housing development projects that need EIA 
approval, the plan to carry out a housing project in a certain geographical area 
represents the earliest stage of development projects. Following this, the idea will be 
tested for engineering and economic viability. The outcomes of these tests are then 
used to create a detailed project plan once the decision has been made to start the 
development project. At this point, the housing developer requests authorisation to 
commence development by contacting the relevant authorities and submitting the 
appropriate paperwork and application forms and after which the EIA process begins. 
The Five Steps of the EIA process are related to particular tasks and the public is 
permitted to contribute to each step. Chesoh (2011, p.120) has summarised the five 
overarching steps of the EIA process as follows: 
 
Screening which encompasses launching the project, evaluating the site and making 
contact with relevant local authorities.  
Scoping which involves site selection, assessing the remit of the EIA to be 
undertaken and requesting public and stakeholder participation.  
Report preparation entails the selection of appropriate consultants, acquisition of 
data including the views of the public and compilation of a draft report. 
EIA review and approval includes the compilation of the final report and review by 
an EIA expert panel.  It further includes submission to the permitting authority for 
private schemes and submission to the National Environmental Board and to the 
Cabinet for government schemes.  
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Monitoring entails submission of reports by the project manager with review 




The purpose of screening is to identify the need for EIA at the earliest stage of the 
project. Thailand has released a directive detailing EIA-appropriate projects and 
activities by size and type. The directive classifies projects into two categories: 
projects that could have noteworthy effects on the environment and that are of a type, 
size or scale that requires an EIA; and projects that are situated in environmentally 
delicate locations and therefore could have serious impacts on the environment. 
According to the ONEP (2014), in order to address substantial growth in project types 
and significant economic development in particular locations, the project type list has 
been amended four times: in 1981, 1992, 2009, and 2012.  
 
The amendments were made to the list of projects in the form of a second directive 
under Section 46 of the NEQA 1992. The second directive incorporated an additional 
8 EIA-appropriate types of project. The new categories included high-density 
residential buildings. The ONEP (2014) explains that private sector development 
activities are now incorporated into the project list along with state and government 
projects. There are now a total of 35 project/activity types deemed appropriate for EIS 
(see Appendix 5), with additional list items being introduced in 2009. As highlighted 
initially, NEQA 1992 details three key criteria for the conducting of an EIA: 
1. The implementation of new development projects.  
2. The redevelopment or further development of a project already underway. 
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3. The need for a new license in order to continue works on a project already 
underway. 
 
This study particularly focuses on the implementation of new development projects. 
Table 17 presents the key requirements for particular types/sizes of new-housing 
development projects. Requirements for land allocation are specified in Annex A of a 
directive by the MONRE in 2012 (ONEP, 2012, Appendix II). As a consequence of 
EIA criteria, developers have to take these conditions into account when planning 
new projects, especially for large-scale condominium projects.  
 
Screening follows the submission of a housing project proposal to the relevant 
permitting agencies.  The relevant agency is dependent upon the proposed nature of 
the scheme and its site.  The agency bears responsibility for the primary checking of 
the proposal to identify if the scheme can be categorised under one of the prescribed 
EIA lists.  If an EIA is determined as appropriate, then the ONEP (the only EIA 
authority in Thailand) is responsible for deciding if the project will need to submit an 
EIS.  The site information and proposed scheme design will be examined by the 
relevant ONEP body.  
 
In Thailand there is no requirement for an exploratory EIA or initial environmental 
evaluation (IEE).  Therefore, a significant proportion of schemes commence with a 
full-scale EIA undertaking relatively late into the scheme design and planning phase. 
The EIS will be submitted at a similar time to the applications for permission, as 




Table 17 Type and Sizes of Housing Development Projects Requiring the  
Preparation of EIA 
Item Type of project or activities Sizes Principle, Method, 
Procedure 
27 Buildings according to the Building Control 
Act, which are buildings located in an area 
beside a river, lake, beach or close to or in a 
national park or historical park, which may 
potentially cause an unpleasant impact on 
environmental quality, where the building has 
a height of at least 23 metres or where the 
total floor area or individual area in the same 
building is equal to 10,000 square metres or 
more. Applications to construct such 
buildings must submit an EIA report when 
applying for a permit for construction or at 
the time of notification to local officials in 
case of no permit required. 
With 23-meter 
height or more 
or the total floor 
area or individual 
area in the same 
building is equal to 
10,000 square 
meters or more  
 
Submit during 
application for a 
construction permit or 
at a time of notification 
to local officials in 
case of no permit 
required which defined 
by the Building 
Control Act  
 
28 Land Allocation for residential or commercial 
purposes as defined by the Land Allocation 
Act 2000, which is defined as a proposal for 
at least 500 land plots or where the total 
allocated area is more than 100 Rai (viz. 16 
hectares). Such development applications 
must submit an EIA report when applying for 
a permit for land allocation as defined by the 
Land Allocation Act.  
 
500 plots of land or 
more or total 
allocated area is 
more than 100 Rai 
(16 hectares)  
 
Submit during 
application for a land 
allocation permit 
defined by the Land 
Allocation Act  
 
31 Residential condominiums projects, which 
according to the Building Control Act 2008, 
are defined as buildings with 80 rooms or 
more or a total utilisation area of at least 
4,000 square metres. Proposals for 
constructions of this kind are required to 
submit an EIA report when applying for a 
permit for construction or at the time of 
notification to local officials in cases where 
no permit is required. 
With 80 rooms or 
more or total 
utilisation area is 
4,000 square meters 
or more  
 
Submit during 
application for a 
construction permit or 
at a time of notification 
to local officials in 
case of no permit 
required which defined 
by the Building 
Control Act  
 





Scoping is where the impacts that need to be addressed are identified. Scoping 
focuses the EIA investigation on the critical factors (ONEP, 2012).  According to the 
NEQA 1992, any scheme for which an EIA is compulsory is obliged to conduct the 
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EIS in line with ONEP preparation criteria published by ONEP (according to NEQA, 
1992).  Furthermore, NEQA (1992) requires that the scoping of each scheme should 
be constructed in accordance with relevant environmental legislation.  
 
Environmental Baseline Data 
In response to the impacts of housing development on environment (discussed in 
chapter 6), a large proportion of the Thai approach to EIA implementation is based on 
the framework provided by the US, due to the role of the World Bank in establishing 
Thailand’s initial adoption of EIA. The U.S. Corps of Engineers Agency provided a 
foundation for the Four-Tiers System of Environmental Resources or Values, which 
served as a model for the Thai Manual and the scoping requirements contained within 
it. These environmental criteria relate to quality of life, human use, biological 
resources and physical resources (see Appendix 4).  
 
ONEP (2014) dictates that these four factors must be taken into account when 
reviewing the current environmental circumstances as part of an EIS. Furthermore, it 
is essential that all types of environmental outcomes (i.e. indirect and direct) are 
outlined prior to the commencement of the project or activity.  
 
Lawrence (2000) notes the significance of scoping in EIA theory. Whilst scoping does 
not appear to be hugely successful in Thailand, researchers such as Sadler & Fuller 
(1997) have pointed out that scoping represents one of the main tools that can be used 
to manage and evaluate EIA quality. At present, there is no official written criteria for 
decision-making or requirements. Furthermore, there is no sufficient way to record 
stakeholder’s feedback within the EISs themselves. This means that it is not possible 
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to accurately determine whether or not stakeholders’ feedback and concerns have 
been appropriately addressed. 
 
EIA consultants must work in accordance with the formal scope determined for the 
EIS.  EIA regulation states that ONEP staff are permitted to offer guidance on the 
relevant scoping aspects of EIS on an individual basis and in alignment with the 
formal Manual (ONEP, 2014).  EIA consultants identified that the lack of EIA 
experience amongst ONEP staff is problematic in ensuring a well-defined EIA scope.  
 
The primary focal points relevant to individual EIS’ vary because they relate to the 
different work experiences of the ONEP staff gained by working over a variety of 
housing development projects. Again, this is interpreted as a result of the absence of 
relevant guidelines for EIS scoping (interview, EIA consultants, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, neither the ONEP staff nor the EIA consultants are able to decide 
whether any EIS was complete until formal ratification by the EIA approval process.  
Only then is the EIS subject to regulatory scrutiny with the ERC being in a position to 
decide whether the submitted EIS is appropriate and deserving of approval. There 
have been instances where EISs have been turned down by the ERC because they 
were appraised as incomplete.  For housing developments, these EIA process 
deficiencies are obviously apparent leading to initial ONEP rejection of the EIS.  
Subsequent resubmission of the EIS eventually leads to approval and to ERC 
requirements for a more detailed review. Examples like this can result in 
disagreements between EIA consultants and the ONEP staff. This is especially 
relevant when the EIS scope was recommended by ONEP staff, only to be eventually 
rejected by the ERC.  Furthermore, this situation results in unnecessary uncertainty 
	 232 
for the time required to achieve EIA approval (interview, environmental authority 
officer and EIA consultants, 2014).  
 
The efficacy of the scoping procedure will have a major impact on the standard of the 
final EIS compiled. A formal guideline approach is not suitable for every scheme 
since it will be constructed to comply with minimum EIS requirements. It can 
therefore lead to two main difficulties for EISs: (1) lengthening of the EIA approval 
process if the ERC considers the EIS to inadequate, or (2) failure to obtain approval 
since the EIS is perceived to be of sub-standard quality (interview, EIA consultants, 
2014). Both these issues elucidate the recalcitrance of developers to initiate EIA 
processes.  
 
Because the ONEP and other organisations involved in the implementation of EIA 
have little political power and credibility, this causes a number of issues in that they 
are unable to fully understand and influence EIA processes. It is for this reason that 
external actors are prescribing EIA as a ‘top-down’ requirement, as explained by 
Rayner (1993). The issue regarding organisational capability is explored further in 
chapter 8. Therefore, there is a need to establish the resources, people and institutional 
capability required to effectively implement the legal requirements for EIA as well as 
to establish the legal requirements themselves, as has been achieved in developed 
nations.  
 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Preparation 
 
The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is created around a hypothetical 
prediction of environmental outcomes and is technical in nature. The report must 
	 233 
highlight an acknowledgement of natural resources and environmental considerations 
with regards to the implementation of the project. Furthermore, mitigation strategies 
should be proposed in order to illustrate that the project proponent is willing to take 
the necessary measures to avoid or minimise environmental damage (ONEP, 2014).  
 
The DOE (1994) explains that the purpose of the EIS in planning is to assist the 
decision-making process. Horberry (1995) adds that in order for informed and 
effective decision-making to take place, the EIS must be able to obtain information 
from various fields and experts in order to provide all decision-makers with the 
necessary insight. The purpose of the EIS, therefore, is to present both the positive 
and negative effects a proposed action will have on the environment along with an 
overview of current environmental conditions and circumstances. It is important that 
the content and structure of the EIS adheres to the prescribed framework and criteria 
as advised by the relevant organisation, and that the information within it is presented 
as a formal report. Overall, it should be understood that the decisions made by those 
assigned to undertake this process take into account the information provided in the 
EIS report along with other factors.  
 
Further to the above points, it is important that the report identifies a number of 
possible alternative approaches with regards to minimising pollution. These measures 
might include alternative implementation options or the selection of a different 
location in which to carry out the project. Where larger scale projects have the 
potential to inflict greater environmental impacts, the EIA should be submitted to 
ONEP for review with recommendations.  Under these circumstances, the EIA should 
be compiled by an ONEP registered EIA consultant. The NEQA 1992 presented five 
key components within the final EIS; 
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• Project Description provides information on various project factors, such as 
design, setting, size and project type.   
• Baseline Conditions provide environmental information regarding the local 
area and adjacent locations. 
• Evaluation of Environmental Impact analyses the project with consideration 
of the four resource classifications. 
• Suggested Mitigation Strategies aims to reduce or avoid environmental 
degradation caused by the development project. These strategies do not have 
to be included in the initial project proposal. 
• Monitoring and auditing outline the measures that will be taken to monitor 
the adherence of the development scheme to environmental protection criteria, 
such as emissions.  
 
It has been highlighted as one of the most commons reasons rejection of EIS 
submissions, often entailing the requirement for multiple re-submissions of EIS 
before approval is finally obtained. As noted by an environmental authority officer 
that participated in this study: 
 
A great number of EISs contain excessive details on current environmental 
conditions, but with limited data for environmental impacts potentially 
resulting from the proposed scheme. 
 
 
As mentioned previously, a great number of failed EIS submissions consist of reams 
of descriptive information, without due regard for the specific siting of the proposed 
project, resulting in inadequate information on which to base a rational decision. 
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Other reasons for failure include insufficiency of data on potential local 
environmental effects; determination, prediction, and assessment of the major 
impacts; alternative scheme options and also proposed environmental impact 
mitigation strategies. These inadequacies are viewed as a consequence of submitting 
duplicate information from previous EISs without sufficient consideration of site-
specific issues (interview, senior and street-level bureaucrats, 2014). However, it is 
unclear whether the EIA results have been integrated into developers’ decision-
making in the project planning process. It is also questionable whether competent 
agencies take EIA results into account when granting permission for project 
construction and operation. This is discussed in chapter 6.  
 
Pimcharoen (2001) affirms that EIS preparation is an issue for many EIA consultants. 
One of the main issues noted was that developers often have little consideration for 
the environment and the impacts their projects will have on it (Pimcharoen, 2001). In 
terms of developer-related issues, one of the main problems is that EIA documents are 
not used properly by developers when determining how feasible a planned housing 
project will be (Pimcharoen, 2001). It is underscored that EIA is often only adopted 
once the housing project has begun, and EIA is not considered an area of major 
concern for many developers (ADB, 1997; Boyle, 1998; Chesoh, 2011; Pimcharoen, 
2001; Suwanteep et al., 2016).  
 
An EIA consultant comments that, in a number of cases, insufficient information from 
developers has caused delays in the EIS preparation process. This issue can be seen 
prominently in housing development projects’ EIS preparation. Developers’ intention 
to participate in EIA practice can be indicated by the amount they are willing to spend 
on EIS preparation. Ludwig (1997) claims that the majority of data relating to EIA 
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processes in Thailand are not widely accessible to the public. EIS is frequently 
presented in a manner that is difficult for non-specialists to understand, and often 
tends to be of a poor standard.  (Ludwig, 1997; Wells-Dang et al., 2016).  
 
Public Participation  
A vital constituent part of the EIS preparation is public participation where the 
opinions of local communities and other stakeholders are sought via public meetings 
and questionnaires (ONEP, 2014). This approach typically requires the accumulation 
of unquestionable site specific data from the field in order to determine a standard 
benchmark against which the potential environmental impacts can be assessed. 
 
Over recent years, public awareness and participation has risen in relation to 
environmental issues. Consequently, Vatanasapt et al. (2003) highlight the increasing 
public demand for more involvement in decision-making, especially when it comes to 
the execution of development projects and other key activities. As Ogunlana et al. 
(2001) and Muanpawong (1999) point out, official EIA report results tend not to be 
accepted by the public due to the absence of real public participation. Furthermore, 
Tongcumpou & Harvey (1994) note that public participation is not properly defined 
within the EIA system despite this being an area that is meant to be significant.  
 
Yao (2006) reports that legislation now exists to support greater public participation, 
whilst researchers such as Beierle (1998), Chess (2000), and Rowe & Frewer (2000) 
highlight the increase in demand for public participation. Consequently, both 
domestic and international decision-making could be impacted. According to 
Creighton (2005), the reason for this growing level of interest and activity may be that 
public participation is seen to provide significant advantages, especially in the form of 
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public advocacy for development projects. Nevertheless, the OECD (2005) notes that 
government investment in public participation differs greatly from government 
investment in assessing outcomes. Furthermore, Charnley & Engelbert (2005) argue 
that some believe public participation to be a drain on time and money when 
implementing development decisions. Additionally, some argue that greater public 
participation only causes disputes between stakeholders to worsen.  
 
Bureekul (2000) explains that the Thai Constitutions, NEQA 1992 and other legal and 
regulatory measures do offer Thai people the right to participate in projects related to 
pollution, resources and the environment. However, Bureekul (2007) and Nicro & 
Apikul (1999) note that the government still has ultimate authority.   
 
Despite the above points, public participation and consultation is still significantly 
lacking in Thai EIA. In Thailand, public participation is not a compulsory EIA stage, 
although a public hearing may be necessary for select development schemes 
subsequent to an NEB ruling.   Such public hearings for an EIA must be carried out at 
least twice (according to MONRE directive (2009)).  The initial hearing is carried out 
at the commencement of the EIA in order to collect views on the draft scope of study 
(including potential advantageous and detrimental effects that may result). The last 
hearing takes place at the same time as the preparation of the draft EIA which 
includes proposed mitigation actions.  Remarks made at the last hearing are included 
in the EIA report.  	
 
Although public participation is considered a primary constituent of an ideal EIA 
process, it is not compulsory under Thai EIA legislation. In fact, the public has hardly 
had any involvement at all in EIA procedures: there is no public assessment and 
	 238 
consultation in the EIS procedure with no input as to the relevancy of a scheme. This 
has led to public protests against some schemes where the EIA process has been 
evolved (Tongchompou & Harvey, 1994).  For major housing development projects 
with significant local community impact, schemes must conduct public consultations 
and set aside a financial budget for compensation (interview, developers, 2014). 
However, the financial requirements for public meetings and any compensation outlay 
are typically managed by the developers and kept apart from any EIA costs assigned 
to the EIA consultants according to the EIA consultants interviewed (2014). Big 
developer J notes: 
 
…We have public hearings but it usually happens when there are problems 
with the project and people file a complaint to the ONEP. They will then 
hold a public hearing to ask for local community’s opinions. This is not 
mandatory. Normally they require a number of samplings in the radius of 
1 km. and 2 km.  
 
 
In reality, processes for the involvement of the public carried out as part of the EIA 
procedure have not provided adequate proof since public opposition to the schemes 
later transpired. Public participation has been narrowly defined as a public hearing or 
meeting which takes place towards the end of the EIA process instead of constituting 
a continuous feedback process throughout the EIA process. In effect, this is akin to 
the planning process, where the public has no contribution to major process stages. 
However, a public hearing might be called by the ERC on an individual basis 
(interview, EIA consultants, 2014). This may assist the developers in identifying the 
level of local community acceptance of a particular housing development. For 
housing development schemes where local opinion was sought due to local 
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community sensitivities, the willingness of motivated individuals and groups to 
oppose governmental and private developers is apparent (Boyle, 1998).   
 
Inadequate public participation and unsatisfactory communication results in many 
legal and practical drawbacks resulting in knowledge gaps and unequal dissemination 
of project data to the local community.  The local community then develops a mistrust 
of the EIA assessment with the potential for violent protests which previous 
precedents have exemplified. This is a significant issue for developers, since housing 
development projects can be seriously held up if stakeholders and members of the 
public are not engaged at the beginning of the project (discussed in chapter 6). One 
environmental authority officer commented that “the critical nature of public 
involvement should never be overlooked as this can result in project delays, adverse 
publicity and even project termination” (environmental authority officer, 2014). 
 
EIS compilation in Thailand is effectively a closed system, as a result of this apparent 
lack of public involvement. The local community has virtually no opportunities to 
view the EIS information with ONEP, project proponents as well as the EIA 
consultant represent the only key players in the EIS preparation process (Suwanteep 
et al., 2016; Boyle, 1998; ADB, 1997). As a result, preparation for the EIS relies 
entirely on the experience of the EIA consultants and the ONEP staff.  It is therefore 
difficult for these participants to outline a definitive scope of an EIA investigation for 
any particular scheme since EIA by nature, is a multi-disciplinary field. An 
environmental authority officer asserts that: 
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the only authorised persons permitted to prepare an EIA in Thailand are 
registered EIA consultants. These consultants therefore retain sole 
responsibility for the production of the EIS until EIA approval is obtained. 
The permitting agencies who grant permission for the implementation of 
the proposed housing projects, have never been involved in the 
compilation of the EIS. 
 
 
In reality, EIS preparation is initiated by a housing developer who first identifies a 
suitable EIA consultant from the list of registered EIA consultants compiled by 
ONEP.  Housing developers may require the EIA consultant to oversee both the EIS 
preparation and approval processes. In these instances, housing developers have 
minimal participation in the EIS preparation. Such developers are primarily concerned 
with obtaining EIA approval. Many EISs are produced by EIA consultants with 
negligible consultation with their clients, housing developers. Therefore, some EISs 
propose high levels of managed mitigation measures without any reference to the 
willingness and abilities of the housing developers to comply them. This arises as a 
consequence of the EIA consultants trying to appease ONEP and obtain an EIA 
approval as fast as possible (interview, senior bureaucrats, 2014).  
 
EIA Review (A Formal Process of Reviewing the EIS by ERC)  
 
The EIA approval process represents a significant component of the overall Thai EIA 
system. According to the OEPP (1996), in an attempt to integrate decision-making 
and EIA more successfully, the NEB has made efforts to enhance certain parts of the 
EIA process. For instance, an official EIA authorisation process was created in 1985, 
applicable to state and government projects that necessitated the authorisation of the 
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cabinet before construction could take place. There are no deadlines for approval to 
be granted and the EIS must be considered adequate if a project is to be approved.  
 
This research concentrates solely on the housing projects approval process under the 
NEQA 1992 that are not subject to cabinet authorisation. The reason for this focus is 
that this study is primarily concerned with the ways in which the development of 
private housing projects is influenced by EIA. The EIS of the proposed housing 
project is prepared by the EIA consultant and developer (see Figure 27). In order to 
receive approval for the EIA, the EIS and any supporting paperwork are sent to the 
ONEP and relevant authorities for review. The EIS is then reviewed by relevant 
officials of ONEP to ensure that it has been completed properly. Following this, 
ONEP will send its comments to the ERC for consideration, which is the final 
decision-maker. ERC have specifically focused on the elements of detail within the 
issued EIS with special attention centred around the negative environmental effects, 
the extent to which the advocated mitigation approaches are effective, and suitable 
monitoring and auditing schemes prior to making a decision.  
 
The mandated shortest processing period for the approval of the EIA of a housing 
project is 75 days. There is an initial 15-day deadline associated with ONEP’s review 
of the EIA, which will be returned to the proponent if the report is not completed 
properly. A longer 30-day deadline is enacted when the report has been completed 
correctly and, therefore, does not need to be returned to the proponent. In the latter 
case, ONEP provides initial feedback on the application and forwards the case to the 
ERC. The committee then has 45 days to complete its evaluation of the application. 
With appropriate caveats regarding monitoring and mitigation, the relevant authority 
will offer the proponent a permit to begin carrying out the project, upon approval. 
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However, the proponent must amend the application and resubmit the EIA report to 
the board of ERC if the project is rejected. Upon receipt of a second application, a 30-
day review deadline commences. The process is illustrated in Figure 28.   
 
All EIA processes solely take place at the ONEP office in Bangkok and the EIA 
committee meets only twice a week during which time they discuss a maximum of ten 
projects. An average of one to two of the ten projects discussed will receive approval 
while the remainder must be modified. As such, it can take some time to secure EIA 
approval. According to Association-B and their consultant (2014), there is only one 
EIA committee responsible for processing 300 separate project applications at any 
one time. In the current climate, the legally specified period for the EIA approval is 
75 days from the first submission. The average approval process time for new-
housing projects, however, is 6-10 months or longer (Matichon, 2013).  
 
Despite this, in practical terms, there is still significant augmentation of this period 
due to the low standards of the EIS submissions. This contributes towards 
interruptions as numerous EISs must be revised prior to approval. The extent of the 
EIA approval process is therefore longer than the legally articulated time; this is still 
the case even when the decisions are generally made in the specified timeframe.  
 
A number of developers explained that, owing to the intricate nature of certain 
projects, the EIA approval period was prolonged (interview, developers, 2014). EIA 
consultant C opines that “there are numerous EIA reports submitted to ONEP for 
housing projects which leads to delays in the review process.”  
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Figure 27 EIA Approval Process for Housing Projects 
 
 
Source: ONEP (2015, p.13) 
 
 
Consequently, the uncertain EIA approval process times are a central inefficient 
aspect of the process. Thus, uncertain elements over the course of the process are 
regarded as limiting housing development projects, particularly in the context of 
intensive growth periods and urbanisation. These are the often cited as reasons for the 
hesitant application of an EIA process by project advocates. 
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With regard to the method of developing and constructing new houses in Bangkok, 
the building approval paperwork and associated documents are handed to several 
authorities, including the Ministry of Interior, the DPT, BMA, and a range of others 
responsible for civic facilities like electricity and water. The granting authorisation for 
housing project construction, the BMA, bears no responsibility in the context of EIA 
decision-making. As explained by scholar A, “EIA reports reviews are conducted at 
the central level therefore there may be a lack of sufficient information of the area of 
the project site.”  
 
The developer submits the EIS to ONEP, while the building application paperwork 
along with other relevant documents are submitted to the permitting agencies for the 
construction and operation approval. Hence, the EIA process is not conducted along 
with the project planning process. Additionally, the formalised EIA review entities in 
Thailand are the ONEP and the ERC, but the reviewers, owing to their position as 
government officers, are not independent panels. It is particularly noteworthy that the 
ERC is the ultimate decision-making authority with regard to EIA. In light of this, 
practical issues have arisen in the quality and related elements of the EIS review and, 
as the ERC is obligated to do two things; reviewing and decision-making, it could 
bias the EIA decision-making process. Thus, big developer H, asserts that “guidelines 
for the EIA report has been altered since changes were made to the ERC. This means 
that relevant parties are not too knowledgeable about new guidelines including when 
it will be applied.” 
 
Additionally, Suwanteep et al., (2016) have noted that ERC members acquire their 
positions according to their current position instead of on the basis of knowledge or 
speciality. Notably, certain ERC members are not familiar with the specifics of EIA. 
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Furthermore, ONEP has never issued a detailed instruction sheet for the EIA review 
aspects. This point is encapsulated in the views of some of the interviewees below: 
 
The EIA regulation has no clarified transparency in verifying scientific 
claims. The ERC has no concrete set of regulations to control this lack of 
validity. Most policies and regulation change over temporal scales, 
depending on alterations in the individuals involved in the management 
process. Although reports are written using the same set of rules, different 
ERCs use distinctive ways of examination at different points in time…a lot 
of this is influenced by temporal particulates and how individuals involved 
perceive the situation. (EIA consultant, 2014) 
 
The ERC depicts certain criteria that are unrelated to the environment as 
part of their judgmental process…in certain cases, such considerations are 
overly dominant in their final decision making. This leads to difficulties 
and inefficiencies during process implementation, and therefore increases 
the time needed to complete the examination. This is because some laws 
and regulations are already included in construction permitting processes. 
(EIA consultant, 2014) 
 
EIA has no concrete legal regulation which developers can follow. There 
are no clear rules, regulations and stipulations to have a consistent 
decision in every period. For instance, ERC discusses the traffic; another 
member focuses on city planning and regulations; another member 
engages in discussions about the environment relative to residents nearby; 
and another one focuses on community health so on and so forth…As a 
result, new or inexperienced developers who want to endeavour in the 
housing industry would be unfamiliar with the EIA process. Their project 




Developers have complained that the EIA approval process under current 
rules and regulations is obscure and therefore, gives too much power to a 
committee whose decisions are seen as subjective. (Environmental 
Authority street-level bureaucrat-A, 2014) 
 
 
New issues raised by ERC have implications for the budget allocated for 
the study which results in the delay of the amendment of the EIA report. 
(EIA consultant-A, 2014) 
 
 
In this way, the housing developers must submit supplementary data again in order to 
meet the ERC requirements. In these contexts, certain developers and EIA personnel 
question the motivation for the requirements, particularly when the respective 
positions appear to switch (interview, developers and EIA consultants, 2014). One 
reason for this is an interruption in the EIA approval process’s decision-making 
element, as some of the interviewees note: 
 
The judgment of the ERC could be related to decision making towards the 
approval process, which normally can take 4 months at the earliest. 
However, such a fast process is very rare…the typical time lapse is 
between 6 to 13 months, or longer. The longer time taken in usual 
circumstances means that there will be more projects waiting for 
approval. Normally, there are approximately 200 projects that are waiting 




…While at least 200 projects at any one time are lined up to receive EIA 
approval, just one committee was examining them. EIA evaluation is based 
in Bangkok and the EIA committee convenes twice-weekly; it is never the 
case that over 10 projects are looked at for a meeting. In terms of the 
average rate of project approval, just one or two projects receive approval 
while the others must be re-examined. Consequently, the process of 
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Monitoring and auditing  
 
The final phase of the EIA process is not EIA approval. A central necessity in the EIA 
process is the establishment and running of an environmental management unit for the 
purpose of overseeing the implementation of protective environmental initiatives and 
environmental monitoring. This is generally an effective way to determine the 
effectiveness of the protective measures that are being implemented. The utilisation of 
monitoring and auditing in the EIA process facilitates greater interactivity, and the 
process itself should be defined according to feedback and modification. As stated by 
Tomlinson & Atkinson (1987), monitoring and auditing will also generate data along 
with this, and this can be pragmatic at a series of instances after the project receives 
authorisation. 
 
Another element of the EIS is a monitoring plan, which logs the proposed initiatives 
in order to check the effectiveness of the environmental control and management 
obligations that are included in the EIS for completed design, construction, and 
operational phases. With regard to approved housing construction, the manual dictates 
that the proposed monitoring process is provided within the EIS. According to NEQA 
1992, the developers are then required to submit monthly environmental monitoring 
reports. These updates are used to indicate that the proponent is sufficiently managing 
issues such as: solid waste management, air pollution, the disposal treatment and 
collection of industrial liquid waste and sewage, environmental issues and sanitation, 
water treatment and water supply (ONEP, 2014). ONEP (2014) adds that in order to 
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guarantee that the activity or project will be conducted in accordance with 
environmental requirements, the report should present the necessary analysis and 
sampling as part of the monitoring strategy.  
 
The purpose of NEQA 1992 is to direct ONEP in terms of the supervision, 
monitoring, and auditing initiatives linked to the establishment of environmental 
mitigation measures of projects and activities. It seems to be the case that the NEQA 
1992 plans for ONEP to exercise power in terms of requiring the assessment of 
environmental protection measures within the EIA and the issuance of monitoring 
logs (ADB, 1997). In the absence of this kind of authority, ONEP is unable to log the 
activities thus undermining whole EIA process and rendering it a paper activity. In 
light of this, one is motivated to ask the following question: in the context of ONEP 
having the authority to mandate monitoring and reporting, what measures can the 
body take if the developer will not perform? 
 
Although Thailand, in pragmatic terms, has established programmes that help monitor 
and audit environmental effects, the nation has no policies that mandate the 
systematic monitoring of the environmental and natural elements involved in an EIA 
following the building stage or in the context of continuing operations. Consequently, 
no effective way in which to assess the existence of the anticipated influences can be 
carried out. In a similar way, a relatively small number of institutional processes have 
been formulated to ascertain whether the suggestions provided by the assessment – in 
terms of reducing, mitigating, and preventing anticipated effects – were carried out by 
the project’s advocate.  
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As stated by the NEQA 1992, the Thai EIA measures mean that the EIS must 
formulate monitoring and auditing schemes. Despite this, when viewed in the real 
world, the important stages are infrequently carried out once the projects have 
received approval. One central issue is the absence of appropriately qualified 
employees in ONEP and associated governmental entities who have the capacity to 
follow-through the realisation of these phases. 
 
Employees’ available time is generally occupied by ONEP’s workload in processing 
EIAs (ADB, 1997). Consequently, ONEP does not focus sufficiently on reviewing the 
project advocate’s monitoring logs, analysing the monitoring data, and monitoring 
compliance. In light of the numerous and growing number of projects in the EIA 
process, it is not likely that, in the coming years, ONEP will have enough employee 
coverage to carry out its surveillance role effectively. Based on interviews with an 
environmental authority officer, it has been found that the majority of permitting 
agencies do not follow up on the projects that need to submit monitoring reports. 
There is barely control over the monitoring process of projects that have been 
approved, especially housing projects. Furthermore, with regard to the post-approval 
stage of the projects in the housing development process, the espoused mitigation 
approaches and monitoring schemes are entirely unacknowledged by property 
developers. These monitoring schemes have not been previously carried out in light of 
projects being finished (interview, environmental authority officer and scholars, 
2014). According to OAG (2012), ONEP has received the EIA monitoring report at a 
lesser rate in terms of EIA approved projects. This is considered to be severely 
insufficient. Between 1998 and 2011, 3940 projects were approved by the ERC. 
Despite this, approximately 900 projects submitted monitoring reports to ONEP and 
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permitting agencies. That means more than 70 percent of approved projects avoided 
monitoring processes, as noted by the environmental authority senior bureaucrat, 
“misunderstandings concerning the role of EIA monitoring means that some 
permitting agencies do not carry out EIA compliance monitoring.” 
 
In light of this, MONRE, as noted by Tan (2004), is broadly viewed as impotent in 
terms of monitoring environmental mitigation initiatives. Although this lack of 
capacity is evident across all governmental bodies, this is especially the case with 
regard to under-developed environmental agencies that are tasked with monitoring 
and implementing environmental measures. Bodies of this kind do not have a high 
position in the bureaucracy and, furthermore, they are relatively impotent, under-
staffed, and are often lacking in terms of ability and resources. As a result of this, both 
the regulatory bodies and the private sector lack a seriousness in the way that they 
approach environmental regulation. Given that so little attention is paid to proper 
auditing and monitoring in EIA practice, it makes sense that little is known about how 
environmental management and development projects’ EIA work together. According 
to an NGO that was interviewed, “ONEP should be a neutral agency that checks and 
monitors the environmental impacts caused by condominium construction and 
development.” 
 
In summary, The EIA process, supervised by ONEP, is directed by the institutional 
fight for potency, and it is notable that the enforcement of EIA in Thailand is marked 
by a range of negative aspects. The range of projects included by the EIA process is 
generally regarded as too narrow in the context of the scope and form of the projects 
it is used for (Stærdahl, 2004; World Bank, 2006). In addition to this, the procedure is 
expensive and long, and certain researchers explain this with reference to the resource 
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limitations for ONEP. MONRE is generally considered as ineffective in terms of the 
power it has to monitor environmental mitigation plans, as stated by Tan (2004). It is 
argued in this study, that it is further associated with weakness in terms of driving 
public engagement and recruiting effective consultants. The absence of public 
participation is caused by the close government control of processes, and the survey 
of EIA research remains the purview of government bodies and government-
appointed boards. The World Bank (2006) highlights that a corollary of this approach 
is limited options for authentic public involvement. The study found that the absence 
of clarified EIA code of practice makes Thai EIA process especially EIS preparation 
and EIA review stages very uncertain and difficult. Another critical issue related to 
the Thai EIA process which needs close scrutiny is the screening phrase of the 
procedure. Whilst little attention is paid to this in the EIA guideline, what has been 
learnt since the early ‘90s could be used to update and ameliorate guidance on this 
part of the process, and so improve EIA system throughout Thailand.  
 
5.6  Conclusion 
 
Although the research community is aware of the relationship between unfettered 
economic development and the destruction of the environment, Thai attempts to 
tackle the related environmental issues are largely characterised by a retrospective 
rather than forward-thinking approach. The introduction of EIA from the policy 
formulation to implementation stage has been explored. It further delineated the 
precise requirements of EIA processes in Thailand, and further evaluated EIA 
implementation. The study found that the shortcomings of EIA implementation that 
housing developers encounter, include a lack of systematic decision-making 
procedures, inadequate legal regulation, unclear codes of practice, inconsistent ERC 
	 252 
decisions, centralisation and lack of public participation and monitoring. In this 
chapter, the challenges of implementing EIA were critically discussed and in the 
following chapter, the consequences of these challenges are analysed. Explicitly, in 
the subsequent chapter, the ways in which a new housing project in Bangkok has been 
affected by the implementation challenges of EIA is critically analysed.  
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CHAPTER 6  COMPLIANCE WITH THE 





This chapter starts with an investigation of the relationships between and across state 
agencies, private developers, and civil society, three aspects of this EIA process are of 
interest and how the interaction between these stakeholders takes a different form 
involved in implementing EIA. Then the chapter explores EIA implementation and 
the evidence that the ineffective regulation has had an impact on new-housing 
development and other aspects of society, individuals and groups. The study explores 
how patterns of housing development have changed, and whether such alterations are 
symptomatic of the successful implementation of EIA provisions. Hence, this chapter 
identifies and explores the conflict of interest caused by integration of EIA into 
housing development. In addition, the chapter further identifies the EIA impacts 
assessment from micro to macro scales, as well as socio-economic attributes of new 
housing developments, since there is the imperative of exploring whether 
environmental mechanisms are being put forward as a means of securing social 
exclusivity, as has been reported elsewhere. 
 
 6.2 Integration of EIA into Housing Development Process in 
Thailand  
 
Government impacts the housing industry through not only laws that govern the 
housing market system, but also via specific regulations particularly EIA policy. 
According to Ball (2012), the housing development projects are affected by three 
primary elements; 
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1. The long-term implications and cost of housing developments - from 
conception to completion, projects can span over years, costing developers 
considerably which can lead to the acquisition of substantial leverage in 
enterprise and capital demands, risk of fluctuation in the housing market and 
other consequences over time. There is therefore no guarantee that projections 
will be realised upon completion. 
2. Housing production process and products –the process can be divided into 
four components including acquisition of land, conception of ideas, feasibility 
and preliminary design, approval from regulatory bodies, and site 
construction. Such stages have been observed to be recursive, given 
unforeseen tribulations throughout the extensive development durations.  
3. Degree of regulation – new-housing developments require a great deal of 
regulatory attention concerned primarily with land-usage. Other aspects 
include construction, structural and procedural matters, such as city planning, 
building control, and especially EIA regulation which is one of the regulation 
attributes that have an impact on housing market. 
 
Following steps must be undertaken in order to initiate a new housing development 
project. First, the plan to carry out a new-housing development project in a certain 
geographical area represents the earliest stage of all housing development projects. 
Following this, the idea is studied for engineering and economic viability. The 
outcomes of these studies are then used to create a detailed project plan once the 
decision has been made to start the development project. The results of the feasibility 
study are applied to the project design, and the project commences (Grimes & 
Mitchell, 2015; Sunding, 2015).  
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Consultants and specialists are employed prior to discussions being held with state 
agencies. These consultants help to identify and assess the feasibility of the project 
before the development site is purchased. Developers often take some degree of 
ownership over the site whilst designs are being created. The project designs will 
depend on the planning system and market demand (Grimes & Mitchell, 2015).  
 
The project proposal may be discussed between developers and state agencies in an 
unofficial capacity, or a more formal meeting may be held prior to the development 
application process. The purpose of such a meeting is to determine and manage the 
risk involved in the project, identify design issues, and so on. The developers are then 
able to receive an assessment of their proposal from the state agencies’ planning 
department. In some cases, various departments are involved in the process. This can 
lead to different feedback being given. Delays can be caused when concerns need to 
be addressed by the developer. In some cases, it is a differing of opinions within the 
local authority that results in varying feedback. However, many developers tend to 
believe that no overall consensus is needed for the project to go ahead (Grimes & 
Mitchell, 2015). Once development authorisation is requested by the developer, the 
developer must forward the proposal to the permitting authorities. Approval is granted 
based on the application along with the relevant documentation and application forms. 
At this point, EIA applicability is assessed by the permitting authorities, as per 
Section 46 of the NEQA 1992.  
 
The approval will be made by the relevant agencies within 40 days from the date of 
submission if an EIA is not needed. Approval is usually given based on relevant laws 
and project planning in this case. When an EIA is necessary, guidance is usually 
sought by the developer from ONEP in Bangkok. This process is outlined in chapter 
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5. At this point, a consultant must be employed by the developer in order to go 
through the EIA and EIS process. Once complete, the developer then sends the EIS to 
ONEP for approval. Once approval has been given, the developer is contacted along 
with the relevant permitting agencies.  
 
Figure 28 The EIA and the New-Housing Development Process in Thailand 
 
 
Source: Compiled by Author 
 
As shown in Figure 29 the majority of developers do not begin the EIA process until 
after the design phase, or towards the end of the project feasibility phase. 
Consequently, most of the main decisions regarding the project are made prior to 
commencement of the EIA process. Any project subject to the EIA must conduct the 
EIA. The developer can apply for approval for project operation and construction 
once EIA approval has been received. This informs the permitting agencies about the 
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proposed design. Subdivision and resource consent is needed before civil projects or 
extensive environmental projects can be carried out.  
 
Theoretically speaking, the EIA and housing development process does not end with 
the operation and construction of the project, since auditing and monitoring must then 
be considered. In Thailand, these are legal requirements as part of EIA. The ERC and 
ONEP’s approval of the EIS will depend on the monitoring, auditing and mitigation 
plans provided in the EIS. In most cases, approval is granted with the expectation that 
monitoring proposals are carried out. If this condition is not met, the approval of the 
project could be revoked, particularly if the impacts of the project are found to differ 
from the impacts outlined in the EIS that was submitted. Therefore, the developer 
must generate monitoring reports throughout the duration of the project and forward 
them to the relevant agencies.  
 
Supervision of Thailand’s new housing developments must be carried out by 
numerous agencies. In the case of EIA projects, different agencies will be involved in 
granting approval for the EIA and the building permit as well as the housing project 
itself. In the former case, the responsibility lies with the central government, whilst in 
the latter case, authority lies with local government agencies. Since Thailand has 
unique traditions in city planning, environmental qualities and national and local 
policy features, EIA approval is not integrated with city planning and building 
control. Planning and environmental management systems often come under the 
authority of various government authorities, although MONRE is officially 
responsible for supervising the EIA process. The MOI and BMA are officially 
responsible for city planning and building control. Housing project EIA has achieved 
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little integration with other planning processes due to the diverse distribution of 
authority in this area (discussed in chapter 4 section 4.5 and 4.6).  
 
The majority of EIAs in new-housing development processes are undertaken 
following finance, location identification and other significant choice making, 
regardless of encouragement for project initiation cycle’s early stages to be the point 
where EIA appraisal data is given to those in charge of such choices. Consequently, 
problems arise when recommendations to completely end a development, 
significantly amend it or temporarily halt it, are made on the basis of EIA results. 
With regard to the preparation of new-housing development projects, it is clear that 
options exercising the clear and balanced mechanism of EIA are hardly utilised. It is 
simply utilised to gain building licences, as a form of stipulated or extra paperwork 
that is necessary. Instead, from the initiation of a housing development project, there 
should be an incorporation of EIA as a rational mechanism. Consequently, all stages 
and aspects of a development should factor in EIA outcomes during the exercising of 
options. Economic and financial factors tend to be the major areas of concern despite 
the early preparation of EIA applications during the housing development process. 
The absence of clear laws that immerse EIA into the housing development process is 
one of the main causes of the issues arising in this area. Therefore, it cannot be 
asserted that EIA results have been fully applied during the decision-making process 
of housing development. Additionally, it cannot be clearly argued that EIA results are 
considered fully by the responsible agencies when approving the operation and 
construction of planned projects (further discussed in chapter 8).  
 
Frost (1997) and Arts (1994) point out that it is important to carry out EIA reviews of 
projects both before and after project planning, since the EIA procedure is meant to be 
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cyclical in nature. It is proposed that both auditing and monitoring must be conducted 
in order to enhance the effectiveness of the EIA and its environmental forecasts 
(Tomlinson & Atkison, 1987). In terms of decision-making and planning, auditing 
and monitoring play crucial roles (Culhane, 1993).  
 
Substantive Environmental Impacts of the Housing Development   
 
The ‘Report of Environmental Assessment Sourcebook’ (World Bank, 1991) outlines 
three key types of environmental impact that large-scale housing development can 
have: direct, indirect, and construction. Golubchikov & Badyina (2012) explain that 
direct impacts can be found on-site, in the local environment or in the wider region, 
and can include issues such as unstable and high-saline soil as well as flooding. Direct 
impacts pose an immediate risk to local communities and can occur, for instance, 
when development projects have not been designed with full consideration of the 
environment. Indirect impacts can have a positive impact on the local economy in the 
short-term, but can have negative environmental impacts in the long-term. Whilst 
direct impacts are associated with the consequences faced by local communities and 
the environment, indirect impacts are associated with project resources and materials, 
such as timber, cement and bricks.  
 
Construction impacts refer to impacts that are caused by the construction process 
itself, such as deforestation and land-clearing. This can cause issues as soil becomes 
vulnerable to the elements, particularly if excavation and other invasive construction 
activities are carried out. Additionally, Golubchikov & Badyina (2012) also explain 
that construction can have a negative impact on the areas surrounding the site since 
construction produces dirt, noise and traffic problems. When using the term 
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‘environment’, this refers to communities and populations (i.e. the social 
environment), plants, animals and the biophysical environment, as well as the greater 
natural environment itself. The consumption of energy and resources is therefore 
greatly associated with housing development projects and activities. Developers must 
give careful thought to the entire housing lifecycle as well as the impacts that each 
stage may have on the environment. The impacts that each stage of housing 
development can have on the environment are outlined in Table 18. 
 
Table 18 The Impacts of each Housing Developmental Stage on the Environment 
Stage of house lifecycle Environmental impact considerations 
Planning stage 
 
Impact of the planned site on the local environment; relationships 
with the city; quality of the local built environment; mixed-use and 
density; polycentricity; infrastructure; public transport; green areas; 
environmental hazards.  
Building design 
 
Considering embodied energy and resource utilisation; enabling 
energy and water efficiency by design; integrating district heating 
and micro-generation; waste management; robustness and resilience; 
future-proofing; possibility of upgrading; shaping of lifestyles.  
Construction 
 
Safe, environmentally-friendly, material; minimisation of 
environmental impact from building activity.  
Operation 
 
Energy performance; air-conditioning, air quality; pollution by 
residents and impact of the local pollution on residents, water use and 
water management, water recovery; comfort and hygiene of homes; 
quality and energy efficiency of the local infrastructure and 
transportation; property maintenance and management; waste 
management and recycling; green practices; natural hazards.  
Refurbishment 
 
Choice of refurbishment material; energy efficient design; disturbance 
of the environment; management of construction waste.  
End of life 
 
Demolishing or reusing; recycling of building components; 
management of construction waste.  
Source: (Golubchikov & Badyina, 2012, p.15) 
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The overarching focus of this thesis is to investigate interactions between government 
agents and private sector builders in the context of EIA procedures. To answer the 
research questions, the impact of possible disputes or conflict between different actors 
within the state institutions must also be evaluated. In order to investigate the nexus 
between state agencies, private developers, and civil society, three aspects of this EIA 
process are of interest. This is where interaction between agents takes a different 
form, from that involved in implementing EIA. Once legislation is in place, a great 
deal of business interest can be expected to focus on what companies have to do to 
ensure a project succeeds. In this section, focus is placed on the complex interplay 
and possible conflicts among the stakeholders. The issues are critically addressed in 
the following section. 
 
Environmental conflict often affects a multitude of people, organisations, interests 
and resources (Dukes, 2004). These issues can revolve around management problems, 
environmental development strategies, restoration work or the negative implications 
of development projects on the environment. (Daniels & Walker, 1995; Canter, 1996). 
Such conflict not only refers to alterations in the physical environment but also to 
economic, political and social factors. Furthermore, the impact of environmental 
conflict may jeopardise the safety of physical property, lead to civil unrest and 
represent a significant drain of time and financial resources (Persson, 2006). These 
issues represent conflicting values and principles among stakeholders as well as 
competing interests (Kakonge, 1998). This represents the dichotomous interests of 
two parties as one group, with one wishing to access natural resources in order to 
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generate income or development while the other wants to prevent the further 
deterioration or exploitation of the environment. It is also crucial to note that the 
former group often has access to greater financial resources and thus has greater 
power (Stewart, 1998). Therefore, it is simply impossible for all stakeholders to 
achieve their goals in such scenarios (Smith & McDonough, 2001; Pol et al., 2006).  
 
According to Jackson & Pradubraj (2004), large-scale development activities are the 
direct and unavoidable cause of environmental conflict as their impacts can be 
simultaneously beneficial and detrimental. In large-scale housing development, the 
two main sources of conflict are internal conflict and interface conflict, the former of 
which takes place between parties involved in the project and the latter of which takes 
place between developers and external stakeholders. Interface conflict often occurs 
during large-scale developments as different stakeholders have different values, 
interests and needs. This study focuses on the attitudes of six stakeholder groups. The 
groups include those affected by the EIA and condominium development project, 
such as state agencies, developers, EIA consultants, non-government organisations, 
buyers and investors, and local communities (discussed in chapter 4 and 5). Each 
group has diverging opinions on how interface conflict arises during the EIA approval 
process and it is this difference of opinion that is the primary cause of disputes. 
 
The development projects also impact upon neighbourhoods and their cultures, 
customs, norms among others, Vatanasapt et al. (2003) argue. However, poorly 
managed and implemented development projects have had adverse effects on the local 
environment as well as negative social and economic repercussions. It is also common 
for developers to satisfy the interests of elite groups at the expense of the wider 
community, which naturally leads to public outrage. Discontent of this nature can 
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often fester as further projects are initiated, eventually leading to serious public 
opposition to up-and-coming regions (King Prajadhipok's Institute, 2007; Vatanasapt 
et al., 2003).  
 
According to Garb et al. (2007), many developers and civic society take legal action 
against EIA outcomes as the assessment results often represent the beginning of 
negotiations or conflict disputes as opposed to the conclusion. There have been many 
cases such as local residents complaining of the impact of large-scale housing 
construction in their community, saying that it jeopardises their way of life. The 
building, for instance, blocks the light and the wind. The following case illustrates the 
conflicts that have occurred from EIA implementation in the condominium 
development process in Thailand.  
 
The emergence of conflict between MONRE and BMA is reflective of the competing 
interests of government bodies on a local and national scale. Such issues often emerge 
in cases where MONRE manages the EIA process while the BMA issues the required 
development permits. In 2012, a project worth £ 56 million launched by Big 
Developer-I began construction once it had obtained EIA approval and the required 
construction permits. However, some members of the public objected to the 
development even though 70 percent of the project was complete and the remainder 
was scheduled to finish in the coming months. The developer claimed that they were 
proceeding with construction as usual and were assured that they were in their legal 
right to do so. Big developer I opines “We are going on with construction following 
our existing permit, and we are confident that we doing everything legal.”  
	 264 
As a result, the Central Administrative Court announced that the EIA reports 
approved by the ONEP are being implemented through public hearings that do not 
align with official legal requirements. This is because the public hearings are situated 
in areas further away than legal regulations currently allow, more than 1,000 metres 
away from the exact location. Rather, it is important to hear out the opinions of 
residents who live in local sensitive areas. Therefore, information in EIA reports 
examined by the ERC is not legally verifiable. The court has the legal power to 
terminate the EIA approvals as well as construction permissions. Moreover, the 
construction of condominiums has negative impacts on local communities, yet the 
BMA do not correctly monitor such situations, thus therefore fail to suspend the 
constructions. This results in consequences for residents in sensitive areas, so it seems 
reasonable to order to BMA to compensate for such damages to the aforementioned 
communities (Katharangsiporn, 2013). The case study of the BMA and local 
authorities is crucial to the final granting of building permission because it is highly 
important for them to implement the monitoring process in order to examine whether 
the construction process is being completed correctly under legal requirements, whilst 
not interfering with the rights of local citizens. In this case, transparency is the 
primary factor as local residents and state authorities should have ready access to any 
related documentation from the beginning of the project through to its completion 
(discussed in chapter 8).  
 
While the developer is largely concerned with gaining EIA approval prior to the 
initiation of a construction project, they must also deal with issues that arise once the 
public learns about the development plans, regardless of whether or not it has already 
been approved by the EIA. As environmental authority senior bureaucrat states: 
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“The EIA regulation states that if any building project does not comply 
with EIA regulations, they will not be allowed to construct any buildings 
or issue any housing permissions. In the case that there is opposition once 




This has been a frustrating obstacle for housing developers but Beierle (2001) argues 
that this setback is due to the fact that activists are not consulted during the planning 
stages in the first place. Protesters serve to cost developers time and money during 
participation procedures and they generate significant animosity toward plans which 
can lead to delays or even the rejection of proposals (Chaisomphob et al., 2004). 
 
Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY) and Locally Unwanted Land Uses (LULU) 
 
There are groups that espouse environmental considerations and hence attract the 
support of ‘NIMBY’ (Not in My Back Yard) and ‘LULU (Locally Unwanted Land 
Uses). NIMBY and LULU mean that the residents who are opposed to projects they 
perceive as a threat such as new development projects (Dye, 2008). Proponents of the 
‘NIMBY’ movement acknowledge the imperative of developing new industry, roads, 
airports, power stations, waste disposal facilities, pipelines and similar infrastructure, 
and yet they oppose these projects in their local terrain, hence the term ‘NIMBY’.  
Housing developers currently face problems caused by the NIMBY and LULU, 
whose opposition has led to public protests over environment concerns. For example, 
the case of a prestige national artist is exemplar of this trend. Big developer K 
explains that they purchased the land beside the artist’s property to build a 
condominium which could creates impacts on his property. The artist then 
complained that the inspiration he acquires upon opening the window and gazing at 
	 266 
the green scenery would be gone and his works would also change as the view from 
the house changed. Thus, the company’s condominium project was disapproved by 
the ERC.   
 
The frequently encountered problems in high-rise condominium project 
mostly concern the view and the blocking of wind and light. These are one 
of the reasons that condominium projects are often revised or cancelled. 
(Big developer K, 2014)   
 
In addition, in 2012, there was a renowned case of high-rise condominium 
development that was taken to the Supreme Court by those in opposition to the 
development after the Central Administrative Court sided with the EIA and the 
developer. As the developer that had approved the EIA of the high-rise condominium 
project, ONEP was the subject of a lawsuit by local residents but the Central 
Administrative Court held that ONEP had followed the correct legal procedure based 
on the testimonies given by those involved, namely local residents and members of 
the development company. It was also ruled by the court that the construction permit 
issued for the development was entirely legal (The Nation, 2012). NGOs and a group 
of 31 local residents sought an injunction terminating construction at the development 
site from the Central Administrative Court. This injunction was sought as local 
residents claimed that the high-rise condominium had caused water drainage issues, 
traffic jams, power outs as well as noise and air pollution. Due to the scale of the 
structure, residents also argued that the development posed a security threat to the 
area. Further, it was also claimed that the building overshadowed the green areas in 
the town as well as some local residential houses. Local residents also noted that they 
had not been included in the EIA public participation of the project and this 
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contravened the NEQA 1992. Thus, the local resident group requested that the court 
force the authorities to rescind the construction permits as the EIA had not been 
performed legally (The Nation, 2012).  
 
It is often argued by developers that the state overly focused on the needs of local 
residents. The developers instead suggest that the EIA should place emphasis on the 
overall benefits of a project as opposed to its impact on a select number of people. 
Developers often believe that excessive focus is placed on how the project will affect 
those living nearby and argue that the state agencies should instead concentrate on the 
impact of the development as a whole as opposed to entertaining the opinions of local 
community groups: 
 
The BMA has difficulty securing permission for condominium projects in 
Bangkok if they represent a threat to the local community and residents 
have voiced strong opinions against the development. The BMA has a 
tendency to avoid risk and deny permission for High-rise developments as 
opposed to adequately assessing the potential impacts of the development 
on the local environments. (Big developer G, 2014) 
 
 
According to a Thai Condominium Association representative, the issues experienced 
before and after securing EIA approval must be addressed and standards must be set 
in order to increase the trust of developers and prospective buyers in the system. As 
cases discussed above, after having purchased expensive land plots, developers 
cannot secure an EIA permit on account of local opposition to the project. A key part 
of the process is public consultation and this involves pursuing feedback from the 
public and local residents via questionnaires or public meetings so that their concerns 
can be taken into account by the EIA. The value of this practice must be 
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acknowledged as local residents who do not feel that their input is valued can cause 
significant delays to a project, jeopardise the image of development companies or 
cause the complete termination of a development project. It is also important that 
feedback is sought from non-government organisations (NGOs) and other key 
stakeholders. 
 
Chompunth (2011) claims that state organisations are typically rather cautious when 
entering into any public dispute or conflict of interests. This level of circumspection 
may perhaps be attributable to the fact that there is no legal framework enforcing 
public consultation, which means that government agencies are also less likely to play 
an active role in the process (Chompunth, 2011). That being said, it could also be 
argued that the absence of a legal framework necessitating the involvement of 
government bodies limits the extent to which certain government agencies can 
participate in or influence the outcome of such disputes (further discussed in chapter 
8). This argument is substantiated by the work of Callway & Ayre (2005) who state 
that a more cohesive political framework is needed to increase the extent to which 
stakeholders can get involved. In addition to inadequate involvement by relevant 
government agencies, it has also been argued that political policy, which is often 
driven by pressure from the public, has the capacity to affect the implementation of 
EIA processes at the policy level (senior bureaucrat, 2014). It has been further 
suggested by a senior bureaucrat of the environmental sector that: 
 
Traditionally, different government sectors were driven by their own 
interests of particular missions and operated only within their respective 
boundaries. As such, the BMA and MONRE have yet to take a 
collaborative approach in resolving disputes, which is why government 
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agencies should intervene in cases where public pressure mounts against 
specific development projects. 
 
 
In summary, as most housing development projects are responsible for considerable 
environmental disruption, the level of the conflict regarding the initiation of such 
projects has increased. Public protests are also fuelled by the fact that developers are 
not obliged to consult local residents at the outset of the project or to offer any formal 
statement indicating that such projects will soon get underway. This in particular, has 
been acknowledged as a significant limitation of the current EIA framework 
(Tongcompu & Harvey, 1994; IPPS, 1993). Next section explores the impacts of EIA 
on new-housing development from micro to macro scales. 
 
6.4 EIA Impact Assessment (From Micro to Macro Scales) 
 
 
EIA also represents policies that are considered the independent variables in the 
assessment of public policy impacts. The dependent variables are therefore the 
cultural, economic, social and political impacts of these policies. Public policy results 
in impacts, which can be thought of as consequences or outcomes (Dye, 2014). A 
policy impact is considered an evaluation of how effective either a national incentive 
has been in achieving its policy goals or multiple objectives in fulfilling collective 
interests (Wholey, 1970). Others define policy impact in terms of the official 
objectives of a policy or program. However, the objectives of a policy are not always 
clear. Additionally, it is not uncommon for policies and programs to have the opposite 
objectives to one another. Therefore, in this study, the ability to meet these objectives 
is not considered the only form of policy evaluation. The policy impact, as proposed 
by Dye (2014), is explored.  
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It is maintained in this study that policy impact represents the ways in which policy 
influences the actual world. This can include direct impacts on specific groups 
associated with the policy, or spillover effects on other groups or settings (Dye, 
2014). Dye (2014) also suggests impacts such as opportunity loss and other indirect 
costs, resource consumption and other direct costs, and both short-term and long-term 
consequences. In this study, housing developers subject to EIA are chosen as the 
target group. The purpose of this exploration is to understand what the 
implementation of EIA is meant to achieve. Thus, the study asks whether EIA is 
designed to influence developers’ behaviour, interest, awareness, attitudes or 
knowledge. The study also asks how impacts are prioritised in terms of importance if 
EIA is designed to have numerous influences. Finally, the study explores any 
potential side-effects that developers experience that do not form part of the main 
objectives of EIA (Dye, 2014, p.70).  
 
In Thailand’s rapidly growing economy where new housing development is a major 
force in the transformation of its cities, the relationship between new housing, 
environmental quality and economic progress is especially critical. Carmona et al. 
(2003) assert that standardisation is considered a logical reaction to the numerous 
sources of uncertainty and risk that developers must deal with. These include 
fluctuations in labour and material costs and availability, fluctuating access to funding 
for buyers and construction companies, delays in construction and project completion, 
market volatility, changes in the cost of land, sudden shifts in demand, among others 
(Carmona et al., 2003). Since it is challenging to adjust to major changes that occur 
during production, and because the housing development process itself has permanent 
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consequences and takes a significant amount of time to implement, this causes greater 
uncertainty (Carmona et al., 2003).  
 
In Thailand, EIA determines the possible scale of the impact a project and/or its 
construction may bring on both the natural and social settings. Developers are to 
abide by Sections 46-48 and 51 of NEQA 1992. The Thai government aims that such 
regulations will minimise any further future environmental damage to its rapidly 
altered landscape. Some developers have not taken to these guidelines well, claiming 
such protocol to be damaging to their businesses.  Additional bodies such as ONEP 
and MONRE have aided in this blanket coverage having released statements that ban 
the transaction of properties constructed without compliance to EIA rules or those 
where environmental considerations have been evaded completely (ONEP, 2012). In 
Bangkok, thus, EIA regulations, together with building control and city planning 
regulations have an effect on new-housing development. The impact of this is 
significant and widespread due to the aforementioned issues associated with EIA 
implementation. The following sections explore the ways in which EIA regulation 
impacts various aspects of development in Thailand.  
 
6.4.1  EIA Impacts on Project Characteristics 
 
EIA implementation has both direct and indirect impacts on new-housing 
development. Its indirect impact is through market processes by discouraging high 
density development in areas where planning constraints have ensured high land 
values, thereby increasing housing development costs and sale price. Its direct 
influence is via the market attempts to discourage dense developments in areas of 
increased value by withholding the relevant permissions and other similar constraints 
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(Adams et al., 2005). This section explores the ways in which EIA impacts project 
characteristics and density. 
 
The Scale of Housing Projects  
 
Condominium plans inclusive of more than 80 rooms, or whose potential site exceeds 
10,000 square metres, must apply for EIA endorsement. They are therefore classed as 
larger-scale housing development proposals. Bartone (1991) has defined such large-
scale undertakings as housing developments comprised of many units as part of a 
unified grouping on a selection of land. They may be smaller-scale subdivisions or 
even whole cities. EIA Policy restrictions impact heavily on housing developer 
decision-makings, whereby policies may shape dimensional considerations at the 
stages of conception, in an attempt to circumvent the need for an EIA inspection so 
that progress can begin faster and cheaper. This method however is inevitably 
unsustainable as the approach does not serve to best utilise the limited land and 




Many housing developers divide their proposed projects into phases, so as not to fall 
into the remit of the ONEP categorisation. It is often the case that developers adhere 
to lower limits; meaning that planning may go ahead for projects proposing less than 
79 units. This is in accord with particular environmental regulations and means ‘low-
rise’ projects which have a total of 9 floors or lower may go ahead. These scaled 
down endeavours may grow into a larger undertaking if placement density is high in 
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relation to average spacing, which, in the end, serves to put developers at greater risk 
of breaching environmental laws as less regulatory attention is afforded. 
 
One big developer, big developer B, for example, owned a piece of land for the 
purpose of constructing a high-rise condominium. The neighbours complained that 
the proposed project would block out the sun and in response, the developer discussed 
the ERC twice although the project was not approved.  Subsequently, the developer 
commenced the project all over again, reducing the height of the building as well as 
the project size.  
 
Adams et al., (2005) propose that density is relational to greater sustainability. It is in 
the interest of developers for sites to contain as many viable housing units as possible 
so as to maximise company profit gain. Developers will obtain sites with preliminary 
proposals but may subsequently aim to elevate the unit numbers over the site. 
Rodphai (1986) observed that the increase in land costs forced developers to find a 
new way to make their projects financially feasible and thus decreased the size of the 
houses built. There are only so many units that can be placed on a given sight 
however, this is also capped by a developers desire to avoid encroachments into EIA 
regulatory limits. As big developer-K comments: 
 
 In many cases, designs must adhere to the preferences of the ERC 
regardless of whether or not they are beneficial design changes. Whilst the 
necessary knowledge and expertise is not found within the ERC, this is 
found amongst housing developers, who work with skilful architects and 





Height Limits  
 
Development capacity is one of the main areas that EIA regulations can negatively 
impact. One of the main reasons, in the case of condominium developments, is height 
restriction. Other reasons include the requirement to ensure that on-site infrastructure 
exceeds what is actually needed for the development, as well as the requirements 
related to urban design. Per-unit costs and development capacity are both impacted by 
height restrictions. For instance, buildings can be no larger than 4,000 square meters, 
containing no more than 80 units, and no taller than 23 metres. Build areas can be no 
larger than 10,000 square metres. Naturally, the number of units that can be built 
within a single building will be determined by the height restriction associated with 
that building. Furthermore, each area in Bangkok may have a different height 
restriction and may face different impacts of this height restriction.   
 
When a development is subject to a certain height limit, the design must be altered in 
order to reduce the number of units contained within the development if EIA approval 
is to be granted. Profitability is negatively impacted when developers attempt to 
achieve the same floor area whilst dealing with these restrictions. EIA has a 
particularly significant impact on developments in the CBD area, where both the 
economically ideal height and capacity cannot be achieved. Additionally, especially 
in the CBD area, limitations on the height and quantity of condominium buildings that 
can be developed on a given site lead to the cancelling of many developments during 




Height restrictions have been enforced with no regard for the feasibility of 
developments. In suburban areas, for instance, the ideal height of most 
developments will be 5-8 storeys, whilst urban condominium buildings will 
ideally have 20 or more storeys. By only enforcing these restrictions in 
favour of the preference for placing tall buildings in locations that will not 
overshadow local communities and residences, the real-world impact of 
building height is often overlooked. 
 
 
Site Coverage and Green Area  	
 
Both the natural and surrounding environment, whether current or future, must be 
considered during the project planning and design stages. Golubchikov & Badyina 
(2012) suggest that creating plenty of green spaces in residential areas is one effective 
method for improving residents’ quality of life, overall health, protecting local 
biodiversity and reducing environmental damage. In 2012, for example, the ERC, in 
addition to its regular green space requirement of 1 square metre. for every 1 tree, 
requested the inclusion of an additional tree in the same area, which is double the 
stipulated requirement. Developers were inconvenienced due to challenges in 
obtaining additional trees. In response to this culture of arbitrarily changing 
regulations, a Thai Housing Association representative comments that: 
 
The EIA is an obstacle to housing project development, especially in the 
case where regulations were changed without prior notice. Therefore, 
projects that were submitted in compliance to previous regulations had to 
be retained and changed so that it is legitimate in accordance to the new 





These sentiments were also echoed by big developer K, who commenced a 
condominium development project in 2011, at a time when the EIA was amending its 
requirements regarding green space. Consequently, the developer had to amend and 
relaunch the development design. The original design included 220 units ranging 
from 38 to 65 square metre at a cost of £2,200 per square metre. The finalised design, 
however, included 320 units ranging from 31 to 55 square metre at a cost of £2,460 
per square metre. According to developer K, land prices on Surasak Road, in the CBD 
area, were £125,000 per square metre in 2011 and £250,000 in 2013, thus, all 
construction projects carried out during this time lost their proposed profits. 
Developer K points out that it is difficult to comply with green requirements since 
condominium developments are not subject to any standardised criteria: 
 
Green areas within the building are not counted under the new 
requirement. Whilst the original design included green space inside the 
actual building, the new requirement only counts outdoor space. The 
developer consequently refunded customers’ booking money with interest 
once it had sold 30 percent of the development and realised the EIA report 
had to be amended. Once the redesign was approved, the developer 




However, later this green space requirement was annulled because there was a shuffle 
in the members of the ERC ordered by the National Environmental Board (NEB) and 




Overall, it is understood that development capacity is negatively impacted by the EIA. 
This is mostly down to building density issues and height restrictions in the case of 
condominium building developments. It has been found that when housing stock 
decreases, prices rise in order to achieve balance between supply and demand (Grimes 
& Hyland, 2014). Housing supply is capped by capacity limitations, delays and 
uncertainties, which results in higher housing prices. Developers also feel that 
innovation is lost through the enforcement of EIA, since it is more difficult to get a 
unique high-density, low-site coverage ratio and high-green space development 
approved than it is to construct a standard infill development. Furthermore, 
developers indicate that development costs can increase as a result of the 
requirements regarding green space and site coverage.  
 
6.4.2  EIA Impacts on Operational Characteristics 
 
 
Project Site and Location 
 
The proliferation of mass transit networks in Bangkok and the concomitant increase 
in traffic density has instigated lifestyle changes in Bangkok.  Many of the city’s 
residents now choose to reside in the city because of the proximity to networks such 
as BTS, MRT, or ARL. Hence, proximity to a mass transit station has become a 
crucial determinant of property investment (CBRE, 2014).  
 
Most urban workers in Bangkok are based in the CBD area, meaning that the 
surrounding areas are popular for commuters. Nevertheless, O’Sullivan (2007, p.119-
122) points out that bid rent for land parcels increase as the proximity to CBD 
decreases. Therefore, residents who wish to have low-to-no transportation costs must 
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pay more to live closer to the CBD. Celik &Yankaya (2006) explain, however, that 
many workers are more concerned with how long it takes them to get to the CBD than 
how far away they live. Notably, some areas a little further out actually offer shorter 
journey times than areas closer to the CBD. It is for this reason that many workers 
choose to live in locations that have good road or main public transport connections. 
As a Thai Condominium Association representative notes: 
 
The location of mass transit systems is very important for the location of 
residential properties in Bangkok. The decisions of many people, with 
regards to where they live and work, is determined by this. Indeed, the 
demand for high-rise condominiums is largely determined by the number 
of people using the mass transit system.  
 
 
Choiejit &Teungfung (2005) note that high-rise condominium projects have been 
carried out in these locations for many years. Chalermpong (2007) notes that this 
raises the cost of developments that are built along these transportation lines and 
shows that property value does in fact increase when it is situated close to a nearby 
train station both MRT and BTS.  
 
Notably, research by Celik & Yankaya (2006) has shown that the price of property 
increases by an estimated £7.5 per every meter closer to a rail station. Thus a property 
located next to a station is £7500 more expensive than a similar property 1km away 
from it (Celik & Yankaya, 2006). 
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Figure 29 Mass Transit Lines in Operation and Under Construction (2016)   
Source: OTP (2016) 
 
As shown in Figure 30, areas such as Sukhumvit Road (on the BTS Skytrain 
Suhumvit Line), the Sathon District and Silom Road (on the MRT and BTS Silom 
Line) are notoriously expensive to live in. At present, EIA regulations impact 
developments on ‘Soi’ sub-streets, limiting them to 8-storeys or 23 meters. Therefore, 
many developers have decided to focus on the emerging CBD areas of Ratch-Rama 
IV, the Thonburi District, or surrounding provinces (AREA, 2015). EIA restrictions 
have a negative impact on the density of development projects in these locations as 




In the past years, there has been a rise in the demand for condominiums in 
close proximity to the main public transport lines, particularly the BTS 
and MRT stations. This has caused us to shift our focus from developing 
horizontal housing marketing strategies towards high-rise building 
developments, particularly condominiums. The main motive is to generate 
higher profit margins, although this alteration would in fact be more time 
consuming. (Big developer G, 2014) 
 
In order to maximise business profits, it is also important to develop such 
projects under the shortest time periods, because time consumed in 
construction and project development is not fully controlled, the costs of 
having to pay loan interests can be devastating to the developer…Loan 
repayments are considered as expensive within the current economy, 
where interest rates are high. At present, the MLR is 7.5 percent, meaning 
that developers will have an increased burden in repaying the associated 
interest rates. This predicament forces developers to hastily complete their 
projects, and one of the strategies they use to accomplish this goal is to 
obtain the EIA approval and building permits as soon as they begin their 
development project and control their initial budget thresholds. (Big 





Grimes &Mitchell (2015) point out that the planning and resource management 
activities carried out between the land purchase and development stage are influenced 
by both the size and nature of the housing development itself. Developers cannot gain 
EIA approval without consent from numerous sources. Consequently, developers can 
incur additional costs, and this can also take some time to achieve. The time it takes 
can depend on factors such as the development’s scale and size, the planned land 
usage, the compatibility between current planning rules and the development plans, 
the degree to which the development will differ from the surrounding developments 
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(i.e. in terms of density, aesthetics, land use, amongst other considerations), the 
quality of the EIS report, and the extent to which the ERC agrees with the developer’s 
proposal and EIS report (Grimes & Mitchell, 2015).  
 
The country's exponentially booming condominium sites, particularly within and 
around Bangkok, have seen the failure of a number of proposals to gain the EIA 
permissions to proceed. Issues resulting in delays and cancellations have become 
much more pressing over time, meaning that obstacles such as the redesigning of 
entire proposals emerge. As such, opportunities for business and lucrative revenue 
predictions are hindered.  A number of large-scale housing projects have been delayed 
or have even experienced total shutdowns. According to an EIA consultant, due to the 
shortfall in ONEP staff, in one EIA approval meeting, ERC is able to consider only at 
most about 10 projects. Approximately less than a half of these get approved. In one 
year only 1,500 projects can pass this evaluation. This number is too low for a rapidly 
growing country like Thailand.  
 
Developers feel that greater uncertainty and delays are encountered in the building 
approval and resource consent process, due to the length of the EIA process and the 
type of interaction that occurs between developers, ONEP officials and related 
agencies. This can bring serious and additional delays and costs to development 
projects. Developers and responsible agencies highlight the uncertainty in the duration 
of the EIA approval process as a key area of inefficiency as well as a hindrance to the 
success of housing development projects especially in times when the economy is 
achieving rapid growth. Consequently, many developers are cautious about effective 
EIA implementation.  
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Development Cost and Housing Prices 
 
Costs arising from uncertainty, delays, regulations and overall development costs 
directly impact housing prices. Grimes & Mitchell (2015) also add costs such as 
financial costs, delay-related costs, uncertainty-related costs, regulatory costs, 
opportunity costs, as well as construction and land costs. It is only if the predicted 
market price of a development is higher than the overall cost of the development that 
a project will go ahead. Given this, feasible projects can be cancelled purely as a 
result of council-related costs. Grimes & Mitchell (2015) also assert that a 
development becomes less likely to be carried out when uncertainty increases, and 
this uncertainty is influenced by the length of delays and the certainty of receiving 
approval. As big developer E noted during an interview, “the EIA approval process 
averages between 10 and 12 months which adds to the financing costs of projects.” 
 
As a case in point, the cost of new condominium developments in CBD along the 
Sukhumvit Road soared to £4,000 per square metre in 2012 (Bangkok Post, 2012) due 
to EIA regulations, planning requirements and an increase in asking prices. Other 
reports also note EIA requirements as a major reason for increased development costs 
(Century 21, 2012). The views of interviewees below, echo these assertions: 
 
In the past, it was only if developers sold land and purchased a plot 
contract that an EIA report was necessary. However, developers are now 
required to provide a title deed when submitting the report. Therefore, 
development costs rise significantly, since developers that used to only 
have to put down a 10 percent deposit on land are now forced to purchase 
the land outright. Additionally, developers may then spend as many as six 
months or longer going through the EIA approval process. (Big developer 
H, 2014) 
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When the EIA is incorporated into medium to low-end housing projects, it 
leads to exacerbations in price rendering them unaffordable to the 
medium-to-low income buyers. Since the EIA has an impact on 
development cost, the sale price per unit will increase accordingly. (Big 
developer H, 2014) 
 
 
Numerous developers, moreover, felt that infrastructure criteria has led to greater 
costs for the developer since they lack innovation and have been designed too 
extensively. Developers shared their opinions regarding the way in which their 
proposals had been affected by the ERC, with many feeling that the ERC blocked 
innovation and market success whilst lacking the necessary experience. Big developer 
K comments that “ the ERC has caused us to incur additional costs and delays by 
making the units less sellable, forcing us to submit numerous redesigns, and by 
enforcing urban design requirements.”   
 
Overall, the development costs are increased as a result of the influence of EIA in 
urban design, partly because of the requirement for design alterations. The ERC has 
been shown to add value in most cases, but not when requirements are enforced 
regardless of whether or not this is best for the specific development in question. It is 
evident that the EIA approval process incurs a high level of unplanned costs for 
developers. Consequently, developers increase their sale prices in order to achieve a 
reasonable return. Therefore, it is logical to argue that EIA does impact various 
elements of development as well as housing prices.  
 
Carmona et al., (2003) assert that the time taken to make decisions will always result 
in a development cost being incurred for as long as the planning system exists. They 
also point out that delays become increasingly unavoidable as democracy within the 
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system increases. Given this, some propose economic competitiveness and market 
operations are limited by planning delays (Carmona et al., 2003). On the other hand, 
some suggest that democracy is a longer process by nature (Anon, 2001), but is still 
necessary. Carmona et al., (2003) also assert that it is necessary to make sure that the 
right decisions are made to begin with, since development impacts have an effect on 
the society and environment for many years after the completion of the project. 
Additionally, it is also argued that in the pursuit of democracy, delays are to be 
expected, and that delays should be valued as the necessary pathway to achieving 
development that has a more positive impact on the environment and that is of better 
quality overall (Dorby, 1975).  
 
6.4.3  EIA Impacts on Home Buyers and Investors  
 
Buyers can purchase condominiums from developers even if the projects do not 
receive EIA approval during the development stage. A growing proportion of 
Thailand’s condominium development projects have faced redesign after being placed 
on the market due to a lack of EIA approval. Consequently, developers are forced to 
refund customers’ money and contend with both delays and the risk of complete 
project cancellation. House buyers and investors in Thailand may be severely 
impacted by the delay and cancellation of housing development projects in which 
they have invested, due to EIA rejection.  
 
Developers failing to obtain the relevant permissions have no choice but to halt any 
further progress. The developer is required to return any payments with interest in 
accordance with the contract of sale when they fail to obtain EIA permissions for a 
prospective residential project once sales have begun. Buyers will have security 
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payments refunded but with likely delays. According to AREA (2013), this is 
presently a persistent nationwide issue in Thailand whereby several condominium 
projects have failed EIA stipulations.  Furthermore, buyers may not have the right to 
transfer ownership if the condominium they purchased was not developed with EIA 
approval. According to an ONEP report (2016), this happened in a number of cases 
between 2010 and 2015. These projects can be found around Sukhumvit, Ladprao, 
and Phaholyothin as well as other parts of the CDB area of Bangkok. Some 
developers, for example, have attempted to get around the need for EIA approval by 
submitting proposals for developments with 80 units or less, then dividing some of 
these units to create more units after construction. This has a serious impact for 
buyers, who may not be able to transfer ownership under EIA rules, according to 
ONEP.  
 
Due to the challenges experienced by off-plan buyers in reselling their properties or 
even experienced by developers in cases where buyers are unwilling to complete 
payment as described in the previous section, there is a high risk of purchasers’ 
default. In response, amendments to the existing Condominium Act were made in 
2008 with the objective of instilling more confidence in buyers and safeguarding 
against fraudulent activities by developers (Global Property Guide, 2010). Other 
forms of regulation for these safeguarding purposes include the Escrow Act, which 
protects buyers from losses in the case of delayed and cancelled projects, and the 
Consumer Case Procedure Act, which permits buyers to leverage advertisement to 
hold developers accountable for any services not rendered upon completion (Global 




6.4.4  EIA Impacts on Community and Urban Pattern 
 
 
Number of Housing  
 
Figure 31 shows the EIA approval volumes from 1985 to 2013. There is a tendency 
for difficulties in attaining permission to build for condominium projects due to EIA 
provisions (Katharangsiporn, 2013). These undertakings suffer not only schedule 
setbacks or constant modifications, but may never be fulfilled at all. As small 
developer D comments: “investments in high-rise building development projects have 
a lot of legal requirements and budget control. Those constraints mean that it remains 
difficult to invest in such projects.”  
 
As of 2014, new proposals have reduced in number by nearly a fifth in comparison to 
2013 figures as observed by an AREA (2015) survey. 350 housing/condominium 
plans consisting of almost 100,000 units were submitted in Bangkok and the 
surrounding area in 2014, the previous year's figures reached 394 and 110,000, 
respectively (see Figure 31). Of the nearly 400 projects, condominium developments 
totalled 132, shrinking by a quarter from the 2013 figures, at 178. This decline has 
been ascribed to Thailand's uneasy political climate, whereby customers have been 
postponing plans to buy. Over half of condominium projects are classed as small scale 






Figure 30 Number of EIA Approved Residential Projects (1985-2013) 
Source: ONEP (2015) 
 
AREA (2013) reports that during the first six months of 2013, a total of 89 housing 
projects (representing 18,404 units valued at a total of Bt45.81 billion) were either 
cancelled or put on hold in Bangkok (see Table 19). The main reason for this was that 
developers were unable to secure funding from commercial banks. Another reason 
was that sales fell below developers’ expectations. Of these units, 47 percent (8,567) 
were condominium buildings that were mid-development; 25 percent (4,598) were 
detached houses, and 13 percent (2,414) were townhouses. Of these developments, 9 
projects were unsuccessful in achieving EIA approval. It is also reported that of the 
300 projects planned in 2012, only 98 achieved EIA approval which is only 33 
percent of total proposed projects (Global Property Guide, 2012).  
 
Developers’ difficulty in securing EIA approval is found in an increasing number of 
condominium development projects across Thailand despite this sector growing 
rapidly over the last number of years. The high proportion of project cancellations and 
delays only serves to reflect the degree to which the Thai housing market, and 
housing stock, is partially impacted by the EIA.  








































Table 19 Residential Projects Statistics in Bangkok (2013 & 2015) 
Source: AREA (2013, 2015)  
 
Land–Use and Land Price 
 
The housing market is significantly influenced by land price in a number of different 
ways. Firstly, as Hara et al. (2010) explain, cities are constantly growing in size due to 
developers’ need to purchase low-cost land in up-and-coming areas on the outskirts of 
the city. This situation has arisen as a result of land becoming increasingly desirable, 
with many individuals keen to purchase land and build upon it. Land with good 
potential includes land that is close to main transportation or other venues or facilities 
Reasons/Year 2013 2015 
Housing developers suspended or cancelled the 
development 
89 projects 129 projects 
Total Number of residential units failed to develop 18,404 units 34,038 units 
Number of condominium units failed to develop 8,567 of the units 
(47 percent of total) 
20,067 of the units 
(59 percent of total) 
Commercial banks rejected applications for project 
financing 
30 projects 37 projects 
Sales failed to live up to expectations 21 projects 23 projects 
Failed to gain EIA permits 16 projects 29 projects 
Designs needed to be changed 8 10 
Put on hold as the developers considered increasing 
sale prices 
7 8 
Projects were suspended or cancelled after the 
severe flooding in late 2011 
5 N/A 
Problems over land-used or the project design 3 3 
Location  N/A 15 
Change from for sale to for rent N/A 2 
Lack of contractor  N/A 2 
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links and projects. Secondly, land use is highly concentrated in Sukhumwit, Satorn, 
Asoke, Silom, and other parts of central Bangkok. This is because the private sector 
and government sector split land based on their respective needs. As Jones (2005) 
explains, this also has an impact on the cost of land in areas that neighbour the CBD 
area. Land costs typically account for 15 percent of all condominium building 
development costs, or as much as 25 percent if the development site is in a popular 
location (JLL, 2015). Developers’ concerns are that the rising land prices and 
subsequently rising unit prices, could turn some buyers towards more affordable units 
in older buildings (Thai Nation, 2015). 
 
The EIA influences developers’ decision-making, in terms of size and locality of the 
project. This means that the limited area of land available for construction in central 
Bangkok is not effectively utilised. Consequently, this leads to expansion into peri-
urban areas in the midst of increasing land prices. From 2014 statistics, the average 
price is approximately £4,000 per square metre, which rises to approximately £6,000 
per square metre in 2015. The EIA thus inadvertently affects the development of 
residential areas in a way that makes the size sub-optimal, limiting the number of 
constructions within the viable land area, particularly in the CBD. This leads to higher 
residential unit prices. As an example, the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) of Sukhumvit 
Road changed from 10-1 to 5-1 (Manager, 2012), leading to more difficulties in 
building high-rise condominiums. The fact that fewer units can be included within 
development projects culminates in higher sale prices, making units affordable to only 
people who have high-incomes. This situation instigates conflict between central 
environmental agencies and local government bodies, because the BMA City Plan 
aims to facilitate lower commute distance for the working class. 
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The developers in Bangkok develop housing projects which are located near other 
large-scale programs, for example, zones near and around the major public 
transportation (MRT and BTS), or CBD. The developers mainly select the site by 
reviewing the government's development projects such as public transportation 
systems or investments in industrial estates. For high-rise development, encountering 
the environmental board is unavoidable because it is mandatory to acquire EIA 
approval. Therefore, they may have to adapt and change their plan to adhere to the 
ERC’s opinion. A Thai Condominium Association representative comments that:  
 
It is difficult to achieve large-scale housing development in Bangkok’s 
urban areas, since this calls for greater land access, resources, roads, 
electricity, gas, water and other infrastructure. Furthermore, if housing is 
spread across different areas, this leads to a breakdown of urban hubs and 
communities which consequently causes urban sprawl. 
 
 
6.4.5  EIA Impacts on Macro Scale  
 
The macro economy, which incorporates labour mobility, house price impact, and 
investment in infrastructure – is closely related to the housing market. Consequently, 
attempts have been made numerous times to improve the macro economy through 
housing. The housing sector has experienced both the benefits and disadvantages of 
policy integration. The new-housing development projects have significantly 
managed to encourage the country’s economic growth and boost industry whilst also 
acting in accordance with EIA regulation. The ineffective implementation of EIA 
could eventually affect national competitiveness and the economic system (Beierle, 
2001; Trethanya & Perera, 2008). 
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This effort can be successful, since the national economy is supported by the housing 
industry in a number of ways (UN-HABITAT, 2012). For instance, housing 
constructing and the housing markets both have the ability to catalyse economic 
growth. Economic growth can also be improved when housing developments lead to 
an improvement in living conditions, labour productivity and health. The housing 
industry contributes to the growth of gross capital stock’s capital assets, whilst also 
contributing to the growth, development and regeneration of cities and regions (UN-
HABITAT, 2012). Furthermore, the housing sector supports individual affluence 
through the housing markets, whilst also contributing to government wealth through 
taxes. The housing sector also stimulates activity in other sectors whilst providing 
employment opportunities for construction workers (UN-HABITAT, 2012). 
Additionally, the housing industry enhances the application of traditional construction 
methods and local materials whilst supporting local businesses and industries. 
Moreover, the existence of institutions that provide financing for housing has a 
positive impact on the mobilisation of domestic finance. Finally, the housing industry 
has the ability to increase revenue by encouraging buy-to-let activity, home-based 
businesses and by increasing collateral for small and start-up businesses (UN-
HABITAT, 2012).  
 
Without proper planning and EIA implementation, the policy obstructs the industry’s 
growth and affects the country’s economy as a whole. The overall economic condition 
of the development area and of the country plays an important role in the decision to 
undertake a project, in addition to societal and environmental considerations. This is 
not the case for low-rise condominium developments, which are not tied to the overall 
national economic condition; there is a more realistic demand in horizontal projects as 
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compared to vertical ones. Vertical developments highly depend on economic 
conditions – that is if economic conditions are good, then demand and sales will be 
high. Horizontal housing development has been barely affected by economic 
conditions except for the year 2011, during the big flood.  
 
Since EIA restriction has impacted on housing development projects. The current 
criteria tends to fluctuate rendering it difficult for housing developers. Also, all EIA 
approval is centralised in the ONEB office and a Thai Housing Association 
representative comments that: 
 
Only 30 percent of proposed projects were approved each year, making 
the country fall behind other countries in real estate development which 
affects other economic sectors…EIA makes the country’s housing 
developments fall behind the other neighbouring countries. Thailand was 
in close competition with Malaysia but the country’s housing market is 
now lagging behind them and this is not even mentioning Singapore, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Thailand is falling behind. Other countries 
also have EIA but unlike Thailand, their EIA has much clearer criteria. 
 
 
Moreover, EIA approval affects the country economically. Many mega-housing 
development projects have been suspended as they await EIA approval, causing a lag 
in expected growth. The Mahanakorn project, for example, would greatly raise the 
value of the vicinity around the project. Also, there is The Super Tower project by G 
Land which when completed will become the tallest building in the ASEAN region. 
This proposed project raised the prices of land nearby by 10-20 percent. However, the 
project still remains in the EIA approval process. Indeed, big developer H opines, “the 
bigger the project, the stricter the committees.”  
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The ERC definitely scrutinises such projects and because of their size, there are 
public hearings and an environmental survey of the whole of Bangkok. In the case of 
the Mahanakorn project, it has already been six years and there has been minimal 
progress. A Thai Housing Association representative comments that “the EIA 




In cases where extensive development work has compromised the well-being of the 
local community and the natural environment, conflict often arises between the 
various stakeholders. The conflicts often generate considerable contention in the 
community along with inadequate EIA regulation and ineffective EIA 
implementation. These complex issues impact housing development projects in many 
ways such as mass suspension, cancellation, and increasing development cost. 
Developers are forced to amend project proposals, meaning time is squandered, 
revenue projections are unattained and opportunities to grow a business are 
compromised. Failure to meet EIA stipulations creates frustration for not only 
housing developers but buyers. Stakeholders such as contractors and financial 
institutions are also affected.  
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The previous chapter provided an analysis of the impact of EIA implementation on 
new-housing development, other aspects of society, individuals and groups. An 
analysis of how individual developers have reacted to EIA procedures is the main 
focus of this chapter. In this chapter, the responses and perceptions of developers with 
regard to new EIA regulations are examined. The chapter investigates whether 
developers are constructing smaller units to circumvent the law or whether they have 
campaigned against policy in order to reduce the severity of its impact. It is also 
determined if EIA regulations have changed the behaviour of the firms. The impact of 
EIA provisions on the firms who may focus on smaller construction projects in order 
to circumvent the new policy is further critically analysed. The behaviour and attitude 
of builders, in terms of the actions they take and the measures they implement to 
pressurise government workers into reducing the severity of EIA regulations is 
discussed.  
 
7.2  Housing Developers’ Business Strategies  
 
This delineates the corporate strategies of housing developers in the context of the 
rising importance of environmental concerns across a diverse range of sectors, and the 
heavy influence of the environment and governance structures on business activity. A 
private sector that is subject to environmental pressure, frequently implements drastic 
new strategies (Levy & Newell, 2005). The strategies are determined based on the 
subjective interpretation of interests within institutional contexts as opposed to a set 
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number of objective interests. Thus, they can easily be affected by national and 
industry-related factors (Levy & Newell, 2005).  
 
Grimes & Mitchell (2015) in their analysis of housing development provide two types 
of business models – complying and non-complying. The types of strategies used vary 
considerably based on the business strategies of the housing developer. Those who are 
‘complying’ generally acquire conditional control over a site and invite the 
participation of local councils in generating a design, estimating costs, calculating 
margins and predicting the demand for units considering existing market conditions. 
If these feasibility studies generate positive results, the developers continue with the 
project. However, if the feasibility studies are unfavourable, they abandon the project 
entirely (Grimes & Mitchell, 2015). On the other hand, those who are ‘non-
complying’ implement a more forceful strategy in acquiring consent as they generate 
a content application under the assumption that they will likely have to defend it in 
court. Nonetheless, their decision to continue with the project will depend on the 
outcome of risk-adjusted return predictions and market analysis in the event that the 
application is indeed granted by the Expert Review Committee (ERC) (Grimes & 
Mitchell, 2015).  
 
The business strategy employed also affects the duration of the EIA application 
process and developers who are compliant will make every effort to prevent delays. 
Thus, this may incur costs due to the need to include the criteria of all state 
requirements. This may also jeopardise the market value of the end result. On the 
contrary, non-complying developers are willing to extend the application process 
despite the risk of an uncertain outcome as they are generally affluent enough to pay 
for the immediate development costs for years. Based on the developments studied as 
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part of this project, many have experienced changes in the management structure due 
to such significant delays and setbacks in the application process, many of which are 
not caused by state agencies. When housing developers in Bangkok decide to 
purchase land for a condominium project, they risk having their EIA application 
approved, delayed, or denied, as the approval process is largely dependent on the 
ERC. As a Thai Condominium Association representative posits “ currently when we 
decide to buy a plot of undeveloped land for a new condominium project, we have to 
bear the risk if the project cannot win EIA approval. The approval process relies 
heavily on the judgement of members of the expert panel Committee.”   
 
Broadly speaking, developers attempt to acquire control over a potential development 
site once they have purchased high-level feasibility land in advance. This process 
identifies the overall development prospects of the designated site. The adoption of 
the filtering technique also lowers the likelihood of developers terminating projects 
unexpectedly. EIA policies along with the manner in which they are implemented by 
ONEP and BMA increase the costs of development projects as well as the uncertainty 
associated with potential housing projects. Additionally, EIA policies lower the 
development capacity of many ventures. The primary aims of the EIA appear to be 
hindered by policies that lower the development capacity of development projects, 
particularly on account of limits imposed on building height, floor area, green area, 
density, style of dwelling, and developing location (discussed in chapter 6). In 
addition, it is often argued by developers that the EIA is overly focused on the needs 
of local residents. Instead, they suggest that the EIA places emphasis on the overall 




Big and Small Developers’ Strategies  
 
Due to competition in the market, big- and small-developers must compete with each 
other to gain a significant market share through good strategies and the provision of 
high-quality homes (Pornchokchai, 2002). According to CBRE (2012), via good 
branding, big developers are able to sell their properties at a faster rate when 
compared to small developers. Further, big developers are often able to attain 
favourable interest rates from banks (CBRE, 2012) particularly as they possess larger 
borrowing power when compared to their smaller counterparts.  They are able to 
establish strategic partnerships with other big companies to strengthen their financial 
position and thus gain access to funding that small companies cannot access. Needless 
to say, they dominate the market (Golland & Blake, 2004). For the small developer, 
many companies are family firms with only one or a few projects. Inexperienced 
developers had challenges in obtaining project loans from commercial banks, 
although the subsidiary finance companies of such banks, took such clients on board 
(Foo, 1990).  Equity would come from the sale of family assets or from the profits of 
another of the family’s companies. A Thai Condominium Association representative 
echoes this perspective: 
 
Not only are large developers capturing the market, they are also 
competing directly with small firms. In prime locations such as those in 
proximity to the main transit link, the BTS Skytrain, there is increasing 
competition because of the high demand for condominiums in these 
locations. Thus, there is essentially a bidding war between small 
developers and big developers who have the financial strength to outbid 
their competitors.  
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There are repercussions for developers of all scales, when they undertake urban 
regeneration and new-housing schemes. Small firms will find it challenging to take 
part in these activities as greater levels of funding will be necessary in advance, due to 
the fact that EIA must be approved prior to any sales revenue being created (Golland 
& Blake, 2004). According to a Thai Condominium Association representative:  
 
The imposition of the new EIA rules by the ministry would reduce the 
number of sales launches for projects exceeding 250 acres of land. Since 
developers must ensure the environmental assessment process before the 
start of construction, this might present challenges and financial problems 
for small developers.  
 
 
These small firms have difficulty when it comes to handling unpredicted costs, thus 
limiting the opportunities these companies have. Greater competition in locations near 
major transit lines and EIA challenges mean that small to medium developers must 
look into alternative market opportunities (Golland & Blake, 2004). 
 
For small housing developers, EIA approval is extremely sensitive. When the country 
has faced many serious problems in the housing sector, pressure has amassed from 
slow economic improvement. Small developer C is of the view that “big companies 
have access to funds via the bond market, where they are able to attain a coupon rate 
of 5 percent. Smaller firms do not have these resources; they must solely depend on 
bank loans and the minimum loan rate is currently at 7 percent per annum.” 
 
Frequent project suspension due to EIA disapproval and the subsequent financial 
distrust among banks has resulted in a quashing of lucrative action. More small and 
medium size housing developers often suffer the greatest as they are unable to secure 
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finance for projects in other ways, meaning they are forced to shut down, merge or 
endure severe loss (interview, small developer E, 2014). In 2014, for example, it was 
announced by a broker that more condominium developers have considered merging 
or co-build projects as a way to lessen the risk of failure to sell completed units. 
Developers are forced to these extreme tactics because they cannot always reach 
revenue targets alone in a struggling economy. Only if the economy improves may 
developers observe greater success for small to mid-range developers who have little 
choice but to undertake more secure but complex joint ventures. A financial 
institution explains: 
 
Most of small and medium housing developers have launched the projects, 
but they cannot achieve their targets. When banks see these signs, they 
become much stricter about extending loans. When they lack financial 
liquidity, they have to sell their projects at a loss.  
 
 
Deal Street Asia (2015) claims that a total of 122 housing development projects were 
terminated in 2014, 50 percent of which were abandoned on account of financial 
issues. In 2013, only 21 projects were terminated, which indicates the severity of the 
trend. Many developers who wish to proceed with projects despite financial 
difficulties must look for funding from brokers, sell the project or establish joint 
ventures with other investors. Therefore, there are not so many new developers 
surviving in the industry. Most surviving developers are the big and experienced who 
have been in the business for a long time (interview, small developers, 2014). Small 




New or inexperienced small developers who want to endeavour in the 
housing industry would be unfamiliar with the EIA process. Their project 
schedule can easily go off the tracks. Besides, if the developers highly rely 
on a loan from financial institutions for the development projects, 
developers would be carrying the massive burden of the interest rates 
which begin since they acquire the land plot.  
 
 
In summary, changes to the housing development industry have far reaching effects 
on the type and size of development companies that take on urban housing projects. It 
appears that smaller firms will find it increasingly difficult to secure development 
projects as many require extensive capital up front, as income cannot be generated 
until EIA approval is secured. In the current housing market, there is a high level of 
competition due to the lack of barriers to entry or exit. However, the condominium 
market in Bangkok is led by a number of major developers who have the majority 
market share. The next section focuses on the responses of developers to the EIA 
approval process, particularly in terms of its inherent subjectivity in its application as 
a means to achieve personal objectives over general compliance with relevant 
policies.  
 
7.3 The Responses of Developers to the EIA Regulation 
 
Several different business strategies implemented by developers in response to EIA 
enforcement are presented in this section, many of which could be linked to the 
builders’ inherent business philosophy when managing uncertainty and risk in the 





7.3.1  Avoiding EIA 
 
Developers have devised means of legally circumventing the EIA (Bangkok Post, 
2009) in response to the delays that are concomitant with its application, and to avert 
financial losses due to these delays. As, big developer H notes: 
 
The general solution for developers is to avoid EIA restrictions by 
reducing the size of the housing project, so that development can 
commence more quickly. This is possible if the total area of the 
establishment is reduced to fewer than 10,000 square metres or 80 units. 
What has been always practiced among developers is that they tend to split 
the housing project into smaller phases to avoid the categorisation as 
prescribed by the ONEP 
 
 
It was common prior to 2006 for developers to design their site plans in such a way as 
to indicate that there are less than 80 rooms, thus negating the need to complete an 
EIA report. This was often achieved by listing several bigger rooms that comprised 
the floor areas of a number of smaller units. This enabled the developer to submit a 
construction permit without delay and begin construction work without being obliged 
to pay rising interest rates as they await EIA approval. Developers can then generate 
an EIA report that offers a more honest account of how many rooms the project will 
contain, once the construction process has begun. After approval, the developer can 
then submit a revised application for the construction permit and does not break any 
laws in doing do. Moreover, any developer planning a condominium project 
containing at least 79 rooms must generate an EIA before beginning construction 
work, although several developers have employed clause 39 of the Building Control 
Act to directly begin construction work before the EIA approves the project. In 2007, 
the National Environment Board sought to put an end to this practice by amending 
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EIA regulations and increasing the overall effectiveness of EIA policies. These issues 
have been addressed as ONEP no longer processes EIAs that are submitted following 
the initiation of building work. In fact, in 2007, 100 separate projects were terminated 
due to the developer’s misuse of the clause 39 loophole (interview, big developer H 
and small developer D & E, 2014). As a result, the protocol regarding the preparation 
and submission of EIA reports were strengthened as the criterion was extended to 
include floor area as well as number of rooms. This revision to the policy also limited 
the development of large-scale high rise buildings, irrespective of their purpose, by 
necessitating that EIA reports be generated for all buildings that exceed 23 metres or 
exceed a floor area of 10,000 square metre (Bangkok Post, 2009). In recent years, 
ONEP has been faced with an extensive backlog of EIAs, and the approval process 
commonly takes at least six to twelve months to complete. As such, developers must 
take time into consideration during future planning activities.  
 
7.3.2  Adjusting Project Characteristics 
 
Plenty of projects that operate within the medium-range market have avoided EIA 
approvals by reducing the project size to fewer than 10,000 square metres and/or 80 
units. Due to the legal requirement that allows establishments under 80 units to avoid 
EIA approval, the speed of project development can be enhanced, which can 
introduce negative impacts that affect project residents and their neighbours 
(Manager, 2006). Most developers tend to maximise the size of their establishments 
(so that it is just under 10,000 square metres), therefore the environmental impacts are 
likely to be just slightly different.  
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It is unlikely for projects that are less expensive, which target middle class groups, to 
be constructed within the CBD or near the main BTS and MRT lines, mainly due to 
the financial constraints. For this reason, they tend to be located further away from 
these locations or towards suburban areas. Moreover, when considering legal 
regulations, EIA restrictions and risk distribution, most developers are encouraged to 
turn to horizontal housing marketing strategies in peri-urban areas (interview, big 
developers G, 2014). According to big developer C: 
 
Some locations may no longer be available for the development of high-
rise residences, or there could be limits on the number of units. Until then, 
we have to suspend land purchases in the central business districts, as 
there is a risk that we will not be allowed to develop condominium projects 
there…However, we have continued to buy land and launch residential 
projects, for both condominiums and detached housing in the suburbs, 
especially the areas located close to the mass-transit rail route. 
 
 
According to a REIC survey, the number of new project announcements in the 
category of housing and condominiums had dropped by 15 percent between 
November 2013 and 2014. The REIC claims that only 350 housing and condominium 
projects containing 94,200 units were announced in 2014 in Bangkok and surrounding 
regions, while 394 projects containing 110,000 units were announced in 2013 (REIC, 
2015). In 2013, 132 of the 394 projects were condominium projects and this 
decreased by 25 percent in 2014. It has also been claimed by the REIC (2015) that 60 
percent of condominium projects are now small in scale as developers wish to 
circumvent the prior EIA approval requirement by launching condominium projects 
that can be classified under housing.  
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7.3.3  Dividing up Projects 
 
In cases where the EIA has not believed that developers can satisfy the housing 
demands of new buyers in only one phase of development, developers have divided 
their project into stages. This could possibly lead to a one-year delay in construction. 
Thus, to initiate a condominium project, developers begin by submitting an EIA 
application, which is more beneficial for the development company and its clientele. 
As an example, towards the end of 2013, big developer H submitted an EIA 
application for their condominium project but did not receive approval until one year 
later. As an EIA requirement result, the project was then divided from one phase 
containing 10,000 units to three separate phases containing 3,000, 3,000 and 3,500 
units respectively (interview, big developer H, 2014). Big developer H further 
explains, “we had to divide up our project when the EIA committee did not believe 
that only one phase could provide the facilities to cover all of the homeowners' 
demand. That caused a delay in the launch of about one year from our business plan.”  
 
In summary, it is common for the additional costs and time incurred to induce 
developers to pursue an alternative development type than the one originally planned. 
On the other hand, some developers simply terminate projects if the potential costs 
outweigh the anticipated market value of the outcome. In fact, all those questioned 
admitted that they had been forced to take this measure in the past due to the inherent 







7.3.4  Increasing Sale Price and Changing Target Buyers 
 
Since EIA increases development costs, many big developers change their company 
strategies to focus more on high-end condominium projects where they can increase 
sale prices and gain more profit. The high-end condominium projects in the CBD of 
Bangkok have increasingly been approved by ONEP, demonstrating a much higher 
trust and better relations in high-end markets of housing developers and government 
authorities. Such condominiums average a cost of £2,000 per square metre. Over 
31,000 are located in the CBD according to 2014 figures. The market has soared in 
areas in the vicinity of MRT or the BTS Skytrain and have been expected to grow 
further due to rising development costs (The Nation, 2015). 
 
7.3.5  Launching Project Sales & Marketing before Getting EIA 
Approved 
 
An increasing number of projects have not received EIA approval even though they 
are being marketed and sold. The fact that many projects are negotiated and sold prior 
to EIA approvals poses a continual predicament for both developers and clients. This 
is usually the case because even if EIA has not yet been approved, the law does not 
block any transactions or business dealings regarding the land in question – the only 
restriction is that no construction can commence. Many projects thus start business 
dealings before the EIA is approved, a stage known as the ‘presale period’. The price 
of the area during this period is usually lower than the subsequent period after which 
the EIA is approved. Moreover, the price will usually rise even further after the 
building project is fully completed. Many projects use the key aspect of passing the 
EIA approval as their selling point (we can clearly see this on advertisements that are 
quoted with the phrase “EIA approved”), since this increases the confidence of buyers 
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who will be more confident  with the likelihood that there will be less environmental 
impacts associated with the land (Manager, 2006).  
 
According to AREA (2011), approximately 197 condominium projects that were not 
yet approved by the EIA were sold during the presale period in 2010. The total value 
of these projects combine to approximately £800 million, in which 15 of the most 
expensive public company limited projects are currently valued at £460 million. The 
regulation, however, states that if any building project does not comply with EIA 
regulations, they will not be allowed to construct any buildings or issue any housing 
permissions. According to big developer B: 
 
Our company encountered a number of problems when we did not manage 
to get an EIA permit for a high-rise condominium project at the first 
attempt. Once we had revised the project in line with the EIA report, we 
did secure the permit, but this lesson taught us not to start a new project 
without first making sure that the EIA permit is in place. Revising the 
project also cost us money 
 
 
In the case that there is opposition once the project has commenced, the development 
will have to stop immediately. This issue has become exacerbated in recent years and 
has led to the significant delay or complete termination of many projects. Developers 
have thus been required to refund booking fees and modify project designs, which 
cause a loss of income, time and valuable business opportunities. Now, developers 
wait for the EIA permit before launching condo projects. As an environmental 
authority senior bureaucrat explains: 
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Most of developers do not launch a residential project until they have been 
given an EIA permit, as they would run into even greater problems, and 
incur expenses if they decided to begin the project and subsequently 
discovered that the permit had not been granted. 
 
 
7.3.6  Revising, Delaying, and Cancelling Project 
 
EIA regulatory practices, which are related to concerns regarding consenting 
outcomes and delays in the consenting and development process, can help alleviate 
the possibility that a developer will undertake a project at the initial stage when they 
are considering to apply for consent or not, or after a successful consenting result. 
With the latter, the length of time taken to process the consent is correlated with the 
chances that market conditions will have undergone a change which negatively affects 
circumstances, meaning the project is rejected. This possibility increases based on the 
consenting timeframe and when the result is not certain (Grimes & Mitchell, 2015). 
 
Any project that begins construction before an EIA is granted cannot be sold to 
prospective-buyers. Many prospective-buyers are left upset when the property they 
desire fails to be approved by the EIA and it can often take some time for booking 
deposits to be returned. A rising number of new condominium developments have 
been rejected by the EIA despite already being available on the market. Thus, 
developers must modify their designs and refund buyer deposits as they are unable to 
sell the properties. According to AREA (2015), only 98 projects of 301 undertaken in 
2012 succeeded in securing EIA approval with nine development projects in Greater 
Bangkok cancelled or terminated within the first six months of 2015 on account of 
this trend (Global Property Guide, 2015). This issue can force the launch date of 
projects to be pushed back and many developers choose to terminate the project 
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instead. The Bangkok Post (2015) argues that this was also a prevalent issue in the 
past but has become more noticeable again recently, with the rapid growth of the 
condominium industry.  
 
Despite already putting the condominiums up for sale on the market, big developer F 
was not granted EIA approval for two separate projects. Two of big developer F’s 
projects had failed to secure EIA approval. The two rejected projects included an 
eight-storey building comprised of 400 units launched in 2012, and two eight-storey 
buildings comprised of 409 units launched in 2013. As a result, the company claims 
that it will refund all booking fees in addition to interest, as promised in the 
contractual agreement (interview, big developer F, 2014).  
 
A condominium project by big developer K was relaunched in 2011 once the design 
plans were altered. The site comprises 319 units ranging between 31 and 55 square 
metres at a cost of £2,450 per square metre. The initial design plan contained 220 
units ranging between 38 and 65 square metre at a cost of £2,200 per square metre. 
Big developer K admitted that the design plans were modified following changes to 
EIA green area requirements. These new criteria stipulate the amount of green area 
that must be provided outdoors but does not address indoor green areas, which the 
developer claims featured heavily in the initial design plans: 
 
Our project was initiated during a change in the green area required in 
the EIA report. The new requirement for green areas does not cover green 
areas within the building. They must be outdoors, but our previous design 




The developer further notes: 
 
Once the company was informed about the need to modify their designs, 
we refunded all buyer booking deposits with interest even though they had 
already sold 30 percent of the properties. The design plans were altered 
and the project had less space available for sale. Thus, we increased the 
price in line with current market trends. (Big developer K) 
 
 
Thus, both developers and buyers are negatively affected if a condominium project is 
rejected by the EIA, as are other key invested parties such as banks and contractors. 
Hence, many financial organisations are now stricter and require EIA approval before 
development loans are approved. Meanwhile, contractors have acquired greater power 
on account of a lack of skilled contractor labourers and thus choose projects that have 
received EIA approval or expect to receive approval. Developers have put forward the 
notion that delays and concerns related to EIA can lower profits stemming from the 
development. Sometimes, the added financial burden can mean developers replace a 
certain development type for the preferred option, while in other instances, they might 
reject a prospective development based on forecasted costs, delays and concerns. 
Specifically, numerous developers have said they gave up projects based on the 
forecasted project length and EIA concerns. 
 
7.3.7  Launching Project Only after Passing EIA  
 
Now, when our company launches condominium projects, we do not begin 
the sales until we have applied for an EIA permit and know that our 
application has been approved. This approach benefits both the developer 
and our customers. (Big developer H, 2014) 
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My company will launch a new condominium project only if the project 
receives EIA approval. (Big developer A, 2014) 
 
 
As the sentiments of the respondents above show, many developers are now worried 
about the fact that the EIA is offering a limited number of approvals. Many 
developers delay the launch of their housing projects until approval is secured which 
will be more beneficial for the company in ensuring the trust of clientele. According 
to big developer I: 
It was common for developers to start their marketing and advertise their 
projects soon after purchasing land and constructing a sales office. 
However, new EIA rules mean that developers now delay the launch 




Big developers A and J have made similar arguments and revealed that their 
companies now wait for EIA approval before beginning construction. In 2013, big 
developer A had to relaunch a condominium project after EIA rejection meant design 
plans had to be modified. This project is situated in a region where high-rise buildings 
are not permitted, in the same location as the new parliament. The company also had 
to revise another condominium project in the CBD when it failed to secure EIA 
approval (interview, big developer, 2014).  
 
Carmona et al., (2003) have stated that the practices of house builders are not under 
their control, as they are a result of the housing development itself and the marketing 
processes related to it. Essentially, this is due to the fact that housing is a unique type 
of consumer good, as housing ‘has first of all a very high capital value’, and the 
developer invests vast amounts of funds in the buying of land and materials. 
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Secondly, production time for housing far exceeds other consumer goods, and 
developers must attempt to reduce turnover time to the greatest extent, meaning that 
delays are expensive and, during recessions, the product is unable to be stored until 
the market circumstances improve, without incurring vast costs. (Booth, 1982, p.20–
21). As a result, it is crucial for house builders that their creations are finished and 
sold in the shortest possible window. Thus, there are specific trusted and well-tested 
formulae regarding development practices which are used widely, in order to limit 
complications and which allow all necessary consents to be gathered as soon as 
possible (Beer & Booth, 1981).  
 
7.3.8  Paying Compensation 
 
Many developers have made their own solutions. The developers perceive that EIA to 
be about compensation. Many condominium projects have been disapproved because 
of environmental concerns and affected neighbours. Therefore, giving money, objects, 
or favours as compensation to local residents affected by the development project has 
become a norm or standard of sorts in Thailand (interview, big developer I, 2014). For 
example, with regard to sensitive areas such as schools, the developer must send an 
inquiry letter and meet the directors of the schools to ask if the project affects them in 
any particular way. Big developer I notes with reference to his experience of 
launching a construction site near a school:  
 
When we build a building near a sensitive area, the developer must give 
something as a compensation to the affected parties. Even though, we 
realised that it does not solve the problem at the root, installing air-
conditioners in schools is the solution…it has already become the norm in 
Thailand.  
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Thus, the question is does it really help improve the environment? In response, big 
developer I asserts: 
 
It definitely facilitates the development project and enables the continuity 
in the construction but the environment will not reap any benefit. Instead 
of finding a better solution, this has become the norm among the housing 
developers. When one developer uses this strategy, others will follow…it 
becomes a matter of negotiation with the affected parties… 
 
You caused me some inconvenience. What can you give me to compensate 
for that?  
 
 
The developers in Thailand have barely taken environmental concerns into account 
when establishing their strategy, which is primarily because of financial motivations 
behind these plans, through land ownership and feasibility studies.  
 
In summary, Thailand integrates the EIA process differently when it comes to the 
new-housing development process. There should be a greater level of focus given to 
comprehending the effects of EIA on developers’ decision-making. The housing 
developer is the first decision-maker in a housing project process, and the EIA should 
be a crucial component of their decision-making process, especially at the initial 
phases. EIA can help decision-making when examining potential project alternatives. 
In reality, EIA has not often been an important element for developers, since the latter 
usually goes ahead with a project through financial and technical feasibility findings 
instead of EIA findings. As a result, EIA is not important in the decision-making of 
the housing process, since developers employ EIA as a tool to gather project 
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permissions as opposed to a tool to limit the negative impacts their project has on the 
environment (interview, developers, 2014). 
 
7.4 Evidence in Lobbying  
 
This section explores the strategies of house-building companies with the view to gain 
nuanced insight into the lobbying activities of such companies, focusing particularly 
on their pressure groups due to their ability to influence policy significantly via the 
lobbying of senior politicians.    
 
Wescott (2001) explains that throughout South East Asia, policy changes happen 
under two main paradigms. One is the common autocratic-paternalistic way of ruling, 
while the other is the paradigm of legitimate authority (Western model of rule of law 
and governance). Governments have allowed major businesses with significant 
influence to make private agreements with administrations (Wescott, 2001, p.43). 
Holcomb et al. (2012) claim that businesses are impacted significantly by public 
policy. They attempt to affect policy changes and governmental decision-making 
pertaining to public policy. Numerous different outlooks exist for businesses with 
regards to their links with the government (Holcomb et al., 2012). According to the 
Environmental Report 1997 (OEPP, 1998), Thailand has been a nation of low 
enforcement. The lack of policies, rules and organisations was ineffective (discussed 
in chapter 8). Because of vague legal authority in Thailand, Thai laws delegate 
significant power to executives through ministerial regulations, notifications and 
announcements, meaning that these individuals can create the rules themselves. In 
instances where they are not able to change a policy, they can affect those in charge of 
the regulation implementation. Overlapping legislation can stop an authority 
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implementing a specify policy if it goes against the wishes of other firms. Because of 
this, business firms in power most often build strong relationships with politicians in 
order to use the available bureaucratic influence in order to support their personal 
goals, regardless of the effect on the public or the environment. Langkarpint’s (2003, 
p.1709) study shows that the Thai public sector demonstrates significant levels of 
corruption and corrupt officials, who make law enforcement and regulation extremely 
challenging to uphold (Delgado et al., 2003; Greenpeace Southeast Asia Foundation, 
2004; Wildlife Fund Thailand, 2003).  
 
In order to assess interest group influence, Dye (2014) claims that the power the 
interest groups hold in the government is not easily quantified because of several 
reasons. Firstly, political views can align with those of the interest groups, regardless 
of any lobbying they do. Secondly, interest groups primarily affect the initial phases 
of setting legislation, involving behind-the-scenes negotiations for certain provisions 
and the drafting of amendments. Thirdly, interest group lobbying is considered to be 
most influential when it comes to specific legislation details, rather than the general 
political direction.  Lastly, the politicians themselves have personal views which 
might be influenced by interest group activities. Western countries, however, differ in 
that the majority of political activities occur at the input (policy making) stage 
whereas in developing countries, the output (implementation) stage of the political 
process involves significant individual and collective lobbying, representation of 
interests and the rise and resolution of conflicts (Wescott, 2001). In this section, the 
formal and informal negotiations between governmental agencies and the private 
sector have been observed in the process of EIA policy formulation and 
implementation in Thailand.  
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7.4.1  Formal Negotiation  
 
“The association has written to the Minister of Natural Resources and 
Environment requesting for a less stringent approach towards EIA 
requirements as the sector is already experiencing difficulties because of 




EIA & new Bangkok’s City Plan 
 
When the incorporation of EIA into the new BMA city planning law, which includes 
land-use restrictions, does not align with the growth of urban areas particularly those 
in the CBD, buildings projects are not developed to their capacity and profit 
maximisation is not achieved (Interview, Thai Condominium Association 
representative, 2014). Therefore, developers have requested a 40 percent increase in 
construction areas to the BMA, so that the benefits of land-use can be enhanced. 
Since many of those who previously inhabited the area have contributed towards the 
new Bangkok city plan, it is normally assumed that they generally do not favour the 
explosion of new high-rise development projects, particularly in close proximity to 
their residential areas (Interview, Thai Condominium Association representative, 
2014). This is illustrated in the next section, via cases where local communities 
protest against new high-rise development projects. 
 
Project Size & Green Areas 
 
With the aim of reducing the heat generated from air conditioners, developers are 
required to grow trees with a 5m x 5m diameter per one ton (equal to 12,000 BTU) of 
cooling capacity. In response to such green space regulations, big developer H opines: 
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It is impossible to follow the green space regulations. This can be 
exemplified by a 250 unit condominium that requires 500 tons of air 
conditioning, which would in turn require the growth of 4,500-6,500 
square metres of trees (this is the total land space required to build 250 
trees, 5m x 5m in diameter). It would be difficult to accomplish this, and 
even if it is possible to do so, the number of units of that particular project 
will also have to be reduced to compensate for the new green spaces, 
which will severely impact the total cost of the development project. 
 
 
The developer further notes:  
 
For condominiums in lower-range markets, the behaviour of consumers 
may not require air conditioning in certain units. Therefore, the 
aforementioned green space requirement should be made more flexible in 
comparison to reduction or increase in air conditioning demands. (Big 
Developer H, 2014) 
 
 
Developers have filed a complaint to ONEP to consider increasing the flexibility of 
EIA regulations. However, the NEB views this green space requirement as part of 
their sustainable development plan, which developers must accept and follow. 
Nevertheless, all developers agree on the need to amend this rule due to the 
substantial impacts on project development. Some developers propose the creation of 
a revolving fund for other environmental purposes (interview, Developers, 2014).  
 
EIA Clearer Regulation & Checklist System 
 
The Thai Condominium Association (TCA) has also advised the ERC to set EIA 
standards in order for companies to operate more effectively. It now takes between 6 
to12 months for EIA approval to be granted following submission. The president of 
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the TCA claims that this proposal could increase the efficiency of the entire EIA 
process and argues that the entire process must be standardised in order to ease the 
concerns of business owners and potential buyers. As a Thai Condominium 
Association representative explains: 
 
The EIA permit process, both the application process and after getting the 
permit, has to be standardised because that will give confidence to both 
developers and homebuyers. The proposal, if approved, would help to 




The TCA has also begun writing a cohesive checklist containing clearer regulations 
regarding condominium developments with floor areas exceeding 10,000 square 
metre or eight stories containing more than 80 units, as many buildings of this scale 
are rather similar in structural terms. It is noted further that: 
 
Using this checklist, projects with a floor area of less than 10,000 square 
metre can proceed to secure a construction permit without receiving prior 
EIA approval. The aim of this checklist is to increase the speed of EIA 
processing and construction schedules, which may lead to a decline in 
condominium prices of between 3 and 5percent. (Thai Condominium 
Association representative, 2014) 
 
 
ONEP has also reviewed the EIA procedure and plans to have developers adhere to a 
complete environmental checklist under the auspices of local authorities, as opposed 
to having to secure EIA approval from the ERC. Local authorities are suitable in this 
case as they are responsible for the approval of construction permits. The TCA argues 
that such measures will generate new codes of practice for developers in the 
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condominium industry. At present, if a developer chooses to purchase land for the 
purposes of a potential condominium project, they are uncertain whether or not they 
will succeed in securing EIA approval. As there is no standardised approval process 
in place, certain projects in the same area may be approved while others are not, 
which has proven detrimental to development in the region. While development 
companies are committed to environmental protection, a single cohesive set of 
standards is required. This point is echoed by a Thai Condominium Association 
representative, who states: 
 
Without a standardised approval process, the projects in adjacent areas 
may be considered differently. One could win EIA approval while the other 
does not. This has been a major risk for developers.  
 
 
The TCA also claims that the provision of a checklist would help to reduce spending 
as developers can proceed with projects. At present, developers must delay 
construction for between six and twelve months as they await EIA approval. This can 
lead developers to incur significant costs as they must pay interest on the land that is 
not currently being developed. This can be achieved by larger companies due to their 
access to financing as described earlier in this chapter, however smaller firms often do 
not have access to such resources. These challenges are captured in the responses 
below: 
 
Standards aside, the checklist will also help us save costs. With the 
checklist, we can go ahead with the projects. Under the current rules, we 
need to wait for six to eight months for the expert panel to grant EIA 
approval. (Thai Housing Association representative, 2014) 
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The implementation of standardised EIA rules would be of great benefit to 
companies since condominiums, which account for a significant 
proportion of companies’’ assets, delay construction by up to one year as 
they await EIA approval. ( Big developer G, 2014) 
 
 
Big developer H claims that regulatory improvements could reduce developer 
spending due to the increase in efficiency. The company has had to delay the 
construction of several projects for up to one year as they await EIA approval and 
they believe that the substitution of the application process with a checklist would 
prove advantageous to businesses and buyers alike. The company also argues that the 
increase in operational efficiency could reduce costs and these savings could then be 
passed on to buyers. 
 
Big developer H also claims that ONEP should devise a number of different 
checklists based on the different conditions of specific regions. For instance, while the 
checklist may be adequate in the CBD, customised versions may be required in 
conjunction with consultations with expert panels in areas that are more susceptible to 
environmental issues. In effect, the checklist should suffice in areas where there are 
minimal risks posed to the environment (interview, Big developer H, 2014). Big 
developer H (2014) additionally notes that, “for some locations where environmental 
threats are low, just the checklist should be enough, and this would benefit both 
developers and home-buyers.” 
 
Redundant Regulations  
 
There are many legal requirements for housing developments, many of which have 
similar aims and objectives, creating an overlap in policies. This makes it more 
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difficult to consider approval. Housing developers must also adhere to the following 
four condominium development laws:  
• The Environmental Quality Protection and Promotion Act 1992. This oversees 
the EIA approval process.  
• The Urban Planning Act. This is implemented by the BMA to oversee 
development projects in Greater Bangkok and across the country under the 
auspices of the Public Works Department. This act addresses environmental 
issues, particularly in relation to how the project may impact surrounding 
areas.  
• The Building Control Act, which allows the MOI to share the Ministerial 
Regulations for potentially environmentally-damaging construction and 
development. Furthermore, Municipality bylaws can be applied by local 
government officials in accordance with Ministerial Regulations. This is 
exercised by the BMA and the Public Works Department and incorporates 
laws on environmental management.  
• The Condominium Act. This is enacted by the Interior Ministry's Lands 
Department. 
 
The developers have commented that while Acts 2 to 4 affect development projects, 
their effect is quite minimal because enforcers work conjointly with developers to 
ensure that all requirements are fulfilled. The legislations nevertheless affects 
decisions concerning the launch of new housing projects (interviews, developer J, 
2014). The dynamics are further explained below through the responses of 
interviewees: 
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At present, in order to obtain housing development permission for one 
establishment, you need to gain permission from 22 approval units, 
causing unnecessary complexity. This lengthy process that stems from such 
inefficiency usually takes up more than twelve months, causing a delay 
that impacts financial institutions and contractors, resulting in additional 
expenses. (Big developer J, 2014) 
 
Numerous planning laws can allow for the local government agencies to 
make informed decisions regarding housing developments. An example of 
this can be seen with the City Plan and Building Control Acts, under which 
proposed projects must take into account the environmental status of the 
project's suggested site. Despite this, the official EIA processes are more 
extensive than those used in practice, and the decision is made primarily 
on other regulations, such as Municipality Regulations. As a result, 
permissions are usually due to planning mechanisms and other laws 
instead of EIA guidelines. (Big developer H, 2014)  
 
 
In summary, the developers and related housing associations have been intensively 
persuading ONEP to make some changes to EIA to mitigate delays. Nevertheless 
following the establishment of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), 
significant changes have been made, three of which are particularly notable.   
 
7.4.2  Informal Negotiations 
 
It has been noted that the former president of big developer B once sat on the board of 
the ERC either as a business owner representative or as an expert in real estate 
business. Other developers find this inappropriate. Although he eventually stepped 
down, when his company project was presented to the Board to avoid a conflict of 
interest, his projects were never openly criticised, suggesting some bias nonetheless 
(interview, big developer I, 2014). Big developer I notes that: 
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It is good that business owners are able to have a role in developing and 
improving environmental policies, but a representative from a particular 
estate company should not be a member of the ERC. It will seem partial. 
But most ERC members today are also the consultants of many housing 
development companies.  
 
 
A case in point is scholar B who sits on the Board and is also an advisor for big 
developer A. This means that when a project by big developer A is presented to the 
Board, he might not comment directly and straightforwardly. Thus big developer I 
posits “the private sector has a great influence albeit indirectly on state agencies. 
Although there are a lot of indirect effects, there are too little direct ones.”  
 
Many developers, especially big developers, choose to file a lawsuit against ONEP 
and the expert committee as a final solution. For example, big developers have filed a 
lawsuit against ONEP when their projects experienced major delays. As a result, 
ONEP eases the EIA process up. The developers believe that the size of the company 
is an important matter in the EIA approval process (Big developer I). Big developer I 
asserts that: 
 
Actually, no one on the ERC would want to get sued because if the 
members neglect the public, they would be criticised...one example is a 
condominium in Pattaya. The board is caught in the middle and that is a 
double-edged sword because if they ignore the issue, they may cause a 






Further, big developer I claims that:  
 
I think every developer has power in the state sector. The state agencies 
give a pretty good facilitation to the big developers. As the 20 biggest 
developers in the country, the state sector facilitates us in any way it can 
to move processes rapidly as long as it is still in the boundaries of the law.  
 
 
Business dominance and influence upon the state is affirmed by Shang’s study. He 
argues that the property development industry has benefitted from a favorable 
political and legislative environment in which to operate because of big developers 
having provided major financial support for various political parties (Shang, 2002). 
He further presented the example of Bangkok Land, an acknowledged supporter of 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (a one-time Prime Minister of Thailand, having previously 
been the Minister of Defence) and his New Aspiration Party (NAP). Bangkok Land, 
the country’s leading property development company, is well known for creating 
Muang Thong Thani (MTT), a settlement occupying a 640 hectare site to the north of 
Bangkok. The project included industrial and commercial units, as well as in excess 
of 40,000 condominium units. When the company ran into major difficulties with 
selling the condominium units that it had built, the Thai government stepped in to 
provide assistance. Only 30 percent of the properties has been sold. The government 
bought up some of these in order to provide offices for the Permanent Secretary and 
housing for Ministry of Defence staff. Other decisions taken by the government to 
favor Bangkok Land have been MTT’s selection as a host location for the Asia 
Games hosted by Bangkok in 1998, and the building of part of a major motorway as 
far as MTT to facilitate commuting to and from the city (Sheng, 2002). 
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Moreover, Wells-Dang et al., (2016) claim that EIA is merely a routine technical 
activity, which can be used to the advantage of the private sector and their 
associations to meet a prearranged action development plan, if control remains solely 
within the scope of the ERC, and in the absence of public accountability. Shepherd 
(2012) affirms that the EIA processes implemented in Thailand are often considered 
dishonest and unauthorised, meaning that their results are not taken into account 
except when there are legal problems from associated complaints. Shepherd (2012) 
also states that numerous developers undertake negotiations without any consultation 
from local residents. Thus, it is not uncommon for the private sector to apply short-
term solutions for certain issues, adopting practices that are illegal, but yet are usually 
neither discussed nor dealt with by the legislative authorities. The next section 
analyses how state agencies manage the feedback they receive from various 
stakeholders. 
 
7.5 The Politics of Response – State’s Actions on EIA Procedures and 
Alterations  
 
For the current Thai government, the real estate sector is conceptualised as a key 
driver for economic growth in Thailand, thus concomitantly, it has implemented a 
myriad of policies in the past few years with the aim of stimulating the economy. The 
government has stipulated that the length of the EIA process should be reduced and 
orders that any unnecessary hindrances to development must be removed to enable 
projects proceed more efficiently. Indeed, an environmental authority senior 
bureaucrat opines “there should be fewer obstructions to investment plans as these 
lengthy procedures have caused delays to development projects.” Further, it is noted 
that: 
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Following complaints from big and small housing developers with respect 
to the rising costs associated with the imposition of EIA regulations on 
projects that entail over 250 acres of land, the Office has sought to 
mitigate the noted challenges by adhering to old requirements which 
mainly apply to land sizes over 500 acres. (Environmental authority senior 
bureaucrat, 2014) 
 
Environmental authority senior bureaucrats agree with the ONEP that the time taken 
to consider EIA approvals should be shortened to facilitate convenience for 
developers, although the strict restrictions and enforcements should however remain. 
The reduction in the time taken for EIA approvals will be applied to private housing 
projects (The Nation, 2015). NGOs however argue against reductions in the 
processing time on the basis that the EIA is an important legal tool that is very 
effective, because urges developers to minimise impacts on the environment, 
particularly condominiums. NGO A comments that: 
 
The reduction in the EIA approval processing time should require a 
clearer informative grounding as to why less time is needed to complete 
such an important examination – both in terms of environmental control 
justification and also a quantifiable number of how many condominiums 
are currently facing problems with this situation (including a monetary 
value of economic damage – since if this flexibility is granted to the 
housing industry in the midst of current expansion, there is a possibility of 
overbuilding (resulting in supply over demand). This will in turn affect the 
wider economy and the environment.  
 
In 2016, NCPO released an order No. 9/2016 which allowed state 
enterprises/government agencies to choose private companies to undertake their 
projects, without waiting for the results of an EIA. Numerous countries across Asia 
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have set more restrictive environment protection laws, whereas Thailand's changes 
are likely to bring in higher levels of investment. This move does not surpass the EIA, 
but it still increases the pressure on those taking part in EIA reviews (The nation, 
2016). The NCPO statement was taken on board by the MONRE, who tried to distract 
attention from related issues that it would not exclude any projects out from the EIA 
policies in the NEQA. Instead, the order was said to facilitate the preparation of TOR 
sections in advance by officials, and when the EIA/EHIA was accepted, then the 
construction time would be cut down as it could be signed instantly (The Nation, 
2016). NGOs question whether a single individual should be able to alter a law that 
impacts the environment that everyone uses. An NGO comments that: 
 
The minimal international standard needs an EIA, which is somewhat 
insignificant in most cases, as discussed…Citizens across numerous 
regions will suffer if this order goes through, as it would surpass the entire 
structure of traditional decision-making. Local communities would be 
impacted but would also not be consulted.  
 
 
Scholar B comments that: 
 
It was primarily employed to the advantage of business investment, instead 
of for the public interest. It is envisioned that the private sector will 
benefit, and the local people will suffer under the NCPO order, as the 




In summary, the study argues that the political system in Thailand had been used as a 
means for ensuring the advancement of the interests of certain interest groups, rather 
than being a mechanism for representing and benefitting the population at large. Thus, 
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Thai public policy can be influenced and altered by business actors whether these are 
individual or groups based on the political environment in Thailand. Political elites 
are able to perpetuate their privileges due to extensive patron-client networks. Further, 
elite groups comprise both business actors and military bureaucrats who have been 
able to accumulate power over the years although they do not formally hold positions 
within the political structure.  
 
Winbourne (2002) puts forward the argument that developing country leaders are 
willing to give up environmental resources in favour of economic profit and meeting 
short-term political targets. This behaviour is particularly harmful when it comes to 
continued EIA process mismanagement, which leads to greater levels of corruption 
and unprecedented environmental damage in the long-term (discussed in chapter 8). 
Even though Thai government identified EIA as a key tool for primary environmental 
concerns into development process, they allow some development projects to be 
executed in the certain special conditions. Next section discusses the role of 
international actors in the different approaches and how Thai state responds to both 
domestic and foreign funded development projects.  
 
State Approaches Towards EIA Procedures in the Context of Domestic and 
Internationally Funded Projects 
 
The interplay of international and domestic systems must be evaluated when 
conducting analyses of Thai state authority. International organisations are essential 
catalysts for establishing and expanding EIA systems, especially to developing 
countries. Hironaka (2002) has conducted research into the acceptance and 
implementation of EIA legislation in developing countries. The author asserts that, 
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domestically, there is limited pressure for the adoption of environmental protection 
measures, either because the citizens are poor and uneducated, or because of political 
despotism. Hironaka adds that, since EIAs tend to be imposed on developing 
countries by international organisations, they have become something of a 
bureaucratic, standardized, procedural formality (Hironaka, 2002). 
 
Many international agencies have embraced EIA. For example, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has proposed that member 
governments should encourage the adoption of EIA procedures and methods, when 
assigning aid to developing countries (OECD. 1992). The World Bank declared that 
borrower countries should undertake EIA when launching major projects, and in 
2006, the World Bank revised its guidance on EIA (World Bank, 2006).  In  addition, 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) recommended that member 
states should establish EIA procedures and draw up goals and standards for EIA. In 
2011, UNEP produced EIA guidelines for developing countries (UNEP, 2011).  
 
Komatsu (1998) argues that both multilateral and bilateral aid organisations, 
particularly the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have played a 
major part in introducing EIA practices. This is partly because these organisations 
also fund or execute many large-scale development projects which could have a 
significant and negative effect on the environment. Examples of such projects 
include: Nam Theun Hydroelectric project in Laos, PDR; and the Mekong River 
Development Plan (ADB, 1997). The World Bank has set about promoting EIA 
concepts in Thailand.  In the last few years, international lenders like the World Bank 
and the ADB have expanded, refined, and coordinated their EIA procedures and 
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strategies, in order to minimise environmental damage. In addition, they have also 
undertaken capacity-building, to facilitate the implementation of EIAs (Li, 2008). 
 
In Thailand case, the divergent of Thai government approaches to EIA between 
domestically and internationally funded projects demonstrates a weak domestic regard 
and support for EIA. Explicitly, compared to international projects, domestic projects 
subvert EIA and environmental protection requirements (Li, 2008).  
 
Boyle (1998) illustrates this point via the case of a tantalum refinery, whereby EIA 
studies were completely avoided until the project reached it final stage. The EIA 
revealed that the project was concomitant with negative externalities for the 
environment and the project was subsequently burned to the ground by a mob. Prior 
to the implementation phase, ONEB had recommended the conducting of an EIA 
following an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) of the project and even 
recommended alternative project sites, however its directive was ignored.  
 
In contrast, when foreign funding is involved, there is a higher regard for EIA 
processes. For example, analyses of the environmental impacts of four large dam 
projects funded by the World Bank in Bhumiphol, Sirikit, Srinagarind, and Bang 
Lang completed in 1963, 1972, 1980, and 1981, respectively, has shown that 
resettlement programs have improved  (Boyle 1991). Resettlement programmes often 
form part of the conditions attached to World Bank loans thus this in part, accounts 
for the successful implementation of the programme. It is very interesting that the 
domestic responsibilities which do not form part of the mandatory conditions attached 
to loan packages have not improved at all. Internationally funded projects are very 
intentional about heeding to EIA requirements. For example, assessment’s revealed 
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that the Nam Choan Dam, would have resulted in the flooding of thousands of 
hectares of rare low-elevation forest and would have further been a detriment to 
wildlife sanctuaries and thus, it was abandoned.  
 
Similarly, although the initial plan for the Pak Mun Dam, entailed the relocation of 
18,700 people, the project was extensively revised to preserve aspects of the local 
community such as its recreational amenities linked to the river. Notably however, 
while a myriad of anti-dam protests were launched in response to the resettlement 
plans, cabinet approved the World Bank loan, and the project proceeded (Boyle, 
1998).  
 
In summary, EIA has been met with significant challenges and antipathy from both 
public and private sector leaders, as a procedure to assist in reaching environmental 
targets concerning large-scale development projects. The government is intentional 
about implementing its industrialisation and economic policy and thus, state and 
businesses have been given extensive power and independence to achieve its 
objectives. Thus, processes may undermine any potential financial progress (such as 
EIA), have been given little to no political support. Therefore, the pursuit of economic 
development is a key reason for the limited support afforded to EIA. It is argued that 
Thailand took on EIA due to external pressure as opposed to a genuine interest in the 
environmental damage development projects create. 
 
Boyle (1998) further explains that the reason for this is the mostly centralised, 
oppressive, dictatorial character of the administration, meaning that mission agencies 
are shielded from the policy criticism voiced by less influential agencies and the 
public. This political and bureaucratic atmosphere demonstrates a ‘top-down’ 
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ideology and use of power and authority, together with the submission given to 
individuals in these positions of power. Furthermore, the patron–client links between 
political and business leaders bolster the overall aim of economic development, 
causing greater difficulty for EIA supporters and environmentalists to go against the 
will of powerful politicians and businessmen.  
 
The limited support for EIA is alleviated to an extent by the external need for 
environmental protection, through major funding agencies such as the World Bank 
and international NGO networks which are vocal in their criticism of the more 
shocking proposals brought up by the local residents. Local communities and public 
interest groups have restricted the power of developers to a small degree, particularly 
when the nation was progressing mostly through external development funds and their 
actions were encouraged by activists inside and outside of Thailand. On the other 
hand, the impact communities and public advocacy groups have had is primarily 
unrelated to national EIA programs, offering very limited chances for the public to be 
a part of decisions (Boyle, 1998). 
 
7.6 EIA and Developers’ Decision-Making 
 
 
Despite the fact that EIA is primarily considered a process or method to notify 
decision-makers of the predicted effects that their proposed projects will have, and 
help alleviate any negative effects, it does not inform decision-making (Benson, 
2003). Garb et al., (2007) suggest that in order for an EIA to effectively influence 
outcomes, it must be implemented during the phases at a time when the developer can 
potentially find alternatives (Li, 2008). EIA in hindsight can be beneficial, since it 
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offers important data regarding mitigation options and continued management 
approaches (Bailey, 1997).  
 
In Thailand, EIA is considered to be a way of justifying decisions already made, 
instead of a way to create unbiased and thorough evaluations which can help decision-
making (Manorom, 2007). Thailand's housing system does not accommodate EIA in 
its development, and there are no laws that support EIA implementation in building 
control and land-use planning processes. The country has used EIA processes 
independently for the development of housing, meaning it is challenging for EIA to 
be considered during all stages of housing development. Thus, EIA serves as a 
rational tool during the housing project planning process, as well as an extra required 
document to attain construction license consent. Where EIA is thought of as a rational 
tool, it is important to be implemented from the very start of any development. Thus, 
EIA findings can be used to make decisions throughout all phases of the housing 
project's planning. 
 
The majority of developers are not willingly undertaking EIA as a critical step to meet 
the legal necessities, and instead conceptualise it is an addition to their decision-
making process. Developers mostly think of EIA as another step to gaining operating 
permission, instead of a way to limit environmental harm. As the EIA procedures in 
Thailand are enacted independently of the development permission process, it is not 
involved by any significant degree, in the developers’ decision-making process. There 
is significant confusion when it comes to the rules and regulations of EIA, and how 
they impact their project development, giving it a sense of arbitrariness. Mostly, 
developers perceive EIA to have no real impact on limiting environmental damage.  
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7.7 Does EIA motivate companies to become more environmentally 
aware?  
 
The implementation of EIA in housing development projects can be beneficial in 
many aspects. Should the developer seriously consider environmental impacts of a 
particular construction, it is likely that the housing project will be well designed to 
minimise environmental damage as well as impacts to local communities. Compliance 
with environmental standards therefore lowers the risk of environmental damage and 
the disruption of public health. From an economic standpoint, this should lower 
additional costs associated with medical treatment and/or financial compensation for 
property damage. In addition, better environmental planning has the potential to 
reduce operating costs since the cost of many unexpected environmental problems is 
likely to be prevented. It is typically more expensive to make amendments at the later 
stages of a project cycle. 
 
EIA attempts to assist housing developers, even if it takes time and incurs new costs. 
Kristin (2002) believes that if the process of EIA is implemented completely in the 
project's design cycle, then housing developers can pinpoint environmental risks early 
on and help limit any related negative effects. In turn, this establishes stronger 
relations between housing developers, local authorities and communities, establishing 
an easier planning permission process. Furthermore, EIA is beneficial as it accounts 
for all social, economic and environmental impacts during the review of development 




The level of detail of EIA means that future standards and quality control 
of new-housing developments will be of the highest quality. Housing 
development will continue to progress regardless, so it is important to 
ensure these developments are sustainable and their design can be 
examined closely.  
 
 
When it comes to new-housing development projects, EIA law is vague as it states 
that EIA needs to be prepared before a project commences. Crucially, there is no rule 
regarding projects needing EIA in their feasibility study, and how to consider EIA to 
the same extent as other factors involved in the study. Project developers have stated 
that EIA has not established any credibility because of the lack of justification, 
clarification and acceptable standards related to it. This study is especially interested 
in examining how much influence the EIA has in the decision-making of housing 
developers. Measures have been taken to ensure that developers amend schemes to 
comply with EIA guidelines, but these have largely been ignored or circumvented. 
Developers have shown a tendency to secure sites prior to any kind of EIA 
intervention. Economic priorities mean that housing projects do not pay great heed to 
seemingly subsidiary issues of the environment. This study finds that in the Thai 
housing industry environmental considerations are not prioritised, with project 
proposals predicated mainly on economic considerations. Land concerns and profit 
maximisation take precedence over environmental concerns, which is of course 
problematic to the country’s sustainable development goals.  Developers claim that 
while their company is willing to comply with any environmental regulations, they 
must be transparent and effective as noted in the responses below: 
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Developers are willing to do anything to protect the environment, but need 
a single set of standards. (Thai Condominium Association representative, 
2014) 
 
We welcome any proposals to save the environment, but the regulatory 
process should be clear and facilitating. (Big developer H, 2014)  
 
The concept of EIA is good but there should be clear and concise criterion 
for real estate developers to adhere to. The current criterion tends to 




Developers are willing to safeguard the environment but require a cohesive set of 
standards on how do so. Current regulations must be made clearer. According to Thai 
Condominium Association representative A: 
 
Clearer regulatory processes would decrease costs and also increase 
efficiency. The elimination of the application requirements in exchange for 
a checklist system would also be advantageous to developers and 
prospective buyers…this measure would lower the costs associated with 
the development process and these savings could then be passed on to the 
buyer through reduced house prices. 
 
Similarly, big developer B notes that “the shortening of the process will mitigate the 
financial burden on developers which means that unit prices can be reduced. This will 
benefit home buyers.”  
 
ONEP has devised a number of different checklists based on the physical conditions 
in different regions. In effect, while the main checklist may suffice for development 
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projects in the central business district, a revised version may be required for areas 
more susceptible to environmental damage as well as consultation with ERC. Overall, 
the implementation of the checklist system would be effective in most areas and 
would prove advantageous for both developers and buyers alike. Thus big developer 
H argues that “for some locations where environmental threats are low, just the 
checklist should be enough, and this would benefit both developers and home-
buyers.”  
 
Developers have called for ONEP to implement a code of practice as the clear basis 
for EIA examination, as well as a guideline for developers to lower the impacts of 
their projects on the environment. The code of practice is seen as the solution to 
clarify any discrepancy between practice and consideration by the ERC. The 
availability of a code of practice acts as a checklist for developers to follow, because 
in the past, all previous building projects located in the same area have very similar 
attributes, but the ERC feedback can sometimes be different for each project. The 
ideal code of practice from a developer perspective should not be overly strict, nor 
contain overly detailed requirements that would hinder the development process. 
Moreover, developers are actually aware and conscious of the environment but there 
are stipulations that they think are not practical in the long run as encapsulated in the 
views below: 
 
These environmental regulations force us to take a good look at the 
environment and we become more environmentally aware. However, 
without these rules, imagine a condominium project without a tree, that 
building will look bland and we risk not being able to sell the units. (Big 
developer B, 2014) 
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In my opinion, even if there was no EIA, it is still the onus of the 
developers to give importance to the landscape and the aesthetics of the 
project. The amount of detail put into it depends on the size of the 
project…but once the regulations were introduced, there are many specific 
requirements regarding the size of the green area amongst others. If you 
ask me if it's a good idea, I'll say it is…every company has to compete 
under the same level of green environment standard. No matter how big or 
small of a company you are, you still have to provide the same amount of 
green area at the same ratio as stipulated. (Big developer B, 2014)  
 
Without these regulations and were it up to the conscience of the 
developer, small companies might just build only one building and not 
provide any green space. It might be at low price but it might not seem 




In summary, EIA is still viewed as negative in the short-run, because there is risk 
involved in developing costs, as well as higher marketing costs and stricter legal 
restrictions surrounding the EIA applications. However, the developers believe that in 
the long-term this will be beneficial because they will be able to adjust sale prices to 
higher developing costs in the long run. They also believe that the EIA requirements 
will be amended so that it will be more reflective of realistic circumstances.  
 
7.8  Conclusion 
 
New-housing developments spark interest over social, political and economic issues. 
Environmental considerations are rarely prioritised in Thailand. The housing project 
proposal is generated on mainly economic considerations. Land concerns and profit 
maximisation take precedence over environmental concerns regardless of the 
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country’s sustainable development goals. The state has relaxed the EIA regulations as 
a way of controlling developers’ impacts on the environmental in every aspect, but 
realistically in practical terms, this has consistently caused problems impeding the 
development of various building projects. This in turn has negative consequences for 
developers while increasing the financial burden related to initial developing costs.  
 
Although EIA was introduced in Thailand more than three decades ago, persons who 
stand to gain profit from executed building projects often do not have a favourable 
view on the necessity of EIA. Others recognise the long-term benefits for the 
environment from EIA operations. These two viewpoints have not reconciled a 
mutual understanding as yet. Whether commentators are concerned about their own 
interests or with broader environmental concerns, the introduction of EIA 




CHAPTER 8  BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE EIA 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THAILAND  
 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines the factors that impact EIA practice, thereby illuminating the 
present position and shortcomings of EIA in Thailand which contribute negatively to 
EIA’s success as a nationwide project and diminish the ability of the government to 
solve issues regarding the destruction of environmental resources in the country. The 
chapter provides an evaluation of the ways in which Thailand’s contextual factors 
influence its implementation of EIA and how the Thai EIA programmes are limited in 
key aspects. 
 
8.2 Economic Development and Environmental Considerations in 
Thailand 
 
Thai development has focused on economic growth, following a top-down decision 
making pattern. Research into NESDPs has revealed a strong tendency in decision-
makers to position management of the environment subordinate to economic 
considerations. Economic prioritising at the cost of natural resources/the environment 
has proven ineffective (TDRI, 1996; Boyle, 1998). Tasneeyanond (1984), and ERI, 
(1991) all attribute this to the lack of prioritisation of the environment at any stage of 
project developments. For example, while NESDP No. 11th posits an ambitious vision 
of an urban future characterised by green, energy efficient, compact and 
environmentally friendly cities (see Table 20), this vision is very much removed from 
the country’s current urban realities, especially given the difficulties experienced in 





Much of the literature in this field depicts similar perceptions whereby the 
environment and economy are seemingly at odds (Boyle, 1998; Kaosa-and & 
Pednekar, 1995; Pimcharoen, 2001; Simpson, 2015; Suwanteep et al., 2016). The 
emphasis in NESDPs has been placed on industrialisation with economic growth the 
main priority.  
 
Table 20 The 11th National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012 – 2016) 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP), 
11th National Plan (2012–2016) 
5.2.3 Develop environmentally friendly cities with an emphasis on integrated urban planning 
having cultural, social and ecological aspects: 
• Develop compact urban designs where areas are used creatively, with emphasis on the expansion 
of green spaces and increased energy efficiency. Infrastructure design technology, improved 
transport systems and energy-saving residential buildings should be promoted. In addition, an 
ecologically sound urban model should be developed and specific green areas set aside for 
agriculture and urban farms.   
• Utilise tax support and other incentives to redirect technology and materials toward renewable 
energy. Regulations should be updated to increase efficiency in energy management.   
• Supervise intensive land use both inside and beyond cities and establish measures to curb urban 
sprawl.	Plan to incorporate public art and designate cultural heritage sites. Communities and local 
administration organisations (LAOs) should develop areas at the sub-district, district and 
provincial levels, and these should be relevant to the means and lifestyle of the inhabitants as well 
as to the sustainable capacity of these areas.   
• Manage an integrated urban environment by using innovative technology for wastewater and solid 
waste management, using the 3R principles (reduce, reuse, and recycle). LAOs should build 
capacity to manage the environment efficiently with participation by all stakeholders.   





Kaosa-ard & Pednekar (1995) note that existing environmental management policies 
in Thailand have concentrated on the resolution of ongoing problems as opposed to 
preventative measures. The problems faced in Thailand have been catalysed by a lack 
of comprehensive planning throughout its new stage of industrialisation, owing to the 
disparate agencies and policies that have been associated with environmental 
considerations. This lack of coordination (Ludwig, 1997; TDRI, 1996), despite many 
policies originating within central government, has been further perpetuated by 
disconnects at the local level, where the responsibility to introduce these plans lies 
with upper level policy makers who are simply not well connected to the realities of 
issues at the micro scale (Kaosa-ard et al., 1995; TDRI, 1996). 
 
In summary, relentless economic growth has undoubtedly destroyed natural resources. 
Poor, unrefined protocol with legislative loopholes, insufficient oversight and 
enforcement as well as inefficient hierarchic structures in management have allowed 
the excess consumption of resources to proceed unhindered. Laws and policies are 
abundant however it is how these laws and their regulating bodies operate that is 
problematic. No clearly defined boundaries or domains exist, resulting in a flawed 
system (Sanidvongse, 1984; Kaosa-ard et al., 1995; Ludwig, 1997). These issues are 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
8.3 EIA Evaluation 
 
As stated by Wholey et al. (1970), evaluating the effect that policy has entails 
assessing the general efficacy of a state scheme insofar as it is fit to achieve its aims. 
Prior to investigating the effect that EIA has on new housing developments in 




be useful to examine EIA’s advantages and limitations. This chapter examines the 
elements that impact EIA practice, thereby illuminating the present position and 
shortcomings of EIA in Thailand. In an attempt to identify the shortcomings and, 
moreover, to improve the efficacy of Thai-based EIA systems, the study underlines 
the basic components of the system and analyses those areas that can be improved. 
 
Thailand’s legal system, over the recent ten years, has been subject to modernisation 
and considerable improvement (Langkarpint, 2000). Despite its highly developed 
regulations, especially with regard to its updated environmental law, it is interesting 
that EIA has failed upon implementation. Glasson et al. (1997) have observed that 
enhancing EIA mechanisms’ efficiency and quality has been a common focus of 
much of the research into the subject. The scholars advocate for procedural and 
organised methods to determine the quality of EIA against standard guidelines and 
procedures, with both EIA implementation and Environmental Impact Statements 
(EIS) influenced by quality assessments. As discussed in chapter 2, in order for 
features of evaluation to be determined appropriately within EIA, substantive, 
transactional, normative and procedural aspects to gauge efficiency have been devised 
by Chanchitpricha & Bond (2013). Furthermore, Veronez & Montaño (2015) have 
revealed the most effective ways to enhance EIA application by means of a holistic 
method. Veronez & Montaño (2015) and Bond et al. (2013) argue that contributing to 
procedural ability and efficiency is the best approach to enhancing EIA mechanisms, 
due to the belief that processes of EIA that are of significant efficiency will result in 
improved results from EIA application. Kurimoto (2008) also notes that EIA 
mechanisms’ enhancement would be achieved through sharing of individual 




In the context of Thailand, a range of researchers, including Lim (1985), have 
advocated for research into EIA systems and developed conceptual frameworks to 
further the study. Lim (1985) developed a framework to analyse organisational 
mechanisms and performance outcomes of EIA implementation while Boyle (1998) 
formulated a framework to focus on social, economic, political, and especially 
cultural impacts of EIA implementation in three other countries: Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia. A notable comparative study carried out by Yap (1994) focuses on 
Thailand and Canada, primarily addressing scope, respondents, review requirements, 
public involvement, and screening specifications linked to EIA operations. A 
framework of the foundational parts of an operational EIA system and quality control 
processes was formulated by Leu et al. (1996), and the researchers used the 
framework in the context of the UK environmental evaluation system.  
 
The pace at which environmental policy in NICs has institutionally developed has 
been more rapid than economic expansion in developed countries, as explained by 
Harashima & Morita (1998). This advancement is generally attributed to the 
implementation of policy positions that reflect those carried out in developed nations. 
Additionally, Thailand’s stance towards environment-based policy has been 
dependent on, and considerably impacted by, aid from multinational organisations 
including the World Bank. In a similar manner, multinational organisations have also 
impacted stances towards environment-based policy. Furthermore, the Thai governing 
body has carried out environmental schemes that are funded by the agencies. EIAs are 
the most commonly employed project planning components employed by the Thai 
nation, and this process was drawn from the experience of multinational 




terms of varying socio-economic, cultural, political, and environmental situations. An 
environmental authority senior bureaucrat suggests that: 
 
While Thailand’s EIA has officially existed for over twenty years, it 
continues to struggle to operate effectively. This may be attributable to the 




The extent to which the facilitation of EIA is ineffective is a central concern for the 
Thai state, owing to the absence of political backing, unclear legislation, an inflexible 
governance structure, inefficient allocations of authority, lacking intercommunication 
between the civic and private realms, insufficient monitoring and implementation, and 
mechanism impotency. These elements are examined in the next section of this 
chapter.  
 
8.4 Legislative Requirements  
 
 
Various interest groups have articulated the need for elucidation on EIA legislation 
and mechanisms, due to the presence of vague guidelines and procedures. As the 
preferred best practice by international institutions, EIA has been adopted as a 
component of development preparation in Thailand. However, particular political, 
social, economic, environmental and cultural nuances are scarcely considered in EIA 
systems and the context is based on industrialised countries’ operational environment. 
For example, US legislation concerning EIA was largely transposed into the context 
of Thailand, however due to the incomparable degree of economic advancement, the 
USA has been stricter in applying the legislation. At the centre of Thailand’s 




environment is not valued highly among societal figures, including civil servants and 
organisations, and, according to scholar A, “Thailand lacks in terms of the 
implementation of legal requirements of EIA.”  
 
EIA policy can be contextualised as predicated on a top-down, command and control 
structure. It is noteworthy that subsidiary elements are also present, including 
technical and effluent standards (Leoseng & Zimmermann, 2005). According to 
NESDB senior officer A, “the policy-level entity is not appropriately formulated; it 
fails to function smoothly and, moreover, it is not supportive of regional 
governmental bodies in terms of carrying out environmental planning.”  
 
There are currently over 20 government bodies involved in implementing 
environmental regulations to some degree. However, it is difficult to grasp how the 
EIA and environmental management system works in practice, given the lack of 
clarity associated with the regulations of each different jurisdiction (Kaosa-ard & 
Pednekar, 1996). Hence due to the poor drafting of laws and policy, EIA is not 
effectively enforced; laws are associated with ambiguity, thereby rendering 
understanding, monitoring, and implementation highly complex (discussed in chapter 
5). As there are no alternative specifications that can direct entities in terms of EIA 
action, separate developing actors and EIA practitioners can justify disparate 
interpretations (Kaosa-ard & Pednekar, 1996). In addition, according to Brandon & 
Ramankutty (1993), tepid law and administration processes jeopardise the 
government’s capacity to encourage adherence across the board, and this can be 
attributed to the influence of the US’s approach on the Thai EIA system. Brandon & 
Ramankutty (1993) maintain that, in the Thai context, enforcement is comparatively 




Researchers have found that regulations are not often effectively enforced in Thailand 
(Leoseng & Zimmermann, 2005). The OEPP (1998, p.8) of the MOSTE, the major 
policy maker of Thailand, noted in its 1997 Environmental Report that most of the 
country’s organisations, rules and policies lacked authority due to poor enforcement.  
MOSTE also made a number of points regarding a lack of clarity in the legal system. 
Firstly, executives are given significant authority over rules as a result of ministerial 
regulations, notifications and announcements. According to planning authority senior 
bureaucrat:  
 
Executives are still able to impact the authorities in charge of 
implementing regulations even when they are not able to control 
legislation themselves.  
 
 
The authority further notes:  
 
one authority may be concerned about interfering with another authority’s 




As discussed in chapter 5, the Thai context does not have suitable EIA comprehensive 
guidelines for EIA preparation and ERC decision-making, and the lack of direction 
for EIA review has severely hindered ONEP’s capacity in light of the missing 
reference corpus. Consequently, evaluation and decision-making for every EIS are 
centred on the individual ERC members’ capacities, experiences, and perceptions, and 
this is important in the Thai EIA approval procedure. As a result of the fact that solely 
general directions for EIA preparation have been drawn up, heated discussions among 




a rejection or approval decision. In combination with this, despite a number of 
environment-based legal provisions being prominent in terms of environmental 
management and EIA activity, the enforcement of EIA integration into land-use 
planning and housing development is not linked to any specific law. One example of 
this is the City Plan Act and Building Control Act.  According to a local authority 
senior bureaucrat: 
 
The code of practice is comparatively clearly defined and thus superior to 
the current system. BMA supports regulatory change especially if the 
approval process can be transferred to local authorities. This may take 
some time but nevertheless, the BMA does also require this time to train its 
staff to cope with increased work volumes.  
 
 
It is often the case that the limitations are affected by inadequate regulatory measures 
for EIA along with ambiguous policy provisions for sustainability moving forward. 
These have been issued by governmental authorities as they come to and step down 
from power and, at the same time, economic development has primarily been 
addressed at the level of policy. 
 
It is also important to emphasise here that the central issue for EIA implementation in 
Thailand is the unambiguous directives for conducting EIA. To a lesser degree, this 
can be attributed to the overview of the EIA provided by ERC contributors. A 
consequence of this has been the needless expenditure on non-significant elements of 
the EIA. Also, tasks that should have been prioritised have not been financed and 
have been assessed as unsuitable. Thus, recommendations and continued research 
have consumed the time of ONEP and ERC, contributing to the long project approval 




the rules could mitigate all these complaints and developers can avoid the EIA 
committee insofar as they meet the stipulated criteria.” He is further of the view that 
“because the EIA is currently overwhelmed, it does not have the requisite resources to 
properly assess projects. The amendment will relieve the committee of this burden in 
light of the challenges they face.” 
 
Private sector actors remain concerned about a draft bill on the EIA which entails a 
provision that permits local authorities to spearhead EIS evaluation as this may 
engender inconsistent and biased assessments. Private sector actors are also concerned 
about the availability of staff to enact such amendments. Thus, a Thai Housing 
Association representative is of the view that “the government must simplify the law 
in a way that is universally accepted by all developers.” 
 
8.5 Political Commitment 
 
Increased democracy in the Thai political sphere has allowed certain institutions, 
directed by elected representatives, to acquire a degree of authority in terms of 
formulating environmental policy. This has taken place according to ministerial 
regulations to convey natural assets to those who offer political support and those they 
represent or, alternatively, by replacing those in office who could compromise their 
activities. Simultaneously, key aspects of policy that could result in negative effects 
for electorates have been interrupted, and this is symptomatic of the ineffective 
prioritisation of policy formulation by policymakers. This is due to their disturbance 
of the operations of environmental management institutions, which has led to lacking 
confidence, reduced morale for those in subordinate positions, and ineffectiveness 




Tan (2004), Bruch et al. (2007), and Li (2008) highlight that the absence of the 
political is seen in the misalignment in institutional power. It is often the case that the 
ONEP official supervising the EIA is subordinated to an external governmental body 
or privately-located project participant. Additionally, important policymakers 
frequently see EIAs as elements that discourage investment, and a widely held focus 
on economic health in Thailand often favours profit maximisation over environmental 
sustainability. The following quote from a national environmental authority officer 
captures the essence of political EIA consideration: 
 
The EIA policy procedure is not sufficiently active. This is primarily 
because no elements have emerged as clarifications. The relevant sectors 
should consider how to increase activity, thereby gaining insight into EIA 
policy and the development projects. Politicians generally don’t reduce 
options but promise to engage in certain actions. 
 
Boyle (1998) has highlighted the fact that considerable political and organisational 
motivation towards economic progress was prevalent in the upper echelons of Thai 
communities. Interestingly, the insistence on economic development and profitability 
accounts for the lack of interest in EIA and environmental sustainability measures. 
The generally centralised and dictatorial governmental approach contributes to the 
isolation of mission agencies from justified and constructive critique by the civic 
body and subordinate organisations. Boyle (1998) notes that the political and 
bureaucratic landscape in Thailand is reflective of the hierarchic layout of its general 
national culture; one product of this is the general reverence given to individuals with 





Those in executive positions are provided with considerable authority by the Thailand 
legal code. Consequently, those in such positions can re-establish and modify the 
rules and, according to Leoseng & Zimmerman (2005), they still impact the 
supervisors of the regulatory enforcement even when they do not have the authority to 
reformulate laws. One senior bureaucrat stated that, in essence, individuals in their 
position must consider that no singular figure has complete authority. Authority in 
making decisions tends to be distributed across different organisations. The following 
quote from a national environmental authority officer captures the willingness of 
politicians in the decision-making process: 
 
We have to consider that actually, none of the decision makers or policy 
makers has absolute authority in making decisions. Authority in making 
decisions tends to distribute across different organisations. If we wait until 
politicians and decision makers get ready for the incorporation of 
proposed changes from the EIA process, I think they will never get ready. 
So, we have tried to persuade them in parallel with gaining the public 
voice to force them based on evidence and regulatory processes. This 
strategy tends to fit with the Thai context. After they agree to take this 
concern into account, we would explain to them to build more 
understanding about EIA implementation.  
 
It is also pertinent to note that, as proposed by Boyle (1998), the permeating patron-
client interrelations that have been established from the political to the corporate 
world have reinforced the drive towards economic advancement. This has contributed 
to the difficulty with which EIA proponents, internal and external to the government, 





Additionally, the NEQA appears not to offer either legal sanctions or punitive 
measures for project advocates who fail to carry out EIA procedures; the sole 
drawback is that operational authorisation could be retracted, but this is relatively 
appropriate. It is notable that the enforcement of EIA is linked to alternative but 
linked environmental legislation. Despite this, not adhering to the EIA specifications 
has yet to be subjected to a legal review; for instance, punitive measures have not 
been initiated for organisations that fail to carry out the after-project phases or the 
monitoring and auditing requirements. Furthermore, no entity has the capacity to 
hinder non-adherence by employing an injunction. Practically speaking, the Prime 
Minister, the Cabinet, and the NEB could provide such an injunction but, from a legal 
perspective, although this would be considered as political rather than judicial 
operation (UN, 1991). A key concluding remark is that, in terms of carrying out EIA 
in the context of Thailand, numerous issues stem from the absence of political will to 
establish EIA as an integral component of the decision-making and planning process.   
 
The implementation of EIA has been significantly impacted by Thailand’s recent 
political discord, which has spread across all Thai societies as well as the country’s 
politicians themselves. This results in little focus on environmental policy, since the 
government is occupied with creating greater political stability. Additionally, as 
Glassman (2010) points out, many government officers choose to take a passive role 
in decision-making due to the lack of political stability and clarity in policy guidance.  
 
8.6 Political instability  
 
Due to its authoritarian governance structure and the complicity of large businesses, 




ensuring successful environmental governance in the context of Thailand. Given its 
history of political instability as well as the paternalistic authoritarianism (Connors, 
2007; Chaloem-tiarana, 2007) that permeates its political system, environmental 
movements have often found it difficult to lean on legislative structures to reinforce 
their efforts thereby achieving true participatory environmental governance 
(Streckfuss, 2011). Political instability continues to adversely affect the effective 
implementation of environmental policies, and further, unstable political climates 
generally undermine investor and consumer confidence (Bank of Thailand, 2009). 
 
Thailand’s unstable political situation hampers the policymaking process as officers 
inherently adopt a neutral posture in order to protect their careers and finances 
(Glassman, 2010). As an Environmental authority senior bureaucrat notes: 
 
There is not much confidence that the laws can be effectively implemented 
because of the politics that underpins the implementation stage. A 
particular government may pass a law but it will not necessarily be 
implemented by the subsequent government. In some cases, laws are 
implemented so hastily that there are loopholes. 
 
 
With the political climate still unstable, it is unlikely that planning regulations and 
EIA laws on their own can increase consumer confidence and this can engender 
negative impacts for both developers and the new housing market. The research 
shows that property prices in Thailand have risen only steadily in the past several 
years partly due to the uncertainties associated with the prevailing political 
uncertainty. Notably between 2008 and 2016, house prices rose only by 29.1 percent 






Confidence in the market was detrimentally impacted by the political 
instability surrounding the coup against the existing government; this 
subsequently caused the value of property to fall.   
 
 
It is for this reason that a Thai Housing Association representative opines that “due to 
the political uncertainties, the Thai housing market is not attractive to buyers 
especially in the case of foreign buyers.” 
 
Thailand’s political instability further impinges on the country’s governance—while 
on paper, Thailand has experimented and subsequently adopted democratic systems of 
governance, this has been largely unsuccessful. The transition to democracy, it is 
argued, has mainly been a proxy for consolidating power and preserving group 
interests. According to a lobbyist, “several elected members of parliament often are 
not concerned about representing the people but rather interest groups.” 
 
Almost 85 years following its first election, Thailand continues to grapple 
with democracy. said Scholar B  
 
 
8.7 Institutional and Organisational Problems  
 
According to Glasson et al. (1999, p.352) many developing countries experience 
difficulties in implementing EIA due to weak institutional structures. These 
institutions often lack the capacity unlike in developed countries (Biswas, 1992) as 
well as the political clout to effectively spearhead the implementation process.  At the 
ministry level, Environment ministries are often relegated by the more influential 
ministries. It is these dynamics that partly explain the top-down character of EIA 





Both public and private spheres are implicated in the enactment of environmental 
strategies with cross-institutional projects, as noted by Pressman & Wildavsky (1973). 
As such, recent studies have considered how such institutions can work conjointly in 
order to enact environmental strategies in the developing world, including those by 
Brinkerhoff (1996) and Lemos (1998). The following discussion critically examines 
the flaws of enacting EIA strategies in Thailand, particularly when multiple 
companies are involved.  
 
Studies by the ERI (1991), TDRI (1996), Ludwig (1997), and Rattanatanya (1997) 
have outlined the major issues regarding companies involved in Thai EIA projects. 
These largely consist of issues with the insufficient application of current ecological 
regulations, inadequate governance systems and the lack of capacity of policy-makers 
who do not assist regional groups in the execution of environmental strategies. 
Furthermore, the principal governing groups do not interact consistently in order to 
ensure the successful achievement of organisational goals. These shortcomings are 
related to the fact that the executive companies lack the staff, materials and other 
resources to undertake their roles adequately, and that overall administrative function 
is diminished as not enough is done to invite other areas of society to take part. 
 
The organisation, preparation and execution of environmental strategies are 
undertaken by a variety of governmental sectors in Thailand, as governance is 
typically administered from the centre. This means that most policies are determined 
from the highest level of government, and may result in problems when several 
departments perform similar roles, or retrench into possessive attitudes, as the 




EIA factors is largely complicated by these inter-departmental relationships. In order 
to analyse the issues further, the next section is divided into three parts: issues that 
exist between institutions; issues that exist within institutions, and the issues between 
organisations and communities. 
 
8.7.1  Issues that Exist between Institutions  
 
The relationship between central and local governments is characterised by a patron-
client slant. Despite the shift towards decentralisation, it is only implemented 
superficially (Guerra & Guerra, 2004). A local authority senior bureaucrat opines that 
“the central government essentially controls local governments and dominates their 
activities. Local governments thus have very little power in the areas of borrowing 
and spending particularly.” These dynamics may be explained by the fact that 
Thailand has historically had a prolonged monarchy system, up until the early 1930’s 
which marked a shift towards a constitutional monarchy. Due to this history, the 
central government maintains its dominance and further, because Thailand has never 
been colonised by any Western countries, its administrative and power structure has 
largely remained consistent throughout its modern history which means that western 
ideals concerning strong local self-governments do not feature as part of its political 
orientation (Guerra & Guerra, 2004). Although a decentralization policy has been in 
place for several years, to enable local government officials to take financial and 
organisational decisions, in practice, the situation is different. According to a local 
authority senior bureaucrat, “the government in Thailand exerts too much centralised 
power, leaving local authorities with little freedom to make their own decisions.” 
The 1997 amendment to the constitution decentralised certain powers, to enable some 




governance. Agenda 21 deals with sustainable development in Thailand, 
encompassing land-use decisions in the context of protecting settlements from 
catastrophic events both caused by nature and human activity. Although Thailand’s 
Town Planning Act (1992) stipulates that all planning decisions should come under 
the auspices of the central Department of Town Planning (DPT), which resides within 
the Ministry of Interior, such authority was transferred to the provinces under the 
constitutional changes of 1997 (Guerra & Guerra, 2004). Planning authority senior 
bureaucrat further adds: 
 
Since then some power has rested with provincial governments, although 
the provincial governors of these local authorities are put in place by, and 
are answerable to, the Ministry of the Interior which is how power has 
actually remained very centralised. Even city governments, who are 
democratically elected, have a scope of power that is limited by the higher 
authority of the provincial government. 
 
 
There is much ambiguity over who is in charge of making decisions, and the 
relationship between ministries and their internal departments tends to be 
complicated. In many cases, ministries choose to operate independently as much as 
possible, which is not in line with EIA requirements. Dougherty & Hall (1995) point 
out that organisations often fail to collaborate even in the existence of official systems 
for doing so. Therefore, it is important to examine the need for unofficial relationships 
and associations to be developed. The principal problems occurring between different 
organisations stems from an absence of collaboration between the varied groups 
involved in implementation, an absence of successful relations between establishment 
figures and external groups, widely spread accountability, and the contradictory goals 






The government of Thailand appears to be mostly concerned with speedy economic 
progress f. According to Jan (1995) and Klarer & Francis (1997), state agencies that 
prioritise economic development have a great deal of political control and 
prominence, often gaining greater resources than agencies focusing less on economic 
progress. Typically, this has meant that environmental agencies have received fewer 
resources as they are deemed to be less politically significant, or may involve 
negative political actions like the commandeering of property or capping urban 
expansion, according to Gamman (1995). According to a NESDB Senior Officer, “the 
system of the Thai government is highly centralised whereby many decisions are 
finalised from above tiers.”  
 
Thai policies extend across a multitude of ministries, agents and government sectors. 
Such a position whereby parties are compartmentalised has prevented the integration 
of development and environmental management and contributed to a poor 
performance on the part of implementing agencies. Boyle (1998) has suggested that 
these governmental difficulties are related to cultural factors, including the stratified 
nature of Thai society, wherein the majority of control and respect lies with the upper 
groups, and only trickles down through the other groups from this upper tier. 
Furthermore, Boyle (1998) implies that codified patron–client relationships and the 
willingness to circumvent clashes mean that governmental workers will work to 
maintain the status quo, backing up their managers and supervisors. This has meant 
that relations between companies are often only undertaken through the managerial 




and collaborative working between institutions, or on occasion in the same institution 
during environmental or EIA projects are difficult. 
 
Furthermore, according to Zhang (2007), the powers granted to environmental 
agencies, particularly regarding the EIA, may be supplanted by other more influential 
departments, as it holds less clout than these alternative governance groups. MONRE 
has attempted to prove its power as an internal governance agency in contrast to other 
groups that tend towards the manipulation of environmental sources. Accordingly, the 
EIA faces great challenges when attempting to blend environmental goals into the 
organisational stage and execution of particular projects, even when they reveal the 
negative consequences of ignoring environmental factors, or criticising extant 
projects. 
 
Cooperation and Coordination among government agencies 
 
Thai laws grant significant authority to the line ministry, which assigns and manages 
officers from Bangkok to the country’s various provinces. The line ministry’s power 
over the country’s provincial government is a result of the country’s centralised 
budgeting system and administration, as Kaosa-ard & Pednekar (1996) explain. Given 
this, effective EIA implementation is thwarted by a lack of local government authority 
and the lack of collaboration between ministries. A study by Marsh (1998) found that 
if those enacting the policies are not involved in the decisions leading to those 
policies, problems can arise when attempting to execute such ideas. This can occur as 
the policy execution and design is not undertaken by the same team, but by separate 
groups as scholar B notes: “governmental organisations do not harmonise over 




introduced by separate departments, and results in unsuccessful or poor enactment of 
EIA” 
 
A receptive, multi-departmental EIA with its rules enshrined in legislation has been 
proposed as a way to get around such problems, but in actual fact the situation in 
Thailand is characterised more by ineffective or inconsistent governmental 
determination to meet such goals, less deliberation of the effects on specific societal 
groups, and tolerance of powerful groups, which affects EIA enactment as a whole. 
Planning authority street-level bureaucrat B is of the view that “organisational 
structures are typically based on functional lines in a way that work crosses functional 
boundaries leading to delays.”  
 
Planning and enactment of town or city expansions requires the agreement of various 
groups, including local, regional and national organisations. As so many groups are 
involved, many of whom may have corresponding actions to perform, a lack of 
organisation or management may exacerbate general issues, and prevent the 
production of a wider-ranging system of environmental policy that incorporates 
housing. According to Brandon & Ramankutty (1993), separate companies are 
typically left to enact their own work with a lack of appropriate cooperation. 
Furthermore, Allison & Halperin (1972) declare that administrative struggles can 
negatively affect the enactment of other societal changes, as separate groups may 
contrast in their overall aims or ideas about how to solve the problem. 
 
Various governmental bodies and divisions are usually given different tasks within 
the wider operation of government. Consequently, only if a legislation or policy that 




construction schemes, do they become involved in assessing and regulating the state’s 
strategies, agendas and schemes. It is common that various issues such as the 
character, plan and application of environmental bodies’ involvement may cause 
tension within government bodies, regardless of any consensus surrounding the 
greater cause for which it relates to, for example ensuring sustainable development 
(Oliveira & Puppim, 2002). Consequently, there is largely only hypothetical 
agreement concerning the harmonious alignment of environmental sustainability and 
developmental aims.  According to EIA consultant A: 
 
Management of EIA throughout Thailand is poorly synchronised, as 
ONEP takes control of the counselling stage, setting up EIA and 
overseeing accounts of EIA, thereby restricting the ability of separate 
groups to react or remark upon EIA. 
 
Wang et al. (2003), Tan (2004), and Li (2008) have thus identified that there is an 
absence of unity between EIA policies and aims as outlined by the central 
government, and the everyday actions undertaken by the EIA on the ground. In 
Thailand, the inability of EIA to be implemented in general urban planning and 
expansion procedures, particularly with departments outside the ONEP, is of great 
concern, and is a key setback, particularly as urban expansion requires the actions and 
input of various departmental groups. EIA consultant A further notes: 
 
If EIA is related to developments, the overall outcome is subject to both the 
permission of housing agencies, and the EIA, each of which are 
undertaken without relation to each other. As such, a number of policy 






Government organisations differ in their interests when it comes to the environment 
and to development. Because different departments are assigned to different issues, 
these government departments only collaborate when it is mandatory for them to do 
so. According to a Thai Condominium Association representative: 
 
The ONEP of MONRE takes charge of the EIA, but alternative 
departments and organisations such as MOI or BMI take charge of the 
building standards or urban planning behaviours to offer permissions. 
These authorising groups are only responsible for the latter elements, but 
have no input or control over EIA aspects, which are supplied in 




These areas have not yet been condensed into a single process, and given the 
independent nature of EIA control, particularly with its enactment, it does not form an 
important part of the acceptance procedure. The Thai Condominium Association 
representative further adds: 
 
The interests of the MOI and BMA and those of the EIA (via the ONEP) 
are in conflict. Consequently, developers have been trying to find a 
resolution. Developers also complain about the lack of central agency 
responsible for aligning the interests of different departments and feel that 
there is a need to incentivise resolution on these issues. 
 
 
In summary, the increased emphasis on environmental concerns has influenced the 
implementation of policy on all levels but the state government lacks a cohesive 
approach and there are often procedural inconsistencies as a result. In particular, the 
state government tends to devise detailed plans on urban regeneration as a whole, but 




implementation or land-zoning (Rattanatanya, 1997). The traditional form of Thai 
government consists of a hierarchical structure wherein duties are split between 
various groups in the middle to upper tiers of governance, leaving little control or 
accountability with the tiers at the bottom of the framework. Additionally, while 
successive governments have claimed a desire to enact environmental laws, this has 
been more difficult in practice, due to the input of various groups. While MONRE is 
in control of preserving natural materials, the MOI and BMA also have overlapping 
accountability in supervising the environment. NEQA 1992 also allows the NEB to 
outline ecological powers if it discerns a lack of success in the implementation of 
environmental laws. Control of the 70-plus acts of legislation introduced from the 
1920s onwards lies with a number of different governance organisations, and has led 
to increased friction between departments due to a lack of final accountability, 
according to Harashima (2000). 
 
Within Thailand, official problems exist as national and local governments do not 
adequately direct the ecological policy, nor is there adequate communication between 
separate agencies within these hierarchies. As such, practical methods to enact 
environmental policies, like the EIA, are affected as much by bureaucracy as by 
misadministration. Furthermore, the entrenched departmental approach of a large 
number of these governmental policies ignores the interrelations that occur between 
areas such as construction standards, local rights, the use of environmental materials, 
or property functions. 
 
Often, there are problems wherein departments only take responsibility for the 
particular actions or legislations officially granted to them, or conversely where 




territorialism or conflict. When a lack of unity in management occurs, or where 
legislation contains several inconsistencies when they are enacted by separate 
departments or even groups from different sectors, one may end up with ineffectual or 
even poor outcomes. These problems, specifically the entrenched, departmental 
behaviours, have prevented the adequate application of EIA objectives in Thailand. 
 
Although it is evident that a wider ranging EIA policy applied across the board and 
incorporating the cooperation of separate groups would be beneficial, Thailand is still 
facing issues with EIA implementation due to the hesitation of governmental groups 
to implement this, neglect of the effects of the societies implicated by policies, and 
over-tolerance of powerful interest groups. Indeed, agencies can be in conflict about 
all kinds of issues even when they agree on the bigger picture. This is common in 
sustainable development projects, for instance, where the different agencies have 
different opinions on factors such as who is responsible for implementation and how 
the projects should be designed. Therefore, at present, the alignment of environmental 
and development interests appears to be something of a pipe dream.  
 
The local government has limited authority over the design aspect of the process for 
the following reasons: 
• Design plans must be sanctioned by the state government as there is a lengthy 
administrative process involved in the approval of any local construction 
project. 
• Local state bodies lack both the resources and specialist knowledge needed to 





Thus, the convoluted nature of the planning process in Thailand proves detrimental to 
effective implementation as conflict occurs between each hierarchical level involved 
in the process. The local government is solely responsible for the realisation of plans 
yet has no input in the initial design phase of the project (Cu, 1991; Kaewasun, 1993; 
Lohani et al., 1997) . 
 
8.7.2  Issues that Exist Within Institutions  
 
Environmental agencies with the mandate to implement EIA programs are relatively 
powerless and have very limited decision-making abilities. Thus, such organisations 
do not have much authority to ensure that EIA is implemented effectively.  
 
Organisational issues can take the form of a lack of or misunderstanding of practical 
data, or a hierarchical structure that does not take account of lower-tier ideas. 
Additionally, groups executing EIA may suffer from a lack of staff, resources, or the 
additional materials typically required in order to perform their environmental duties 
successfully (Brandon & Ramankutty, 1993). Awareness and comprehension of the 
methods of EIA enactment between the implicated agencies is variable, which is 
significant as those involved in enacting EIA may greatly affect how EIA is applied 
during the design and managerial stages. Issues typically exist in how the legislative 
elements linked to EIA are applied, as well as the shortage of capable and informed 
staff within the field of EIA in Thailand, largely restricting how applicable and 
successful the process can be. 
 
The shortfall of staff with effective skills in both practical and scientific areas is 




of the environment implied by EIA processes. According to the UN (1991) there are 
not many skilled practitioners who have the necessary abilities, especially in the 
developing world. A significant proportion of Thailand’s talent has moved to the 
private sector in pursuit of higher salaries due to the country’s economic 
development. Some of the most negatively-impacted ministries are those that depend 
on technical talent, such as scientists and engineers. As Kaosa-ard & Pednekar (1996) 
point out, the public sector must invest more in human resource development if 
successful environmental management is to be achieved. This is due to the significant 
limitations that the above shift has caused in the arena of environmental management 
in the public sector. This is prevalent in Thailand, where the EIA workforce does not 
have many practitioners capable or knowledgeable enough about the wide range of 
environmental, developmental or housing problems they will encounter. This means 
that the necessary tasks cannot be completed, and leads to a lack of success when 
implementing EIA. Issues are present with each group involved in the process: from 
national, regional, and local governments to the EIA practitioners. A local authority 
senior bureaucrat explains that:  
 
The role of the BMA is currently limited to only issuing construction 
licenses to developers in possession of EIA approval. The BMA also 
focuses on monitoring compliance as per the directives of ONEP. 
 
The major EIA group within Thailand is ONEP, which controls the managerial 
aspects of procedures, outlining the steps of EIA and how it should be enacted in 
practice. As EIA was brought in to Thailand from abroad, there are issues with the 
recruitment of appropriate staff, not only for the advisory organisation but also for 




problems throughout the EIA procedure. Most typically, this takes the form of 
inadequate EIA applications, which consequently result in setbacks later in the 
assessment and sanctioning stages (UN, 1991; TDRI, 1996; Ludwig, 1997). 
Furthermore, staffing problems do not only affect the central government groups, but 
also the smaller groups taking control of the observational EIA functions and those 
enacting the legislation. This is arguably more acute, as these departments have 
relatively little power within the hierarchy, lacking the appropriate functions, 
workforce, resources and tools. As such, it appears that none of the supervisory 
groups as well as the non-public groups are prepared to take on these directives 
appropriately. In addition to these inter-organisational complications, there are also 
internal problems with clashing aims and responsibilities, both nationally and locally. 
As noted by local authority street-level bureaucrat E: 
 
EIA and even urban planning is generally limited because of the lack of 
collaboration between departments in BMA. Due to this lack of 




8.7.3  Issues that Exist Between Institutions and Civil Society 
 
Issues arising in the relationship of institutions and civil society can take the form of 
the inadequate involvement of locals in planning stages and overlapping jurisdiction 
over the enactment or alteration of processes by singular agents. This can result in the 
public losing faith in governmental agents regarding their ability or obligations 
towards extension tasks. Additionally, both national and small-scale governmental 





In Thailand, details of ongoing developments or their proposed effect on the 
environment is hard to access, as EIA does not provide their consultation details 
openly, and often may only be released through secretive channels (Boyle, 1998). 
Furthermore, governmental access to and distribution of relevant data is affected by 
the inefficient structure of EIA frameworks, and by pre-existing government 
hierarchies. Such restrictions on the access to and sharing of relevant material has a 
major effect on how well EIA (and other multi-agency projects) can perform. Those 
directly implicated in projects in society are unable to consult the material produced 
by multiple agencies undertaking EIA behaviours (Boyle, 1998), meaning they are 
also unable to provide informed commentary during design stages. As such, EIA 
agents have little access to the valuable information locals may have regarding 
regional circumstances, or to get involved with related activities instigated locally. In 
such circumstances, the agents and the local community are subject to gossip, 
misinformation, mistrust, or even direct complaints and conflict, which can impact 
negatively on the whole process. Within smaller hierarchical groups, the absence of 
access to data, lack of collaboration or disorganisation can result in restrictions to the 
government’s understanding of how developments may affect the local environment, 
or how to mitigate this (Suwanteep et al., 2016).   
 
As Thai governance is typically hierarchical, authoritative and patriarchal, one should 
not be astonished that access to materials is so constrained. This methodology allows 
the governmental or supplementary sectors and their financial backers to keep those 
who might be negatively affected by developments in the dark. As Boyle (1998) has 
stated, this is particularly pertinent when governments are able to or wish to disrupt 




comprehensible material is of utmost importance. EIA has often been criticised for 
releasing difficult to read or exhaustive articles that are ineffective at explaining 
matters to members of the wider society. This is therefore a relevant issue that should 
be addressed by the EIA, as it will prove not only helpful in building wider societal 
relationships, but will also allow for smoother internal procedures, as often, those 
involved in planning may not be skilled in this particular area either (Alton & 
Underwood, 2003; Garb et al., 2007). 
 
The degree to which considerable policy transformation has been engaged in as a 
result of incorporating EIA mechanisms, as opposed to mere theoretical adoption, has 
been considered as resting on the extent of a state’s democratic nature. The presence 
of processes for conflict resolution, the power of lobbying interests, the degree of 
democratic freedom and accountability structures are all relevant issues politically. 
O’Riordan & Sewell (1981) have determined that for citizens in states where there is 
much less potential to oppose outcomes, considerable reduction in information 
availability and closed procedures for decision taking, EIA’s effectiveness will be 
diminished.  
 
In summary, the major issue isolated in the reports on EIA within Thailand by ERI 
(1991), TDRI (1996), Ludwig (1987), and Rattanatanya (1997) is the ineffectual 
enforcement of EIA procedures. Such studies have revealed that the EIA does not 
work well at an internal, institutional level, nor does it run all the time, or provide 
assistance to smaller governance groups in order to develop and enact environmental 
policies. Additionally, communication between different governmental or external 
bodies is insufficient, meaning these groups do not work effectively together. 




resources, or appropriate materials to undertake the environmental policy enforcement 
in a successful manner. Finally, all levels of government appear unsuccessful in 
attempting to involve wider society in their projects. These are the major issues that 
provide a barrier to EIAs successful enactment in Thailand. 
 
Due to internal structures and organisations, it has been hard for Thai culture to enact 
the core ideas of EIA policy and planning. According to Sanidvongse (1993), the 
Environmental Protection Plan aimed at reducing overall pollution was only brought 
in because environmentalism was seen as a relatively new problem. As Panich (1989) 
has suggested, further issues hindering successful enactment is the lack of skilled 
technicians and employees with the requisite environmental understanding. This 
absence of skilled workers is particularly an issue in the developing world, as such 
individuals with the required talent are rare. Additionally, as identified by 
Rattanatanya (1997), key organisational approaches, like the managerial negotiations 
which allow for collaborative plans to be drawn up and enacted by several different 
organisations, also remain rare. 
 
The major groups involved in environmentalism have the necessary designs, but lack 
the capability to enact their plans. In some instances, the organisations have not 
gained the assistance of groups who would be able to enforce their legislation. A 
similar situation is present with urban development; governmental planning groups 
have access to the relevant laws, yet are unable to enact their designs aimed at 
minimising the untampered growth of urban areas, or mixed-land use (TDRI, 1996). 
 
Closely related to the issue of private, public and municipal stakeholders working 




in Thailand. The idea of community engagement has been accepted for a long time, 
but has been very seldom implemented in practice. There is such a lack of clarity as to 
what the government is expected to do, and what the individual is entitled to be 
involved in, that a state of stalemate has been reached, with one sector feeling that the 
other should be responsible for various things. Certain aspects of legislation in 
Thailand also contribute to this situation (Friend et al., 2016). As has already been 
mentioned, in Chapter 6, citizens often see this as being a sign of the Thai government 
shirking its responsibilities to them.  
 
8.8 Corruption and Mismanagement 
 
Corruption is conceptualised as a serious governance problem. As a NESDB senior 
officer opines “the undermining of democracy due to the lack of clean elections and 
politics in general, is one of Thailand’s biggest problems.”  
 
The poor management of the EIA process is one of the main reasons for the lack of 
success it has achieved in Thailand, as is the prevalence of corruption. In many cases, 
EIA practice is perceived as unethical, and only the threat of legal action seems to 
bring this into any significant focus (Shepherd, 2012). Furthermore, Shepherd (2012) 
and a lobbyist both show that consultation with local communities is rare: 
 
Many developers are holding discussions in private. Influential business 
sectors in Thailand typically forge strong ties with politicians as they aim 
to utilise bureaucratic powers for their benefits. (Lobbyist, 2014) 
 
 
Langkarpint (2000) also provides evidence of corruption by officials and agents, 




consideration of the impacts on the environment or any public goods. This renders 
law enforcement and regulation almost impossible (Delgado et al., 2003; Leoseng & 
Zimmermann, 2005). 
 
Corruption has caused Thailand to come under doubt regarding the nation’s ability to 
achieve success and development (NESDP, 2012), also causing ineffective 
administration mechanisms and delays in processes. Furthermore, Thai society has 
become divided over conflict regarding collective benefits. The NESDP (2012) 
explains that, especially when it comes to policy, Thai corruption is extremely 
complex. The reason for this complexity is the lack of transparency and openness of 
the MNRE and Housing and Urban Development (MOI and BMA). Corruption and a 
lack of adherence to EIA regulations has arisen as a direct consequence of the 
Ministry’s unethical exertion of authority (Yusuf, 2008). A high number of EIAs have 
been utilised as a mechanism for ignoring environmental issues whilst assuring the 
public and government agencies that everything is on track (King, 2009). 
Governments from the developing world often over-focus on immediate economic 
and political benefits along with profits, overlooking the need to protect 
environmental resources (Winbourne, 2002). However, as Kakonge (2013) points out, 
this puts the nation in a position where future environmental damage could be 
incurred and corruption can be perpetuated, worsening the mismanagement of the 
EIA process as this lobbyist appears to suggest, “many developers overlook 
environmental and public interests in favour of gaining bureaucratic authority by 
building relationships with key politicians.”  
 
Researchers such as Leoseng & Zimmermann (2005), Delgado et al. (2003), and 









This chapter has provided an evaluation of the ways in which Thailand’s contextual 
factors influence its implementation of EIA. The Thai EIA programmes typically are 
held back by a lack of effective legislation and managerial tools needed to do the job 
correctly. Uncertainties and insufficient enactment of the existing legislation, the 
overlapping of functions between separate agencies, and the dearth of qualified 
researchers and staff all characterise the EIA groups. Each of these contribute 
negatively to EIA’s success as a nationwide project, as well as diminish the ability of 
the government to solve issues regarding the destruction of environmental resources 
in the country. 
 
Political and socio-economic characteristics within the country’s hierarchical 
governmental system, as well as the desire to grow the economy mean that major 
influence falls within the remit of particular groups. Environmental groups aiming to 
develop the effective supervision of natural materials are far less likely to receive high 
levels of resources. It is therefore very difficult for those affected by environmental 









This section summarises the findings of this thesis in the context of the research 
questions that underpin the study. It further underscores the remaining dimensions of 
the research subject that can be addressed by future researchers. The theoretical and 
policy implications of this study are additionally discussed.  
 
Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) with fast-growing economies, such as 
Thailand, need to deal with the conflict that exists between concurrently promoting 
environmental sustainability and economic progress due to public policy strains. How 
can such economies grow effectively while mitigating their negative impacts on the 
environment? Although central to national economic growth is the development of 
housing to achieve urban transformations, this process can negatively affect the 
environment. As a result of the growth of the urban population, there has been a 
simultaneous increase in the call for more housing, thus adding to environmental 
stresses. In order to deal with this issue, in 1981 the Thai government introduced EIA 
which aims to predict and prevent environmental problems arising from major 
development projects in order to achieve the sustainable development objectives. In 
this research, the EIA was referred to as the assessment of certain repercussions, both 
positive and negative, with regard to the environment, from various housing 
development projects and activities.  
 
This research theoretically and empirically explored how the Environmental Impact 




research examined the relationship between environmental policy, economic progress, 
and new housing development in terms of how major agents for change in the city 
prioritise economic and environmental considerations in new housing development 
through EIA regulation. In particular, the purpose of this study is to investigate the 
decision-making process with regards to EIA policy-making and its implementation, 
as well as decision-making in relation to private housing development. The study 
investigated how agencies of the government and house building companies (and their 
representatives) interact and impose on one another; either to tighten or to loosen 
environmental considerations in house building. 
 
This research examined the relationship between the state and the business sectors as 
perceived with regard to the impact of these as contentious or opposing interests 
concerning new housing developments. Furthermore, the research analysed the extent 
to which public policy, in particular the EIA, holds repercussions for new housing 
developments in the Thai capital, Bangkok, whilst looking at the issue with a 
corporatist approach and basing the investigation on the basis of the state-capital 
relationship. A qualitative interview approach was used as the main means of 
collecting data for this research, and both small and big development firms, EIA 
consultants, political figures, street-level bureaucratic individuals and associations 
related to housing development, as well as academics and NGOS, were interviewed. 
 
The study found that the potential for friction between state agencies and developers 
has intensified, owing to increasingly strict regulations. Of course, it can be argued 
that tension over EIA processes diverges from other strains in state-capital 
relationships. Thus, insight can be gained from theoretical perspectives of the state in 




O’Leary, 1987). Taking insights from this literature, this thesis identified how the 
state impacts private housing development by regulating and directing new house 
building. It further question the extent to which  state actions are influenced by private 
sector efforts to ‘control’ the state’s influence. Thus, this research focused on the 
interplay between the interests of the state and private sector providers, viewed in 
terms of how these competing interests impact on the introduction of enhancements to 
environmental demands in new housing development. It therefore sought to 
understand both theoretically and empirically, the impact of EIA on developers’ 
decision-making in new housing development, including the impacts on factors such 
as timing, costs, land-use constraints, amongst others, faced by developers. The study 
conceptualised new housing development as the outcome of interactions between a set 
of institutions and actors organised around processes for the promotion, production, 
marketing, and consumption of housing. These processes are socially created and 
dependent on cultural, economic and political contexts. 
 
9.2 Summary of Research Findings  
 
This study finds that although environmental concerns are rarely mentioned or 
featured in the decision-making processes of the private and public sectors, economic 
growth has nevertheless been a primary concern of national developmental objectives. 
All developers aim to maximise profits by minimising the turnover speed to capital. 
Thus, they seek to avoid the risk and uncertainty that occurs in EIA processes 
regardless of environmental concerns. EIA is not only a major hindrance to the 
housing industry and the country’s economy, but it also presents limited efficacy in 
addressing environmental impacts caused by these developments. While EIA 




projects in order to reach sustainable development goals, the failure of its 
implementation has led not only to an inability to protect the environment and attain 
sustainable development goals, but also to promote the growth of the housing industry 
and the country’s economy.  
 
9.2.1  Summary of EIA Practice and Evaluation  
 
While the concerns of a number of parties involved in the EIA process including 
developers, consultants, state agencies, and local communities generally coincide, 
some differences also exist between them. By virtue of the fact that developers 
possess large resources, they usually hold positions of greater power. Nevertheless, 
they too are compelled to consult with government bodies in order to obtain 
permission, as well as to reduce the likelihood of acquiring fines and being 
investigated. EIA consultants have a somewhat conflicting dual role in seeking to 
appease the developers who recruit them, while simultaneously contributing directly 
to a system which guarantees their long-term employability. Motivation and impetus 
on the part of government can vary greatly, and tends to be influenced by the level of 
concern exhibited by individual ministers, their locus of control and the specific 
participants engaged in the process. Ironically, it is those with the most capacity to 
affect change in terms of policy development and enforcement that have the greatest 
vested interest in retaining the current status quo. This is because they personally have 
contributed to devising the existing policies and procedures now being implemented. 
Various parties, including government, academics and the general public, who are 
more removed from EIA activities, are more disposed towards a transformation of the 
existing system, but they have less ability to shape policy development and its 




The issues related to EIA mostly emanate from the fact that the key concerns of all 
groups taking part in the decision process of a project are not the same; high-ranking 
bureaucrats in the central government will give more attention to the promotion and 
progress of environmental consciousness across a number of problem areas, for 
example. Their goal is to inform the public about protecting their environment. On the 
other hand, local citizens and authorities concentrate more on local pollution 
problems and mitigation. Due to these differing aims, not everyone can be satisfied 
concurrently, leading to conflict. Thus, environmental issues remain unsolved due to 
clashing interest group objectives and multiple jurisdictional issues.  
 
Large-scale housing development projects that have compromised the safety and 
well-being of local communities and environments have led to considerable disputes 
between communities and those in the private sector and government agencies. These 
disputes often stem from policy issues, ineffective environmental management 
regulations, inadequate systems for monitoring and assessing environmental impacts 
and a lack of consistency in how legislation is enforced. Thus, the public often calls 
into question, the capacity of the government to effectively oversee industrial 
development and to adequately remediate environmental issues.  
 
EIA processes have been implemented in Thailand for the past ten years and the 
reliability and accuracy of EIA mechanisms has been enhanced by the prioritisation of 
scientific methods and forecasting techniques. Nonetheless, the attitude of 
stakeholders towards the system has failed to improve, particularly the attitudes of 
key decision makers. As such, the EIA system is most often perceived as another 





Practically speaking, it is difficult for EIA consultants or ONEP employees to ensure 
that the EIS system has been implemented properly until a formal approval 
submission has been made. The submitted EIS is then carefully examined to 
determine whether or not it has been adequately completed and whether or not it can 
be approved. The ERC has rejected EISs on the grounds that they were inadequately 
performed. In one particular case, ONEP identified the obvious shortcomings of a 
housing project and the EIS was subsequently denied approval. Once the contents 
were revised and resubmitted, the application was tentatively approved pending 
further assessment by ONEP. These issues can generate disputes between ONEP 
employees and other interest groups. For instance, in one case, ONEP oversaw the 
completion of the EIS which was subsequently denied approval by the ERC. These 
issues can also lead to significant delays and uncertainty in the EIA approval process.  
 
Following the successful receipt of EIA approval, developers often experience the 
‘After EIA Effect’, which often involves disputes with local residents who oppose the 
development project. If local residents oppose a development project, contentious 
disputes will arise and the project may be abandoned entirely. Thus, public 
consultation represents an integral part of the EIA process and the opinions of local 
community members and other interest groups should be sought through public 
meetings or surveys in order for prevailing concerns to be adequately addressed in the 
assessment. As mentioned in chapter 5, this aspect of the process is fundamental as 
strong public dissent can lead to significant delays, negative media attention and 
perhaps even project termination. As scholar D, who was interviewed as part of this 
study notes, “regardless of whether ONEP participates or not, such conflicts will 




buildings. Specifically, increases in the cost of land, as well as in the cost of oil, will 
create a greater demand for condominium blocks.” 
 
9.2.2  EIA Evaluation: Strengths and Shortcomings 
 
This study found that the environmental policies of Thailand have relied on 
developmental assistance from international agencies such as the World Bank and 
thus, EIA processes are also subject to the influence of such international agencies. 
Thailand generally uses EIA as a part of its project planning which imitates the 
mechanisms advocated by international agencies. As a result of their entrenchment in 
extant mechanisms and tools from developed nations, this process is not amenable to 
change in other cultural, socio-economic, political, and environmental settings (Boyle, 
1998; Kaosa-ard & Pednekar, 1995; Pimcharoen, 2001; Simpson, 2015; Suwanteep et 
al., 2016). This research finding converges with the finding of Langkarpint (2000), 
who argues that despite advances in the Thai legal system, there have been failures 
when it comes to modern environmental law.  
 
Boyle (1998) claims that the problems posed to Western industrialised countries in 
resolving environmental issues are significantly smaller than the issues faced by Thai 
authorities.  Despite having constrained political assets, the pressures for development 
and economic advancement are still as significant as in Western industrialised states. 
Furthermore, the political adoption and prospects for integration of environmental and 
sustainability demands is diminished, while demands for regulation from within 
society is generally less. Consequently, the political establishment does not give much 
weight to demands from an already frail environmental advocate community for 




particular factors that contribute to this situation, for example dictatorship, poverty, 
dominant economic and political concerns of a narrow section of society, poor access 
to data and knowledge, low literacy levels, as well as weak civil society structures.  
 
This study found that Thai EIA practice is experiencing issues that arise ostensibly 
from the effective implementation of EIA and the administrative resources needed for 
this implementation, the insufficiency of specialty knowledge and understanding 
within certain agencies concerned with the environment, replication of administrative 
studies and the effectiveness of the bureaucracy of the state and its role when finding 
solutions to natural resource problems in Thailand. More importantly, the ERC has no 
total authority over decision-making because it has been interfered by political bodies, 
particularly in government projects. The study showed instances where ERC members 
have been removed if their views differ from the government, or disagreed with the 
project aims and objectives; in such cases, government representatives have 
substituted them (ADB, 2010; AECEN, 2010; Brewster, 2014; Wells-Dang et al., 
2016) 
 
The research findings demonstrate that EIA programme elements are not present, or 
when they were, they are poorly implemented. The extent to which the facilitation of 
EIA is ineffective is a central concern for the Thai state, primarily owing to the 
absence of political commitment, unclear legislation, an inflexible governance 
structure, inefficient allocations of authority, a lack of intercommunication between 
the civic and private realms, insufficient monitoring and implementation, and 
mechanism impotency. This research uncovered four primary issues: legislative 





With respect to the legislative issue, this research shows that Thailand’s laws are 
vague, and as the regulations drafted by the EIA are poor they can be a challenge to 
understand and determine as well as to enact. The main challenge of EIA 
implementation stems from the absence of thorough guidelines for EIA as well as, to 
some degree, the assessment of EIA from the ERC. One of the disadvantages of the 
USA forming the basis for the EIA laws in Thailand is that the EIA guidelines are not 
available in specific form. The differences in the development trajectories of both 
countries, is not acknowledged in Thailand, thus the necessary limits and guides in the 
Thai context has not been provided and the capacity of ONEP is further weak. EIA 
consultants and developers utilise ambiguities to bias the information to their ends, 
and thus the choices made regarding EIA are founded on the sentiments of the ERC 
members, who comprise the main decision-making individuals for the EIA approval 
protocol. As a result, there has been unneeded expenditure on some significant issues, 
while certain crucial duties and demands remain poorly assessed and without the 
necessary funding to operate correctly. There has been a lengthier period with regard 
to the approval of certain projects from the unnecessarily lengthy time period taken to 
suggest alterations and additional research. As a result, there are generally a number 
of contentious debates among primary individuals within the administrative process 
of EIA both prior to, and after, the choice to reject or ratify has been taken. Such 
issues and challenges are generally impacted by inadequate regulations of the EIA, in 
addition to uncertain statements of policy regarding the sustainable development 
facilitated by various governmental bodies in the past. Economic progress, 





The study also finds that since there is a lack of political will to fully integrate EIA 
into the planning process, hence the difficulties in implementing EIA. The 
asymmetries in institutional power clearly reflect this (Tan, 2004; Bruch et al., 2007). 
Thai laws assign substantial powers to the executives by allowing the issuance of 
ministerial regulations, notifications and announcements, thus, the executives have 
the power to lay or reset the rules; if they cannot promulgate or modify legislation, 
they can still influence those overseeing the implementation of the regulations in a 
way that favours their interests as well as that of their supporters and constituents 
(Leoseng & Zimmermann, 2005). For example, in cases where certain policy 
decisions would adversely affect constituents, there have been convenient delays.  
 
The interference of policy-makers in the day-to-day operations of environmental 
management agencies has resulted in the lack of priorities at the policy-making level, 
lack of confidence and inefficiency, as well as low morale in street-level bureaucrats 
(Kaosa-ard & Pednekar, 1996). Moreover, this research converges with Boyle’s 
(1998) affirmation that the patron–client relationships among political and business 
leaders strengthen the power behind the economic development focus and make it 
more difficult for supporters of EIA. Notably, the findings of this study run counter to 
the study by Siedentopf & Hauschild (1988) which shows that the government might 
pay lip service to the need for environmental improvement, while barely pushing 
private companies to take any action. This study also found that the unstable political 
condition in Thailand also undermines the effective implementation of law, thus 
limiting the effective implementation of EIA.  
 
This study additionally revealed that the limitations concerning EIA implementation 




the main focus and thus environmentalism remains a secondary or tertiary issue. 
Limits in the organisational setting related to EIA systems in Thailand are due to the 
fact that EIA is not properly enforced. On the level of policy-making, the body 
operates poorly, and tries to help local governmental bodies and agencies in the 
enacting of environmental policies and plans. Indeed, among the relevant bodies, 
there remains an absence of inter-working, with agencies generally not helping one 
another. Sometimes, this is due to insufficient funds and staff shortages. Furthermore, 
both central and local government agencies lack initiative in encouraging public 
participation.  
 
The study revealed that internalised institutional issues limit the effective 
implementation of EIA. These pertain to the enacting of EIA practice’s legal 
demands, in addition to the insufficient numbers of practitioners who have the 
capacity and technical knowledge to correctly implement EIA practice in Thailand. 
The study further found inter-institutional challenges that obstruct the effective 
implementation of EIA, explicitly, overlapping mandates and jurisdictions were 
revealed to be a major limitation.  
 
Presently, housing developers are required to gain twenty-two separate approvals 
from twenty-two different units in order to secure permission for housing 
development projects. This results in an unneeded multifaceted system. In Thailand’s 
governmental structure, there is a top-down systemic decision-making process, 
whereby the authority of the government is separated into a number of different 
departmental and ministerial bodies within the central government’s strata, and thus 




of the fact that the government has tried to stress the significance of an environmental 
agenda, enacting such a policy in law, this research shows, can be challenging.  
 
An institutional issue in Thailand is the inability to order and manage several policies 
geared towards the upkeep of the environment, among both local governmental forces 
and the central government, in addition to the various sectarian concerns that exist in 
all strata. Therefore, the EIA process, and other tools utilised to make environmental 
plans and policies, generally becomes compromised due to political concerns in 
addition to mismanagement. This study showed that a related issue is that several 
legal mechanisms and stratagems devised by governments are wholly sectoral in their 
approach, as they do not take into account the existing connections such as those 
which exist among construction regulations, land use, rights of the local community, 
and the exploitation of local resources.  
 
Consequently, ministries charged with administering an array of mandates initiate the 
laws. This study argues that without the necessary level of coordination between one 
government agency and another, contradictions and contentions can often arise, and 
these can mean an increase in the sectoral laws supported and pushed by various 
governmental agencies, in order to exacerbate issues of insufficient or bad 
implementation. Generally, the ongoing stress on the sectoral method has been a 
problem for EIA implementation in the country. Such results converge with Allison & 
Halperin (1972) concerning the fact that a persuasive character exists in bureaucratic 
politics which is subsequently able to affect public policy. The study also showed that 
issues exist between institutions and communities because access to information 
concerning projects and the environmental repercussions of projects remain 




information or EIA reports on an official basis, and such information is generally 
leaked or released in an unofficial way. EIA administrative frameworks have served 
to obstruct the sharing of information within governmental bodies, as has the 
bureaucracy’s hierarchical structure, this study finds. It also finds that there is 
significant influence from developers given the poor alignment between the aims and 
objectives of the state. Developers have, therefore, subsequently attempted to mitigate 
and control conflicts as they perceive the system to be ineffective. They are of the 
view that only people within a state agency are able to mediate the requirements and 
demands of the organisations concerned. Thus, neither the private sector nor the 
regulatory authorities take environmental policy seriously when it comes to 
environmental management and sustainable practice. 
 
This study also revealed processing issues as underpinning the ineffective 
implementation of EIA, due to the fact that it is a centralised process and hence 
concomitant with delays. This challenge, the study found, is exacerbated by the lack 
of public involvement in the approval process. It is argued that a more participatory 
approach could help to determine regional and local perceptions of a given housing 
project for developers. In cases where  the local community rejects housing proposals, 
public protests have often ensued. Thus, in preparing the EIA, it is important that the 
experience of EIA consultants as well as ONEP members of staff are utilised. Some 
developers argue that because the EIA is based on the demands of local individuals, 
the EIA must highlight the general advantages that arise from such a project, rather 
than the impact on a few individuals. The study found that owing to aesthetic reasons 
or concerns about traffic, a majority of local residents do not wish to see a large-scale 





This study found that the lack of monitoring mechanisms for EIA to assess the 
difference between predicted and actual impacts is also an underlying factor that 
explains its ineffective application. Further, there are very few avenues via which the 
suggestions made within a study can be stopped, or by which possible repercussions 
on developers can be enacted. Most developments post-approval do not undergo any 
monitoring programs and mitigation regulations. Developers have noted that such 
monitoring programmes have gone unimplemented after project completion. These 
results corroborate with the findings of other scholars such as Tan (2004) who notes 
that MONRE is generally perceived as a poor monitoring tool for environmental 
mitigation schemes. Despite the absence of capacity in every local governmental 
agency, new environmental agencies are especially accountable for enacting 
regulations and laws. Such new agencies are not well represented in the bureaucratic 
system, and therefore the private sector firms and the bureaucracy - due to such 
agencies’ limited resources - are able to ignore them.  
 
In Thailand, EIA is limited due to insufficient or irrelevant regulations and laws and 
resources for the implementation of such laws. Bad enforcement policy, as well as 
administrative duties being replicated, and poor understanding of certain issues are all 
pervasive. All these problems limit the efficacious enactment of both the 
bureaucracy’s power, and its implementation, to solve existing environmental issues 
within Thailand. Further, due to the authoritarian nature of the Thai government as 
well as the hierarchal nature of Thai society, mission agencies do not have the clout to 





9.2.3  Impacts of EIA on New-Housing Development 
 
The empirical findings provided the explanations of how the state impacts private 
developers through environmental regulating and directing new housing development. 
The study’s results demonstrate that EIA is not properly implemented and it is argued 
that these shortcomings will persist and may continue to significantly delay and add 
costs to housing developments. Consequently, whether this is on a micro or macro 
scale, EIA has many impacts on new housing developments. For instance, the 
principal constraint of EIA is the stage at which the assessment transpires within the 
time-frame of the project. EIA occurs only after major decisions, such as site selection 
and/or investments have been made; this results in delays, suspension, major 
modifications to the project, increased development cost, and potentially even 
cancellation of the overall project. Developers are forced to amend project proposals, 
meaning that time is squandered, revenue projections are unattained and opportunities 
to grow a business are compromised. Failure to meet EIA stipulations means not only 
frustration for housing developers, but for buyers too, and for stakeholders such as 
contractors and financial institutions.  
 
EIA also has impacts at the micro-level. Corporate strategies, development duration 
and cost, project characteristics, and the pattern of housing development are all 
sensitively impacted by EIA. Indeed, some individuals propound the argument that 
costs incurred are impacted by the EIA, and that the cost of housing is ascertained on 
the basis of the overall development costs (wherein delay and uncertainty stem from 
EIA complications). Therefore, housing prices may rise throughout the housing 
development processes as a result of complications from the EIA process. 




to the repercussions of housing project cancellations, potentially losing investments as 
a result of EIA rejection. With regard to the macro scale concerns, the housing sector, 
urban sprawl, and the economic growth of the country are negatively impacted by 
such complications. 
 
This research demonstrates how EIA generates repercussions via the increasing cost 
of housing because of the imposition of controls. For instance, the need for green 
areas, and aspects such as the floor-areas ratio, along with CBD density restrictions, 
all impact housing costs. The extent of these impacts are differential, based on the 
location of projects.   
 
9.2.4  The Responses of Housing Developers 
 
How far the implementation of environmental regulation in new housing development 
reflects the priorities of the private sector and the state authorities? Carmona et al., 
(2003) corroborate the findings of this study by making the argument that developer 
choices are subject to varied pressures that result in multifaceted outcomes. This 
research discovered that such regulations must be considered in order to commission 
a new project. Many developers view EIA regulations as restrictive. Some are 
compliant while others are noncompliant. For example the study found that some 
avoid regulations by engaging in smaller projects, while others separate their projects 
into smaller ones. Some restrictions cause developers to change their aims or goals 
due to the costs potentially incurred by them. Conversely, a number of developers 
merely end their projects if profitability falls. A number of individuals admitted to 




EIA regulation avoidance is observable when some developers try to lower the 
magnitude of their projects so that restrictions incurred by the EIA are prevented. 
Therefore, they can commence their projects sooner. Generally, housing projects are 
separated into smaller stages to prevent unwelcome categorisation from the ONEP. 
Furthermore, those construction projects that operate in middle-market bands 
generally manage to sidestep EIA recommendation by lowering projects to fewer than 
eighty units or lowering the plot to fewer than ten thousand metres squared.  
 
A change in project location can also take place if the monetary restrictions or 
chances for development are poor. Usually, CBD and BTS/MRT mass transportations 
areas are avoided. Projects can also be separated into many smaller projects or stages 
so they are able to prevent the imposition of EIA restrictions, and they may also do 
this if the demands of the homeowner or purchasers are not addressed in a single 
stage. Some projects commence prior to securing EIA approval - this is the “pre-sale” 
period. The cost of the land is not as high throughout this period but it usually 
increases once the approval has been granted. This is used as a selling point by a 
number of projects as it means increased buyer confidence, and therefore they believe 
the environmental impact of purchasing the land is less.  
 
Sometimes, there are cancellations or delays in projects. This is because existing 
regulations assert that all constructions that are not complicit with the regulations 
established by the EIA shall not be permitted to build any other construction or 
provide permission for housing. In this situation, opposition begins after the project 
itself has begun, and so the construction of all houses is stopped imminently. This 
problem has resulted in several notable delays or cancellations of projects when the 




projects until they have gained EIA approval, which is referred to as ‘complying’. 
Several development firms decide to put off their projects until approval has been 
granted, thus increasing potential purchaser trust and helping their firm.  
 
Generally, the secondary and auxiliary costs and a longer time-frame are provided so 
that developers can look for different development paths or locations. Conversely, if 
profits fall, many development firms simply cancel their construction plans. Indeed, 
every one of the individuals asked said that they had been subject to a command to 
enact this line of action as a result of the vagaries concerned with the EIA process.  
 
Responses and Perceptions of Housing Developers on EIA Regulations 
 
The optimisation of profitability is the aim of all developers and worries and 
contentions over land and profits take precedence above sustainability problems, thus 
sustainability concerns are neglected. 
 
Due to the ambiguities associated with the process, developers are usually unwilling 
to enact EIA processes and protocols. A number of developers conceptualise the EIA 
as a paperwork item that deals with housing permission, and they thus neglect 
environmental issues. Additionally, other developers regard it as a licencing 
document for operational mechanisms as opposed to decision-making processes. 
Thus, this research finds that EIA is deemed by developers to be an obstacle 
deliberately coined by bureaucratic forces. Developers further conceptualise EIA as a 
negative phenomenon because of the risks present in relation to development 
expenses and the restrictions imposed on them by law. Nevertheless, many think that, 




the cost of their products and services. Additionally, EIA requirements, according to 
some, must be changed so that they mirror the realistic situation at hand better. Such 
persons have espoused the implementation of more transparent and relevant laws. 
 
9.2.5  Lobbying Evidence  
 
This study questions the extent to which the strength and content of state actions are 
influenced by private sector efforts to ‘control’ state influence. How far the 
framework for environmental regulation is a reflection of state sector imperatives or 
reflects the circumvention of the state by the private sector? This study shows that 
developers prefer a quicker and simpler process so that they can secure the approval 
of projects more easily and increase profits. The intention of EIA is not to expedite 
the development timeframe, but rather to guarantee that negative repercussions on the 
environment do not occur.  
 
This research has demonstrated that too much influence from private firms and 
interests in the determining and formulation of EIA has negative repercussions for 
and in the market. This research provided several illustrations of instances where 
developers have demanded that the NEB and their government change EIA laws in 
accordance with business interests and the growth of construction sites. Yap (2002) 
corroborates these findings, and has suggested that many Thai ministers hold close 
relationships with large private firms and firms within the real estate sector. Ministers 
receive finances from both sectors, and therefore big development firms are important 
funders of political parties and interests, ensuring that their agenda is reflected in 
government policy. The conclusions drawn by Sheng (2002) and Keivani & Werna 




state agencies find it too difficult to formulate new laws and regulations that do not 
serve the housing sector. Yap argues that public policy is tangibly impacted by 
funding from the private sector. This argument is corroborated by the data acquired in 
this research, in the context of Thailand. Indeed, private-sector individuals have an 
immediate impact on the policy of their government and can change policies to permit 
corporate interests to impact both governmental policy and governmental bodies. It is 
claimed that Thailand’s business sector has forged strong ties with the country’s 
politicians. Langkarpint (2003), Delgado et al. (2003), and Leoseng & Zimmermann 
(2005) all argue that the purpose of this is to use bureaucratic powers to nurture their 
own interests, without consideration of the potential impacts on the environment. 
There have been instances where corruption has been evidenced by the public sector. 
This poses a predicament since corrupt officials or agents may render law 
enforcement and regulation almost impossible. 
 
A barrier to highly harmonised and organised initiatives being introduced by policy 
makers, in order to meet broad aims over a long duration, is both public and private 
bodies’ asymmetrical access to information. Furthermore, this is the case if a 
company’s for-profit objectives are at odds with the political aims of a project, with 
the former commonly overriding the government’s intentions. Nevertheless, in the 
contemporary period there has been more positive collaboration between public and 
private bodies in order to formulate and introduce policy initiatives, particularly as 
private sector involvement has grown. Prior to the People’s Constitution in 1997, 
particular aims were pushed largely by private real estate bodies in Thailand. Since 
this time, however, and as a consequence of political and economic developments, the 




9.3 EIA and Its Implications for Thailand’s Sustainable Development 
Goals 
 
This research shows that the lack of cooperation between planning systems, housing 
development, and the EIA system in Thailand has engendered several implementation 
problems with adverse effects on development costs, national competitiveness, quality 
of life and the economy.   
 
The United Nations (1997) underscores the importance of achieving sustainable 
development through the coordinated and interrelated efforts of environmental 
security, and social and economic development. Improving the wellbeing of every 
individual is the main aim of such development, while equilibrium between 
environmental, economic and social factors over a long duration is the ultimate aim of 
sustainability. Assessment of such factors should be included in every aspect of 
government activity. 
 
The perceived consequences of development over a longer duration should also 
consider urban development and strategy, particularly when social and environmental 
issues may be in conflict with the economic focus in the context of the city. Thus, 
sustainable development particularly needs to deal with this issue. A genuine 
consideration of sustainability is possible through the mechanisms of EIA, with the 
consequence that it has indeed become more widely adopted in this regard. In order to 






Social, economic, and environmental factors may not be straightforwardly 
distinguished, as the varying aspects of real estate’s sustainability may include factors 
that can be interlinked and transcend classification. A degree of rationality is required 
in relation to the perception that mutual benefits are realised through sustainability, as 
suggested by EIA. Marcuse (1998) perceived that fiscal reallocation, power problems 
and various disagreements and conflict can all arise through the implementation of 
sustainability. For example, various parties may have genuine and significant 
disagreements about the balance between social justice and environmental 
sustainability. Environmental considerations or social equality may not go hand-in-
hand with healthy homes, and social, health and/or environmental benefits may be 
undermined by cost-effective real estate schemes. Meanwhile, fiscally accessible 
housing may be more difficult with the high building costs resulting from 
construction regulations, as detailed in chapters six and seven. Furthermore, citizen’s 
assent, infrastructure or plot accessibility and various political obstacles may hinder 
new-build home schemes. Thus, rather than simply focusing on sustainability – 
regardless of its importance – it is important to remember to find a balance. 
 
Economic advancement and environmental security requires a compromise to be 
made. The environmental impact of construction schemes, as well as an advantage-
disadvantage assessment for both the construction scheme and the local environment, 
should be factored in to the EIA to reach the ideal balance and exercise the best 
option. Different political factors, and social and economic backgrounds, alongside 
specific schemes, will all influence the best decision in a particular situation. 




of sustainable economic progress and a secure environment, can all be produced from 
EIAs that are properly implemented and administered (Abaza, 2004). 
 
Producing stable and promising policies and legislation, however, is difficult for 
Thailand, due to the political and economic insecurity that has afflicted the country. 
As it has in other advancing states, it has undermined Thailand’s potential. This 
political instability may be prolonged and yet the effective implementation of 
legislation requires democratic transitions and a stable political system.  
 
9.4 Theoretical Implications of the Research Findings 
 
This research has primary focused on the interplay between the interests of the state 
and private developers, viewed in terms of how the competing interests impact on the 
introduction of enhancements to environmental demands in new housing 
development. How do the empirical findings of this research relate to the main 
theoretical approaches to the study of state-business relationships? Corporatism has a 
definite influence on independent business organisations, in the form of their 
relationship and interactions contributing to important policy-making. Additionally, 
an equilibrium of shared control, by the business and state is accentuated by 
corporatism. The Thai pervasive patron–client relationships between state and 
business leaders perpetuates the skewed focus on economic development as opposed 
to environmental considerations, making it difficult for EIA proponents to achieve 
their conservation goals. This has been the case in Thailand, according to 
Laothamatas (1988), who states that corporatism played a pivotal role in the 1970s. 
However, while economic policies have benefited from corporatism, environmental 




Thailand pertains to a weak central state. The Thai state is easily influenced by 
business interest groups, since it lacks the institutional power, political will, weak 
corporation within and between organisations, and organisational structure and 
resources. These factors have contributed to ineffective EIA implementation in 
Thailand.  
 
The EIA has been affected by the relationship between not only the administrative 
tools and the policy scheme, in the form of a conducive partnership, but the state and 
organisational professionals. Prevalence, in the housing sector, originated early as a 
result of the combination of corporatism and politico-bureaucratic segmentation of 
environmental issues. Governments, nevertheless, benefited from this type of neo-
corporatism, due to the nature of its original societal and political environment 
(Crepaz, 2007; Downes, 2010; Hukkinen, 1995; Pape, 2005; Scruggs, 2001; Szarka, 
2007). Additionally, public awareness, increased international partnerships and 
environmental concerns have contributed to improving strategies. However, this study 
argues that systems in the current EIA in Thailand are being disregarded for 
prompting a prolonged rate of environmental improvement.  The study believes that 
the business elites are exercising unequal control. 
 
The environmental authorities have permitted vast opportunities for discussion, by 
including representation from many organisations, augmenting environmental 
processes and allowing influential peoples to retain their areas of control. Neo-
corporatist interventions may have been responsible for these factors. The EIA for 
housing development projects, however, has proven more complicated, possibly 
because of the tiered nature of its management. The application of EIA policy has 




unavoidable, due to a mixture of control and influence on EIA implementation used 
by the business sector, their financial centrality and preferences to accumulate 
manufacturer interest. In the case of new-housing, it is hard to find an escape from 
systems of interest representation, when in certain contexts, conflicting expectations 
prevent the EIA in Thailand from being fulfilled. This study argues that the EIA 
requires increased specificity in its implementation however the business sector and 
their associations serve as an obstruction.  
 
9.5 The  Policy Implications of Research Findings 
 
Glasson et al. (2005) and Awakul & Ogunlana (2002) claim that since the EIA assists 
in informed decision-making and therefore reduces the effort and complication 
involved in the decision-making process, it is considered a helpful evaluative tool 
when it is implemented effectively. In terms of stakeholder relations and cost-
reduction, EIA does provide benefits in this area, as well as in the long-term (Abaza et 
al., 2004). EIA has the potential to bring positive impacts to the people of today and 
tomorrow by promoting sustainable economic growth and a cleaner environment, but 
only when it is managed effectively. EIA resolutions intend to stop environmental 
issues, according to the research, stemming from large-scale development projects so 
that they are able to attain their developmental objectives for sustainability. 
Nevertheless, as a result of unsuccessful implementation, EIA remains a preventing 
factor for the housing sector as well as for the economy of Thailand as a whole. 
Furthermore, it generates a negative impact with regard to tackling developmental 






As a result of globalisation and the growing competitiveness within global markets, 
nations are looking for more efficacious means, tools and systems. Indeed, they are 
motivated to look for and begin reforms which impact the state’s relationship within a 
given market. A country’s economic advancement can be detrimentally impacted by 
the lack of consideration for environmental factors during planning, as evidenced 
during the speedy economic progress of Thailand. Consequently, in relation to the 
quick economic advancement as well as the environment of Thailand, crucial 
consideration needs to be given to sustainable development. 
 
As a result of this, both the reformation of EIA regulations and the repercussions of 
such a measure with regard to dealing with imbalanced economic growth and 
environmental sustainability need to be considered by Thailand’s government. 
Veronez & Montaño (2015), as well as Bond et al. (2015) determined that technical 
efficiency is a major way by which EIA procedures can be successfully and usefully 
enhanced. Furthermore, Suwanteep et al. (2016) explain that this is due to a well-
prepared EIA plan being particularly important for the application and positive results 
of the EIA process.  
 
While the EIA system has been implemented in Thailand for almost 40 years, it is still 
concomitant with notable limitations and gaps.  In Thailand, EIA issues are not 
merely legal issues, as issues specific to technological processes and levels are also 
relevant. So that the EIA processes can be improved and made more proficient, the 
Thai government needs to: i) encourage political will; ii) amend EIA regulations to 
enable the efficient execution of policy at every level; iii) create a code of practice 




v) enhance regulatory procedures - particularly monitoring and public participation. 
This is explained further below: 
 
Encourage Political Will 
  
Political impetus and solid guidance from political figures is necessary for EIA and 
sustainability to be promoted and implemented efficaciously, as they can also provide 
effective planning and calculation that is crucial to making far-reaching alterations. In 
terms of implementing EIA and supporting policies for sustainability, dedicated state 
bodies with adequate authority to act should be formed. To facilitate cooperation, the 
particular bodies of concern should also be organised in harmony. 
 
Amend EIA regulations to enable efficient execution of the policy at every 
level 
 
The lack of mutual understanding concerning EIA and environmental issues among 
policy makers, including ONEP officials and government authorities, and other 
relevant stakeholders, has undermined Thailand’s environmental efforts. To reverse 
this trend, it is imperative to improve communication through policy dialogues and 
administrative reforms, as a strategy for boosting the capacity of the administrative 
system. All guidelines on EIA must be streamlined and concise. It is also imperative 
that local government is afforded the agency to oversee its own operations. 
Government must also develop unambiguous criteria concerning the roles and 





Local groups, government sectors and bodies, NGOs and private bodies should all 
cooperate and be incorporated into the planning and enacting of EIA drafts, 
legislation and approaches, as a means of improving governance. Planning and 
approaches to building more real estate necessitates a broad and free debate. As 
Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) suggest, in order to achieve the successful delivery of 
a policy, implementers need to be governed by guidelines that set clearly 
comprehensible duties and establish a tiered system of control and must be ensured 
access to adequate resources.  
 
Create a code of practice and a precise guideline for stakeholders 
 
It is proposed that an annex in code of practice and guidance handbook for EIA 
should outline relevant legislation and policies particularly in Thai context. Included 
in any updates should be a review of the timeframes of the EIA process, and the list of 
issues to be considered during the scoping phase should be added to. For example, 
additions might include something on the scope and timing of an EIA, the suggestion 
of alternatives to featured projects, who should be involved with an EIA, stakeholder 
engagement issues, health & safety, risk assessment, etc. For every EIA action and 
scheme, the particular local environment should be considered and factored into the 
scheme’s preparation and formulation stages, by means of an accurate and detailed 
code of practice. So that certain aspects of the scheme and the relevant legislation and 
policies are clearly known to stakeholders - for example EIA experts, scheme 
managers and planners, ONEP and ERC - sector manuals and codes of practice would 
be particularly instructive, primarily for the strengthened EIA method. Systematic 
frameworks must also be established to facilitate effective EIS reviews and ensure 




Further, in order to be effective, multi-stakeholder consultants should be encouraged 
in EIS reviews. 
 
Strengthen institutional capacity 
 
The complete normalisation of EIA within public and private bodies, as well as its 
ring-fencing against government alterations and political whims, is crucial to its 
successful adoption over a greater period of time. To improve EIA effectiveness for 
Thailand at both the national (NESDB, MOI, and MONRE) and local (BMA and local 
administrative) levels, coordination must be encouraged from a wide range of actors 
including the private sector. Civil society can also play a regulatory role by 
encouraging and advocating for sustainable approaches with regards to the urban 
environment. Public participation is also important as there is the importance of 
having a firm grasp of the issues at stake in order to pave the way for sustainable 
urban development. 
 
These stakeholders’ approaches should be influenced by sustainable development 
notions, as should legislative and political debates. Emphasis must be placed on 
capacity building via in-house training and staff recruitment especially for ONEP. 
ONEP must support and encourage each province via local authorities that would 
correspond the legislative and administrative framework of the central government, to 
reduce conflict interests and concentrate on the implementation. Local authorities 
must also boost their administrative capacity and promote environmental 
sustainability. Such efforts would encourage EIA staff to better perform their 
mandated duties. It will further enhance joint efforts between ONEP and other 




planning, sturdy regulatory foundations and the transformation of governance 
infrastructure should all be implemented in this regard. 
 
Enhance regulatory procedures - particularly monitoring and public 
participation 
 
Through engaging in the different processes, option exercising and scheme 
development can both be influenced by ordinary citizens’ recommendations. 
Comprehending awareness of environmental issues within a local community, as well 
as their desires and requirements, rests crucially on citizen-stakeholder and local 
engagement. When potential beneficiaries, stakeholders, and local citizens feel jointly 
invested in a proprietorship, a scheme’s feasibility is enhanced. Societal values, 
principles and culture should also be taken into consideration. Nadeem & Fischer 
(2011), Elling (2005), and Au & Lam (2005) have all suggested that successful citizen 
engagement is of greater likelihood when the evaluation of the potential consequences 
of a scheme involves the engagement of a wide collective of citizens. 
 
Observation to guarantee compliance, as well as continued administration of a project, 
should both be informed by EIA reappraisal or the monitoring of information. This 
can include the imposition of legislation, coordination on data with other bodies 
relevant to the environment and its protection, local administrative organisations’ 
regulation of private companies acting on their behalf, alongside general 
improvements in observation. The improvement of environmental administration rests 
on the crucial aspects of ensuring compliance and execution post-scheme, which is 




of regulatory initiatives and precision of estimations - based on the recognition of 
alterations via auditing - is an aspect of using enhanced observation information. 
 
To ensure effective public participation in the EIA system, monitoring must be 
overseen by ONEP staff.  At both the scoping and the review stages in the EIA 
process, it is imperative that multi-stakeholder consultations are held in order to 
capitalise of the specialist knowledge of each participating stakeholder. Further, 
stakeholder feedback and concerns must form an integral part of the EIA report.  
 
Government must also invest in boosting the capacity of the mentoring system which 
can serve as a support system for all institutions concerned with EIA implementation. 
Such a system can assist EIA staff to perform their responsibilities more fully and 
effectively.  
 
The ONEP and permitting agencies should follow up and conduct site inspections 
during both construction and initial operation to verify whether the developer has 
implemented the mitigation measures described in the submitted EIS, as well as 
monitor predicted environmental impacts. These inspections are also essential to 
make sure that all environmental conditions have been followed. Thus, the EIA report 
should be an integral part of the licence documentation and should be available to the 
inspectors during their frequent inspection visits.  
 
Consideration of the above recommendations and effective implementation of recent 
amendments would promote good practices within the Thai EIA system. These 
measures would strengthen the EIA process and ensure environmental protection not 
only in Thailand but also in other countries to overcome challenges facing the EIA 




9.6 The Strengths and Weaknesses of The Thesis 
 
The most notable strength of this thesis is that it investigates the extent to which the 
implementation of EIA in new housing development reflects the priorities of the 
private sector or those of national-local state authorities. The study also sheds light on 
the theoretical discussion concerning the extent to which environmental regulation 
can be conceptualised as a reflection of state interests. Despite the large number of 
studies on EIA and the implications for environmental protection, there is a lack of 
studies that consider the impact on housing development. Due to the high potential for 
large wealth transfers and amenity creation, this is an important area of research for 
policy analysts, public authorities and other officials concerned with urban growth 
and development. Another strength of this study pertains to its controlled design. The 
participants were selected according to the technical knowledge using snowball 
sampling. The use of elite interviews further enabled the researcher to interview first-
hand, participants of the processes under investigation. Overall, despite a variety of 
EIA constraints, Thailand, as one of the Newly Industrialised Countries, has achieved 
considerable progress in establishing an EIA system.  
 
Some limitations of the study must however be noted.  Firstly, the use of in-depth 
qualitative interviews and the small number of research participants limit the 
generalisability of the research findings beyond the research sample. The issue of 
small sample size is difficult to overcome in this kind of study although increasing the 
sample size would enable a broader generalisation of the study (Webler & Tuler, 
2006). Further, the procedural effectiveness approach which is the focus of this thesis 
has inherent limitations that restrict its scoping to elements directly linked to the 




therefore, of EIA effectiveness, as already pointed out by Bond et al. (2010) and Lima 
and Magrini (2010), are not effectively incorporated in the study. Finally, the results 
of this study are specific to the Thai context and thus do not account for the nuances 
of other cases.  
 
9.7 Recommendations for Future Research and Practical 
Applications    
 
The environmental governance techniques and methods in Thailand and other Asian 
developing countries stem from other nations, but specifically, Western, developed 
countries despite the divergent political, institutional, cultural, social and economic 
nuances of these countries. The recommendation is made, therefore, that the subject 
of environmental governance within developing countries in Asia demands further in-
depth research and investigation.  
 
Additionally, the understanding of the subject and the collation of more information 
and knowledge on other nation’s practices may be an efficacious means of 
highlighting the benefits and shortcomings of the EIA system, thus boosting its 
efficacy. To ensure that EIA processes become more effective, such stages are 
suggested. Meanwhile the actual processes and practices taking place also demand 
further investigation and research to ensure long-term environmental sustainability, 
and public participation. Indeed, there needs to be a collective awareness by local 
residents in proximity to developments, as well as an overall systemic change.  
 
Finally, Housing developing is concomitant with overlapping regulations and thus 
there is the need for a more nuanced model of the housing development process. This 




regulators, and other stakeholders and the way these interactions impact the timing of 
development activities. Lastly, since the environmental regulation of land use changes 
is stage-managed by several levels of government, important questions about the 
interactions between regulatory agencies and the problems associated with 
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APPENDIX 1  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
No. Data Sources 













3 Big Developers 
(Public Limited Company, PLC) 
Big developer-A 08/07/14 
4 Big developer-B 21/10/14 
5 Big developer-C 12/07/14 
6 Big developer-D 15/09/14 
7 Big developer-E 03/07/14 
8 Big developer-F 17/07/14 
9 Big developer-G 13/09/14 
10 Big developer-H 29/10/14 
11 Big developer-I 15/07/14 
12 Big developer-J 22/08/14 
13 Big developer-K 06/08/14 
14 Big developer-L 09/06/14 
15 Small Developers 
(Company Limited, Co, Ltd.) 
Small developer-A 15/06/14 
16 Small developer-B 25/08/14 
17 Small developer-C 13/10/14 
18 Small developer-D 21/07/14 
19 Small developer-E 20/07/14 
Lobbyist 
20  Lobbyist 15/12/14 
Politicians 
21  Politician-A 23/11/14 
22 Politician-B 14/12/14 
National Government Agencies 
23 National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) 
NESDB Senior Officer 02/12/14 
24 NESDB Street-level Officer-
B 
14/11/14 





26 Environmental authority 
street-level bureaucrat-A  
11/11/14 





street-level bureaucrat-B  
28 Ministry of Interior  
(MOI) 
Planning authority senior 
bureaucrat 
29/11/14 
29 Planning authority street-level 
bureaucrat -A 
17/10/14 
30 Planning authority street-level 
bureaucrat-B  
15/08/14 




32 Bangkok Metropolitan Administration  
(BMA) 
Local authority senior 
bureaucrat 
23/10/14 
33 Local authority street-level 
bureaucrat-A 
04/08/14 
34 Local authority street-level 
bureaucrat-B 
14/08/14 
35 Local authority street-level 
bureaucrat-C 
02/09/14 
36 Local authority street-level 
bureaucrat-D 
05/09/14 




38  EIA consultant-A 18/10/14 
39 EIA consultant-B 25/10/14 
40 EIA consultant-C 07/09/14 
41 EIA consultant-D 11/10/14 
NGO 
42  NGO 22/11/14 
Experts/Scholars 
43  Scholar-A 06/11/14 
44 Scholar-B 20/11/14 
45 Scholar-C 09/12/14 
46 Scholar-D 06/10/14 
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APPENDIX 2  INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDES 
 
 
Emphasis Question Guides 
Central Question • How far does the State act in an independent manner, and 
so influence the actions of Capital? 
• Who takes the lead in determining environmental inputs 
into new housing development? 
 
StateèBusiness 
• How does the state impact on private housing development 
through regulating and directing new house building? 
o How far does the implementation of environmental 
regulation in new housing development reflect the 
priorities of the private sector or those of national-
local state authorities? 
o How far does public policy, especially as regards 
environmental regulation, impact on new house 
building in Thailand’s capital city? 
 
BusinessèState 
• How strength and content of state actions are influenced by 
private sector effort to control state influence? 
o How far does the framework for environmental 
regulation reflect a circumscribing of the role of the 













Question Guides for Housing Developers 
 
Question Set 1 – Decisions regarding the building of new developments and what 
impacts on decisions making  
 
Nature of the company and development projects 
• How would you describe company’s;  
o organizational structure (e.g. ownership and financial structure)? 
o corporate objective (e.g. maximize profit, market share, or public 
image)? 
o operational characteristic  
§ when did entry to industry? 
§ areas of operation?  
§ target groups? 
• What are the key considerations that determine the type of housing unit or 
combination of housing units you look to build? 
• What are the key considerations determining the size of development (e.g. size 
of projects, units, price range, and land) and cost of projects you propose? 
• What are the key factors that company look for in a site for the development?  
o Does company operate in any specific area (location and site 
attributes)? Why?  
• Is there any other the key considerations that determine characteristics or 
combination of housing project, such as social facilities retail outlets or public 
institutions? If yes, how and why? 
 
Experience of the company in putting forward project proposals 
• How far is there diversion from the original proposal? And what is finally 
built? And what are the key factors that bring about such diversions?  
• How far is the final outcome of the development process decided by the 
availability of finance? Or by government regulation? Or any other factors?  
o Which are the most influential regulations? Why?  
 
* The follow-up questions on the initial question are critical, and I cannot determine 









Question Set 2 – Whether company have had any role in seeking to have the EIA 
legislation/regulation changed 
 
Business perspective of environmental regulation, particularly Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA)  
• What do you think about the environmental legislation? And EIA? 
• How would you describe the relative importance of environmental regulation 
to new-housing development? (in the past and present) 
o How far did you take this issue in consideration of new project? 
• Do you think you would hold that view before the EIA regulation was 
changed in 2005?   
o Given what you thought in 2005 did you seek to influence government 
- either directly or through business associations - as regards what the 
regulation specified?  
o Since its enactment, have you made any further attempts to have any 
aspect of the regulation changed?  
• What do you think about the ways in which the EIA regulation has most 
impact on your business? Is it effective?  
 
Impact of EIA on developer’s decision-making in new housing development 
• How are environmental considerations in the company’s housing development 
influenced by public policy?  
o Are there company’s decisions which are influenced by legal 
requirements for consideration of proposed project?  
• How far did the finding of the EIA report impact on your decision in 
developing new-housing projects characteristics? (e.g. changing size of 
project, location, design, materials, production practices or service for new 
dwelling) 
o Is the public consultation and participation influenced in decision-
making? 
 
How company respond within a regulatory framework 
• How does company engage with public officials before submitting proposals 
in order to secure maximum favour for a proposal?  
o Does the company take any action on the environmental policy? Why? 




o To what extent have result of the EIA been used in company decision-
making? 
• How does company engage with officials after a submission is made to 
mitigate requirements they do not like? 
• What characterizes the compromises does company prefer to make in order to 
secure official support?  
• What does company see as the bottom-line as regards deciding whether a 
project is tenable?  
 
How company seek to determine what regulatory framework is  
• How far did company or any relevant organizations engage with politicians, 
officials or others to have legislation framed in a way they find less 
burdensome whether lobbying against the introduction of the regulation or 
lobby to have the regulation changed in any way? 
• How effective any such lobbying has been?   
 
** Each informant was asked to name other individuals that they think might be 






























Question Guides for Government Agencies (Senior Bureaucrats) 
 
Question Set 1 – Policy formulation and implementation  
 
Nature of organization 
• How would you describe your organizational structure and operational 
characteristics? 
• How would you describe your role and areas of responsibility within your 
organization? 
• Could you explain your experience with policy processes and implementation? 
 
Policy formulation and implementation 
• What did government officials seek to achieve in drawing up (or 
implementing) EIA procedures?  
o What are the EIA regulation’s goals, concepts, and processes? 
o Have these objectives changed over time; and, if so, why is this? 
• In what ways has the EIA policy’s environment (e.g. social, cultural, political, 
and economic) affected its process, implementation, and results? 
• How was the EIA regulation planned and developed?  
o What compromises, if any, were made during EIA planning and 
development?  
§ Were those compromises sensible in view of the final EIA 
design?  
• How far are the EIA regulation processes and system implementing as 
planned? If not, how and why?  
o Are there factors affecting the responses of implementation agencies? 
 
 
Question Set 2 – whether the framework within which decisions are made is so 
‘constructed’ as to favour one set of decision agents (viz. private sector builders) 
 
Role of state agencies 
• What is your nature of responsibilities within housing sector? 
• How would you describe your role and/or organization in determining impacts 
on private housing development through setting and/or implementing the 






Role of business 
• Was there any participation of business in policy making? Which process? and 
How? 
• How do you see the role of business in the environmental policy making and 
implementation? 
• How competing interests in the housing development process were listened to 
and their views taken on board in policy outcomes?   
 
How the state responds within a regulatory framework 
• Do you hold or have you ever held office in a business organization? 
• How often do you have contact with the following interest groups? (e.g. 
housing industry, real estate and construction associations, finance institutions, 
or environmental organizations)? 
o How would you describe your relationship with those interest groups? 
• How far did building company or any interest groups attempt to engage with 
politicians, officials or others to have legislation framed in a way they find 
less burdensome whether lobbying against the introduction of the regulation or 
lobby to have the regulation changed in any way?  
• Did the state act as a neutral arbiter or did it favour particular outcomes, and if 
the latter, why?  
• Why has the EIA regulation changed over time (e.g. in 1992, 2005)?  
o What was the nature of the lobbying that occurred at that time? 
o Was it effective?  
o Has there been ongoing lobbying since it was approved, etc.? 
o How effective any such lobbying has been?   
 
* Each informant was be asked to name other individuals that they think might be 






Question Guides for Government Agencies  (street-level bureaucrats) 
 
 
Question Set 1 – Policy formulation and implementation  
 
Nature of organization 
• How would you describe your role and areas of responsibility within your 
organization? 
 
Policy formulation and implementation 
• Could you explain your experience with policy processes and implementation? 
• What did government officials seek to achieve in implementing EIA 
procedures?  
o What are the EIA regulation’s goals, concepts, and processes? 
o Have these objectives changed over time; and, if so, why is this? 
• In what ways has the EIA policy’s environment (e.g. social, cultural, political, 
and economic) affected its process, implementation, and results? 
• How was the EIA regulation planned and developed?  
o What compromises, if any, were made during EIA planning and 
development?  
§ Were those compromises sensible in view of the final EIA 
design?  
• How far are the EIA regulation processes and system implementing as 
planned? If not, how and why?  
o Are there factors affecting the responses of implementation agencies? 
o Is there complete understanding of the objectives to be achieved and 
tasks to be performed? Why? 
§ Do these conditions persist throughout the implementation 
process? 
§ Do you need to depend upon other agencies for policy 
implementation? or if other agencies must be involved, how 
important are that the dependency relationships? 
• How effective is EIA as a tool in protecting the environment and preventing 
environmental deterioration?  
o Are adequate time and sufficient resources made available to the 




o Is the required resources available at each stage in implementation 
process? If no, how and why? 
 
 
Question Set 2 – whether the framework within which decisions are made is so 
‘constructed’ as to favour one set of decision agents (viz. private sector builders) 
 
Role of state agencies 
• What is your nature of responsibilities within housing sector? 
o Is it only on new-house building or any other types related to housing? 
• How would you describe your role and/or organization in determining impacts 
on private housing development through setting and/or implementing the 
environmental policy framework, regulating and directing new house 
building?  
 
Role of business 
• Was there any participation of business in policy implementation? and How? 
• How do you see the role of business in the environmental policy making and 
implementation? 
• How competing interests in the housing development process were listened to 
and their views taken on board in policy outcomes?   
 
How the state respond within a regulatory framework 
• Do you hold or have you ever held office in a business organization? 
• How often do you have contact with the following interest groups? (e.g. 
housing industry, real estate and construction associations, finance institutions, 
or environmental organizations)? 
o How would you describe your relationship with those interest groups? 
• How far did building company or any interest groups attempt to engage with 
politicians, officials or others to have legislation framed in a way they find 
less burdensome whether lobbying against the introduction of the regulation or 
lobby to have the regulation changed in any way?  
• Did the state act as a neutral arbiter or did it favour particular outcomes, and if 
the latter, why?  
• Why has the EIA regulation changed over time (e.g. in 1992, 2005)?  




o Was it effective?  
o Has there been ongoing lobbying since it was approved, etc.? 
o How effective any such lobbying has been?   
 
* Each informant was be asked to name other individuals that they think might be 




Question Guides for EIA Consultants  
 
Nature of organization 
• Could you explain your organizational structure and operational 
characteristics including experience and location of projects? 
• How would you describe your role and areas of responsibility? 
o Do you specialize in any specific type of projects (e.g residential, 
industry, or commercial)? 
• What are the key factors that building company look for in EIA Consultants 
for making the EIA report? 
 
The EIA and EIA report 
• What do you think about the EIA registration?  
o Is the EIA system (e.g. the EIA requiremnets, process, legal 
provisions, and processing time) based on clear and specific 
regulation? Why? 
• What do you think about the key considerations that determine quality of 
EIA? 
• How far do the project proponent respond to the EIA reports and to the points 
raised during the process? 
• How far are the financial costs and time requirements of the EIA system 
acceptable to those involved?  
o Do the financial costs and time required to complete the various stages 
of the EIA process exceed those specified? How and why? 
 
Impact of EIA on the development project 
• How would you describe the relative importance of environmental regulation 
to the development, particularly housing sector? 
• What do you think about the ways in which the EIA regulation has an impact 
on business? Is it effective?  
• How far is the finding of the EIA report determined on the building 
company’s decision outcome of the development process? 
• How far is there diversion from the original building proposal? And what is 
finally built? And what are the key factors that bring about such diversions?  
 




• What do you think about the changes of EIA in the past (e.g. 1992, 2005)?  
o How did it changed? 
o Since its enactment, have you seen any attempted from business to 
influence government either directly or through business associations?  
§ Does the company take any action on the policy? Why? 
§ What do the company do? How? 
• Base on your experience and knowledge, have you represented proponents or 
any relevant organizations to engage with politicians, officials or others to 
have legislation framed in a way they find less burdensome whether lobbying 
against the introduction of the regulation or lobby to have the regulation 
changed in any way? 
• How effective any such lobbying has been?   
 
* Each informant was be asked to name other individuals that they think might be 








Question Guides for Scholars and NGO 
 
Nature of organization 
• Could you explain your organizational structure and operational 
characteristics including experience and location of projects? 
• How would you describe your role and areas of responsibility? 
o Do you specialize in any specific type of projects (e.g residential, 
industry, or commercial)? 
 
The EIA and EIA report 
• What do you think about the EIA registration?  
o Is the EIA system (e.g. the EIA requiremnets, process, legal 
provisions, and processing time) based on clear and specific 
regulation? Why? 
• What do you think about the key considerations that determine quality of 
EIA? 
• How far do you respond to the EIA implementation and to the points raised 
during the process? 
• Have you participated in any EIA process? How?  
o Did you agree or disagree with the result or feedback? Why? 
 
Impact of EIA on the development project 
• How would you describe the relative importance of environmental regulation 
to the development, particularly housing sector? 
• What do you think about the ways in which the EIA regulation has an impact 
on business? Is it effective?  
 
How respond within a regulatory framework 
• What do you think about the changes of EIA in the past (e.g. 1992, 2005)?  
o How did it changed? 
o Since its enactment, have you seen any attempted from business to 
influence government either directly or through business associations?  
§ Does the company take any action on the policy? Why? 
§ What do the company do? How? 
• Base on your experience and knowledge, have you represented proponents or 




have legislation framed in a way they find less burdensome whether lobbying 
against the introduction of the regulation or lobby to have the regulation 
changed in any way? 
• How effective any such lobbying has been?   
 
* Each informant was be asked to name other individuals that they think might be 




APPENDIX 3  NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 






Characteristics of Plans and Development 
Guidelines 
Urban and Housing Development 
Guidelines 
1st NESDP  
1961-1966 
• Established economic base of the country as 
single objective.   
• Focused on infrastructure-led development; for 
example, transportation networks, irrigation 
dams, power supply, and utilities etc.   





• Continued strengthening economic base of the 
country and began to emphasize on human 
resources development.   
• Emphasized on economic and social 
infrastructure development, including 
distribution of benefits to the regions especially 
rural and remote areas.   
• Launched sector analysis as the frameworks for 
projects’ development.   
• Recommended decentralization to 





• Still focused on economic growth with more 
emphasis on monetary stability.   
• Highlighted social aspects in the National Plan 
for the first time, mainly in area of population, 
for example, family planning, reduction of 
population growth rate.   
• Emphasized on distribution of income, economic 
and social services to rural and remote areas. 
Also recommended improvement of agricultural 
institutions, agricultural credit, and agricultural 
product prices.   
• Emphasized on measures to 
control population size and 
migration from rural area to 
Bangkok, a Primate City of the 
country.  
• Recommended development of 








i. Because of political uncertainty at that time, the 
4th Plan, emphasized on broad policies and 
measures to tackle development problems.   
ii. Focused on economic rehabilitation, especially, 
expansion of agricultural production, 
restructuring in manufacturing sector aimed to 
enhance export earnings. Implemented 
stimulating measures to counter industrial 
slowdown, coupled with measures to distribute 
income and job opportunities to the region.   
iii. Recommended natural resource management in 
the National Plan for the first time, with 
emphasis on land use management, water 
resources provision, and energy development in 
the Gulf of Thailand.   
iv. The environmental impact assessment (EIA) was 
formally introduced  
• Developed regional cities as 
centers for rural-regional 
decentralization.  
• Developed Bangkok as the self-
contained polycentric metropolis 
so that the inner zone, the suburbs, 
and the outer zone could have 
economic and social centers of 




• Shifted planning approach from project-oriented 
to program-oriented.   
• Launched area-based planning approach to be 
implemented by both public and private sectors, 
i.e. identified target areas for rural development 
program, Eastern Seaboard development 
program, regional cities development program 
etc.   
• Emphasized solving poverty in 288 poverty-
stricken districts and sub- districts.   
• Initiated development of economic 
area in Eastern Seaboard to diverse 
economic activities from BMR).  
• Formulated structural plan of 
BMR and identify specific roles 




• Initiated program-based National Plan and 
reviewed roles of the government in national 
development administration through state 
enterprises’ development plans.   
• Emphasized the importance of economic growth 
and maintaining fiscal and financial stability.   
• Emphasized the roles of private sectors in 
development, and increased the roles of local 
people organizations in conservation and 
development of natural resources and 
environment.   
• Formulated development policies 
on urban and specific areas e.g. 
growth management of Bangkok 
through fiscal & legal measures, 
and Regional Cities development 
program.  
• Accelerated development in 
Eastern Seaboard area, and 
preparation for new economic 




• Initiated Sustainable Development by 
emphasizing balanced development in 3 aspects 
namely, economic growth, distribution, and 
development of human resources, quality of life, 
& environment.   
• Focused on shaping Thai economy to be the 
regional economic forefront in terms of 
economic, trade, financial & tourism.   
• Formulated development 
guidelines for BMR by 
coordinating infrastructure 
investments together with land & 
environmental management.  
• Continued development in Eastern 
Seaboard area.  






policy in Upper Central Region.  
8th NESDP 
1997-2001 
• Shifted development paradigm from 
emphasizing economic growth to people- 
centered development.   
• Emphasized the bottom-up planning approach, 
and encouraged people in every sector of society 
to participate in the country’s development from 
the plan formulation process onward.   
• Emphasized on balanced development between 
various aspects such as economic, social, natural 
resources and environmental.    
• Emphasized that the natural resources and 
environment should have been protected and 
managed properly, efficiently to form the basic 
of the sustainable development of the next 
generation. 
• Continued development in Eastern 
Seaboard area, Southern Seaboard 
area, Western Seaboard area and 
BMR.  
• Emphasized on economic 





• Launched “Sufficiency Economy Philosophy” as 
the administration mechanism for the country.   
• Continued from the 8th National Plan, in 
emphasizing people-centered development.   
• Emphasized on reviving economic and building 
immunity through grass-root economic 
development and expand social protection.   
• Shifted from quantity-based development to 
quality-based development, coupled with 
enhancing social justice and competitiveness.   
• Formulated strategy on 
restructuring of sustainable rural 
and urban development through 
empowering community; 
developing livable city & 
community; reducing rural & 
urban poverty; developing benign 
urban- rural linkage; and 
formulating strategy on regional, 
sub-regional and community 
development.  
• Launched provincial cluster 




• Emphasized the action-oriented implementation 
of “Sufficiency Economy Philosophy”.   
• Carried on from the 8th & 9th National Plans, in 
emphasizing people-centered development.   
• Formulated country-development vision to attain 
“green & happiness society”.   
• Emphasized on using economic capital, social 
capital, and environmental capital in country 
development.   
• Emphasized on strategy to 
empower community as country’s 
foundation.  
• Focused on participation of all 
partners in every steps of 
development, especially in 
clarifying roles of development 
partners to be used as guidelines in 
formulation of action plans.  
• Continued provincial cluster 




• Utilised the current resilience of Thai society and 
its economy, and prepare both individuals and 
society as a whole to cope with the effects of 
such changes and pave the way toward well-
balanced development under the Philosophy of 
Sufficiency Economy.  
• Developed efficient and 
sustainable economy by upgrading 
production and services based on 
technology, innovation and 
creativity with effective regional 
linkages, improving food and 
energy security, upgrading eco-
friendly production and 
consumption toward a low-carbon-
society  
• Preserved natural resources and 




maintaining the ecology and a 




• Based upon the principles of the Sufficiency 
Economy Philosophy  
• Complied with the 20-year national strategic 
plan (2017-2036) which seek to enhance and 
develop the potential of human capital; ensure 
justice and reduce social disparities; strengthen 
the economy and enhance competitiveness on a 
sustainable basis; promote green growth for 
sustainable development; bring about national 
stability for national development toward 
prosperity and sustainability; and enhance the 
efficiency of public sector management and 
promote good governance.  
• Expand new production and 
service bases to generate more 
income for people in each region, 
and supporting the quality growth 
of urban areas.  
• Distribute regional growth and 
economic opportunities more 
equitably.  
• Develop the city centers of each 
province to become livable cities 
for all  
• Develop and revive key economic 
areas to grow ecologically and 
improve the living standards of 
their communities.  




APPENDIX 4  GUIDELINE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCES AND VALUES TO BE STUDIED 
 
 
Elements Scope of Study 
1. Abiotic resources  
1.1 On land Geomorphology  Topography Elevation Unique physical feature e.g. island 
or cliff 
Soil  Profile of soil type and extent of each, 
sedimentation, erosion physical and chemical 
characteristics  
Geology  General description of geology of the site  
Resources  Seismicity type and quantity of mineral resources in the 
project site and surrounding area  
1.2 Aquatic Surface & underground 
water  
Water source, quantity, quality and flow rate  
Sea water  Oceanographic characteristics. Water quality and current 
water stratification  
Air Climatic characteristic (rainfall, intensity, temperature). 
Incidence of inversions, fog, storms,  air quality  
Noise Intensity and frequency  
2. Biotic resources  
 Animal/plant  Ecology, species, number, distribution habitat and migration  
Rare species  Species, number and its importance  
3. Human use value  
 Drinking/domestic water  Sources, quantity, quality and adequacy  
Transport Route (highway, railway, water route)  
Electricity and energy  
Flood control/drainage 
Agriculture activities 
Sources, kind, type, adequacy  
System and efficiency agriculture development / agriculture 
promotion  
Irrigation system reforestation  
Industry Type of industry  
Mining Type of mining  
Recreation Type and use of the green area recreation area, green area  
Land use Existing land use  
Area specific zoning 
4. Quality of life value  
 Socio-economic  Information on population (occupation, income, language, 
religion)  
Health  Sickness rate, infectious diseases, endemic sickness,  
health services  
Occupational health  Occupational disease, work related accident, health risks  
Historical  Historical site, archaeological site, traditional customs, 
traditions and culture  
Recreational value Beauty value of recreational area  
Important natural landmark  
Preservation or conservation area 





APPENDIX 5  TYPES AND SIZES OF PROJECTS OR 
ACTIVITIES REQUIRING PREPARATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORTS  
  
Item Type of Projects or Activities Sizes Principle, Method, Procedure 
1 Mining as defined by the Mineral Act    
1.1 Mining as follows:    
1.1.1 Coal mining  All sizes  
 
Submit during apply for mining 
concession  
1.1.2 Potash mining  All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.1.3 Rock salt mining  All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.1.4 Limestone mining for cement  
Industry  
All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.1.5 All types of metal ore mining  All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.2 Underground mining  All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.3 All mining projects located in the 
following areas:  
  
1.3.1 Watershed area class 1 by the cabinet 
resolution  
All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.3.2 Reserved forest added by the cabinet 
resolution  
All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.3.3 Wetland, internationally recognized  All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.3.4 Areas adjacent within 2 km. to ancient 
site, archeological site, historical site or 
historical park defined by laws related with 
historical site and object, artifact, and national 
museum, and world heritage site registered 
according to the world heritage convention.  
All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.4 Mining that uses explosives  All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
1.5 Other mining projects according to The 
Mineral Act, except 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4  
All sizes Submit during apply for mining 
concession 
2 Petroleum Industry     
2.1 Petroleum Exploration by means of 
geophysical drill  
   
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
approval form related government 
agencies or permitting agencies 
defined by Petroleum Act  
2.2 Petroleum Production Industry  
  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
approval form related government 
agencies or permitting agencies 
defined by Petroleum Act 
3 Petroleum and Fuel Pipeline System Project  
  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
approval from related government 
agencies  




Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand Act 
or Projects with identical feature or Land 
Allocation Project for industrial 
development  
project construction or operation  
 
5 Petrochemical Industry using chemical 
process in production  
 
Productivity is 
100 tons/day or 
more  
Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation  
 
6 Petroleum Refining Industry  
 
All sizes Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation  
7 Natural Gas Separation Industry or Natural 
Gas Reforming Industry  
All sizes Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
8 Chlor-alkaline Industry using Sodium 
Chloride (NaCl) as raw material for 
production of Sodium Carbonate (Na2Co3), 
Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH), Hydro Chloric 
Acid (HCl), Chlorine (Cl2), Sodium 
Hipochloride (NaOCl) and Bleaching 
powder  
Productivity each 
or total products 
are 100 tons/day 
or more  
 
Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
9 Cement Industry  
 
All sizes Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
10 Pulp Industry  
 
Productivity is 
50 tons/day or 
more  
Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
11 Pesticide Industry or Industry producing 
active ingredient by chemical process  
All sizes Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
12 Chemical Fertilizer Industry using chemical 
process  
All sizes Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
13 Sugar industry as follows:    
13.1 Producing raw sugar, white sugar and 
refine sugar  
All sizes  
 
Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
13.2 Producing Glucose, Dextrose, Fructose or 
other products alike  
 
Productivity is 
20 tons/day or 
more  
Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
14 Iron or steel industry  Productivity is 
100 tons/day or 
more  
Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
15 Mineral Smelting Industry, Mineral 
Dressing Industry or Metal Melting 
Industry except Iron or Steel  
 
Productivity is 
50 tons/day or 
more  
Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
16 Liquor and Alcohol Industries including 
beer and wine  
  






at 28 degrees)  
Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 






Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 





Submit during apply for a permit of 





17 Central Waste Treatment Plant according 
to the Factory Act  
All sizes Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
18 Thermal Power Plant  
 
Productivity of 
electricity is 10 
MW or more  
Submit during apply for a permit of 
project construction or operation 
19 Expressway as defined by the Expressway 
and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand 
Act or other projects alike  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval  
 
20 Highway or road as defined by the Highway 
Act, passing through following areas:  
  
20.1 Wildlife sanctuaries and wildlife non-
hunting areas as defined by the Wildlife 
Conservation and Protection Act  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval  
 
20.2 National park as defined by the National 
Park Act  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
20.3 Watershed area class 2 approved by the 
Cabinet Resolution  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
20.4 Mangrove forests designated as the 
national forest reserve  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
20.5 Coastal area within 50 meters of high tide 
level  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
20.6 Area adjacent within 2 km. to the 
internationally recognized watershed area or 
world heritage site registered according to the 
world heritage convention.  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
20.7 Areas adjacent within 2 km. to ancient 
site, archeological site, historical site or 
historical park defined by laws related with 
historical site and object, artifact, and national 
museum.  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
21 Rail-Type Mass Transit System   
 
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval  
22 Port  
 
With capacity of 
vessels for 500 
gross tons or 
more  
 
or with the total 
length of the 
front port is 100 
meters or more  
 
or with the total 
port area is 1,000 
square meter or 
more  
Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
23 Recreational Port  
 
With capacity of 
50 vessels or 
more  
Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
24 Land Reclamation  
 
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
25 Construction Or Expansion Of A 





25.1 Sea wall next to coastline  
 
The total length 
is 200 meters or 
more  
Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
25.2 Groin, training jetty, training wall  
 
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
25.3 Offshore breakwater  
 
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
26 Aviation Transportation System     
26.1 Construction or Expansion of commercial 
airport or temporary take-off or landing strips 
for commercial purposes  
The runway 
length is 1,100 
meters or more  
Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
26.2 Water airport  
 
All sizes Submit during apply for permission of 
airport establishment or of aircraft 
take-off and landing  
27 Building which defined by the Building 
Control Act that has location or building 
utilization as follow:  
  
27.1 Building that located near rivers, seacoast, 
lakes or beaches or in the vicinity or inside 
National Parks or Historical Parks which may 
potentially cause unpleasant impact to 
environmental quality   
 
With 23 meter 
height or more  
 
or the total floor 
area or individual 
area in the same 
building is equal 
to 10,000 square 
meters or more  
Submit during apply for a permit for 
construction or at a time of 
notification to local officials in case of 
no permit required which defined by 
the Building Control Act  
 
27.2 Building used for wholesale or retail 
business   
 
With 23 meters 
height or more  
 
or the total floor 
area or individual 
area in the same 
building is equal 
to 10,000 square 
meters or more  
Submit during apply for a permit for 
construction or at a time of 
notification to local officials in case of 
no permit required which defined by 
the Building Control Act  
 
27.3 Building used as private office   
 
With 23 meters 
height or more  
 
or the total floor 
area or individual 
area in the same 
building is equal 
to 10,000 square 
meters or more  
Submit during apply for a permit for 
construction or at a time of 
notification to local officials in case of 
no permit required which defined by 
the Building Control Act 
28 Land Allocation for residential or 
commercial purposes which defined by the 
Land Allocation Act   
 
500 plots of land 
or more  
 
or total allocated 
area is more than 
100 Rai (16 
hectares)  
Submit during apply for a permit of 
land allocation defined by the Land 
Allocation Act  
 
29 Hospitals or Nursing Homes that defined by 
the Medical Services Act located in the 
following area:  
  




beaches within 50 meters distance  
 
patient’s bed or 
more 
construction or at a time of 
notification to local officials in case of 
no permit required which defined by 
the Building Control Act  
29.2 Other areas from 29.1   
 
Total 60 in- 
patient’s bed or 
more  
 
Submit during apply for a permit for 
construction or at a time of 
notification to local officials in case of 
no permit required which defined by 
the Building Control Act  
30 Hotel or Resort which defined by the Hotel 
Act  
 
Total 80 rooms 
or more  
 
 
Submit during apply for a permit for 
construction or at a time of 
notification to local officials in case of 
no permit required which defined by 
the Building Control Act  
31 Residential Building which defined by the 
Building Control Act  
 
With 80 rooms 
or more  
 
or total 
utilization area is 
4,000 square 
meters or more  
Submit during apply for a permit for 
construction or at a time of 
notification to local officials in case of 
no permit required which defined by 
the Building Control Act  
 
32 Irrigation  
 
Irrigated area of 
80,000 Rai 
(12,800 hectares) 
or more  
Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval  
 
33 All types of projects located in the areas 
approved by the Cabinet as watershed area 
class 1  
All sizes  
 
Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval  
 
34 Trans Watershed Diversion as follows:    
34.1 Trans major watershed diversion as 
temporarily operated except for disaster or 
impact to public security  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
34.2 International trans watershed diversion 
as tempo rarity operated except for disaster or 
impact to public security  
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
35 Sluice in the main river  
 
All sizes Submit during apply for project 
permission or approval 
Source: ONEP (2015, p.77-85) 
 
 
 
